U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #29, 98-03-05
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
952
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, March 5, 1998
Briefer: James B. Foley
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 SLOVAKIA: Kidnapping of Michael Kovac, Jr.
SERBIA/MONTENEGRO
1-4,6 The option of force in reponse to Kosovo; Urge for calm
2,3,8,10 `Gelbard preview of options; Means at our disposal;
2,4,7 Contact Group - Sec. Albright and European leaders on 3/9
2,4,6,8 Unconditional dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina;
Improving the political situation of Kosovo-Albanians;
Role of third party in dialogue
3,7 Implementation of Dayton accords, four steps; PM Dodik;
SECI initiative
4,6 Call for an independent investigation of killings in Kosovo
5 TERRORISM: Definition/ US position on terrorist activities
6 Kosovo violence impact on Balkan area; Robin Cook assesment
9 US communications with Albanian Government/Milosevic
9-10 Comparison of Bosnia and Kosovo; Degree of Danger
10 Helicopter Guns Ships
10 Continued Agression of Serbs Despite USG Protests
10 Further economic sanctions, IMF and World Bank sanctions
CUBA
11 Humanitarian aid to Cuba
12 Promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba
12 EU dedication to promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba
RUSSIA
12 Reaction to Yevgniy Adamov, Russia's new minister of atomic
energy
13 Russian -Iranian nuclear relationship
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
13 Palestinian training by the CIA
13 Reports of Israeli government holding Lebanese men
14 Role of Jordan's Hussein in MEPP
CHINA
14 Elimination of 11 ministry bodies in China
14 Economic growth in China
ILSA
14,15 Secretary's determination on Total Gazprom's
sanctionability
16 Options in regard to the implementation of sanctions
SLOVAKIA
15 Official US course of action in regards to Slovakia
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #29
THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1998, 1:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon. Welcome to the State Department. We barely
have a quorum today. It's not the numbers; it's the quality of those
present.
I have one announcement before we begin your questions. The March 3
decision of the Slovak Government to grant amnesty to any persons who may
have planned or participated in the kidnapping of Michael Kovac, Jr., and
any persons who may have violated the constitution in preparing the ballots
for the May 1997 referendum on direct election of the president and entry
into NATO is a further serious setback to the rule of law and constitutional
government.
In the case of the of the Kovac kidnapping, the Slovak Government's action
effectively precludes the resolution of a serious political crime. The
amnesty for persons involved in the preparation of the referendum means
that no one will be held accountable for actions which not only deprived
Slovak citizens of their legal right to express their opinion, but also
directly violated a ruling of the constitutional court.
These actions are not consistent with the behavior of a government that
respects the rule of law. They invite further abuses of the law and the
constitution by those who claim to be serving the national interest.
Barry.
QUESTION: I wondered if you could give us the US policy on whether force
is an option for order to be implemented in Kosovo? Does that remain part
of US policy, that it's an appropriate tool?
MR. FOLEY: First of all, the United States strongly condemns the violence
in Kosovo this weekend, particularly the excessive use of force by Serbian
police. This violence results from the failure of Serbian authorities to
recognize the legitimate grievances of the Kosovar-Albanian population.
Our firm message to both parties is that the difficulties in Kosovo cannot
be solved through the use of force. We have received credible reports of
ongoing operations in Kosovo by Serb authorities. Kosovar-Albanian sources
have reported the presence of tracked vehicles and artillery fire in the
region. We have no recent information on casualties.
We view the situation in Kosovo as very serious, and are investigating
these reports. There will be serious negative consequences for the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia as a result of this latest outrage, beginning with
the withdrawal of the positive measures Special Representative Gelbard
previewed with Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade last week. So we are withdrawing
those.
We will explore with the Contact Group Ministers on Monday in London
additional coordinated measures in response to these events. We have also
proposed that independent outside authorities investigate the deaths of a
number of Kosovar Albanians who were killed in violence last weekend. There
are credible reports that they were, in fact, executed while in the custody
of Serb police.
As to your specific question, there should be no doubt about the seriousness
with which we view the situation in Kosovo. We've made clear to Mr.
