U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #32, 98-03-12
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
874
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, March 12, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
SERBIA / FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
1 FRY offer of Conditional Dialogue with Kosovar Albanians
2 Reported Serb Willingness to Allow Reburial of Kosovar
Albanian Victims
2-3 Reports Milosevic Prepared to Allow Return and Full Access
to ICRC
3,6 Dangers of Possible "Spillover" to Neighboring Countries
3,5-6 Possibility of Training and Assistance under Partnership
for Peace Program For Neighboring Countries
4,6 Deputy Secretary Talbott's Travel to Slovenia, Albania,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria and
Romania; Secretary Albright's Meeting re Implementation
of Contact Group Steps
FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
1-2,3 International Peacekeeping Presence/UN Secretary General's
Comments
GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS
6-7 Ambassador Miller's Meetings in the Region
CUBA
7 Helms-Burton Legislation/US Policy
INDIA
7 Reaction to Elections in India
PAKISTAN
8 Reported Suit By Pakistan re US Aircraft
TERRORISM
8 Suit by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) re
Department's Terrorism List
8 Reported Threats by Islamic Jihad re Court Ruling Yesterday
NORTH KOREA
8 Four-Party Talks
DEPARTMENT
8 Reported Threats to Federal Buildings
CHINA
9 Timing of President's Trip to China
9-10,13-14 Chinese Government's Intention to Sign International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IRAQ
10-11 Authorization for Use of Force/Consultations with Security
Council
UNITED NATIONS
11-13 US Arrears/Possible Loss of Vote in General Assembly
RUSSIA
13 Gore-Chernomyrdin Meetings/Subjects Discussed
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #32
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1998, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I do not
have any statements today, and as soon as the relevant reporters from the
Associated Press get here, then I can ask them to ask the first question.
Mr. Schweid, fire away.
QUESTION: Can you folks - I know it's early, but what do you make now
today of the Serbian overtures, speaking of the highest form of autonomy;
the Albanians rejecting, apparently, the offer? I know - we know what you
said yesterday. I wondered if you found any basis for enthusiasm over the
initiative.
MR. RUBIN: No, we have not heard anything that makes us enthusiastic or
encouraged in the area of the Serbian Government's willingness to
talk.
So far, what we've seen is an approach by Belgrade that seems deliberately
selected and designed to make it unacceptable. It seems like the Belgrade
authorities are proposing things that are designed to fail; that are
propaganda exercises. For example, Belgrade's offer involved only
representatives at the level of the Serb Republic and not the level of the
FRY, the Kosovar Albanians believe this would arbitrarily limit their
options in any discussions.
We also note that the announcement of supposed Serb offer to negotiate
consisted in large part of a justification for the use of force in Kosovo,
and contained no hint of remorse for the deaths of innocent Albanian
victims.
In short, it's time for the propaganda to stop and the negotiations to
start.
QUESTION: How might it get to be a credible offer?
MR. RUBIN: Well, if both sides put aside their maximal demands and agree
to sit down and talk without any preconditions, that would be a credible
offer.
QUESTION: The Secretary General of the United Nations this morning at the
Press Club said that he's going to ask the Security Council to review the
earlier decision to withdraw the peacekeeping force from Macedonia, the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Does the United States concur that
it would be premature, given this tension in Kosovo, to withdraw that
force?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly are pleased that the Secretary General agrees
with us that there is a need to have a stabilizing international military
presence, a peacekeeping presence, in the region. It's something that the
Contact Group countries talked about; it's something that Secretary
Albright discussed directly with Secretary General Annan yesterday.
Precisely what form that international peacekeeping presence would take is
something that one can discuss. We still have several months before the
mandate expires. I believe it expires at the end of August. But we do think
it's encouraging and important that the international community is getting
behind the idea that if the current trends don't reverse themselves - and
there's still little evidence that they will - that one of the grave risks
here is that the violence in Kosovo will spread to neighboring countries,
like the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and that's why it's so
important to ensure that all sets are taken, including the possibility of
extending the military presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, will occur.
QUESTION: Would the United States like that extension to be indefinite?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't addressed that issue at this point. We had
always thought there was some value in keeping that force there, and we
might have found other ways to do so in the absence of recent developments.
