U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #33, 98-03-13
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
385
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, March 13, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
IRAQ/UN
1 Ryan Crocker and David Newton named to observer group for
inspecting presidential sites
CHINA/NON-PROLIFERATION
1,6 Reports of nuclear deal with Iran inaccurate
2,6 "Sea-change" in Chinese non-proliferation policies,
practices
4 Uses of chemical, AHF, anhydrous hydrogen fluoride
5 1-2-3 agreement could begin soon
5 No connection to President's travel plans
NORTH KOREA
6-7 Annual winter military exercises
6 Limitation on foreign travel in-country/ food-assistance
visits not affected
7 Four-Party Talks: preliminary meeting in Berlin
IRAN
4-5 U.S. efforts to curtail nuclear capability efforts
7-8 Warm welcome for U.S. wrestling team encouraging
8 Court decision on terrorism being studied
9 Travel warning still in effect
NORTHERN IRELAND
9-10 High-level visit scheduled for next week
10 Multi-party talks in the region continue/ unsung work done
by Sen. Mitchell
10 U.S. expects Sinn Fein to honor cease-fire
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
10-11 U.S. considers FRY politically responsible for crackdown
11 U.S. considers War Crimes Tribunal to have deterrent effect
12-13 No evidence yet that FRY is implementing steps enunciated
by Contact Group
13-14 Events in Kosovo could impact U.S. national security
interests
LATVIA
12 Situation with Russian minority
ALBANIA
13 Official visit by NATO Secretary General
IRAQ
14 Senate resolution/ U.S. supports assembling war crimes data
for record
16 GOI has still not provided UNSCOM with information it needs
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
14 U.S. extremely concerned about current situation
TURKEY-GREECE
15 Greeks reportedly reject Turkish call for unconditional
dialogue
RUSSIA
15 President Yeltsin's health, official schedule noted
15 Contacts with GOR on Kosovo situation
15 Primakov trip to Belgrade
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #33
FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1998 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. It's
Friday; it seems there aren't many of you here, but we will brief
nonetheless.
We put a statement out earlier today, as you know, on the War Crimes
Tribunal. In addition, I want to say that we have submitted to the United
Nations two names for US diplomats to participate in the process of the
special group to inspect presidential sites. They are Ryan Crocker and
David Newton. We'll be getting you some bios on that a little later today.
They are senior US diplomats who have long experience in sensitive matters
such as this. We think that the process continues to move forward, and we
thought it was important to contribute to that process.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: These are the diplomats who would participate by observing the
inspectors inspect.
QUESTION: Are you prepared to talk about the China-Iran nuclear deal?
Does it seem to you that the Chinese tried to pull a fast one by attempting
to go ahead with this deal just a couple of brief months after promising
they would no longer engage in such transactions?
MR. RUBIN: First let me say, with our usual disclaimer about not
commenting on intelligence matters, I can discuss this incident. I think
contrary to the suggestions that some have drawn from this event, this is a
case that demonstrates how non-proliferation works, not how
non-proliferation doesn't work. And there are always people who want to
comment how there are a few drops less in the glass than there should be;
and there are some who want to explain how full the glass really is.
This is a case of the glass being well more than half full on
non-proliferation. It's an indication of the progress we have made with
China on nuclear non-proliferation. We raised with Chinese authorities a
possible - and let me emphasize the word "possible" -- transaction between
a Chinese entity and an Iranian organization involving a chemical that is
not on any international nuclear control list, but could be used in the
processing of nuclear materials.
The Chinese authorities investigated the matter and promptly informed us
that a transaction like that had not been agreed to, and that China had no
intention of making such a transaction; nor do we have any evidence that a
shipment of the chemical occurred, or that such a transaction is
proceeding.
So again, the fact that this was discussed and resolved to our satisfaction
is an example of what happens when non-proliferation practices are working.
The suggestion is that this was something that was going to happen is
neither correct, as well.
What we understand is there was a preliminary contact at a relatively low
level, and that our response was to use the diplomatic process to stop this
kind of transfer and ask them to look into it. And indeed, when we did,
the Chinese conducted an investigation and responded promptly to our
inquiry. It therefore is an indication that when you have these kind of
commitments at the highest levels and you address a problem - not a problem
that has happened, not a problem that you know will happen, but what we in
this business call a concern that something might happen - that these
problems can be resolved.
