U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #31, 98-03-11

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U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Wednesday, March 11, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

ANNOUNCEMENTS/DEPARTMENT
1		U.S. Condemns Attack on Karen refugee camp in Thailand
3,13		Secretary Albright not likely to accompany President
		  Clinton on his trip to Africa
17		Background briefing this afternoon on Four Party Korea
		  talks
SERBIA / FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
1-3,5		Contact Group statement requirements/Ten day deadline on
		  FRY authorities to comply/Russian commitment to the
		  Contact Group agreement on UN Security Council
		  consideration of an arms embargo against FRY
3,4		Contact Group meeting on March 25/Secretary Albright's
		  participation/Possible action at March 25 meeting
3,7-8		Early burials of victims of violence in Kosovo/External
		  investigation into the violence/Amb. Gelbard conversation
		  with Pres. Milosevic/International Red Cross access to
		  Kosovo/International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia role
		  in investigation
4,5-6		FRY offer of conditional dialogue with Kosovar Albanians /
		  Participants in a meaningful dialogue/U.S. position on
		  political definition of Kosovo 
4		Definition of "ethnic cleansing"
6		U.S. position on the use of force in Kosovo/International
		  concerns about the international situation in Kosovo
IRAN
8-9,11		Judicial decision against Iran in the case of a U.S. victim
		  of a terrorist attack in Israel
9-11		Iranian support of terrorism/USG relationship with
		  Pres. Khatemi/Requirements for a future U.S.-Iran dialogue
UNITED NATIONS
11-13		Possibility that legislation authorizing the repayment of
		  U.S. arrears to the UN will include language on family
		  planning ("Mexico City" language) 
SAUDI ARABIA
13-14,18-19	Update on the health of King Fahd
IRAQ
14-15		Structure of UNSCOM relationship with new diplomatic
		  observer group led by Amb. Dhanapala
15-17		Initial judicial finding that 6 Iraqis are ineligible for
		  immigration relief in the U.S./Evacuation of Iraqi Kurds
		  and opposition members in 1996/USG relationship with the
		  Iraqi opposition
18		Iraqi complaints of U.S. blocking contracts under the
		  "oil-for-food" program
RUSSIA
17-18		Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting/Press conference at
		  conclusion of meeting
18		U.S. reaction upon Russian ratification of START II treaty
INDONESIA
19-20		Japanese PM Hashimoto to visit Pres. Suharto/IMF compliance
CYPRUS
20		Comments of Turkish community on Cyprus re conditions for
		  participation in political talks

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #31

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1998, 1:20 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to this State Department briefing. I don't see any of those who traveled with us made it today. That's unfortunate.

But let me start by saying that the United States condemns the attack by armed elements associated with Burma's State Peace and Development Council - that's the new name for the SLORC - on unarmed civilians in a care and refugee camp in Thailand on Tuesday, March 10. We call on the government of Burma to end its campaign of terror and violence against ethnic minorities, and instead to engage in dialogue with the ethnic groups and with the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Sui Kyi, to bring about national reconciliation in Burma.

Let's start with a new person - Barry Schweid.

QUESTION: Clarification please, a little logistics. The Contact Group meeting was in London.

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: You have another meeting here on the 25th.

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: But that's more than a two-week span from the previous one. So what is, to be literal about it, what is the time span Milosevic has to shape up or face a move for new sanctions - until the 25th?

MR. RUBIN: He has ten days, according to the Contact Group statement, if he doesn't take rapid and effective steps to stop the violence - the steps that are laid out in the statement. These must be done within ten days, otherwise, the Contact Group will move to further international measures. The measure identified is the freeze on assets.

So this is an ongoing process. The decision was made by five countries - Italy, France, the United Kingdom and the United States and Germany - to impose that additional step, the freeze on assets. That decision was made now to be triggered if he fails to follow through on the steps required.

QUESTION: But requiring the UN Security Council to --

MR. RUBIN: Well, this is to be determined. There are some - let me try to do the best I can with this. This was a very rapidly moving situation. When the Secretary got on the plane to go to the first leg of her trip, there was no package of sanctions in her brief. These were sanctions that were developed on the aircraft by her and her advisors, in the face of an ongoing situation. So the kinds of steps - an arms embargo, a ban on equipment that could be used for repression, a visa ban, as well as the prohibition on government financing - are steps that can be taken without a Security Council resolution, if countries so choose. And the first step in building international support for this stiff response was to get the Contact Group countries to endorse them.

That endorsement occurred on those four; it occurred on the fifth, to be triggered in ten days. And now the Contact Group members are working assiduously to implement those measures. In the first case - the arms embargo - there is expected to be Security Council consideration of an arms embargo. The point there is not so much that the European countries and the United States transfer arms to Serbia, but rather we have some concerns that the Russian Government may begin some military cooperation in this area, and that other governments around the world may, in the aftermath of the Dayton accords, begin pouring weapons into Serbia. So we would be working to develop a Security Council resolution to prohibit that.

On the asset freeze, this is a complicated technical issue that the treasury departments of governments are now consulting on. Some governments believe that it needs the action of the Security Council before it could implement that; others believe it could be implemented without that. That's what we're working on right now.

