U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #28, 98-03-03
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1198
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, March 3, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 Secretary testifies tomorrow, no daily press briefing
1 Secretary Albright departs for Ukraine on Thursday, March 5
IRAQ
1-5 Interpretation of UN Security Council resolution calling
for Iraqi compliance
1-3 UNSC authorization useful but not necessary for potential
use of force
3-4 No timeframe for early test of Iraq's compliance with
UNSCOM inspection agreement
3 UN SYG Annan's assurance that UNSCOM retains control over
inspection process
4-7 Requirements for lifting sanctions; peaceful intentions
6,8 No USG intent to conduct bilateral US-Iraq meetings
6 Reported Iranian military incursion into eastern Iraq
7 Trigger for military action
7-8,15 No reaction to alleged FBI investigation of spy providing
US military info to GOI
12 Opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi's remarks to Congress re
failure of promised USG support; Radio Free Iraq; USG
contacts with opposition groups
PEACE PROCESS
8-9 Israel press (Ma'ariv) report on Israeli military
withdrawal from Lebanon
9 White House meeting on Middle East peace process,
revitalization of talks
9-11 USG view of synchronized Israeli-Palestinian
implementation; US "ideas"
9-10 Possible Albright-Netanyahu meeting in London during this
trip unlikely
11 Greece concerns about expanding Israeli-Turkey
relationship; effect on ME peace talks
11 USG support for relationships supporting Israel's security
and ability to negotiate
11 Request for public USG assessment of responsibility for
talks stalemate
CUBA
12-14 USG reaction to American citizen travel to Cuba, meetings
with officials
14 Secretary Albright's Miami meetings w/ Cuban-American
groups
14-15 Canadian OAS Ambassador's proposal to reinstate Cuba as
active member at Summit of theAmericas, reject unilateral
actions such as Helms-Burton
SERBIA / FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
15-16 No proposal to send international forces to Kosovo; US
condemns violence; Albright contacts w/ Cook, Primakov
16 Potential need for Contact Group meeting to discuss
violence in Kosovo
BANGLADESH
16 USG support for freedom of the press
TURKEY / GREECE
17 GOT call for dialogue with Greece; Foreign Minister
Pangalos talks in US
RUSSIA
17 Atomic Energy Minister resigns; USG expects bilateral
dialogue will continue
MEXICO
17 Alleged GOM request for copy of DEA memo on US
certification decision
17-18 Sen. Helms resolution rejecting Administration
certification of Mexico
DEPARTMENT
18 Cannot rule out possible additional meetings during
Secretary's upcoming travel
18-20 Requested readout of Secretary's conversation w/ Russian
Foreign Minister Primakov
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #28
TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1998, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today is Tuesday.
Tomorrow the Secretary will be testifying; we will not be briefing. And on
Thursday, as you know, she will leave on her trip to Ukraine.
Mr. Schweid.
QUESTION: It may be worthwhile, I think, to go into the Security Council
resolution again. In at least one newspaper's headline, the Security
Council has not authorized using force against Iraq. Richardson says he's
happy with what they did. Is this authority to use force? Is that what
severest consequences could mean, if Iraq reneges?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm going to break my rule about not reflecting on
particular newspapers or media organizations, in this case. The actual
headline in the newspaper is much worse than the one you read.
QUESTION: This is the web site headline.
MR. RUBIN: Right. The actual newspaper headline suggests to me that that
headline writer should go into fiction work, rather than nonfiction work.
The United States did not seek authorization to use force, and any
suggestion that we did is based on fiction, not fact.
This resolution was the clearest possible threat to use force that the
Security Council has taken since this crisis began last year. The words
"severest consequences" is diplomatic code for military action. As you know,
the United States has said for some time that we do not believe we need
Security Council authorization for the use of military force, and that is
why we did not seek Security Council authorization.
So those who suggested that we didn't get what we sought were writing
fictional work. We wanted something different, and we got what we wanted.
What we wanted was the clearest possible message to the Iraqi regime that a
failure to comply with this agreement would lead to worldwide condemnation
and increasing support for the US determination to use military force, if
necessary.
I can only say that I remember sitting in this room just a couple of weeks
ago - standing in this room - and hearing from all of you about the lack of
support for the threat to use military force from countries around the
world. This Security Council resolution now unanimously puts the Security
Council on record -- and therefore, by implication, the world on record --
supporting the strongest possible threat language you can use in diplomacy.
I was in New York for four years. I never saw the word "severest," the
superlative form of the word, used. I often saw "grave"; I often saw
"severe"; I often saw "serious". But "severest" means there is no more
severe consequence, which makes quite clear that what we're talking about
here is military force.
It is true that some countries did not want this resolution to authorize
the use of force, but they were arguing against a phantom. We did not seek
authority to use force. So what's changed here is the fact that the world
is now supporting a strong, clear threat that military force will ensue if
Iraq violates this agreement. And that's why we think this resolution was
so important.
QUESTION: If this is the strongest language that you've seen after your
experience there, why stop short there? You have severest consequences; why
not just spell it out once and for all for Saddam to see and really have
that to be the icing on the cake? Why not just make it plain?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as is normal in the world of diplomacy and the
resolutions of the Security Council, even Resolution 678 - the Gulf War
Resolution - did not spell it out to the satisfaction of some people, if
they wanted to see the word, "military force" or "ground invasion" or "air
power." Those are not words that are used in Security Council resolutions.