And let me remind all of you that in thinking about this, the United States
is firmly of the view that there has been a "sea change" in Chinese
policies and practices on non-proliferation. Whether it is signing up to
the unconditional extension of the NPT; whether it is stopping nuclear
testing and signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; whether it's
supporting a fissile material cut-off treaty; whether it's supporting a
safeguard system for the International Atomic Energy Agency; or whether it
is assisting us in our work to stop North Korea from developing a nuclear
program, across the board the Chinese have - we've seen a sea change as a
result of the work of the United States in recent years in bringing China
into the fold, moving away from the practices in the past that were of such
danger to us, and moving towards the kind of relationship that advances and
protects the security of the United States, its interests and its allies.
QUESTION: I think I know the answer to this, given your strong words, but
I'll ask it anyway. Are you confident - is the United States confident
that this wasn't an attempt by the Chinese authorities to sort of test how
vigilantly the United States was watching, having been caught trying to
talk about a deal that we felt was problematic? Then they said, OK, we'll
go and we'll make sure we stop it to --
MR. RUBIN: Well, unlike some commentators, we aren't capable of getting
into the heads of the Chinese. And we don't have evidence that this was a
deliberate attempt to bypass a national decision. The evidence, to the
extent that we have it, is that this was a low-level contact that, once
brought to the attention of those policy-makers who can influence the
process - was looked into and was stopped. That's called
non-proliferation.
There's no question that China and Iran have a diplomatic relationship.
What we've done here is moved the practice from a presumption of
transferring dangerous systems to a presumption of denying the transfer of
dangerous systems. That's called non-proliferation.
QUESTION: On their part?
MR. RUBIN: On their part and our part, in working with them.
QUESTION: What was the timing? Can you discuss at all the timing of
this?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any direct information on the timing. The words
that I've been given to use are "recently." But let me see if after the
briefing I can try to get you some more detail on particular dates, but
that can often be difficult.
QUESTION: In relation to the summit.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, yes.
QUESTION: Just following up on what Carol was asking you, is there any
concern on the side of the US that had you not raised this with them or
been there monitoring on some level, this deal, that the Chinese could have
made a decision the other way? That seems to be a valid question.
MR. RUBIN: We're always concerned. We're concerned about a lot of
things. What I'm saying is that those who have speculated and
psychoanalyzed the motivations, as far as we know, don't have evidence.
The evidence that we have was that we don't have an indication that the
transaction would have gone forward if we hadn't contacted the Chinese. We
don't know the answer to questions like that. What we know is that this
was a low-level contact, and that when it was raised, that it was not a
signed, sealed and delivered project, but rather an inquiry. And when the
inquiry was investigated, it was terminated.
There's no reason, as far as we know, to presume, as so many commentators
are wont to do, that it would have resulted in this. We have no illusions
about the difficulties of pursuing non-proliferation, and the fact that in
many countries in the world there are those who will transfer either
equipment or technology or expertise even sometimes without the authority
of their government. What we can do is when we find out about a potential
problem, is raise it and resolve it; and that's what we did in this case.
QUESTION: And in this case was the low-level contact within or outside
the government, the Chinese Government? Because you just made - you don't
know --
MR. RUBIN: Right, I am going to have to be a little tricky - not tricky,
but a little careful -
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Tricky works.
MR. RUBIN: A little careful. I know that that word didn't come out
right. What I was trying to say is that what we're trying to do here is
provide you with a lot more information than we normally do in a case like
this. And in order for me to do that, there are certain lines that I have
to draw.
In China, in this area, it's fair to say that the entities involved are not
completely independent; but it's also fair to say that there is a
difference between the policy-maker level and the technical level. And so
while this entity was clearly not a policy-making level operation, I think
it's also fair to say that it didn't take the Chinese very long to ask them
what was going on, unlike in the United States when we might ask our
companies for information about what they're doing; they may seek to block
the access and information.
QUESTION: And can you tell us whether the US had observed the contact, as
you put it, the low-level contact, occurring over some duration of time, or
was it a one-shot thing? I don't --
MR. RUBIN: Again, that's skirting on the edge of what I can say in this
forum about this kind of thing. We were made aware of a contact at a low
level, and this hadn't gotten very far along. When it was investigated, it
was told to us that there was no agreement to transfer, nor was there an
intention on the Chinese part to do so.
Let me also give you a little information on this chemical, because I think
there's a little bit of hyperbole in some of the descriptions of this
chemical. This chemical, AHF, anhydrous hydrogen fluoride is not used to
enrich uranium to weapons grade. AHF is used in the conversion process,
which takes uranium from its basic form to a gaseous form suitable for
beginning an entirely new process called uranium enrichment. Much work and
an entirely separate process is then used to enrich uranium to weapons
grade.