Milosevic that we will respond to actions by FRY forces that inflame the
situation. We have a broad range of options available to use. I'm not going
to speculate about which ones they might be.
Beyond that, I think you saw the remarks that Special Representative
Gelbard had made yesterday, talking about means that we have at our
disposal. We are going to be exploring these means and these options with
our friends and partners in the Contact Group on Monday. I can't foreshadow
what they might be, but the consequences, I said, will be very serious.
QUESTION: Well, some interpreted his reference to appropriate tools as a
reaffirmation of force as an option. Is that interpretation wrong?
MR. FOLEY: Well, there was an erroneous report that attributed to
Ambassador Gelbard a specific comment in that regard, which he did not
make; and the transcript of his remarks makes that clear. On the other hand,
as I said, I'm not willing, from this podium, to specify what options we
have under consideration.
There will be serious consequences if this situation persists -- if the
government in Belgrade, on the one hand, continues to use force to deal
with this problem; and if, on the other hand, the government in Belgrade
continues to refuse the serious dialogue and the implementation of reforms
that can reach out to the Kosovar Albanian community and convince them that
they have a stake in an improved situation for themselves in the Kosovo.
QUESTION: I have two questions. So you have made a decision to withdraw
those limited concessions that Gelbard had announced earlier?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, we have.
QUESTION: And are you saying that the use of military force is off the
table, that that is not one of those options?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not specifically addressing that option in either a
positive or negative way. I'm being very careful in choosing my words. As I
said, we have a broad range of options. I cannot speculate on which options
we might choose. Our choice also will depend on what may happen in the days
ahead. We've called now, very publicly and very firmly, on President
Milosevic to exercise restraint and to begin the kind of dialogue which
we believe is necessary to resolve the differences that exist in
Kosovo.
Again, we believe, as I said a minute ago, that the violence results from
the failure of the Serb authorities to recognize the legitimate grievances
of the Kosovar Albanian population.
QUESTION: What is it - excuse me. I just wanted to clear up one detail.
Positive measures, I know about the opening of a consulate in the United
States, what are the other ones?
MR. FOLEY: There were, I believe, four steps of a somewhat symbolic
nature, but which, nevertheless recognized the fact that, on Belgrade's
side, and in particular on the part of President Milosevic, that in the
recent weeks we had seen positive contributions to the implementation of
the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. President Milosevic had played a useful and
positive role in the developments which led to the election of a pro-Dayton,
reform-minded prime minister in the Republika Srpska - Prime Minister Dodik
-- and had cooperated in other areas involving Dayton implementation
as well. But as you know, we have a range of concerns with the government
in Belgrade. The outer sanctions remain in place, and their lifting is
contingent on FRY positive action in a range of areas, and none more
important than in Kosovo.
What we have seen is a tremendous step backward. We responded initially and
immediately by withdrawing the four actions, which I'll enumerate for you
in a second; and we're considering other serious measures as well. The four
measures that we have withdrawn include FRY participation in our Southern
Europe Cooperation Initiative, so-called SECI initiative. We had offered to
consider allowing an increase in personnel at the FRY observer mission in
New York at the UN; allowing them to open a consulate in the United
States. And also, the fourth measure involved landing rights for the
Yugoslav airline in the United States. Those four --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: SECI participation for Belgrade.
QUESTION: You say SECI - (inaudible) -
(Laughter.)
MR. FOLEY: SECI is an initiative that the United States Government is
sponsoring to promote greater dialogue and cooperation among all the
countries in the Balkans.
QUESTION: Listen, are you just being diplomatically polite - although you
did use some strong words? I mean, your description - outrage is pretty
strong. You don't like what the Serbian troops did - I mean, by all
accounts this was a kind of atrocity, widespread atrocities. I mean,
killing mothers and children and father and son together so I guess it's
neater that way. I mean, does the State Department find widespread
genocidal behavior or just outrageous actions by Serbian police?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't think that I can underestimate the degree of
outrage and the degree of concern within the United States Government over
the recent events in Kosovo. I believe that outrage and that concern are
shared by our European partners, and we're going to be meeting with them.
