U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #32, 98-03-12

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U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Thursday, March 12, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

SERBIA / FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
1		FRY offer of Conditional Dialogue with Kosovar Albanians
2		Reported Serb Willingness to Allow Reburial of Kosovar
		  Albanian Victims
2-3		Reports Milosevic Prepared to Allow Return and Full Access
		  to ICRC
3,6		Dangers of Possible "Spillover" to Neighboring Countries
3,5-6		Possibility of Training and Assistance under Partnership
		  for Peace Program For Neighboring Countries
4,6		Deputy Secretary Talbott's Travel to Slovenia, Albania,
		  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria and
		  Romania; Secretary Albright's Meeting re Implementation
		  of Contact Group Steps
FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
1-2,3		International Peacekeeping Presence/UN Secretary General's
		  Comments
GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS
6-7		Ambassador Miller's Meetings in the Region
CUBA
7		Helms-Burton Legislation/US Policy
INDIA
7		Reaction to Elections in India
PAKISTAN
8		Reported Suit By Pakistan re US Aircraft
TERRORISM
8		Suit by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) re
		  Department's Terrorism List
8		Reported Threats by Islamic Jihad re Court Ruling Yesterday
NORTH KOREA
8		Four-Party Talks
DEPARTMENT
8		Reported Threats to Federal Buildings
CHINA
9		Timing of President's Trip to China
9-10,13-14	Chinese Government's Intention to Sign International
		  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IRAQ
10-11		Authorization for Use of Force/Consultations with Security
		  Council
UNITED NATIONS
11-13		US Arrears/Possible Loss of Vote in General Assembly
RUSSIA
13		Gore-Chernomyrdin Meetings/Subjects Discussed

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #32

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1998, 12:35 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I do not have any statements today, and as soon as the relevant reporters from the Associated Press get here, then I can ask them to ask the first question.

Mr. Schweid, fire away.

QUESTION: Can you folks - I know it's early, but what do you make now today of the Serbian overtures, speaking of the highest form of autonomy; the Albanians rejecting, apparently, the offer? I know - we know what you said yesterday. I wondered if you found any basis for enthusiasm over the initiative.

MR. RUBIN: No, we have not heard anything that makes us enthusiastic or encouraged in the area of the Serbian Government's willingness to talk.

So far, what we've seen is an approach by Belgrade that seems deliberately selected and designed to make it unacceptable. It seems like the Belgrade authorities are proposing things that are designed to fail; that are propaganda exercises. For example, Belgrade's offer involved only representatives at the level of the Serb Republic and not the level of the FRY, the Kosovar Albanians believe this would arbitrarily limit their options in any discussions.

We also note that the announcement of supposed Serb offer to negotiate consisted in large part of a justification for the use of force in Kosovo, and contained no hint of remorse for the deaths of innocent Albanian victims.

In short, it's time for the propaganda to stop and the negotiations to start.

QUESTION: How might it get to be a credible offer?

MR. RUBIN: Well, if both sides put aside their maximal demands and agree to sit down and talk without any preconditions, that would be a credible offer.

QUESTION: The Secretary General of the United Nations this morning at the Press Club said that he's going to ask the Security Council to review the earlier decision to withdraw the peacekeeping force from Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Does the United States concur that it would be premature, given this tension in Kosovo, to withdraw that force?

MR. RUBIN: We certainly are pleased that the Secretary General agrees with us that there is a need to have a stabilizing international military presence, a peacekeeping presence, in the region. It's something that the Contact Group countries talked about; it's something that Secretary Albright discussed directly with Secretary General Annan yesterday.

Precisely what form that international peacekeeping presence would take is something that one can discuss. We still have several months before the mandate expires. I believe it expires at the end of August. But we do think it's encouraging and important that the international community is getting behind the idea that if the current trends don't reverse themselves - and there's still little evidence that they will - that one of the grave risks here is that the violence in Kosovo will spread to neighboring countries, like the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and that's why it's so important to ensure that all sets are taken, including the possibility of extending the military presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, will occur.