AHF is also used to convert basic uranium to a form suitable for
manufacture of reactor fuel. In addition, AHF has other uses. One of the
reasons why it's not on any international nuclear control list is because
it has many uses and is used in many different chemical processes,
including, as some have indicated, as a precursor to the nerve agent Sarin.
That's why it's on the Australia Group list. It is a highly caustic and
difficult-to-manufacture-and-handle chemical.
The point of all this is that we've moved to a point now in the recent
years in non-proliferation, where rather than trying to stop countries from
transferring nearly complete weaponization programs for either nuclear
weapons or missiles, we're down to a very low level. We're down to the
ingredients that can be used for processes that then can be used for
possibly enriching uranium. So we're working way down in the weeds here to
try to prevent non-proliferation dangers from sprouting. Therefore, it is
easy for people to make more of what a particular agent or chemical or
capability can do than it really can do.
In other words, it's a long way from taking the uranium to a useable form
for making uranium into enriched uranium that can be used for bombs. And
it is not as simple or as dramatic as there's a tendency to make it.
QUESTION: Did the US inquire of the Chinese about this because the US
feared it might have been used in connection with the Bushehr plant or some
other aspect of Iranian nuclear --
MR. RUBIN: Again, with the usual caveat that I'm under in situations like
this, let me just say that we spend an enormous amount of time and effort
keeping track of, keeping tabs on, working on the process of preventing
Iran from developing a nuclear capability. So whenever we see something
that might in any way advance their knowledge or make it marginally easier,
we raise our eyebrows, we ask questions and we try to stop it. But that's
not the same as implying that Iran was on the verge of getting an
ingredient that is so unique and so dangerous that it would put them on the
fast track to a nuclear weapons capability; because this clearly was not
the case in this incident.
QUESTION: Is it true that the ban on US civilian nuclear-related sales to
China ends in ten days unless Congress blocks it? Is that --
MR. RUBIN: I don't know the number of days, but it is correct that the
peaceful agreement - the 1,2,3 agreement, as it is called - would go into
effect if Congress doesn't act negatively in a small number of days.
Now, this issue obviously arises in the context of discussions of us trying
to show what progress we've made. And in that regard, let me point out
that we believe, as a result of our discussions with the Chinese, that the
Chinese are taking very seriously their assurance that they are not going
to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran. And our discussions with
the Chinese and our independent judgments support the fact that the Chinese
are taking very seriously this assurance.
QUESTION: Any effect on the President's travel plans to China, of this
episode? I mean, does this episode play into that at all?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think so. I think the President himself said that --
not surprisingly, the same thing that I said - which is that this is an
indication of how the process can work well; that when you want to fight
the fight against non-proliferation, that you need to work together rather
than cutting off your ties. That's why he believes this is an area that
you want to work with them on. I believe he was quite forward-leaning on
the timing for his trip, in comments he made at the White House.
QUESTION: Jamie, can you help me procedurally? In a situation like this,
where you have a "concern," is it normal, procedurally, to raise it in the
form of a demarche?
MR. RUBIN: Well, demarche is a broad-based term we use here in the
Department. It could be as simple as a phone call; it could be as
elaborate as a letter from the President of the United States. And there's
a lot in between. But what that means is that there is contact with a
government from another country about an issue of concern to us, and that
did happen in this case.
QUESTION: I want to go to another subject, but are there more questions
on this?
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: On China, yes.
QUESTION: There's also a report in The Washington Times, that in addition
to Iran, there's also transfer of something - they don't say what - to
Palestine. Do you have anything on that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there's always a report like that in that paper. I've
given up trying to comment on it.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Sorry if you've taken this one up, Jamie, but there seems to be
a good PRC element and a rogue PRC element involved here in these nuclear
matters. Is the PRC government not aware of what its right hand is doing -
the left to the right?
MR. RUBIN: I think I tried to answer this in response to Ralph's
question. We are now engaged at a level of non-proliferation that is very
low down. We're talking about the kind of cooperation that isn't directly
related to nuclear -- manufacture of nuclear weapons or even the precursor
to that; but rather, a transfer of a chemical like this.
As I said in response to an earlier question, I have no illusions that in
China when an official is involved in a discussion like this, that at some
point along the way, the Chinese Government can directly engage. But as
far as we know, the policy-maker level, when apprised of this situation,
inquired, discovered that there wasn't an intention to transfer, there
wasn't an agreement to transfer and assured us there wouldn't be a
transfer. That's called non-proliferation.