Secretary Albright will be participating in the Contact Group meeting in
London on Monday.
So, Barry, you can parse my words, but without wanting to exaggerate, the
situation is very grave. Some terrible, repressive acts have occurred.
Innocent people have been killed. That's why we're calling for independent
outside authorities to investigate those killings. We're considering
serious further measures, particularly in the light of what may continue to
happen there. We continue to urge calm on all sides. I would remind you
that we have and continue to urge restraint by the Kosovar Albanian
leadership, and have made clear that we do not support secession or
independence of Kosovo. And of course, we condemn all terrorist actions.
But we believe that the Kosovar people - Albanian-Kosovars in Kosovo
have legitimate political grievances. They have a right to an enhanced
status within the FRY, to greater self-administration. These are fundamental
political rights and grievances which have not been addressed, and which
are the ultimate source of the violence which has occurred in the last
days.
QUESTION: Well, I was listening yesterday -- the word Albanian was used -
I don't want to get too Talmudic or Jesuitical about this, but you
recognize, the State Department, the people there as Albanians. The Kurds
in Iraq, you keep referring - the State Department keeps referring to as
Iraqi Kurds, but you do - the State Department does recognize Palestinian
Arabs and Palestinians, having an ethnic identity. Where do the Albanians
fall, sort of with the Palestinians, as an ethnic people, right, having
ethnic individual - national rights?
MR. FOLEY: I believe the term that we --
QUESTION: Which you never gave the Kurds.
MR. FOLEY: -- used to apply to them is "Kosovar Albanians." As I said, we
do not support the secession or independence for Kosovo, but we believe
that they have rights to an autonomous status; we believe they have rights
to enhanced self-administration. One of the building blocks or initial
blocks of the reforms we think are necessary involve the education
agreement -- the implementation of that agreement, which has lagged and
lagged, which would give students in Kosovo an opportunity to study in
their own language and to study subjects to their liking. That is, if you
will, symbolic of what we want to see over the long run, which is the full
enjoyment of the rights of the people in Kosovo, which have been long
denied and repressed with the consequences we've seen in the last
few days.
QUESTION: Can I ask you about this question of terrorism? Is this a
terrorist group? The State Department called them a terrorist group, I
believe, this week or last week, for the first time perhaps. If these
people are attacking Serb police or soldiers, armed people, would that be
considered terrorism? Isn't terrorism if you attack civilians and unarmed
people?
MR. FOLEY: Let me make clear, we condemn violence of all kinds. I'm not
going to give any kind of a blank check to different kinds of violent
actions, depending on how you may or may not define them. Violence is not
the answer.
There have been terrorist acts committed by this Kosovar Liberation Army,
which we condemn. We think it's time for the moderate leadership in Kosovo
to stand up and take its responsibilities and lead the way, providing that
there is a dialogue partner in Belgrade toward sitting down and discussing,
and eventually resolving these issues.
QUESTION: Can I follow up? What are those terrorist attacks? Because it's
a relevant question. There is a distinction, isn't there, between attacking
the institutions of power and civilians?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not making that distinction.
QUESTION: Well, then, George Washington was a terrorist.
MR. FOLEY: I'm not making that distinction.
QUESTION: I mean --
MR. FOLEY: We think that violence is not the answer. We don't, as I said,
support independence or secession of Kosovo.
QUESTION: Does the State Department never support freedom fighters,
independence movements? Is that always out of - off the table these
days?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I wouldn't want to answer that in a broadly philosophical
way. I'm concentrating on the situation in Kosovo, which is potentially
explosive at the moment. Violence is not the answer. Those who --
QUESTION: Well, I've been here three years, and I haven't heard one
instance where --
MR. FOLEY: Well, you're more an authority on that than I am. You've been
here longer than I.
QUESTION: -- where the State Department has supported any kind of
independence movement.
QUESTION: You mentioned we're calling for independent outside authorities
to investigate.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: This recent flare-up in Kosovo, you'd like to have an
investigation specifically on these riots on the weekend?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, because there have been reports of deaths of innocent
civilians in Kosovo that we think need to be investigated.
QUESTION: Who might do that investigation? Any ideas?