QUESTION: One question - on the weapons, is it your understanding that Russia is going along only so far as having it considered by the Security Council, presumably to abide by any decision?

MR. RUBIN: You'll have to have the Russian representatives give you their formal position. But given the tenor of the meeting, the discussion that was had, the discussion the Secretary had with Foreign Minister Primakov, I would be surprised if the Russian Government blocked an imposition of a Security Council resolution; and doubly surprised, if that resolution were passed, that they were to break that resolution.

QUESTION: Do you understand a $1.5 million deal - did you understand whatever ban there might be applies prospectively; or would it apply also to that recent --

MR. RUBIN: You're talking about the telephone system with the Italians.

QUESTION: Right.

MR. RUBIN: That is something --

QUESTION: No, the Russian weapons deal. There's also the telephone deal.

MR. RUBIN: Well, I didn't make any specific comment on a specific number of Russian weaponry. If there was a ban on arms sales --

QUESTION: That's the question.

MR. RUBIN: That would apply, once the ban was in place. I am not aware of any transfers of arms. I am aware there are discussions about resuming a military relationship. So long as the arms embargo were to be put into effect prior to the transfers, it would b prospective, in the sense that these embargoes, as my --

QUESTION: It's the delivery, not the contract.

MR. RUBIN: Correct. These embargoes would prohibit the transfer of weaponry. If that weaponry hadn't yet been transferred, it would then apply prospectively.

QUESTION: Fine. One fast last question. Meeting's here the 25th. I think that's a conflict with the trip to Africa. Will the Secretary be, do you think, at the Contact Group meeting; or do you know at this point?

MR. RUBIN: The decision as to whether that meeting will be a Foreign Minister-level meeting or political directors, or perhaps at the special envoy level, has not been determined. I think it's become clear during the course of the day that the Secretary is not likely to go on the trip with the President to Africa. So that would not be a conflict for her, if it were a foreign ministers' meeting.

QUESTION: Jamie, two things. Why isn't the Secretary going to Africa, since that's been - that subject has been introduced? And then I have a second question.

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary has to make her decisions based on a number of factors - scheduling, timing, other events, budgetary pressures, the work that needs to be done here in Washington. She and the President and Mr. Berger and others talked about the various pros and cons of her being on the trip. At this point it looks like the pros of her staying in Washington or being available for other activities outweigh the cons of her not going. So that's where we are right now. I consider it unlikely that she will go; but it's some days away, and that decision can always be revisited.

QUESTION: And have you seen any evidence that Milosevic has done what the Contact Group called for him to do, which is to pull back from military actions?

MR. RUBIN: No, on the contrary. What we've seen is an outrageous decision by the Serbian police to conduct early burials. These are burials that were conducted without the approval of the families. This action suggests that President Milosevic has something to hide. We are concerned that the burials have destroyed and damaged evidence before it could be properly examined by independent forensic experts.

Bob Gelbard requested that the families be able to have the bodies examined by outside authorities. This was a message the Contact Group made with regard to outside information being made available. This is another demonstration of the intransigence and flouting of the will of the international community by President Milosevic. It's this kind of uncooperative behavior that undermines the prospect for meaningful dialogue in Kosovo, and that raises serious doubts as to whether he will take the steps that the Contact Group has called for.

QUESTION: Jamie, on that point, Milosevic's government, I think last night, did offer the resumption of dialogue with the Albanians on no conditions except that they give up their desire for independence. I'm just wondering, do you regard that as a serious offer or just a cynical one, in light of what else they've done?

MR. RUBIN: Again, "no conditions except" is a formulation that doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

Let me say this - we and the Contact Group members believe that both sides - - the Serbian authorities, as well as the representatives of the Kosovar Albanians- must get into a meaningful political dialogue without preconditions. This is a situation that can spin out of control. This is a situation that Secretary Albright is determined to do what she can to prevent from spinning out of control. Belgrade's offer, as reported and described by you, is woefully inadequate, even if it signals the possibility of dialogue.

What we want is both sides to make clear that they are prepared to talk their way through this problem so the kinds of atrocities that we saw - the ethnic cleansing that we saw over the last week - is not repeated, and the people of the region get their legitimate rights met and the Serbian Government gets its legitimate desire for its territorial integrity to be protected.

That's not going to be resolved by making preconditions or by burying bodies before investigators get a chance to look at it.

QUESTION: When you say ethnic cleansing, would you define that as what you've seen in the last week as ethnic cleansing? What makes that ethnic cleansing?

MR. RUBIN: Well, at the risk of getting into an extensive discussion with someone who may be the world's greatest expert on the subject, let me say this - that when civilians and people are targeted and killed based on their ethnicity and driven out of their homes based on their ethnicity, that is, in my book, ethnic cleansing.

QUESTION: Jamie, you've given President Milosevic an ultimatum, a deadline to which he needs to respond or reverse course. You just said that he's not starting off on the right foot, and the question, then, that comes to mind is, what happens after the 25th, should the results you're looking for you don't get? And what - is the Contact Group prepared to take swift and firm action - firmer action - against him? Or are you going to wait this out for two more weeks?