QUESTION: On North Korea: There was some reporting overnight about some
sort of a statement that the North Koreans gave out to diplomats that got
people all sort of concerned about whether they were mobilizing a war or
doing something extraordinary in terms of the military.
MR. RUBIN: Well, this is, as far as I can tell from the experts, a sort
of an annual ritual in this area. We've seen media reports. North Korea
is conducting its annual winter exercises. We will be monitoring the
situation closely, and comparing this exercise to previous such activities.
My colleagues at the Pentagon have suggested that in many respects, the
level of operations are lower and that overall, the training level is down.
With respect to putting limits on foreigners' travel that is part of this
report, it's not unusual, unfortunately, in North Korea that there are
limitations put on travel inside North Korea. But the North Korean
authorities have told us that they will continue to permit visits by
foreigners to local areas related to food assistance during the period of
this exercise.
QUESTION: The United States has been in touch with North Korea directly
since this --
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. What I said was this is a normal
procedure; and therefore, this time of year this kind of thing often
happens - or annually happens. And in the process of getting assurances
about what our monitors can do, or international monitors can do in North
Korea, I believe the discussion was that that would need to take place even
during a period of exercises such as this.
I don't have any information about contact regarding this reported issuance
of a note. I do know that right now in Berlin, there is a discussion
between the United States and North Korea. That is a preliminary to the
four-party process. But I wouldn't be surprised, in any diplomatic
contact, that such an issue would arise. What I'm indicating is that we've
had prior assurances that this wouldn't interfere with the monitoring
process for food assistance.
QUESTION: Jamie, touching on the Berlin talks: Did the North Koreans, for
example, tell the US about these exercises or make any statements in the
talks about this episode and --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that this was a big deal, because, as I
indicated, it's such a ritual occurrence on an annual basis.
Charles Kartman is now meeting with the North Korean vice foreign minister
to discuss issues on our bilateral agenda. This is the latest in a series
of meetings that Mr. Kartman and Mr. Kim have had. There will be officials
from the NSC and the Pentagon there. The meeting began about a few hours
ago our time, and we haven't received a report from that meeting.
QUESTION: Anything about - will it affect in any way the beginning of the
Monday sessions in Geneva?
MR. RUBIN: We haven't heard anything. As far as we know, everything is
on track.
QUESTION: * Yesterday the President apparently received the wrestlers who
had been in Iran. How should one sort of look at that in a diplomatic
sense? Is this another overture by the United States - by receiving these
medalists, or these wrestlers, was the United States showing another sort
of positive sign to Tehran?
MR. RUBIN: We are encouraged by the warm welcome the visitors received in
Iran. As you know, we had concerns that we've talked about quite a bit
from this podium, and we believe that our concerns in these areas can be
resolved best through government-to-government dialogue, and they can be
overcome through that dialogue. But we do welcome increased contact
between our two peoples; and this is clearly a case of contact that can
improve the understanding on the part of Iranians of Americans and
vice-versa. So we certainly welcome this kind of contact.
As far as what this means, again, we are pursuing our policy as we know
best, through our discussions, through our public comments and we're not
going to pre-judge what any particular event may or may not do. What
matters here is increasing mutual understanding and increasing the degree
to which the people of Iran understand what the people of America care
about and vice versa. As you know, we still have under review various
steps we might take to increase those contacts in terms of easing certain
restrictions. But we welcome increased contact between the two, and
certainly this was a dramatic contact between Americans and Iranians, I
think, for any of us who saw the results of that wrestling match and the
warmth with which those wrestlers were received. It's certainly not an
accident that the President is meeting with them.
QUESTION: * What, if anything, can you say about the fact that President
Khatemi's advisor on women apparently was here yesterday.
MR. RUBIN: I have no information on that.
QUESTION: Does the court decision --
MR. RUBIN: Are you still on Iran?
QUESTION: This is on Iran, yes. Does the court decision --
MR. RUBIN: You two should be able to work out an acceptable arrangement.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: If I don't ask it right, though, he might.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: No, we don't have any, do we?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Does the court decision awarding I think it's $247 million to
the victims of terrorism that was allegedly sponsored by Iran in any way
complicate US policy in this area?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, we're studying that court decision. It's quite
complicated. This is, in a sense, a case of first impression because of
the fact that it was pursued under this law. Our legal adviser has been
studying this and trying to give the best advice he can about its
significance legally - what steps we, the State Department, may or may not
have to take.