MR. FOLEY: I don't think we put forward formally a group, and I don't
think we necessarily have a favored group. We believe that some independent
outside organization, whether it's the International Committee for the Red
Cross or some such group, would be able to go in and make an independent
assessment of what has happened.
QUESTION: Could I just get back to the military option issue? Gelbard was
asked specifically about the "Christmas warning," and he said US policy has
not changed. Can you just - is that the case? I mean, that warning issued
in 1992 still stands today?
MR. FOLEY: We've not commented on press reports on that subject, and I'm
not going to be able to do that today. As I said, we have a broad range of
options. I'm not going to specify either in terms of ruling in or ruling
out particular options. And I certainly can't comment on that particular
subject.
QUESTION: Robin Cook, who was in Belgrade, I believe yesterday --
MR. FOLEY: Yes - or today.
QUESTION: -- echoed the international fears that bloodshed might become
uncontrollable and spread beyond Kosovo, to quote this article. He told
reporters it was urgent to redouble diplomatic pressures on Belgrade, to
recognize that the international community cannot sand by while they impose
repressive police measures. Does the US agree with Mr. Cook's assessment of
the danger to Balkan area of this police battle that's going on?
MR. FOLEY: I think it's not secret that we've always believed that Kosovo
has implications beyond Kosovo, beyond the FRY region-wide. That's why the
situation there is so critical, and that's why we are going to be meeting
in the Contact Group on this basis, to deal with this issue. We think,
indeed, that violence in Kosovo can have an impact beyond Kosovo, and it is
critical that the international community come together, as they will on
Monday, and make it crystal clear to Mr. Milosevic that he's got to
call the dogs of repression back and must sit down and negotiate with
the Kosovar Albanians - the moderate leadership there - on the kinds of
reforms that will be necessary to diffuse the situation.
QUESTION: Do you think - is it your - you talk a little bit about
operations that were going on there, Serbian operations. What do you see as
the nature of those operations? And do you see sort of a systematic effort
by Milosevic to destabilize Kosovo?
MR. FOLEY: I would hesitate to try to put myself in his mind, to
characterize his actions. He has --
QUESTION: I want to know your interpretation of his actions.
MR. FOLEY: He has shown a record over the last decade as a tactician of
some ability, but not usually demonstrated an ability to think long-term,
to think about the long-term interests of his people in the region;
although we have recognized positive steps on Dayton implementation when he
has taken those.
But again, I'm not in a position to read his mind. What the United States
is trying to do, and what we will do with our partners in the Contact Group,
is signal to him the serious costs of allowing this situation to fester.
Whether it involves a conscious long-range design or mere tactical
maneuvers, the fact of the matter is that the repression that is taking
place is totally unacceptable to the international community and will have
the most severe consequences.
QUESTION: I'm not asking you to read his mind. I'm asking what you see,
how you analyze the situation. What kinds of operations do you see the
Serbians undertaking? We see violence; we see incidents of violence. But
what do you see particularly? And do you think - does it add up to the
United States as a systematic effort to undermine Kosovar Albanians in a
way that Belgrade has not done before this?
MR. FOLEY: I think that we're not in a position to make that determination.
Certainly, the actions of the last week and the last days are very
worrisome and very troublesome, and perhaps point in that direction. What
we are trying to do is to grab Mr. Milosevic's attention right now, while
there is time to pull back and consider the very serious consequences to
him and his country pursuing in the direction that you described, if such
is the intention or the result of the repression that is occurring
there.
QUESTION: Can you see a broader - possibility for a broader regional
conflict --
MR. FOLEY: Well, I answered that question when Bill asked it. We see
potential negative fallout beyond Kosovo in what is happening there. I
think that's why you're seeing the international community coming together
very quickly in the wake of this violence, to meet and discuss steps to
make sure that that sort of development does not occur.
I think, Betsy, you had a question also.
QUESTION: It was the same thing.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, Carole.
QUESTION: On the other issue of the unconditional dialogue that you've
called for, in your view should there be a third party at the table? Would
the United States or Europe play that role? If there were to be a dialogue
between Belgrade and Pristina?