But right now, perhaps some of the countries that had concerns about it
staying there are rethinking those concerns.
So the long and the short of it is, some international military presence in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a good thing; it's a necessary
thing; it's a preventive step to avoid the situation spinning out of
control, and we're going to be working with the international community to
try to make that happen.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you see any positive sign in the Serbs' willingness
to allow the Kosovars to unearth their dead and do what they want with
them?
MR. RUBIN: One can work real hard to find some indications of progress,
but the bottom line is the things that were demanded by the Contact Group -
the removal of the police, the beginning of negotiation, the allowing of
outsiders to investigate what went on there - has not happened. We have
some reports that President Milosevic is prepared to allow the ICRC to come
back and make sure they have full access. But this is occurring in a
context where just yesterday the ICRC offices were threatened.
What we need to see is a wholesale shift in the mentality that has
previously been that they can solve at the barrel of a gun what can only be
solved at the negotiating table. And we have not seen any pattern of
evidence that they have changed that fundamental view.
QUESTION: These reports that you may let the ICRC back in, are those news
reports or independent reporting?
MR. RUBIN: I would have called them news reports if they were news
reports, but they are not sufficiently clear for us to call them confirmed
reports. They are reports.
QUESTION: Is there any consideration being given within the US Government
to favoring a larger force, a different force, a force with different rules
of engagement for Macedonia?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, this is something that's under discussion right
now but, yes, we are looking at what the right mix of capabilities and
missions will best serve a situation that has gotten worse, not gotten
better. So we will be looking at that. We don't have any firm numbers or
mission statements to give you at this time; but certainly the basic
mission -- that is a stabilizing presence designed to deter the possibility
of a cross-border conflict in this region - is and would still be
the goal.
QUESTION: Geographically, is that something to be thought about, too, or
are you talking about the mission to Macedonia?
MR. RUBIN: We're still talking about the mission for the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. However, as you saw yesterday -- unfortunately I
have to go through all those words lest somebody in this room think I've
changed our position on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - that's
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
We are also looking at the possibility of some training and assistance and
partnership under the Partnership for Peace program for other neighboring
countries. We are trying to make sure that we take all the steps we can to
enhance the stability of the region; to give confidence to the countries in
the region; and to make sure that there are no miscalculations and there is
as much confidence as possible, so that if the situation does deteriorate
further, the risk of it spreading is limited.
QUESTION: Some of this is hypothetical, so there is a limit, I suppose,
to what State could say. But there have been, even in the middle of the
turmoil - I wanted to check it out with you. There are authoritative
suggestions that if there is a spill-over, it won't go very far; that this
is something, because there have been all sorts of alarm bells that Greece
and Turkey and Italy and Albania, Bulgaria will all be drawn in. How
dangerous does the State Department perceive this?
MR. RUBIN: We do have grave concerns about this situation both in its own
context, as well as the possibility of it spreading. There are those who
can predict that everything will be fine and people who can predict that it
will be the third Balkan war. In our view, the risks of it spreading are so
great in that the dangers associated with it are great, not that the
probability is necessarily great. So when you judge the risk here, you are
judging both the probability of something happening and the consequences of
it happening,. So the consequences are so dangerous that even if
some may regard the risks as lower than 50-50 or slightly higher than 50-50
or 20 percent, whatever that number is if it's a significant probability,
if you combine that with the dangerous consequences, it is something that
merits the utmost attention by senior officials of our government.
In that regard, let me say that Deputy Secretary Talbott will travel next
week to Slovenia, Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria
and Romania. He will be outlining steps that states in the region can take
individually and collectively to demonstrate the international community's
resolve in the face of President Milosevic's unacceptable actions in
Kosovo. Secretary Albright convened a meeting this morning here in the
Department on the implementation of the steps the Contact Group outlined,
and I can just say that because the consequences are so grave, that the
Department and other agencies in the government are seized with the
subject.
QUESTION: Do you remember the idea of possibly a very special, special
mediator? Is this going to be something Strobe Talbott will have special --
MR. RUBIN: I have not heard there's any organizational shift. Bob Gelbard,
our special envoy, is on the Hill right now testifying on Kosovo. He's our
man when it comes to President Milosevic in Kosovo, and our man when it
comes to the situation.