But I don't think it's a surprise that we in this government and,
therefore, the people of this country, have deep and profound concerns
about Iranian support for groups that conduct terrorism. That's what this
case is about; that's what our policy has been designed to change; and
that's what we think can best be changed by a government-to-government
dialogue and the change in actions that would flow with the encouraging
words that we saw from President Khatemi and his statement to the American
people.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I'm getting double-teamed by one news organization. This is a
good trick.
QUESTION: You said a few minutes ago that you welcome increased contacts
between our two peoples, with Iran.
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Unless something's happened in the last couple of days, the US
officially still refers to Iran as a place that is dangerous because of its
anti-American atmosphere; and that travel warning, as far as I know,
remains in effect. Is it still in effect; and how does that jibe with
welcoming increased contact?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we think that through the proper kind of contact that
the atmosphere that our warning still is in effect entails will ease; that
would be the hope. We're not suggesting that just anybody go do anything
in Iran. The wrestlers clearly had the endorsement of the Iranian
Government; they had the procedures associated with that endorsement. That
is different than any old American tourist being advised by us of what the
risks and possibilities are for his travel or her travel to Iran.
QUESTION: Does the warning --
MR. RUBIN: You switched seats on us.
QUESTION: Huh?
MR. RUBIN: You changed seats on us here.
QUESTION: Well, I'll tell you why later.
MR. RUBIN: Don't.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: All right. You asked. Jamie, does the warning that was
received by the US Government specifically for the Pentagon that's been -
that Ken Bacon said yesterday was credible in some ways, at least - does
that have any bearing at all on terrorist groups that may be sponsored by
Iran? Or can you tell us, enlighten us at all about where it's coming
from?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information on what the basis of the Pentagon
statement was.
QUESTION: I wanted to touch base with you, if I could, on Northern
Ireland. A bunch of folks are coming into town - Gerry Adams is going to
be here, Trimble is coming into town, Mo Mowlam. I'm curious about a
couple of things. Do you anticipate any sort of substantive work being
done in the meetings with those folks, or are these primarily just
meet-and-greet type things? And I'm curious about the US view of Mr. Adams
and Sinn Fein at this point. There's been a couple of incidents of
violence in recent times. Sinn Fein always seems to claim that they are
set aside from the IRA, that they're not associated. I'm curious what the
US view is at this point.
MR. RUBIN: Well, our view on the relationship there has not changed. The
Irish Prime Minister, the British-Northern Ireland Secretary, the heads of
all the political parties participating in the Northern Ireland peace talks
will be among those coming to Washington over the next few days for the
various St. Patrick's Day events early next week. Gerry Adams will be
among those Northern Ireland leaders in attendance at the President's
St. Patrick's Day reception.
Let me emphasize that the hard work, the unsung work that is done is done
under the chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell in the region. These
multi-party talks continue under his chairmanship. That's where the real
work gets accomplished. And I doubt that that is going to change because
they're all here. At the same time, whenever an issue like this is ripe,
as it is obviously ripe now, and there are many countries and many people
involved who are in contact with each other, one often hopes that some
contact will yield adjustments in positions or greater flexibility or
greater willingness to operate.
With respect to Sinn Fein, we fully expect the cease-fire will be respected
and maintained if Sinn Fein is to remain a serious participant in this
process.
QUESTION: If I could on that, do you anticipate that people will be
urging Mr. Adams further to return his delegation to the talks when they
resume? Apparently he hasn't yet said flatly that they will rejoin, as
Mr. Blair has been --
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, one of the reasons this whole process is
in the expectation that he will rejoin the talks this week.
QUESTION: Is there any doubt in the Administration's mind that President
Milosevic ordered the police action in Kosovo these past weeks?
MR. RUBIN: There is no - let me give you an example. I mean, again,
"ordered" is one of those words that I'm going to be very cautious about
using, for obvious reasons. But clearly, today the latest reports that we
have are that there was a major peaceful demonstration in Kosovo, and that
the police allowed the demonstration to go on peacefully. This is in
marked contrast to the demonstrations that occurred on March 2nd , and in
stark contrast to the crackdown that occurred over the weekend.
The point of that is that when the Serbian authorities want to avoid the
kind of direct action that yielded the killings of innocent people and the
movement of ethnically-based refugees out of a given area, they know how to
do that. And it's clear from these demonstrations that a large portion of
the population there very much wants their rights respected, and wants to
pursue that goal through peaceful means.