MR. FOLEY: Well, you may know, under Vatican auspices, the Sant'Egidio
Foundation, I believe, has been promoting reforms and reconciliation, in
particular, I believe, in connection with the education agreement. I
believe Secretary Albright will be meeting with the foundation leaders in
Rome and will be discussing their role.
I think, as far as the United States is concerned, what is important is not
so much who is doing the mediating as the fact that the two sides are
coming together and sitting down at the table and discussing differences,
and discussing the implementation of the real reforms that will address the
root cause of the violence and address the just grievances of the Kosovar
Albanian people.
QUESTION: Jim, you just used virtually the same language that the UN
resolution on Iraq uses, which Albright told the Appropriations Subcommittee
yesterday is simply a code word for military force. If this continues, it
will have the most serious -- severe consequences - "severe consequences."
MR. FOLEY: Well, I've been very careful, and we've been discussing this --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - code word for force?
MR. FOLEY: I've been very careful - we've been discussing this for 15 or
20 minutes --
QUESTION: Yes, and you haven't said force yet.
MR. FOLEY: -- not to specify what the options are that are available. I
would refer you to Ambassador Gelbard's remarks yesterday as illustrative
when he talked about the very sorry state of the Serb economy today, which
is heading south and which can be made to head further south if the
Belgrade authorities persist in this direction.
QUESTION: As you look back, did the US get too - was the US a little bit
early in being nice to Milosevic, with these little carrots?
MR. FOLEY: I don't think so. The fact is that Dayton implementation in
Bosnia is critical; it's an American foreign policy objective of the
highest order. And if Mr. Milosevic has taken, as he has, positive steps to
help in the implementation of Dayton, it is normal that we would seek to
encourage further steps in that direction.
What I explained, though, Barry, at the outset is that we have a wider
agenda than Bosnia with Mr. Milosevic - especially concerning the outer
wall of sanctions. I think there's nothing wrong with responding positively
to positive steps. But the Kosovo situation, at the moment, transcends
other considerations, I must say.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- about Pristina and about Belgrade, but the
Albanian Government has also made some statements about it. Do you have any
communications about this with the government of Albania?
MR. FOLEY: I'm sure through our embassy in Albania and their embassy here,
we've had communications. I'm not aware specifically of recent communications,
but I'd be surprised if there were none.
QUESTION: I'm going to draw a rather sharp comparison, in order to get
you to talk about timing. The Serbs were allowed to go on shelling Sarajevo
for a matter of years before troops were actually sent in to stop them. Is
there a greater sense of urgency here now - a greater sense that the West
will have to respond very quickly in order to prevent this brushfire from
spreading? What's your sense of how long the Serbs have before the West
will respond in a way that will prevent this from continuing?
MR. FOLEY: Well, first of all, I think you should wait until the Contact
Group meets in London on Monday. I think the international community will
be responding at that moment quickly and forcefully.
Second, it's very hard to compare the two situations, because, as you know,
the international community was in fact seized of the Bosnian issue -
perhaps not in a way that would have satisfied our concerns at the time.
There was a UN peacekeeping mission, which - well it's history. I won't
review it at this moment. But I think they were entirely different
situations. But I can't really understate the importance to the United
States Government today of what is happening in Kosovo, and our view that
very serious measures are under consideration in response to the very
serious situation occurring there.
QUESTION: Would you regard the potential dangers of this situation as
even greater, perhaps, than Bosnia, for strategic reasons, because of where
Kosovo is and who its neighbors are?
MR. FOLEY: I would not want to speculate about what the possible
implications are. I merely stated that it's long been our view that the
Kosovo situation can have an impact beyond Kosovo. But to try to spell out
different scenarios would be to raise alarm bells that I don't care to
raise at this moment from this podium. What we are telling Mr. Milosevic is
to stop the violence now.
QUESTION: Can I ask you about another area?
QUESTION: I just one other question. When did you last speak to
Milosevic?
MR. FOLEY: I believe that earlier this week Ambassador Gelbard may have
spoken with him. I can't confirm that specifically. But we have been in
communication with him, if not by telephone, at least indirectly, I believe
as late as last evening.