MR. RUBIN: If I'm not mistaken, today is March 11. March 25 is two weeks from now. I'm not going to be in a position to project for you what steps will be considered at a meeting two weeks from now. What I can point you to is the statement by the Contact Group, talking about firmer measures that would be applied, including the asset freeze that was discussed. Foreign Minister Primakov, himself, indicated that they would take a look at the third and fourth of the steps that the other five countries support now - namely, the ban on government financing for privatizations and the prohibition on visas for senior officials responsible.

So those are three issues that have already been identified. Beyond saying that we have a number of options available to us, and that we are not ruling any of them out, I am not in a position to project what we will decide to do two weeks from now.

QUESTION: Jaime, let's go back to your statement that you think there should be a meaningful dialogue between the two sides without preconditions. How does that - I thought the US position was there can be no statehood for Kosovo; there can be enhanced autonomy. But you seem to be saying that both sides should come to the table without ruling that out. Can you square that?

MR. RUBIN: If people want to come to the table and talk, they can do that. We've seen that all over the world -- parties that had diametrically- opposed positions that managed to find a way to sit down and talk without giving up their positions. If they want to have a discussion, they will have to move off their maximal demands publicly in order to begin a meaningful dialogue.

It is not new for us to take the view that if we want to solve a problem, that it's better to have it solved at the negotiating table rather than solved on the killing field. It is our view that the way to do this is for the sides to move off their maximum demands; sit down and negotiate arrangements, including the implementation of the education agreements that were negotiated in the past; and that that doesn't require people to give up their positions - it requires them to sit down and talk about how we can make progress peacefully, rather than see more killings and more death.

QUESTION: Just to clear - I want to be absolutely clear. You're not saying that statehood should be on the table?

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure you're familiar with our position on this subject; and let me say what our position is.

QUESTION: I'm familiar with yesterday.

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's still the same position. I can assure you it didn't change between yesterday and today. Our view is that the Kosovar Albanians have a right to greater self-administration; they have legitimate political rights that ought to be respected. We do not believe in the independence of Kosovo, but that doesn't mean that one can't sit down and begin to talk about practical ways to improve the lives and enact the legitimate rights of the people of the region without requiring a complete resolution to every issue of principle that exists. This is a standard problem around the world that, if people want to see violence ensue, they can stick to their maximum demands. Or they can decide that they care about the welfare of their people, and they can sit down and start improving it.

QUESTION: Is the Administration ready to restate what the previous Administration had said on using the threat of force to prevent violent repression of Albanians in the region?

MR. RUBIN: The best answer I can provide to you is that this is a matter of the most seriousness to the President and the Secretary of State. This is an area of the world that, if it spins out of control, can affect the vital interests of our allies in NATO. It's a grave matter; and in that situation, we have many options available to us. And I'm not going to rule any option out.

QUESTION: So I guess President Bush's Christmas warning is still government policy?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to discuss in detail the nature of any warnings that may have been issued through diplomatic channels.

QUESTION: On the Security Council deliberations, there's a report that opposition to putting all the blame on the Serbian side, coming from a surprising source, the Chinese. Is that in fact the case?

MR. RUBIN: Say that again.

QUESTION: That the Chinese are objecting to what they consider to be an unbalanced placing of responsibilities on Yugoslavia. They think that Kosovo bears part of the responsibility and should, therefore, take some of the consequences.

MR. RUBIN: Without purporting to describe the Chinese position for the Chinese Government, let me say this - we do not believe this is an internal matter. We, in the Security Council, in many past cases, we have made clear that if a situation within a country that we accept its boundaries risks spinning out of control and affecting the international peace and security of the neighbors, that it is a matter that is legitimately to be discussed and perhaps decided upon by the Security Council.

This is one of those cases where the scenarios are quite familiar to all of you. We have a situation where Albanian refugees from Kosovo could find themselves in one of the neighboring countries. One of those neighboring countries may feel that it needs to go to protect that country. That is why the Albanian Government had asked for a meeting in Brussels with the NATO alliance - to discuss how to ensure that stability in that area can be protected.

So whatever the Chinese Government position may or may not be - and it certainly wouldn't surprise me if they took the position that anything that happens within a country is an internal matter - that it is our view that it's a legitimate subject for consultation in the Security Council.

QUESTION: New subject?

MR. RUBIN: Just a minute.

QUESTION: Mr. Gelbard, I believe, certainly publicly and maybe also to Milosevic directly, said he wanted an investigation of the earlier atrocities, ten days ago. I just wanted - clearly, by the Serbs burying the dead in a mass grave that's a kind of a response. But what did Milosevic tell Gelbard? Did he agree to some kind of outside investigation?

MR. RUBIN: I don't believe Ambassador Gelbard has talked about the details of his discussion with President Milosevic, other than to say that it was a very difficult discussion and that he laid it on the line with regard to the American views and the views of the Contact Group members, and that we have - I can certainly say from this podium - we've seen no evidence other than this woefully inadequate discussion of possible dialogue, that President Milosevic has got the message and is going to start talking rather than ordering the killing of Albanians.