QUESTION: And Swigert has got a role, too.
MR. RUBIN: Swigert will be his deputy, and will be an important
player.
QUESTION: Will Talbott be trying to organize this conference that was
talked about of the ministers of all these countries to --
MR. RUBIN: I am sure that will be one of the things that will be
discussed on the trip. Many of the ministers thought it was very important
to keep these countries working together, talking to each other. In that
regard, we believe it was useful that the neighboring countries - that is,
the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - had a statement signed by the foreign
ministers of those countries, expressing their concern, making clear that
the Kosovo problem is not an internal affair for the Serbs. It is a matter
that could well affect the international peace and security of the
region and, therefore, the world.
QUESTION: Just backing up, you were talking to Barry before; you said
something about extending training missions to other nations. I assume that
would include Albania and what other countries?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, that would be an example --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Albania is a member of the Partnership for Peace. I believe
that all those regional countries in one form or another are members.
QUESTION: Bulgaria?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not saying that we are going to have training missions in
every one of those countries. Certainly Albania is a country where
discussions have taken place about what steps might be taken by NATO as
part of the Partnership for Peace process to give them greater confidence.
Those are all steps being considered and discussed.
In order for me to give you real-time information and give you a nature of
our thinking, I have to be able to say that none of these decisions have
been made, and there are a lot of details associated with them that can't
be discussed until final decisions are made.
QUESTION: But this would be separate - this list of countries who might
receive training. This is separate from what you were referring to earlier
of the extension of the peacekeeping force in Macedonia.
MR. RUBIN: I was describing the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's
peacekeeping mission, and that was the discussion I had about extending the
mission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These other issues
are ones where we're talking about training and other confidence-building
measures that can be taken between NATO and those countries.
QUESTION: On the training, has Albania received heretofore any training
or assistance?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Albania is a participant in SFOR, and they are, I
believe, have several dozen participants in the SFOR mission. So they are
part of the Partnership for Peace process, which includes exchanges of
military officials and training procedures. What exact military exercises
have taken place in Albania, I'll have to get you for the record.
QUESTION: Jamie, when you talk about training, you're also talking about
military assistance, perhaps, to some of these countries?
MR. RUBIN: Again, this is normally a cooperative process where we're
trying to teach them the ways and means of operating, the best procedures.
Countries in the region have military assistance programs unrelated to the
PFP. The PFP is designed as a cooperative process, not a ticket for
military assistance.
QUESTION: We sometimes overlook Cyprus problems -- certainly overshadowed
by this now, but there's a report - no, it's related in a way. Did the
Turks refuse to see Envoy Miller?
MR. RUBIN: I would first, in deference to Sid --
QUESTION: All right, go ahead.
MR. RUBIN: I'll come back to that, but I - go ahead.
QUESTION: Just if you can, on this training question --
MR. RUBIN: The one where I said the details are limited?
QUESTION: Right, well, to the degree you can in this forum, what would be
the objective of this mission? Is it to allow them to defend their borders
better?
MR. RUBIN: Right. It would be to give them the confidence that their
military will be in a position to operate and defend their borders and to
be able to prevent an outflow from refugees from cascading into a regional
military conflict. So it will be to bolster their capabilities. Secretary
General Solana is in Albania today, and he will be in a position to make
detailed recommendations in this area.
QUESTION: Jamie, on the Secretary's trip, it seems to me that the foreign
ministers she consulted with in Italy, France, Britain, Spain did not
mention the possibility of a wider war very much in their public comments.
And the Secretary did mention it, but it was sort of in passing. Has
something happened to suddenly heighten concern about this?
MR. RUBIN: No. I can't speak for why their public comments did or didn't
include particular risks, but I think if you look at the list of recommendations
that the Contact Group laid out -- including sending missions to Albania,
including extending the military presence in Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia -- that by implication, they all understood the regional risks,
which is why they all signed up to these recommendations about activities
in the region -- in the countries nearby.
So I don't think this is a view where the United States holds some special
information or special judgment about the dangers. On the contrary, I think
the reason why the meeting was held and the reason why the meeting reached
such a firm conclusion at such a rapid pace was because all of the
ministers recognized that this was a situation that, if not handled early,
could lead to a wider and more dangerous problem.