QUESTION: Does the State Department have a position on humanitarian food
relief for the Cuban people, as suggested by --
MR. FOLEY: Are we finished with --
QUESTION: I don't - maybe --
MR. FOLEY: I'm not protesting if we are.
QUESTION: No, no. I'm sorry.
QUESTION: I've got a couple quick questions on Kosovo.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: There are reports today that they've used helicopter gun ships
against Albanian -- I think Albanian villagers. Do you have any confirmation
of that?
MR. FOLEY: I would have said that, believe me, if that had come to my
attention before I came out here. As I said, we've seen other worrisome
indications of military movements and deployments as of this morning, but I
was not aware of that coming in.
QUESTION: But you've been protesting these deployments and threats of
violence and the early violence now for several days, and it doesn't appear
to have slowed down the Serbs.
MR. FOLEY: I think it's indisputable that, at least as of now, Mr.
Milosevic has not gotten the message.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. FOLEY: And we're going to try to increase the volume and the content
of that message in the days to come.
QUESTION: Now, you don't want to talk about military force, but you say
that the economy is a place where you could squeeze him some more. There's
already a wall of sanctions in place. What more can you possibly do than
cut him off from IMF and World Bank funding and from all the sanctions that
are already in place?
MR. FOLEY: Well, you're asking in a clever way to draw me out on the
kinds of options that I have steadfastly refused to be drawn out on over
the last 20 or 25 minutes. I can't do that for you today.
QUESTION: Can I try a clever question on Cuba?
MR. FOLEY: Sure. Barry, you only have clever questions.
QUESTION: I thought that was a rather simple question. Does the State
Department have a view of the suggestion by some staffers on Capitol Hill
that Cuban people should be assisted in humanitarian food shipments?
MR. FOLEY: We have just received the report, read about it in the
newspapers, as have you, this morning. So we've not had an opportunity to
review it. So at this time we don't have any comment on details of the
report or on the proposed legislation.
We would note, however, that facilitating humanitarian assistance to Cuba
has been an important element of US Government policy ever since the
passage of the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992. The US has become the largest
donor of humanitarian assistance to Cuba since 1992. According to
Department of Commerce statistics, we have licensed over $2 billion in
humanitarian donations, including $228 million in medical goods. We've
given you that information previously.
We are aware of various proposals facilitating additional humanitarian
assistance to Cuba, including two legislative bills currently pending
before Congress that provide embargo exemptions for the sale and transport
of food and medical exports to Cuba. We're also aware that the Cuban-
American National Foundation, endorsed by Senator Helms, is proposing the
authorization of the delivery of humanitarian donations and US Government
food aid to the neediest Cuban people.
The United States Government continues to believe that maintaining pressure
on the Cuban Government through our embargo is fundamental to encouraging
systemic democratic change. At the same time, strengthening Cuban civil
society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to
the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a
peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.
The long and the short of it is that we've just seen the report this
morning - not entirely surprised by it, because details had been adumbrated
in previous weeks and there is other legislation currently before the
Congress that also is under review within the Administration. So I can't
tell you where we're going to come out on it; but we believe we have a very
good record, even now, in terms of authorizing humanitarian donations to
Cuba. We're certainly going to study these proposals coming out of
Congress.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- very critical on the implementation of the Helms-
Burton law, not only on Title IV that has - Title III that has been
suspended, but also on the part about visas. Is the State Department not
pursuing these --
MR. FOLEY: Well, although we have not had an opportunity to read the
report and evaluate it, even having seen the press reports, we can state
that we disagree with that assertion. We believe, as Ambassador Eizenstat
has stated here from this podium on different occasions, that through his
significant efforts, the EU has indeed taken important steps to promote
democracy and human rights in Cuba.
Because of the President's multilateral initiative, launched in 1996 under
Ambassador Eizenstat's direction, Castro is under more international
pressure to change than ever before. This historic initiative has changed
the terms of the debate about Cuba. When the President announced his
decision in January of 1998 to again suspend Title III, he pledged the
right to file suit in order to "make maximum use of Title III to increase
pressure on the Cuban regime by working with our allies to accelerate
change in Cuba."