QUESTION: Would the United States like that extension to be indefinite?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't addressed that issue at this point. We had always thought there was some value in keeping that force there, and we might have found other ways to do so in the absence of recent developments. But right now, perhaps some of the countries that had concerns about it staying there are rethinking those concerns.

So the long and the short of it is, some international military presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a good thing; it's a necessary thing; it's a preventive step to avoid the situation spinning out of control, and we're going to be working with the international community to try to make that happen.

QUESTION: Jamie, do you see any positive sign in the Serbs' willingness to allow the Kosovars to unearth their dead and do what they want with them?

MR. RUBIN: One can work real hard to find some indications of progress, but the bottom line is the things that were demanded by the Contact Group - the removal of the police, the beginning of negotiation, the allowing of outsiders to investigate what went on there - has not happened. We have some reports that President Milosevic is prepared to allow the ICRC to come back and make sure they have full access. But this is occurring in a context where just yesterday the ICRC offices were threatened.

What we need to see is a wholesale shift in the mentality that has previously been that they can solve at the barrel of a gun what can only be solved at the negotiating table. And we have not seen any pattern of evidence that they have changed that fundamental view.

QUESTION: These reports that you may let the ICRC back in, are those news reports or independent reporting?

MR. RUBIN: I would have called them news reports if they were news reports, but they are not sufficiently clear for us to call them confirmed reports. They are reports.

QUESTION: Is there any consideration being given within the US Government to favoring a larger force, a different force, a force with different rules of engagement for Macedonia?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, this is something that's under discussion right now but, yes, we are looking at what the right mix of capabilities and missions will best serve a situation that has gotten worse, not gotten better. So we will be looking at that. We don't have any firm numbers or mission statements to give you at this time; but certainly the basic mission -- that is a stabilizing presence designed to deter the possibility of a cross-border conflict in this region - is and would still be the goal.

QUESTION: Geographically, is that something to be thought about, too, or are you talking about the mission to Macedonia?

MR. RUBIN: We're still talking about the mission for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, as you saw yesterday -- unfortunately I have to go through all those words lest somebody in this room think I've changed our position on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - that's the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

We are also looking at the possibility of some training and assistance and partnership under the Partnership for Peace program for other neighboring countries. We are trying to make sure that we take all the steps we can to enhance the stability of the region; to give confidence to the countries in the region; and to make sure that there are no miscalculations and there is as much confidence as possible, so that if the situation does deteriorate further, the risk of it spreading is limited.

QUESTION: Some of this is hypothetical, so there is a limit, I suppose, to what State could say. But there have been, even in the middle of the turmoil - I wanted to check it out with you. There are authoritative suggestions that if there is a spill-over, it won't go very far; that this is something, because there have been all sorts of alarm bells that Greece and Turkey and Italy and Albania, Bulgaria will all be drawn in. How dangerous does the State Department perceive this?

MR. RUBIN: We do have grave concerns about this situation both in its own context, as well as the possibility of it spreading. There are those who can predict that everything will be fine and people who can predict that it will be the third Balkan war. In our view, the risks of it spreading are so great in that the dangers associated with it are great, not that the probability is necessarily great. So when you judge the risk here, you are judging both the probability of something happening and the consequences of it happening,. So the consequences are so dangerous that even if some may regard the risks as lower than 50-50 or slightly higher than 50-50 or 20 percent, whatever that number is if it's a significant probability, if you combine that with the dangerous consequences, it is something that merits the utmost attention by senior officials of our government.

In that regard, let me say that Deputy Secretary Talbott will travel next week to Slovenia, Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania. He will be outlining steps that states in the region can take individually and collectively to demonstrate the international community's resolve in the face of President Milosevic's unacceptable actions in Kosovo. Secretary Albright convened a meeting this morning here in the Department on the implementation of the steps the Contact Group outlined, and I can just say that because the consequences are so grave, that the Department and other agencies in the government are seized with the subject.

QUESTION: Do you remember the idea of possibly a very special, special mediator? Is this going to be something Strobe Talbott will have special --

MR. RUBIN: I have not heard there's any organizational shift. Bob Gelbard, our special envoy, is on the Hill right now testifying on Kosovo. He's our man when it comes to President Milosevic in Kosovo, and our man when it comes to the situation.