We believe that these events occurred inside Serbia. As you know, we do
not support the independence of Kosovo. President Milosevic is politically
responsible for what goes on in his country. Therefore, it's hard for us
to believe that these kind of crackdowns could occur over his objections.
But with respect to any direct, legal responsibility, I did just make an
announcement today about the War Crimes Tribunal, and it would be up to
them to make a judgment as to what the chain of command involves in a case
like this or whether, indeed, the application of the War Crimes Tribunal
would apply in the sense that these are violations of international
humanitarian law.
That's for them to decide, and responsibility is for them to decide. But
certainly at a political level, what goes on in that country, we believe he
is in a position to shape.
QUESTION: So you'd said in the Bosnian conflict - or not you, but your
predecessors - that the Administration is willing to let war crimes
investigations go where it will, even if it does go up to the level of
President Milosevic. Now you've donated almost a little more than $1
million for similar investigations in Kosovo. I'm wondering whether you
would have the same position, or maybe even suspect there may be a little
stronger evidence here that President Milosevic might be implicated in at
least ordering, not ordering each guy to pull the trigger, but --
MR. RUBIN: Right. Let me answer the question this way: we took quite a
forward-leaning position in inviting the Tribunal to act so quickly here,
and we have a tribunal in process. We're now assisting its capabilities,
and that obviously didn't exist in past years.
At a minimum, we hope the involvement of the Tribunal, or the possible
involvement of the Tribunal will serve as a powerful deterrent against
those who might be in a position to take such acts the next time. With
respect to how the Tribunal decides what the culpability is in these
events, and whether that culpability rises in the chain of command, that is
for them to decide, and we have no interest in interfering with that
process.
We have demonstrated, I think, by the donation we have made today that we
want the Tribunal to be able to do its work and, as I said, at a minimum we
hope it will be a powerful reminder to those who might be asked to conduct
such operations in the future about what they might face. Let's bear in
mind that there are many, many indicted war criminals who now are in the
dock in The Hague -- a lot of those who thought the War Crimes Tribunal
would never get down to business. There are now many, many indictees
there. They have been surrendering and some have been picked up. This is
a serious piece of business that everyone in the region should understand
has the full backing of the United States of America.
QUESTION: Jamie, conversely, I mean, you said it would be difficult to
imagine this sort of thing happening in Serbia over President Milosevic's
objections. Can you take that a step further and say that it would be
difficult to imagine this happening without his authorization?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to make those kinds of judgments. I don't have
the evidence for the chain of command for this event. I do believe we
think that President Milosevic is politically in charge of his country.
When we want to get something done by the Serbs, we go to President
Milosevic, and he has demonstrated an ability to implement what he decides.
With respect to these incidents, they are now under investigation, we hope,
by the Tribunal -- and they won't be unless there is an acquiescence on the
part of the Serbs to let them do that, obviously. But the signal has been
sent that the Tribunal's jurisdiction applies. At a minimum, that will be
a powerful deterrent; at a maximum, they will be able to do their work and
come to some conclusion. But I wouldn't want to pre-judge that conclusion.
QUESTION: The Latvians and the Russians seem to be in a minority - the
Russian minority in Latvia. Who do you blame for this? Is it the Russians
trying to make a provocation with Latvia or do you feel the Latvians are
mistreating their Russian minority?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there are problems there that we hope the governments
work out with the maximum amount of cooperation. We have had concerns in
these areas that have been contained in our human rights reports, and I
would point you to those. But at this point, we don't think it's
necessarily useful to point fingers. We want these problems to be
resolved.
QUESTION: You're not saying one side or the other -
MR. RUBIN: Well, at this point we don't think it's useful to point
fingers. We want the problems to be resolved.
QUESTION: Can I ask you something about the meeting yesterday with
General Karamat in the State Department. I understand the meeting was
attended, among others, by Pickering, as well as Holum, as well as
Inderfurth. Because of their attendance, I was wondering whether it's
really wide in scope and can you say something about that?
MR. RUBIN: I believe the Secretary even dropped by that meeting. I ran
into her heading in that direction; I don't know if it actually happened.
But let me get you a full readout on that meeting and what was discussed
after the briefing.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, I don't know whether you have any - whether this is the
right occasion to ask or not, but there is sort of a ten-day clock ticking
from the London conference -- tomorrow would be, I guess, half-way through
and we don't have an opportunity to ask you tomorrow. Is there anything
you would care to say about how President Milosevic is handling the ten-day
period in light of London's very specific call for him to open a dialogue
in Kosovo, and with regard to the behavior of Serbian police and military
forces inside Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we don't see any of the steps the Contact Group demanded
-- that is, removing the police force and starting the process of dialogue
- being implemented. We think there needs to be an unconditional,
well-prepared dialogue so that we can resolve this issue at the negotiating
table rather than on the battlefield. We haven't seen evidence of that.