At that time, the President pointed out that a number of important steps
taken by US allies, including the European Union's common position on Cuba,
the Ibero-American summit leaders called for democratic change in Cuba, and
new attention to the human rights situation in Cuba from European NGOs was
pertinent. I would also note, for example, that the European Union has
formed a working group on human rights among the embassies of its member
states in Havana to coordinate EU human rights efforts in Cuba. Our
Interests Section in Cuba has worked with our partner European embassies
there on human rights issues.
So we would take issue with that conclusion. We believe that really there's
been a major turning point - a sea change, if you will - in the attitude of
the European Union towards the need to promote actively democratization and
human rights in Cuba.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - says that other things were done, but it's been
dying out - practically - it's only Spain and the Czech Republic practically
are still doing it, and especially critical of France and Germany.
MR. FOLEY: That's not our information, but I can assure you that we're
going to continue to work with our allies on how we can promote our common
objective of promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba.
QUESTION: Do you have any observations about the man who was named
successor to Viktor Mikhailov at MINATOM?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, I do. You're talking about Yevgniy Adamov, who's been
just named Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy.
The United States has worked closely, of course, with the Ministry of
Atomic Energy in the past. Our relations with the ministry have been quite
constructive on a number of issues, including material protection, control
and accounting, plutonium disposition and other areas. Given strong
interest on the part of President Clinton and Vice President Gore in this
area, we expect our dialogue and cooperative work on nuclear matters to
continue without interruption under the new minister. We've always had a
frank and open dialogue with the Ministry, and we expect that to continue
under its new minister.
QUESTION: Do you expect any - if I just sort of took your words as
they're stated, it sounds like you don't expect any change, which wouldn't
necessarily be good for US-Russia policy, since you don't like a lot of the
things that they're doing now. So, I mean, do you see any reason to believe
that he will be any less aggressive than Mikhailov in marketing Russian
nuclear technology to Iran, for instance?
MR. FOLEY: I think that's too early to tell. He's just been named.
Certainly, the Russian Government is not lacking understanding of our very
strong views about this issue, and is working with us now on this issue. We
don't see eye-to-eye on each and every issue in every case, but I believe
that we do have much improved cooperation with the Russian Government now
on the issue of illicit transfers to Iran and the need to combat those.
So this is an ongoing effort, and I wouldn't be in a position to predict
how the new minister may or may not affect those efforts. But we believe
that the direction comes from the top, from President Yeltsin and from
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who will be here next week to meet with Vice
President Gore in the context of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.
Certainly, that will be an opportunity for the two leaders to discuss this
issue and where we're going on it.
QUESTION: And one slightly different issue -- do you have any comment on
the Times story today about the Palestinians and the CIA training?
MR. FOLEY: What I can tell you is that the US is working closely with
Palestinians in several areas, including efforts to improve the performance
and the professionalism of the Palestinian law enforcement authorities. But
I cannot, obviously, comment on intelligence matters or reports or
allegations, as such.
QUESTION: Jim, a general area -- have you seen the decision by the
Israeli Supreme Court that the Israeli Government has a constitutional
right to hold some number of Lebanese men, basically as trading material,
in future hostage --
MR. FOLEY: We've seen the press reports, but we're studying the ruling. I
can't comment on it. We're going to be raising it with the government of
Israel, but I have nothing of a formal nature to say about that today.
QUESTION: You're going to raise it. You're going to ask --
QUESTION: You were not aware of that before?
MR. FOLEY: We're going to be discussing it with the government of
Israel.
QUESTION: You were not aware of that before?
MR. FOLEY: I was aware of the press reports this morning, but, no, I was
not aware of the issue, as such. Maybe others in the building were, but I
wasn't personally.
QUESTION: You say you're raising it, do you mean to verify that there is
such a thing?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, because we've just seen the press reports; right.
QUESTION: Chinese Premier Li Peng announced to eliminate 11 ministry
bodies. What's your observation? Do you welcome this reform or --
MR. FOLEY: I've not seen that report. I couldn't possibly comment on it
until we've had a chance to verify --
QUESTION: Also, Premier Li Peng, he estimated 8 percent growth, economic
growth, this year. Do you think this observation - this prospect is
realistic?