QUESTION: Are you talking to the Greeks and Turks about this particular
problem, about the possibility of it widening?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we certainly have been in touch with the Greeks and the
Turks about this. I don't believe that is on Deputy Secretary Talbot's
agenda, but I think the Greeks and the Turks and the United States and NATO
countries - certainly they are part of NATO. Albania is meeting in Brussels,
they were participants in that; and I am sure they will be hearing the
report of Secretary General Solana about his recommendations in Albania.
QUESTION: Yesterday, both the Turkish Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime
Minister refused to see your special coordinator for Cyprus. What is the
implications for the US efforts towards Cyprus?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Miller held productive and very substantive
meetings with President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash in
Nicosia, March 9th and 10th. He saw Clerides again in Athens March the 10th
for a follow-up discussion. Yesterday and today in Ankara, Ambassador
Miller held very wide-ranging and productive discussions with Turkish
Foreign Minister Cem, General Bir, and with State Minister Gurel.
Ambassador Miller leaves for Athens tomorrow morning, where he will meet
with Greek officials.
The so-called snub story, as far as we can tell, is inaccurate. There was
no snub. Ambassador Miller was received warmly in Ankara, as he has always
been received. No meeting with Prime Minister Yilmaz was requested. A
meeting with the deputy prime minister was requested but could not be
scheduled. So we don't see a snub, even if some want to report a snub.
QUESTION: Cuba?
MR. RUBIN: Sure, yes, go ahead.
QUESTION: This is the second anniversary of the signing of Helms-Burton,
implementation of which leaves the US pretty much alone in its Cuba policy,
which is probably where it's been pretty much the last 35 years. Any views
on the effect in this to US policy toward Cuba?
MR. RUBIN: The bottom line here is that Cuba is on the wrong side of
history. If one looks at a map of the Western Hemisphere over the last 15
years, you see a steady and incredible trend away from dictatorship, away
from totalitarianism and towards democracy. Cuba is the last blot on the
map of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Our policy is aimed at trying
to make sure that Cuba, like the other countries in the region, becomes a
democracy. Our policies of promoting democracy in the region have been
successful in the last decade and Cuba is the last black mark on that
map of democracy that has grown so successfully.
As we can see, Cuba is alone in the hemisphere. Their economy is falling.
Dissent is growing. The Pope's visit illustrated the Cuban people's hunger
for spiritual growth. We are working with other countries in the world to
try to make sure that their relations with Cuba are linked to progress in
Cuba's democratization and human rights, and that policy has worked.
European countries and others are now making any improvement in their
policies linked to improvements in Cuba's human rights record. So the
process of promoting democratic change in Cuba is frustratingly slow,
but that has been true in many parts of the world. But the power of
democracy ultimately wins out, and we have confidence that it will someday
in Cuba win out.
QUESTION: A couple of questions. One, it appears in India that BJP, which
has been labeled in this country as the Hindu party, may lead India in the
next elections. Is the US Government ready to work with the BJP? And, also,
if you have any reaction on the elections in India.
MR. RUBIN: Well, all I can say is that it was a democratic process and we
were waiting to see what comes of it in terms of a government. India is a
good friend of the United States; and Secretary Albright was there, had
very good discussions with Indian officials. We want to promote better
relations with the Indian Government as it is formed, and we are looking
forward to that process.
QUESTION: And, also, Pakistan has sued the US over 28 airplanes, and they
are demanding $658 million or the planes. Do you have any reaction or
comment?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as you know, this has been a frustration in US-Pakistani
relations for some time. We have tried to work on the problem. We hope that
it doesn't come to that, but let me get you a considered answer for the
record.
QUESTION: And, finally, one more. LTTE, which State Department, in its
terrorism report, labeled as an international terrorist organization --
they also have filed a lawsuit against the State Department in the DC
Appeal Courts. Any reaction?
MR. RUBIN: I am unfamiliar with that. We'll have to get you that for the
record.
QUESTION: On Korea, I understand there is a bilateral with the North
Koreans in Berlin tomorrow. Do you have anything on that, any background?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we had some information provided yesterday on that, and
if you need more after reviewing that information I would be happy to
provide it to you.