QUESTION: But the question of the investigation - what kind of an investigation would the United States like to have into the circumstances of the deaths of --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we could start with the ICRC to find out what happened. We've made clear that we believe that this is under the authority of the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia; that Justice Arbour has made clear that she believes this fits under her purview. The statute setting up the Tribunal specifically talks about actions on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which this clearly is. So this is within her purview.

Normally in cases like these, what you're looking for are outside groups to be able to go in and find out what happened. The ICRC would be a very good start.

QUESTION: But do you know what happened at the ICRC today?

MR. RUBIN: I think I've made clear that we haven't seen the kind of response from President Milosevic and his authorities to allow the outside groups to go in. We want them to be able to go in.

QUESTION: They closed down their office in Pristina because they were getting death threats - a serious number of death threats. So they've actually pulled out, and --

MR. RUBIN: That doesn't mean that the ICRC wouldn't be in a position to investigate if it was made available. The problem isn't available investigators or fact-finders; the problem is access. And that's our problem, not the availability of people trying to go into it.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, you say that Milosevic is facing the prospect of war crimes prosecution over there?

MR. RUBIN: I did not say that that would necessarily apply to President Milosevic. I said that the United States believes, and the Contact Group statement makes clear, that we invite the International Tribunal to see whether it believes that crimes against humanity, violations of international humanitarian law have occurred there; and if so, they can proceed with their investigations. And where that leads is up to the Tribunal.

QUESTION: Excuse me, but your agony and your despair or the State Department's with Milosevic seems to be accelerating. I wanted to give you one more swing. In a long answer to Roy, you ended up with the phrase, "or order the killing of Albanians." Were the killings - you were on the road when this broke out, I believe, and the State Department was very careful, as it always is at the beginning, until all the facts are in place, to be outraged by killing; to be outraged by civilian victims - not necessarily putting direct blame on the Serbs.

MR. RUBIN: I think I know where you're going.

QUESTION: Okay --

MR. RUBIN: Barry, I think I know where you're going. Let me --

QUESTION: Is Milosevic - does the State Department - you can say anything you want, and you can take back anything you said, because you didn't say he ordered the killing.

MR. RUBIN: I specifically --

QUESTION: But I'm inviting you to clarify whether he was responsible for the killings that have occurred already.

MR. RUBIN: All right, there's a difference between legal responsibility in terms of --

QUESTION: I'm talking about war crimes.

MR. RUBIN: -- in terms of the War Crimes Tribunal or in other legal terms, and political responsibility. Clearly, these acts were taken by the Serbian police. Clearly, the Serbian police ultimately operate under the authority of the president of the country. So if President Milosevic does not want these policemen to engage in these tactics, I suspect he would be able to find a way to prevent it.

QUESTION: This morning, Jamie, a federal judge here entered a $247 million judgment against the government of Iran in a case brought by an American woman who was a victim of one of those terrorist attacks in Israel. This is the first act of this new law that Senator Lautenberg is sponsoring. Does this help or hinder these very cautious and carefully- worded sort of diplomatic messages to Iran that have been coming from the Administration? And is the Administration prepared to force this judgment?

MR. RUBIN: The judgment was, as you know, handed down late this morning, and we have not had a chance to review the opinion in great detail. We can't, therefore, comment specifically on the court's findings.

However, we do believe it is a fact, in our view, that Iran has provided financial and other support for organizations, like Palestinian Islamic Ji'had, that have carried out violent acts of terrorism. We condemn terrorism strongly. As you know, the question of Iran's support for terrorism is one of the key issues that we have between our two countries. We have not detected a pattern of activity on the part of Iran that indicates that they have terminated that support. We are hoping that the words that President Khatami used at the time of his public statement to the people of the United States, which were encouraging words about their views on terrorism, will be followed by a change in the pattern of activity that we think constitutes support for terrorist organizations.

Our policy doesn't get affected by court judgments. Our policy is to try to encourage and induce these changes in behavior. We believe the best way to resolve the differences we have with the Iranian Government on terrorism, on weapons of mass destruction, is through direct dialogue -- as well as the Middle East peace process. We believe that these issues can be overcome through this dialogue.

As far as what we would do to enforce the judgment of this court, because we haven't had an opinion - an opportunity to study it completely, we're not in a position to make a judgment as to what its legal implications are for the Department of State. This event is not a surprise to us. Our former US Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Phil Wilcox, met with the family and their attorneys last summer and discussed the April '95 attack, as well as Iranian-sponsored terrorism generally, with them.

So court opinions, in our view, are not going to change our policy; and our policy is that these are major problems between our countries, but they are problems that we believe can be overcome through direct dialogue.

QUESTION: Jamie, do --

MR. RUBIN: Do you have a follow-up?

QUESTION: If you read what Assistant Secretary Indyk said yesterday, and what the President and the Secretary of State have said over the past couple of months, it seems to me that the Administration has been careful not to avoid doing things or having the United States do things that would undermine any inclination on the part of President Khatami to, shall we say, move back toward the mainstream of the international community. Does this judgment get in the way of that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, that remains to be seen. We are still studying the judgment, and I can't possibly answer the question of what we would or would not have to do under a judgment until we've been able to examine it.