QUESTION: And Swigert has got a role, too.

MR. RUBIN: Swigert will be his deputy, and will be an important player.

QUESTION: Will Talbott be trying to organize this conference that was talked about of the ministers of all these countries to --

MR. RUBIN: I am sure that will be one of the things that will be discussed on the trip. Many of the ministers thought it was very important to keep these countries working together, talking to each other. In that regard, we believe it was useful that the neighboring countries - that is, the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - had a statement signed by the foreign ministers of those countries, expressing their concern, making clear that the Kosovo problem is not an internal affair for the Serbs. It is a matter that could well affect the international peace and security of the region and, therefore, the world.

QUESTION: Just backing up, you were talking to Barry before; you said something about extending training missions to other nations. I assume that would include Albania and what other countries?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, that would be an example --

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: Albania is a member of the Partnership for Peace. I believe that all those regional countries in one form or another are members.

QUESTION: Bulgaria?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not saying that we are going to have training missions in every one of those countries. Certainly Albania is a country where discussions have taken place about what steps might be taken by NATO as part of the Partnership for Peace process to give them greater confidence. Those are all steps being considered and discussed.

In order for me to give you real-time information and give you a nature of our thinking, I have to be able to say that none of these decisions have been made, and there are a lot of details associated with them that can't be discussed until final decisions are made.

QUESTION: But this would be separate - this list of countries who might receive training. This is separate from what you were referring to earlier of the extension of the peacekeeping force in Macedonia.

MR. RUBIN: I was describing the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's peacekeeping mission, and that was the discussion I had about extending the mission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These other issues are ones where we're talking about training and other confidence-building measures that can be taken between NATO and those countries.

QUESTION: On the training, has Albania received heretofore any training or assistance?

MR. RUBIN: Well, Albania is a participant in SFOR, and they are, I believe, have several dozen participants in the SFOR mission. So they are part of the Partnership for Peace process, which includes exchanges of military officials and training procedures. What exact military exercises have taken place in Albania, I'll have to get you for the record.

QUESTION: Jamie, when you talk about training, you're also talking about military assistance, perhaps, to some of these countries?

MR. RUBIN: Again, this is normally a cooperative process where we're trying to teach them the ways and means of operating, the best procedures. Countries in the region have military assistance programs unrelated to the PFP. The PFP is designed as a cooperative process, not a ticket for military assistance.

QUESTION: We sometimes overlook Cyprus problems -- certainly overshadowed by this now, but there's a report - no, it's related in a way. Did the Turks refuse to see Envoy Miller?

MR. RUBIN: I would first, in deference to Sid --

QUESTION: All right, go ahead.

MR. RUBIN: I'll come back to that, but I - go ahead.

QUESTION: Just if you can, on this training question --

MR. RUBIN: The one where I said the details are limited?

QUESTION: Right, well, to the degree you can in this forum, what would be the objective of this mission? Is it to allow them to defend their borders better?

MR. RUBIN: Right. It would be to give them the confidence that their military will be in a position to operate and defend their borders and to be able to prevent an outflow from refugees from cascading into a regional military conflict. So it will be to bolster their capabilities. Secretary General Solana is in Albania today, and he will be in a position to make detailed recommendations in this area.

QUESTION: Jamie, on the Secretary's trip, it seems to me that the foreign ministers she consulted with in Italy, France, Britain, Spain did not mention the possibility of a wider war very much in their public comments. And the Secretary did mention it, but it was sort of in passing. Has something happened to suddenly heighten concern about this?

MR. RUBIN: No. I can't speak for why their public comments did or didn't include particular risks, but I think if you look at the list of recommendations that the Contact Group laid out -- including sending missions to Albania, including extending the military presence in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -- that by implication, they all understood the regional risks, which is why they all signed up to these recommendations about activities in the region -- in the countries nearby.