The Contact Group countries are in regular contact now to implement the
measures that were set forth in that statement.
The Security Council is now discussing the arms embargo. We are working
with other countries to implement the other steps. We are trying to
develop lists of the senior officials whose visas would be denied under
these steps, and preparing the way to take additional measures if there
isn't a dramatic shift in the pattern of cooperation on the part of the
Serbian Government that we have yet to see.
QUESTION: I take it yesterday's public call for a dialogue in Kosovo was
not - you didn't even mention that just now. That does not even rise -
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I said yesterday, I believe, or it might have been
the day before - I kind of don't remember. As I said earlier in the week,
the initial call seemed to us to be more a propaganda exercise than a
serious proposal. It was more designed to justify military action than to
apologize for the deaths. It was more designed to show some willingness to
negotiate while taking a posture that was -- undoubtedly the Serbian side
knew would not yield the result. So our standard is an unconditional,
well-prepared dialogue. That is what we are looking for and we have yet to
see it.
QUESTION: I'm sure this is no surprise to you that members - your
colleagues on the Hill are coming out already saying that having an
American involvement in the Kosovo situation is something that they would
not support and would be adamantly opposed to. I know that you don't want
to hypothesize; you've said that many times. But you've already said that
you're not ruling anything in or out, so is this a hurdle you think you are
going to get past, should the situation warrant an American troop
involvement or an expansion of NATO in the region?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this. The NATO Secretary General obviously was in
Albania yesterday and is talking to the Albanians about steps that we can
take to increase the confidence they have had in their military. NATO
undertook to arrange a series of 12 advisory team visits in the aftermath
of the 1997 crisis to restructure the Albanian military, to consolidate
democratic authority and assist with logistical and management training and
draw up a broad strategic concept. In addition, the Partnership for Peace
is involved, providing regular military advice and assistance in a
clearinghouse format to coordinate activities. That is the base from which
Secretary General Solana was going to operate from, and we think it is
important for this kind of contact to go on.
As far as the critics, the critics will criticize; and we in the
Administration have to do what we think is best for the national security
of the United States. The last two Administrations, that is President
Clinton and President Bush, have both made clear that a spinning out of
control of a crisis in Kosovo could affect the vital interests of the
United States because it involves NATO allies, it involves the Balkans; and
that is why President Bush and President Clinton both believed that it was
a serious matter in recent years. This is not a partisan issue. This is a
matter of national security where the last two Presidents have made clear
that this is a serious issue, that it could have grave consequences, and
that we need to treat it seriously.
As I have said earlier, we have a number of options available to us. We
are not ruling options out at this stage. That would be imprudent. We are
considering what steps to take. In the American political system, there
are critics who criticize whatever step we take. We have to do what we
think is right for the American people and for the national security of the
United States.
QUESTION: Different subject. A Senate resolution earlier today - Iraq,
Saddam Hussein going to war crimes -- how does the State Department view
that? Is there any substance, any impact from this, or is this -
MR. RUBIN: We do support an effort to document Iraqi war crimes,
including those of Saddam Hussein and to establish an
internationally-recognized record of such war crimes. We made clear last
year that we support the "indict campaign" which seeks to assemble such a
record; and we would be supportive of a war crimes tribunal that build on
this assembled record.
While there now appears to be little support in the Security Council for
such a tribunal, it is possible that an effective, vigorous, fact-finding
process might well improve the chances of support in the Security Council.
So we are supportive of this idea. We support a fact-finding mission. We
supported the" indict campaign." And, hopefully, when evidence is gathered
and information is assessed and analyzed, there will be greater support in
the international community for a tribunal. But it is premature to make
that judgment at this point.
QUESTION: On the peace process in the Middle East, there was a suggestion
in one of the papers you all tend to pay attention to today that the
Clinton Administration is preparing -
MR. RUBIN: There are no newspapers we pay more or less attention to.
Some we have greater and lesser regard for.