MR. FOLEY: Well, the last thing anyone who knows me could accuse me of is
any kind of expertise in economic affairs. So I would not personally
venture to comment on that. Obviously, the Chinese Government is undertaking
a very serious economic reform program, and we support that program. But I
have no official reaction, though, to those prognostications about future
Chinese economic growth.
QUESTION: King Hussein of Jordan was in the United Emirates this week,
and he discussed his diplomatic role in the recent Iraq-UN crisis.
According to one Arab press report, he discussed he was working on behalf
of the United States and President Clinton. I was wondering if you might be
able to comment on King Hussein's specific role in that mediation effort
during the crisis.
MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not aware that there is a mediation effort, as such.
I think there were press reports indicating something of that nature that
we discussed with the Jordanian Government, and have been assured that
there's not a specific initiative in that regard. But of course, King
Hussein is an eminent leader in the Middle East, and we support his
positive contributions to the Middle East peace process and to the interest
of peace and stability generally in the region.
QUESTION: Is the Secretary getting any closer to being able to decide
whether or not the Total and Gazprom deal is sanctionable under ILSA?
MR. FOLEY: My understanding - of course, the law is the law and she's
going to apply it. Under the law, she has to make a determination on
sanctionability. She will do so. My understanding is that decision will be
made soon. I don't have a specific date for you.
QUESTION: Jim, could I go back to your first announcement about Slovakia?
Other than warning the Slovak Government, is the United States and its
allies prepared to do anything about what this appears to be - which is a
severe backsliding from democratic institutions?
MR. FOLEY: Well, as you know, our relations with the Slovak Government
have - with Slovakia, generally, have been impeded and hampered by certain
gaps and failures on the part of Mr. Meciar to institute real democratization
and meaningful economic reforms in the face of better performance on the
part of virtually all of his neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe in the
wake of the end of the Cold War. We have been impeded in our ability
to provide the kind of help and assistance to Slovakia that we provided
elsewhere in the region on that basis.
I'm not aware of any further measures or impediments that are under review
as a result of this, but I think it is significant that I have made this
statement from the podium to express just how seriously the US Government
officially take this action.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - program to Slovakia?
MR. FOLEY: I'd have to check that for you, Jim.
QUESTION: Thanks a lot.
QUESTION: Can I just - I really wanted to ask about ILSA. I want to
understand what it is that the Secretary is deciding. Is she just deciding
whether or not the companies - Total and Gazprom - are sanctionable;
whether this deal is large enough and meets the terms of the - that in
theory, there could be sanctions? And is that all she's deciding? Or are
there, for example, other considerations? Because when you read the law, it
sounds like -- it's a bit blurred, frankly, in my opinion.
But it sounds like it might be possible to determine, for example, that
since the Russian Government is cooperating on the question of missile
engine technology to Iran - cutting back the flow of that - that that might
allow somehow a determination that Gazprom shouldn't be sanctioned. In the
law, it interrelates the nation with the company quite a bit in a rather
foggy way. I'm not clear what it is she's got to decide.
MR. FOLEY: This is a very serious issue, as you know. I don't have the
law in front of me at the podium, so I'm going to give you an answer as I
understand it, but pledge to get back to you if I need to refine it after
having consulted the document, the legislation itself.
My understanding is that it is the Secretary's duty to make a determination
on sanctionability - is the activity sanctionable or not, under the law,
under the terms of the law? In making that decision, then, she must choose
among a menu of options if she determines that the action is sanctionable.
And there are options which I can get you --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: -- that flow from a determination of sanctionability.
QUESTION: First there's the determination of sanctionability, then
there's the 90 days, and then all these other questions.
MR. FOLEY: Well, there are different options. I'm risking commission of
an error by describing what those options are, but I believe that they
include immediate imposition of sanctions; they include a national - an
immediate national interest waiver; and I believe the third option is a 90-
day period in which there can be consultations with the government involved
when sanctionability has been determined. Those are provisions provided
under the law.
Thank you very much.
(The briefing concluded at 1:50P.M.)
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