But I guess the point I would make is that this kind of situation is not a surprise, in that we have long said that the support by Iran for terrorist groups, like the one that apparently committed this act, is a major problem for us. But we have also said that the best way to overcome this problem is through direct dialogue, and we have made clear that we are intrigued and encouraged not only by the election of President Khatami, not only by his ability to get a cabinet through the parliament, but by the statements that he made in public. And as well, Secretary Albright has said that in the case of the Middle East peace process, there is greater space for Chairman Arafat to operate in the Arab world, and that is an encouraging sign.

But what we're looking for in the case of terrorism, which is the key issue here, is a pattern of behavior; and so far, we have not seen a pattern of activity that indicates they have terminated support for these terrorist groups.

QUESTION: Just on that brief point, as you said a couple months ago, US officials, the Secretary were saying that Arafat had told them - had been told by an intermediary, whatever - that the Iranians were willing to give him more leeway in negotiations. This is a few months ago. This bombing took place four or five years ago. Now you're saying you're seeing no change in Iranian behavior. So are you saying --

MR. RUBIN: I'm trying to be as careful as I can --

QUESTION: Hold on --

MR. RUBIN: Okay.

QUESTION: So apparently in spite of these words, pledges, whatever, from the Iranians to Arafat, they are continuing to try to undermine - to carry out, support extreme groups in Gaza and the West Bank.

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me distinguish between the three issues, and let's put weapons of mass destruction aside for the moment and focus on the other two, which is opposition to the Middle East peace process and support for terrorist organizations.

We, as you know, like to judge things by actions not words. One of the indicators that we think is a fair indicator of Iran's support or lack of support for the Middle East peace process is the extent to which the designated negotiator, Chairman Arafat, is in a position to conduct negotiations and have the support of the Arab world and others who are important in that part of the world, like the Iranian Government.

Secretary Albright said that she believes that Chairman Arafat has greater space in which to operate because of the changed statements and actions of the Iranian Government in this discreet indicator, including when he went to Tehran for the OIC meeting, the meetings he had there, and the lack of criticism that he received and his general view that he is in a better position to operate.

There is another aspect to this Middle East peace process, and that is support for terrorist groups not just in the Middle East, but also - not just those groups that attack the peace process through terrorist acts, but support terrorism outside of the Middle East peace process. We have not seen a pattern of activity in the area of support for terrorist groups that indicates that they have terminated support. But that doesn't mean that one can't acknowledge and make clear that in one indicator of the support for the Middle East peace process, that there have been some modest signs.

QUESTION: Jamie, on the specific case that this judgment deals with, clearly a judge has decided that there is enough evidence to make him believe - him or her believe - I don't know, I haven't read the judgment - that Iran was behind this particular, or supported this particular act of terrorism. Does the US Government believe that Iran was behind or supported this particular act of terrorism?

MR. RUBIN: Again, we would have to study this particular judgment, and I would have to get a considered answer to the question of how we --

QUESTION: No, I'm not asking about the judgment. I'm asking about the particular incident of terrorism.

MR. RUBIN: Right, and if I were in a position to tell you in an unclassified forum what our view was of this, I would have done so in the previous ten minutes of discussion. But I can say this - that we believe that it is a fact, a well-known fact, that Iran has in the past provided financial and other support for organizations like Palestinian Ji'had that have carried out violent acts of terrorism.

QUESTION: Jamie, on a different subject --

MR. RUBIN: One more, and then we'll switch subjects. Go ahead.

QUESTION: One of the points that was brought up this morning after the judge handed down his decree was a suggestion by Senator Lautenberg and others that this provides a legal precedent that's likely - that they believe is likely and should encourage similar lawsuits. They particularly mentioned the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. What would the State Department's view of additional suits of this type be? Would that be a --

MR. RUBIN: The State Department's view of additional suits would be significantly affected by the State Department's considered judgment of this legal opinion. Until we have done so, it would therefore be hard to make such a sweeping generalization.

QUESTION: Different subjects? The Administration was notified by the Hill today that there are a group of Congressmen who are going to attach the Mexico language, the abortion language, to the State Department funding request for the UN, for IMF, and for other important foreign policy legislation. How serious do you think this matter is?

MR. RUBIN: We think it's a very serious matter. Secretary Albright believes that to hold national security legislation hostage to a political issue like family planning is bad for the United States. It undermines our ability to operate at the United Nations and, frankly, our view is that those who would hold this money hostage should let the UN money go. It's bad for our national security to make these linkages, and the fact is it's undemocratic for people to hold our national security legislation hostage rather than letting the votes be tallied. Secretary Albright has made clear that the democratic way is for an issue of principle like this to be voted up or down and, meanwhile, to let the nation's foreign policy and national security business carry on. Without the money that the United States owes the United Nations, it is harder and harder for us to achieve support in New York for the goals that the American people expect us to be pursuing, including containment of the government of Iraq and protecting us against their weapons of mass destruction, including stopping terrorism around the world, including a number of activities the UN pursues. It's harder and harder for us to be able to pursue those legitimate national security objectives when members of Congress hold legislation hostage to a family planning dispute.