So I don't think this is a view where the United States holds some special information or special judgment about the dangers. On the contrary, I think the reason why the meeting was held and the reason why the meeting reached such a firm conclusion at such a rapid pace was because all of the ministers recognized that this was a situation that, if not handled early, could lead to a wider and more dangerous problem.

QUESTION: Are you talking to the Greeks and Turks about this particular problem, about the possibility of it widening?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, we certainly have been in touch with the Greeks and the Turks about this. I don't believe that is on Deputy Secretary Talbot's agenda, but I think the Greeks and the Turks and the United States and NATO countries - certainly they are part of NATO. Albania is meeting in Brussels, they were participants in that; and I am sure they will be hearing the report of Secretary General Solana about his recommendations in Albania.

QUESTION: Yesterday, both the Turkish Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister refused to see your special coordinator for Cyprus. What is the implications for the US efforts towards Cyprus?

MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Miller held productive and very substantive meetings with President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash in Nicosia, March 9th and 10th. He saw Clerides again in Athens March the 10th for a follow-up discussion. Yesterday and today in Ankara, Ambassador Miller held very wide-ranging and productive discussions with Turkish Foreign Minister Cem, General Bir, and with State Minister Gurel. Ambassador Miller leaves for Athens tomorrow morning, where he will meet with Greek officials.

The so-called snub story, as far as we can tell, is inaccurate. There was no snub. Ambassador Miller was received warmly in Ankara, as he has always been received. No meeting with Prime Minister Yilmaz was requested. A meeting with the deputy prime minister was requested but could not be scheduled. So we don't see a snub, even if some want to report a snub.

QUESTION: Cuba?

MR. RUBIN: Sure, yes, go ahead.

QUESTION: This is the second anniversary of the signing of Helms-Burton, implementation of which leaves the US pretty much alone in its Cuba policy, which is probably where it's been pretty much the last 35 years. Any views on the effect in this to US policy toward Cuba?

MR. RUBIN: The bottom line here is that Cuba is on the wrong side of history. If one looks at a map of the Western Hemisphere over the last 15 years, you see a steady and incredible trend away from dictatorship, away from totalitarianism and towards democracy. Cuba is the last blot on the map of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Our policy is aimed at trying to make sure that Cuba, like the other countries in the region, becomes a democracy. Our policies of promoting democracy in the region have been successful in the last decade and Cuba is the last black mark on that map of democracy that has grown so successfully.

As we can see, Cuba is alone in the hemisphere. Their economy is falling. Dissent is growing. The Pope's visit illustrated the Cuban people's hunger for spiritual growth. We are working with other countries in the world to try to make sure that their relations with Cuba are linked to progress in Cuba's democratization and human rights, and that policy has worked. European countries and others are now making any improvement in their policies linked to improvements in Cuba's human rights record. So the process of promoting democratic change in Cuba is frustratingly slow, but that has been true in many parts of the world. But the power of democracy ultimately wins out, and we have confidence that it will someday in Cuba win out.

QUESTION: A couple of questions. One, it appears in India that BJP, which has been labeled in this country as the Hindu party, may lead India in the next elections. Is the US Government ready to work with the BJP? And, also, if you have any reaction on the elections in India.

MR. RUBIN: Well, all I can say is that it was a democratic process and we were waiting to see what comes of it in terms of a government. India is a good friend of the United States; and Secretary Albright was there, had very good discussions with Indian officials. We want to promote better relations with the Indian Government as it is formed, and we are looking forward to that process.

QUESTION: And, also, Pakistan has sued the US over 28 airplanes, and they are demanding $658 million or the planes. Do you have any reaction or comment?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as you know, this has been a frustration in US-Pakistani relations for some time. We have tried to work on the problem. We hope that it doesn't come to that, but let me get you a considered answer for the record.

QUESTION: And, finally, one more. LTTE, which State Department, in its terrorism report, labeled as an international terrorist organization -- they also have filed a lawsuit against the State Department in the DC Appeal Courts. Any reaction?

MR. RUBIN: I am unfamiliar with that. We'll have to get you that for the record.

QUESTION: On Korea, I understand there is a bilateral with the North Koreans in Berlin tomorrow. Do you have anything on that, any background?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we had some information provided yesterday on that, and if you need more after reviewing that information I would be happy to provide it to you.