QUESTION: But that the Administration is, as it has threatened to go
public with its ideas for how much territory the Israelis should cede in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and specific steps the Palestinians should
take on the security front. Can you -
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this -- we are extremely concerned about the
situation in the Middle East right now. The reaction on the ground to the
use of lethal force which resulted in the deaths of three Palestinians is a
strong indicator of the underlying resentment that exists there that is a
function of the crisis of confidence that has evolved so tragically in the
Middle East peace process. Secretary Albright has worked assiduously on
this process. We don't intend to surprise anyone.
At the same time, we think it's extremely important that the leaders of the
region understand that they have to make decisions if their aspirations and
the wishes and the goals and the reasonable desires of their people are to
be met. We are actively talking amongst ourselves about what the best way
is to revitalize the Middle East peace process. Clearly, it's not making
any progress right now. As Secretary Albright has said, 1997 was not a
good year for the peace process, and so far 1998 hasn't been much better.
What we are doing, therefore, is looking at our options and analyzing the
situation, and when we have some new proposal or new ideas -- as opposed to
an American plan -- we will share those with you.
QUESTION: The Turkish Government lately, they make unconditional dialogue
call for the government of Greece. But yesterday we learn the government
of Greece has rejected this kind of call. Usually the State Department
described this kind of rejection from the Greek side as positive step. How
do you describe this time the Greek-side behavior on these rejections?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to challenge the premise of your question, as you
know, but there hasn't been a lot of progress we have seen identified
publicly in this area. We want progress in this area, but I'm not familiar
with the specific idea that was rejected that I allegedly might praise, so
I really can't comment on that specifically. But we'll try to get my able
deputy to give you a full-fledged briefing on everything we know on this as
soon as our Friday calm and relaxed briefing here at the State Department
ends.
QUESTION: On Russia/Kosovo, has Secretary Albright been in touch with
Mr. Primakov regarding his plans and his discussions with the Serbs? And
on a somewhat related matter, has the US received, either from him or
others, any kind of comment about President Yeltsin's health or any kind of
reassurance or information or anything like that?
MR. RUBIN: With regard to President Yeltsin's health, let me say this -
at the risk of commenting on the health of a leader, and at the risk of
using press reports to do so, according to press reports, the Kremlin
reports that Yeltsin is suffering from an upper respiratory ailment. He is
recuperating at a dacha. We wish President Yeltsin a speedy recovery. He
appears to be keeping a busy schedule in general. He appeared on
television yesterday. On Tuesday he met with leaders from the North
Caucasus. He's been consulting extensively with government officials
there. The last time a US official saw President Yeltsin was when
Ambassador Collins presented his credentials on January 19th. But
President Clinton did speak with President Yeltsin by telephone on February
23rd. That is what I can share with you about President Yeltsin's health.
With regard to Kosovo and our contacts with the Russian Government, I am
not aware of any phone call or direct oral contact between the two foreign
ministers. I suspect at the working level, there's been a lot of
discussion; certainly there has been in New York with the Russian
representative there. And I think at the political director's level, there
may have been additional contact.
We're still working out the arrangements for the next group meeting of the
Contact Group in Washington on the 25th. But I don't think any final
decisions have been made.
QUESTION: Isn't Primakov supposed to go, or has he already gone?
MR. RUBIN: No, he would - it's - I would have to get you the date, but I
believe it's still at least a week away before he goes to Belgrade.
QUESTION: The Iraqi Foreign Minister has asserted that Iraq no longer has
any weapons of mass destruction, no warheads, et cetera. What is the US
reaction to --
MR. RUBIN: Sounds like I'm not even going to need my book for that one.
QUESTION: What is the US reaction to that? Is it possible that they
forgot where they buried them?
MR. RUBIN: Even at the risk of commenting on a press report that I
haven't seen, let me say this - we believe that the Iraqi Government is
still not providing UNSCOM the access, information and materials it needs
to make a judgment. There are huge gaps in the area of missiles, in the
area of chemical weapons, in the area of biological weapons that Iraq has
refused to come clean on.
If they were to come clean, UNSCOM would be in a position to assess whether
indeed there is additional work that needs to be done, or whether indeed
particular errors can be deemed closed in terms of the declarations
matching the evidence.
We are a long, long way from that because of a repeated pattern of Iraqi
stonewalling over the years. And UNSCOM, as well as the outside monitoring
teams, have said over and over again that Iraq has failed to provide
information, failed to provide explanations and failed to do what is
necessary for UNSCOM to finish its work or even to be able to resolve the
huge discrepancies that still exist in this area.
QUESTION: So just more smoke?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'm sure you can write your own lead, but we certainly
don't agree with that.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:25 P.M.)
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