QUESTION: She was told several times on the Hill in the last couple of weeks that this was going to happen and that this Administration was either going to have to deal on this issue or this was going to continue to happen and the funds were going to continue to be held up. Are there plans for this Administration to deal or do you think this is just their playing --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we don't know what is going to happen, and what we know is that this is wrong, and that is our view.

QUESTION: Jamie, just to pursue that, is there any room for compromise as far as the Administration is concerned? Again, to repeat Betsy, last week Secretary Albright was told by Chairman Callahan to face the reality that they would have to deal with it.

MR. RUBIN: I think that Congress ought to face the reality that by holding up legislation affecting our national security that they are harming the foreign policy interests of the United States by failing to provide the money that will increase our leverage in New York in the fight against terrorism and the fight against rogue states like Iraq.

QUESTION: But if both of you remain inflexible, you just said yourself that our national security shouldn't be held up by this legislation. And it seems to me when both sides are at loggerheads, one would want to re-look at the situation. And Congress has said that for now they are not going to do that.

MR. RUBIN: The situation can be re-looked at if the members of Congress will understand that we are prepared to have the votes cast on positions of principle that differ. That's the democratic way. When you disagree about something, you vote on it up or down, and not to link the legitimate national security interests of the United States to an unrelated dispute over family planning.

QUESTION: Jamie, the Administration is going to remain obdurate in their position and they're not going to deal with --

MR. RUBIN: I'm saying that the United States Administration believes that this is harming our national security to link family planning, an issue of principle, to the pursuit of our national security objectives in the Security Council in New York on matters like Iraq, on matters of isolating rogue states. And the sooner that this legislation - this hostage is released, the better off the national security of the United States will be.

QUESTION: Is this one of those issues that is keeping her here and preventing her from going on the Africa trip?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, there are a whole number of issues built into this calculation, and I don't want to tie them to any one. But this is certainly one of the issues that she believes that she needs to continue to work on with members of Congress

QUESTION: Do you have an update on King Fahd's condition?

MR. RUBIN: The government of Saudi Arabia has told us that press reports of the King having had surgery are erroneous. The Saudis also advised us that King Fahd is in stable condition and his health is improving. We wish him a continuing and rapid recovery.

QUESTION: Now, can I follow up on that, please? The press reports certainly that emanated from here yesterday occurred because the State Department said that it understood that the King had surgery. When that statement was made, was that based on knowledge that the US had or is that based on press reports that weren't acknowledged at the time?

MR. RUBIN: That statement, made by my able deputy, was not the best statement he ever made.

QUESTION: Is that the same one that's your current deputy?

MR. RUBIN: And he's still my current deputy. In short, I believe that statement - you know how you are always trying to get us to comment based on what's the latest thing on the wires. Occasionally, we make our statements here based on wire reports and we will do our best to refrain in the future from responding in real time to issues at the risk of then being told that we made a mistake.

QUESTION: So what's wrong with King Fahd?

QUESTION: Excuse me, can I follow up on that?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: So that statement was in error? Is that what you're saying? That the United States did not have independent information that the King had undergone surgery? I'm sorry, I don't really want to make a deal out of it but -

MR. RUBIN: You don't? It seems like you do.

QUESTION: No. I mean, it's important for us who think it's important to get it right.

MR. RUBIN: Right. I said what I said today. There has been some work gone into these three sentences, considered work over the last 24 hours. The first sentence that I read to you, "The government of Saudi Arabia has told us that press reports of the King having had surgery are erroneous. The Saudis also advised us that King Fahd is in stable condition and his health is improving." If we didn't think that was the best of our knowledge, I would add something to that.

QUESTION: All right. Can I ask you another subject?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) that one.

MR. RUBIN: Thank you, Mr. Schweid.

QUESTION: The Sri Lankan. Well, I was going to ask you -

MR. RUBIN: Mr. Foley thanks you as well.

QUESTION: I was wondering what you thought the state of his health was, if he had a cold or something, because he has been apparently ill; however, leaders never get ill.

The Sri Lankan diplomat going to Baghdad or gone to Baghdad, who does he report to - the Security Council or to Kofi Annan?

MR. RUBIN: The structure of the relationship is as follows. There are over 20 commissioners of the special commission, of which Dhanapala, Ambassador Dhanapala, is now a commissioner. That commission is headed by the Executive Chairman, Ambassador Butler.

QUESTION: Right.

MR. RUBIN: And so, therefore, the work of Ambassador Dhanapala's special group is done under the authority of the special commission. We have very clear assurances that that work will be done and reported to the council through Ambassador Butler. Now, there has always been a technical fact that Ambassador Butler sends his reports to the Security Council with a cover note from the Secretary General saying, I hereby transmit the report of Ambassador Butler. That has been going on for seven years. I would expect that to continue.

With respect to how his inspectors will work and who they will take their lead from, the inspectors in this special group will be experts. The diplomats will merely observe. So those experts will come from one of two organizations, either UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission for the Chemical, Biological and Missiles, or the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency for the nuclear account. Those inspectors will be led in their work at each of the sites by a team leader who will be a member of UNSCOM or the IAEA.