QUESTION: The Palestinian Islamic Ji'had group seems to have taken offense at yesterday's court ruling and reportedly has threatened attacks on US interests or Americans. Are you aware of that or do you have a reaction?

MR. RUBIN: I've seen press reports of that statement, and my reaction to those press reports is as follows. It's not up to groups who are responsible for terrorist violence to be offended. They should be offended by every death that they have caused; and they should be apologizing for the deaths they have caused, rather than taking offense at the legal processes that go on in our country where victims are seeking redress.

As far as any further reaction, we'll have to wait and see it in specific form. But if there is an implied threat in that statement -- such groups often make such threats. I am not in a position to assess the significance of that threat because it was a press report, but it would be a grave mistake for terrorist groups to target Americans.

QUESTION: Jamie, on the question about a threat, which is not related to Howard's question, the Pentagon has raised their level of security slightly. There are reports that there have been threats which various agencies around town are taking seriously. Is this building aware of a security problem and have you -

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any increased threat in terms of physical violence of the kind you mentioned.

QUESTION: Speaking of security, anything on brown tweed jackets on the seventh floor?

MR. RUBIN: I have nothing for you on that.

QUESTION: Leaving aside Paula Jones and so forth, possibly the President will be going to China earlier. There are sort of two takes on it. One is that relations are so good now with China we want to maintain them; and the other take is sort of that they are taking a downturn so we need to bolster them a little bit. Can you -

MR. RUBIN: My impression - again, they spoke from the White House about the timing of this trip and I gather Mike McCurry said serious consideration was being given to going this spring or in June. Let me say this -- we want to build on the momentum that has been created in US-China relations. We have had some major successes in the last year in the area of nonproliferation. The Chinese Government has taken major steps towards meeting the international norms that are so important to protecting our interest sand our security. We have seen the release of Wei Jengsheng.

We have seen now today some very welcome news. Today the Chinese Government has indicated their intention to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This is an agreement that covers freedom of expression, religion, peaceful assembly - all the rights that we in this country and the world hold so dear. President Clinton made the signing of this covenant a priority in his discussions with President Jiang during the summit. The decision to sign the covenant represents China's formal commitment to those principles. By announcing its intention to sign the covenant, China has also indicated in more concrete terms than ever before that it accepts the universality of human rights.

But perhaps the most important thing about this is the covenant provides an ongoing process under which China will be obliged to report on its implementation of the treaty and adherence to these universal principles within one year of ratification and then every five years following. This report will then be reviewed by a committee established by the covenant, composed of 18 human rights experts from around the world acting in their individual capacities. Members that are state parties will elect the experts, pose questions, challenge assertions. Therefore, this is an excellent multilateral mechanism for examination of China's human rights record. It is a very significant development that will ensure a regularized process under international law for shining the spotlight on the abuses of human rights that we have long talked about in China and, therefore, is a significant step forward in America's efforts to promote human rights in China.

QUESTION: Will that have an impact on what happens in Geneva next week?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll have to assess our position in light of this decision by the Chinese. I do think it will have a significant impact, but that does not mean that that decision has been made. As soon as we make that decision, I will try to report it to you. But, clearly, this is a step forward. It's the kind of step on human rights that the world has long called for; and it will provide an important multilateral mechanism, a way for the world to shine the spotlight on human rights abuses in China. That's why this convention is so important and that's why this development is so significant.

QUESTION: Jamie, China is planning to fire millions of bureaucrats or workers - going to affect in any way economically US-China relations?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have any information that.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much.

MR. RUBIN: You're welcome.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Did you get - earlier, before I came in, did you get to the issue of Kofi Annan and what he said on Sunday here in town and what he said since? Have you got into that?

MR. RUBIN: No, I have not, but I think I know where your question is going, and let me try to answer it.

QUESTION: What do you think is truly his policy on the US use of force in Iraq?