QUESTION: The Palestinian Islamic Ji'had group seems to have taken
offense at yesterday's court ruling and reportedly has threatened attacks
on US interests or Americans. Are you aware of that or do you have a
reaction?
MR. RUBIN: I've seen press reports of that statement, and my reaction to
those press reports is as follows. It's not up to groups who are responsible
for terrorist violence to be offended. They should be offended by every
death that they have caused; and they should be apologizing for the deaths
they have caused, rather than taking offense at the legal processes that go
on in our country where victims are seeking redress.
As far as any further reaction, we'll have to wait and see it in specific
form. But if there is an implied threat in that statement -- such groups
often make such threats. I am not in a position to assess the significance
of that threat because it was a press report, but it would be a grave
mistake for terrorist groups to target Americans.
QUESTION: Jamie, on the question about a threat, which is not related to
Howard's question, the Pentagon has raised their level of security
slightly. There are reports that there have been threats which various
agencies around town are taking seriously. Is this building aware of a
security problem and have you -
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any increased threat in terms of physical
violence of the kind you mentioned.
QUESTION: Speaking of security, anything on brown tweed jackets on the
seventh floor?
MR. RUBIN: I have nothing for you on that.
QUESTION: Leaving aside Paula Jones and so forth, possibly the President
will be going to China earlier. There are sort of two takes on it. One is
that relations are so good now with China we want to maintain them; and the
other take is sort of that they are taking a downturn so we need to bolster
them a little bit. Can you -
MR. RUBIN: My impression - again, they spoke from the White House about
the timing of this trip and I gather Mike McCurry said serious consideration
was being given to going this spring or in June. Let me say this -- we want
to build on the momentum that has been created in US-China relations. We
have had some major successes in the last year in the area of nonproliferation.
The Chinese Government has taken major steps towards meeting the international
norms that are so important to protecting our interest sand our security.
We have seen the release of Wei Jengsheng.
We have seen now today some very welcome news. Today the Chinese Government
has indicated their intention to sign the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. This is an agreement that covers freedom of
expression, religion, peaceful assembly - all the rights that we in this
country and the world hold so dear. President Clinton made the signing of
this covenant a priority in his discussions with President Jiang during the
summit. The decision to sign the covenant represents China's formal
commitment to those principles. By announcing its intention to sign the
covenant, China has also indicated in more concrete terms than ever
before that it accepts the universality of human rights.
But perhaps the most important thing about this is the covenant provides an
ongoing process under which China will be obliged to report on its
implementation of the treaty and adherence to these universal principles
within one year of ratification and then every five years following. This
report will then be reviewed by a committee established by the covenant,
composed of 18 human rights experts from around the world acting in their
individual capacities. Members that are state parties will elect the
experts, pose questions, challenge assertions. Therefore, this is an
excellent multilateral mechanism for examination of China's human
rights record. It is a very significant development that will ensure
a regularized process under international law for shining the spotlight on
the abuses of human rights that we have long talked about in China and,
therefore, is a significant step forward in America's efforts to promote
human rights in China.
QUESTION: Will that have an impact on what happens in Geneva next
week?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll have to assess our position in light of this
decision by the Chinese. I do think it will have a significant impact, but
that does not mean that that decision has been made. As soon as we make
that decision, I will try to report it to you. But, clearly, this is a step
forward. It's the kind of step on human rights that the world has long
called for; and it will provide an important multilateral mechanism, a way
for the world to shine the spotlight on human rights abuses in China.
That's why this convention is so important and that's why this development
is so significant.
QUESTION: Jamie, China is planning to fire millions of bureaucrats or
workers - going to affect in any way economically US-China relations?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any information that.
QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much.
MR. RUBIN: You're welcome.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Did you get - earlier, before I came in, did you get to the
issue of Kofi Annan and what he said on Sunday here in town and what he
said since? Have you got into that?
MR. RUBIN: No, I have not, but I think I know where your question is
going, and let me try to answer it.
QUESTION: What do you think is truly his policy on the US use of force in
Iraq?
MR. RUBIN: I think there was a great deal of exaggerated critiquing of
this issue. This is a very simple issue. It's the issue that distinguishes
between talking to colleagues in the Security Council and around the world
about whether there's been a violation and what the results of that
violation of the accord on Iraq will be, and requiring a positive vote in
the Security Council to justify internationally the use of force.