So the long and short of it is that Ambassador Dhanapala operates under the authority of the Executive Chairman, Ambassador Butler, and was selected, like Ambassador Butler was selected, by the Secretary General.

QUESTION: Yeah, but it really - you know, not - that doesn't exactly answer the question. It's the structure. I understand the structure.

MR. RUBIN: All right.

QUESTION: And you understand what we're asking. Is he Kofi Annan's agent there to report to Kofi Annan, who seems to have another view of the dispute than the US has educated the public what the issues are?

MR. RUBIN: The answer is that Ambassador Butler is Kofi Annan's agent as well, because Ambassador Butler was selected by Kofi Annan under that theory. So the short answer is we don't believe that there is a problem in the agreement or the procedures set forth to implement the agreement. The problem isn't going to come in those procedures. The problem will come if Iraq violates those procedures.

QUESTION: Jamie, there apparently has been a court ruling that will result in the deportation of six members of the Iraqi National Congress or the Iraqi opposition, where generally - first of all, what can you tell us that you know about the details of this, and what does that do to the Administration's efforts to work better with the Iraqi opposition, as stated some weeks ago?

MR. RUBIN: Let me give you a little background for people to understand it properly. It's a very complex issue. After Saddam Hussein brutally struck into northern Iraq in September 1996, a large number of Iraqis, most of whom had close connections to the United States, sought our protection. With the help of the government of Turkey, the United States Government evacuated over 6,500 Iraqis, mostly Kurds, from Iraq to Guam and then to the United States. These were mostly Iraqis who were associated with humanitarian programs in northern Iraq.

This was an honorable and humanitarian effort to protect Iraqis who would otherwise have been harmed by Saddam's troops. We were aware at the time that Saddam had many infiltrators in northern Iraq, and to the extent we could, we would quickly review the backgrounds of these individuals prior to the evacuation. But because of the urgent circumstances surrounding the evacuation, we deferred complete background checks. Once the individuals arrived in Guam, further background investigations were completed and 25 individuals were identified as persons we believe to pose threats to our national security. The INS placed these individuals into exclusion proceedings on the grounds that they could pose a threat to the national security. They were brought to California for hearings before immigration judges. These cases are in various stages of the immigration process.

Yesterday, a judge found that six of these individuals were ineligible for immigration relief based on classified information developed by the US Government indicating that these individuals posed a danger to our national security. No final decisions have been made about what the US Government will do if the exclusion orders in these cases become final. Further questions about the disposition of these six need to be directed at the Justice Department.

With respect to how this will affect the prospect of working with opposition groups, let me say that we have no doubt that the people of Iraq and the rest of the world would be better off with a new government in Baghdad, but such an effort is a long-term process and involves many costs and risks. We have worked with the Iraqi opposition in the past and we are actively considering ways to do so more effectively in the future. The Senate, as you know, has put forward some ideas. Some of those are very interesting to us and we are carefully reviewing them. For example, Radio Free Iraq is an interesting idea that we are examining.

With regard to humanitarian assistance, this is complicated by the fact that we have just increased the quota for northern Iraq to $682 million in humanitarian assistance, and before providing any humanitarian assistance to such an area, we would want to make sure we were using the money wisely.

With regard to war crimes, we have supported the calls for an investigation into the Iraqi regime's war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possible genocide. In short, there are a lot of ideas out there. We are exploring them and I don't think the disposition of these cases has any impact on our ability to work more effectively with the Iraqi opposition that has been - it's been difficult to work with in the past.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, if I may follow up. You started off with 25 and then six had sort of reached this level. Do you know what happened to the balance?

MR. RUBIN: You'll have to check with the Department of Justice on that.

QUESTION: Do you think that these six necessarily face retaliation or that their lives may be in danger?

MR. RUBIN: Again, the Department of Justice, in coordination with other agencies, will obviously be deciding what to do with them. And when those decisions are made - no final decisions have been made - we'll be in a position to judge or to explain why we took whatever actions we decide to take.

QUESTION: You're saying then that these six people were identified as infiltrators, Iraqi agents?

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that.

QUESTION: No, you said that we were aware at the time that Saddam had many infiltrators in northern Iraq, then you described 25 people who were identified as such and singled out.

MR. RUBIN: No, I didn't say that. Sid, if you're going to read real carefully and try to catch me, then you should really listen more carefully. I said that we were aware that Saddam had infiltrators in the north and we wanted to review people's backgrounds. We didn't have a chance. When I got to a description of why 25 were isolated, I did not say that they were isolated because they were, you know, infiltrated by Saddam Hussein. I said that we believe they posed a threat to our national security.

QUESTION: So are you saying they were not -- you're just not commenting on that?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: Do we have the Korea briefing coming right after this?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. In the back, yes.

QUESTION: Jamie, among the ideas that the Administration is considering in terms of supporting Iraqi opposition -- of people in the Iraqi opposition, would supplying arms be one of them?

MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry. Please repeat the question.

QUESTION: You listed several ideas like Radio Free Iraq that the Administration is looking at and possibly considering for support to help the Iraqi opposition. Would supporting -- or giving weapons to the opposition also be one of those efforts?