MR. RUBIN: I think there was a great deal of exaggerated critiquing of this issue. This is a very simple issue. It's the issue that distinguishes between talking to colleagues in the Security Council and around the world about whether there's been a violation and what the results of that violation of the accord on Iraq will be, and requiring a positive vote in the Security Council to justify internationally the use of force.

We have taken the position that we believe there is legal authority internationally contained in two resolutions - Resolution 678 and Resolution 687 - in the sense that if Iraq is in violation of Resolution 687, the cease-fire resolution, the underlying authority authorizing member states to use all necessary means against Iraq is contained in Resolution 678. That is our view. But it's also been our view - and we've stated quite clearly - that one of the advantages of this agreement is that we are better off either way. If Iraq meets the agreement's requirements and does what it has promised to do - namely, allow unfettered and full access to the UN inspectors - we will have access to places the UN has never gone before.

Most recently, this weekend UN inspectors went to the ministry of defense building. They've never gone there before. This is an example of how access can improve the ability of UNSCOM to do its job, and how if this agreement is implemented, it is the best way to combat the weapons of mass destruction threat.

We've also said if the agreement is violated, that we are in a better position to get support internationally for the use of military power. It is our view that it would be normal and appropriate if Chairman Butler believes there's a violation of this agreement, he will be reporting that to the Security Council. Member states will be commenting on that report, expressing their views on that report; and that is consultation in the Security Council. We fully expect that to happen; that's always been part of our timeline for activity if Iraq violates the agreement. So this is a difference without a meaning, and I'm not even sure it's a distinction without a difference. But it's certainly not practically significant.

There will be discussions in the Security Council. How could there not be, if Chairman Butler issues a report of a violation? I've been there; the member states comment on what they think that violation means and what the consequences would be. That is very different than requiring a resolution under an international law to justify the use of military force.

QUESTION: It's Kofi Annan who's saying this. Did he get it wrong?

MR. RUBIN: He didn't say that. If you look at his quote, what he said was "required to consult." Consultation, as members of Congress often point to us, sometimes involve no more than a discussion.

QUESTION: But the authority is given -- it has been given --

MR. RUBIN: We believe, in our view, the authority exists now for military action. It is inconceivable to me there won't be some discussion/consultation in the Security Council in the event that Butler declares a violation.

QUESTION: He used the verb "required." That's what I'm driving at.

MR. RUBIN: Well, one can make a lot out of that, but it turns out not to matter. People who wanted to look for the Secretary General telling us what to do or what not to do obviously would jump on a word like that.

But from our standpoint, the Secretary General did a great job in getting Saddam Hussein to agree on paper to an agreement. Now it remains to be seen whether it will be fully implemented over time. And the fact that he thinks we ought to consult before using military force is no problem; we're going to consult before using military force. The President made that quite clear.

He also made clear that this agreement would never have been possible had not the threat of the use of force been in existence when he went to Baghdad.

QUESTION: The Secretary General also said that - he alluded to - or one of his aides did yesterday - that come January, if the US hasn't paid $600 million, you're going to lose your voting rights. Is that - do you have any comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: I don't want to commit myself to that exact date, but there are some major, major problems we face in the coming months if the Congress does not allow us to pay back the money we owe. And it would be truly an embarrassment of the highest order for the United States of America, the richest country in the world, the most powerful country in the world, the country that created the United Nations, that has seen the UN pursue the goals that the United States has laid out in the world of promoting democracy, promoting peace, have its voting rights denied because of an unrelated dispute over what should happen or not happen in conferences on family planning.

If there is a view in Congress that that's an issue that needs to be decided, let's decide it the democratic way. Let's have a vote up or down the way democracies operate, but let's not stigmatize, embarrass the United States of America before the court of world opinion at the United Nations; and let's not harm America's ability to promote America's interest in fighting terrorism, in fighting rogue states, in New York at the UN by denying the United States the funds that it owes to the United Nations by treaty.

That doesn't mean that the Congress isn't capable of stopping the money. They surely are; they have. But it is an obligation that we undertook freely, and it is something that ought to be paid because it would be an embarrassment for the United States to lose its vote and it certainly will harm our national security if we can't pursue our policies in New York.

QUESTION: Leaving aside the date of January then, he is generally correct about that?