We have taken the position that we believe there is legal authority
internationally contained in two resolutions - Resolution 678 and
Resolution 687 - in the sense that if Iraq is in violation of Resolution
687, the cease-fire resolution, the underlying authority authorizing member
states to use all necessary means against Iraq is contained in Resolution
678. That is our view. But it's also been our view - and we've stated quite
clearly - that one of the advantages of this agreement is that we are
better off either way. If Iraq meets the agreement's requirements and does
what it has promised to do - namely, allow unfettered and full access
to the UN inspectors - we will have access to places the UN has never gone
before.
Most recently, this weekend UN inspectors went to the ministry of defense
building. They've never gone there before. This is an example of how access
can improve the ability of UNSCOM to do its job, and how if this agreement
is implemented, it is the best way to combat the weapons of mass destruction
threat.
We've also said if the agreement is violated, that we are in a better
position to get support internationally for the use of military power. It
is our view that it would be normal and appropriate if Chairman Butler
believes there's a violation of this agreement, he will be reporting that
to the Security Council. Member states will be commenting on that report,
expressing their views on that report; and that is consultation in the
Security Council. We fully expect that to happen; that's always been part
of our timeline for activity if Iraq violates the agreement. So this is a
difference without a meaning, and I'm not even sure it's a distinction
without a difference. But it's certainly not practically significant.
There will be discussions in the Security Council. How could there not be,
if Chairman Butler issues a report of a violation? I've been there; the
member states comment on what they think that violation means and what the
consequences would be. That is very different than requiring a resolution
under an international law to justify the use of military force.
QUESTION: It's Kofi Annan who's saying this. Did he get it wrong?
MR. RUBIN: He didn't say that. If you look at his quote, what he said was
"required to consult." Consultation, as members of Congress often point to
us, sometimes involve no more than a discussion.
QUESTION: But the authority is given -- it has been given --
MR. RUBIN: We believe, in our view, the authority exists now for military
action. It is inconceivable to me there won't be some discussion/consultation
in the Security Council in the event that Butler declares a violation.
QUESTION: He used the verb "required." That's what I'm driving at.
MR. RUBIN: Well, one can make a lot out of that, but it turns out not to
matter. People who wanted to look for the Secretary General telling us what
to do or what not to do obviously would jump on a word like that.
But from our standpoint, the Secretary General did a great job in getting
Saddam Hussein to agree on paper to an agreement. Now it remains to be seen
whether it will be fully implemented over time. And the fact that he thinks
we ought to consult before using military force is no problem; we're going
to consult before using military force. The President made that quite
clear.
He also made clear that this agreement would never have been possible had
not the threat of the use of force been in existence when he went to
Baghdad.
QUESTION: The Secretary General also said that - he alluded to - or one
of his aides did yesterday - that come January, if the US hasn't paid $600
million, you're going to lose your voting rights. Is that - do you have any
comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to commit myself to that exact date, but there
are some major, major problems we face in the coming months if the Congress
does not allow us to pay back the money we owe. And it would be truly an
embarrassment of the highest order for the United States of America, the
richest country in the world, the most powerful country in the world, the
country that created the United Nations, that has seen the UN pursue
the goals that the United States has laid out in the world of promoting
democracy, promoting peace, have its voting rights denied because of an
unrelated dispute over what should happen or not happen in conferences on
family planning.
If there is a view in Congress that that's an issue that needs to be
decided, let's decide it the democratic way. Let's have a vote up or down
the way democracies operate, but let's not stigmatize, embarrass the United
States of America before the court of world opinion at the United Nations;
and let's not harm America's ability to promote America's interest in
fighting terrorism, in fighting rogue states, in New York at the UN by
denying the United States the funds that it owes to the United Nations by
treaty.
That doesn't mean that the Congress isn't capable of stopping the money.
They surely are; they have. But it is an obligation that we undertook
freely, and it is something that ought to be paid because it would be an
embarrassment for the United States to lose its vote and it certainly will
harm our national security if we can't pursue our policies in New
York.
QUESTION: Leaving aside the date of January then, he is generally correct
about that?