MR. RUBIN: The question of how we would implement any decision to more effectively support the opposition is something that is under discussion. I wouldn't be in a position to describe what tactics we might pursue.

QUESTION: Do you have anything to say about the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting and whether there had been any progress on the missile issue in particular?

MR. RUBIN: What I have to say on that is that there will be a press conference at 4:45p.m. in Room 450 of the Old Executive -

QUESTION: It's 5:30 p.m., isn't it? Are you sure?

MR. RUBIN: I was just - 5:30 p.m. was crossed out and 4:45 p.m. was written in. So, hopefully, my able deputy wrote that in correctly.

QUESTION: Which one is that?

MR. RUBIN: So I have no comment during an ongoing discussion, and they will report.

QUESTION: Well, when they (inaudible) START treaty will be ratified, will you throw your hat in the air again? The Administration?

MR. RUBIN: No, we will throw our hat in the air when the START treaty is ratified, Barry, as you know. In fact, I doubt we'll throw our hat in the air at all.

QUESTION: You ought to be pretty tired of it by now.

MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry. Betsy, then Sid.

QUESTION: Iraq yesterday complained that the US was holding up goods under the oil for food program yet again. Would you agree with their assessment?

MR. RUBIN: This is another example of Iraq making outrageous allegations that are not supported by the facts. Since the beginning of the oil for food program over a year ago, more than 2,400 requests for importation of humanitarian goods to both the northern and southern parts of Iraq have been reviewed. Nearly 97 percent of all applications have been approved. Fewer than 2 percent have been denied. At this time, under phase three of the program, 144 applications have been approved, four applications are on hold. Not one has been denied.

The reason why the program has slowed down is because Iraq decided not to export oil to fill up the bank accounts that control the money that can be used for humanitarian assistance, and I believe there is a significant backlog. The UN has over $500 million in contracts ready for approval but awaiting receipts of funds from oil sales. So if there is a slowdown and if they are suffering in Iraq, it is the direct cause of Saddam Hussein's regime, again demonstrating that it cares more about enriching the regime than it does about purchasing humanitarian supplies.

Sid.

QUESTION: Just to go back to King Fahd. I don't mean to hold anybody up to any sort of scrutiny because we all know that a lot of people sign off on this guidance; it's not just one person. Are you saying - there are some very, very detailed reports from the region talking about - and officials in this town confirming - that an American team performed some sort of procedure on King Fahd yesterday.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: Now, perhaps the Saudis don't think that procedure qualifies as surgery but, you know, today you are sort of carrying - allowing them to pass their message through you.

MR. RUBIN: Well, I wouldn't say it that way. What we are trying to do is answer your question about what we know about King Fahd's health. It's my understanding that what we said yesterday was based on a press report that we believe not to be true. Which press report it was we'll have to get you after the briefing. But we're trying to answer your question about what we know about his health, and the answer is what the Saudi government has told us, that the press reports of the King having surgery are erroneous, that the King is in stable condition and his health is improving. And that is what we can say today about the state of the health of King Fahd.

QUESTION: Well, that doesn't mean that he didn't have surgery or some medical procedure which elsewhere might be described as surgery.

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that.

QUESTION: And that's what you're basing your knowledge on is what the Saudis are telling you, so as far as your understanding is that you're accepting -

MR. RUBIN: Should I bring someone out here? Then you can flay him publicly if it will make everybody feel better.

QUESTION: Jamie, that's not the point, Jamie. You know, it was said as fact from this podium based on the building that the King of Saudi Arabia, a man who controls a great deal of oil -

MR. RUBIN: It was "understanding." The word that was used yesterday was "our understanding." And our understanding today is that the Saudi government has told us what they've told us, and I've reported that to you.

QUESTION: So you haven't contacted any team of American doctors?

MR. RUBIN: I have no information on that. I'll have to get it for you.

QUESTION: Different subject?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: On Asia and Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto is going to Jakarta on the 14th and the 15th and meeting with Indonesian President Soeharto. What would you expect of the Japanese Prime Minister this time and what is your understanding of the current political situation in Indonesia?

MR. RUBIN: Well, our hope obviously is that any leader who discusses the matters of the economy with the Indonesian President will stress the importance of Indonesia carrying out the program the IMF has laid out for it. And we believe that the IMF has built in flexibility into that program and the Indonesians have been given an opportunity to agree on modifications. We have been concerned, we in the United States and the IMF have been, about the humanitarian impact of the current crisis. So, again, what we want is anyone who has discussions with the Indonesian leadership to emphasize that there must be a credible reform program and that we hope that President Soeharto chooses a cabinet that includes a strong economic team as a signal of his intention to implement fully Indonesia's IMF economic reform program.

And as far as we know, that process is ongoing , and that's the message that we would like to see sent.

QUESTION: Turkish republic of northern Cyprus decided yesterday that they will not participate in any future negotiations unless the existence of two states on the island is accepted. In what ways do you think this may have an impact on the future of Cyprus issue?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I have no comment on that specific report because I haven't seen it, but I think our position on what is required to make progress in Cyprus is extremely well known to you, and that hasn't changed.

(The briefing concluded at 2:20 P.M.)

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