MR. RUBIN: There is a risk in the coming months. It's complicated as to when, because it depends on how much money you can pump in at what time. But in the coming months, we do face a genuine risk of losing our vote in the United Nations, and that would be a great embarrassment to the richest and most powerful country in the world.

QUESTION: Is that the General Assembly or the Security Council?

MR. RUBIN: The General Assembly.

QUESTION: Not the Security Council?

MR. RUBIN: I technically don't know the answer to that, but I believe it's the General Assembly.

QUESTION: How would losing the vote in the General Assembly harm the US's ability to -

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm sure you were here yesterday, Jim, and you heard me talking about what I believe to be the dangers and what the Secretary of State believes to be the dangers of not paying our arrears -- and that is losing our leverage in New York in discussions with countries from Europe, countries from the Middle East, countries from Asia, countries from Latin America.

When we go to New York and you all look to see whether we are able to convince countries in the world to approve of and support our policies, and the first thing these countries say, well, that's all fine and good but when are you going to pay your bills to the United Nations, that undermines our leverage, that harms our ability to get support on issues like Iraq. That's what I mean about harming our national security.

In addition, in response to Sid's question, I said it would be a true embarrassment for the United States to not be able to vote in the General Assembly. There are many countries in Africa who are up to speed in their dues, up to date, and it would be truly an embarrassment for the most powerful and rich country in the world to not be able to vote in the General Assembly.

QUESTION: Caspian oil subject -- yesterday at the Gore and Chernomyrdin meeting, did it produce any new agreement or understanding about the Caspian oil or the pipelines, because lately we are hearing some confusing statement about the - (inaudible) -- pipeline is the most preferable - isn't the most preferable pipelines.

MR. RUBIN: There were several committees that did their work. There is an elaborate briefing that took place yesterday with a number of fact sheets. I do not have any information on what was discussed in that area. I can say this -- that it is normal that when leaders have extensive meetings on a subject like this that the issue of Caspian oil comes up. But I don't have any information for you on what specifically occurred there, and we'll try to get you that for the record.

QUESTION: Another subject is the - another conflict issue is the Russian sale of S-300 missiles to Greek side of the Cyprus. Do you think that they handled the subject also in this meeting?

MR. RUBIN: Again, that was not discussed in the press conference or the associated materials, but I can say that our view is we have concerns about that.

QUESTION: I would just like to ask one more about the China thing. You mentioned that they are going to sign this covenant. Can I ask you, how was this communicated to the US Government? Who told who; and when are they going to sign it?

MR. RUBIN: We expect this to be signed soon. I don't have any more information than that, other than to say that we will be discussing with them the timing of signature and ratification. We learned about this through diplomatic channels in recent days, but I'll have to get you exactly how.

QUESTION: For it to have the impact you described earlier on the resolution in Geneva, do they have to have signed it, at least signed it and possibly ratified it, before the commission meets next week?

MR. RUBIN: We have seen a pattern of Chinese announcements in this area where they first say they intend to sign a treaty or a convention, and then they sign a treaty or convention and then they ratify a treaty or convention. They, of course, don't have ratification problems in China as a non-democratic country. And so we wouldn't expect there to be too much of a delay unless there was a desire to slow it down, and we have no reason to believe that they, having made the decision to sign it, will not carry through on it.

We will be judging our decision about what to do in Geneva based on their decision to sign, and not requiring some ratification process which, in the legal world, often takes time even in a country that doesn't have a senate that often has its own mind on these subjects.

QUESTION: Don't you think it's a little cynical of them to do this on the eve of the meeting in Geneva?

MR. RUBIN: Well, one can try to assign motivations to it or one can focus on the results, and we focus on results here. The result is that, when ratified, there will be a mechanism in place to shine the spotlight on Chinese human rights practices, an international treaty obligation will be assumed, and a way to have the world watch and talk about and focus on Chinese human rights practices will be established. That is the point of the convention. Whatever their motivation might have been, it is a major advance in the area of international legal oversight of human rights.

QUESTION: I had a feeling that was going to be your answer.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)

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