MR. RUBIN: There is a risk in the coming months. It's complicated as to
when, because it depends on how much money you can pump in at what time.
But in the coming months, we do face a genuine risk of losing our vote in
the United Nations, and that would be a great embarrassment to the richest
and most powerful country in the world.
QUESTION: Is that the General Assembly or the Security Council?
MR. RUBIN: The General Assembly.
QUESTION: Not the Security Council?
MR. RUBIN: I technically don't know the answer to that, but I believe
it's the General Assembly.
QUESTION: How would losing the vote in the General Assembly harm the US's
ability to -
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm sure you were here yesterday, Jim, and you heard me
talking about what I believe to be the dangers and what the Secretary of
State believes to be the dangers of not paying our arrears -- and that is
losing our leverage in New York in discussions with countries from Europe,
countries from the Middle East, countries from Asia, countries from Latin
America.
When we go to New York and you all look to see whether we are able to
convince countries in the world to approve of and support our policies, and
the first thing these countries say, well, that's all fine and good but
when are you going to pay your bills to the United Nations, that undermines
our leverage, that harms our ability to get support on issues like Iraq.
That's what I mean about harming our national security.
In addition, in response to Sid's question, I said it would be a true
embarrassment for the United States to not be able to vote in the General
Assembly. There are many countries in Africa who are up to speed in their
dues, up to date, and it would be truly an embarrassment for the most
powerful and rich country in the world to not be able to vote in the
General Assembly.
QUESTION: Caspian oil subject -- yesterday at the Gore and Chernomyrdin
meeting, did it produce any new agreement or understanding about the
Caspian oil or the pipelines, because lately we are hearing some confusing
statement about the - (inaudible) -- pipeline is the most preferable -
isn't the most preferable pipelines.
MR. RUBIN: There were several committees that did their work. There is an
elaborate briefing that took place yesterday with a number of fact sheets.
I do not have any information on what was discussed in that area. I can say
this -- that it is normal that when leaders have extensive meetings on a
subject like this that the issue of Caspian oil comes up. But I don't
have any information for you on what specifically occurred there, and we'll
try to get you that for the record.
QUESTION: Another subject is the - another conflict issue is the Russian
sale of S-300 missiles to Greek side of the Cyprus. Do you think that they
handled the subject also in this meeting?
MR. RUBIN: Again, that was not discussed in the press conference or the
associated materials, but I can say that our view is we have concerns about
that.
QUESTION: I would just like to ask one more about the China thing. You
mentioned that they are going to sign this covenant. Can I ask you, how was
this communicated to the US Government? Who told who; and when are they
going to sign it?
MR. RUBIN: We expect this to be signed soon. I don't have any more
information than that, other than to say that we will be discussing with
them the timing of signature and ratification. We learned about this
through diplomatic channels in recent days, but I'll have to get you
exactly how.
QUESTION: For it to have the impact you described earlier on the
resolution in Geneva, do they have to have signed it, at least signed it
and possibly ratified it, before the commission meets next week?
MR. RUBIN: We have seen a pattern of Chinese announcements in this area
where they first say they intend to sign a treaty or a convention, and then
they sign a treaty or convention and then they ratify a treaty or
convention. They, of course, don't have ratification problems in China as a
non-democratic country. And so we wouldn't expect there to be too much of a
delay unless there was a desire to slow it down, and we have no reason to
believe that they, having made the decision to sign it, will not carry
through on it.
We will be judging our decision about what to do in Geneva based on their
decision to sign, and not requiring some ratification process which, in the
legal world, often takes time even in a country that doesn't have a senate
that often has its own mind on these subjects.
QUESTION: Don't you think it's a little cynical of them to do this on the
eve of the meeting in Geneva?
MR. RUBIN: Well, one can try to assign motivations to it or one can focus
on the results, and we focus on results here. The result is that, when
ratified, there will be a mechanism in place to shine the spotlight on
Chinese human rights practices, an international treaty obligation will be
assumed, and a way to have the world watch and talk about and focus on
Chinese human rights practices will be established. That is the point of
the convention. Whatever their motivation might have been, it is a
major advance in the area of international legal oversight of human
rights.
QUESTION: I had a feeling that was going to be your answer.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)
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