That resolution, 678, authorized all necessary means to be used. We have
said for some time that our view is that if Iraq violates this agreement,
it will be in fundamental violation of Resolution 687, the Cease-Fire
Resolution, which will then give rise to Resolution 6878, which authorizes
the use of military force. So in our view, a new authority to use force is
not necessary. What was useful was a clear threat from the international
community directed at the leadership in Iraq that a failure to comply would
lead to the severest consequences. That's what the resolution says.
That is a marked shift from the international lay of the land that
existed just a couple of weeks ago, and that's why this resolution is so
important.
QUESTION: Does this in any way - some might look at this and see the UN
once again backing away from something and giving Saddam higher ground,
even yet again.
MR. RUBIN: All I can say is you'd have to use an awful powerful
microscope to find anything in this resolution other than a clear threat to
use military force - the same threat that the Security Council obviously
did not make two weeks ago.
QUESTION: You call this a useful resolution. Why has it been, from this
podium and elsewhere the last week or so, there have been statements,
repeated statements that no resolution is necessary at all?
MR. RUBIN: Well, that's the difference between the word "useful" and the
word "necessary," Roy. We've made clear that a resolution is not necessary,
from our standpoint, in terms of international legal authority. We believe
the international legal authority exists, based on the fact that Iraq, if
it violates this agreement, will be in fundamental violation of the cease-
fire, and therefore the underlying authority to use force will pertain.
So that is what is necessary.
What is useful is a signal from the entire world that a failure to comply
with this resolution would lead to the most severe consequences.
QUESTION: My question is why, then - why not strive for what you now say
is a useful resolution? Why not have said this would be a useful thing to
have a resolution doing the following things?
MR. RUBIN: I think I just said that it was useful.
QUESTION: Yes, but why not - in other words, you've been taking such a
neutral stance on the value of a resolution for the last week or so.
MR. RUBIN: I think if you look back at the words that we've used - and I
know you do that on a regular basis - we've said that a strong message from
the Security Council would be welcome.
QUESTION: What about the Russians this morning were talking about the
issue of an automatic recourse to force. And their interpretation was that,
if there was a breach, that it would return to the Security Council, and
you wouldn't have - you wouldn't automatically --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I wouldn't be surprised if there was a breach, the
Security Council would talk about it. What I am saying is that, from the
standpoint of the United States -- the country that has gathered the
military force in the Gulf and is prepared to use that military force -- we
believe the authority exists; the warning has now been issued; and Saddam
Hussein should be put on notice that the President of the United States has
the power, the will and the authority to use military power, if he
violates this agreement.
QUESTION: One of the things that the United States was looking for was an
early test. Do you have any assurances now from UNSCOM or anybody else that
there will be an early test of the Iraqis' willingness to cooperate?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have a time frame for you. I believe that those who
have been in contact with UN officials are reasonably confident that they
are working assiduously on developing a program for going back into Iraq
and seeing whether Iraq is going to move from a pattern of non-cooperation
to a pattern of cooperation. And they are working assiduously on such a
program, but they would be the ones to describe the time frame.
As I indicated yesterday, Chairman Butler - and I will also point, by the
way, to another statement here for those of you who seemed also interested
in taking your microscope out when this agreement was put forward.
Secretary General Annan, the signer of the agreement, makes clear in his
statement that the agreement ensures that UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission,
"remains in full operational control of the inspection process." Secondly,
Secretary General Annan makes clear that, according to the agreement, Iraq
has to provide immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access to those teams
to every area, facility, piece of equipment, individuals and means
of transportation.
So for those of you who were so anxious to find holes in this agreement, or
those outside this room who might have done so prematurely, let me point
out that the two principles we went in - and I know these words are going
to sound familiar to you - total access and operational control for UNSCOM
were preserved and strengthened, and those are the words of the Secretary
General.
QUESTION: Jamie, on the issue of sanctions relief, there is a provision
in this resolution that talks about fulfillment of Resolution 687, I think
it is. And I'd like to know, is there some light at the end of the tunnel,
as some of the other countries have talked about it, for the Iraqis, should
they comply with the Annan agreement?
MR. RUBIN: If Iraq complies with this agreement -- and that's a big "if" -
- in other words, if Saddam Hussein acts like a wise man not a wise guy and
implements this agreement, then the UN Special Commission will be in a
position to make judgments that they have been unable to make -- namely,
whether Iraq is in compliance with Resolution 687's provisions on
destroying weapons of mass destruction; whether they can certify that the
Iraqis have eliminated all of their weapons of mass destruction; and
whether they can certify that the long-term monitoring regime is in place
that will prevent them from ever building weapons of mass destruction or
missiles over 150 kilometers. When that is in place and when Iraq is in
compliance with other relevant provisions of UN resolutions, then it's
possible to think about lifting sanctions.
We are not sanguine about that prospect. We have grave doubts that Iraq has
changed its behavior. We have doubts whether Saddam Hussein has changed his
stripes. Will he move from a pattern of non-cooperation across the board
with the United Nations to a pattern of cooperation is a question that, at
this point, it's hard to answer yes to.
With regard to the resolution, it merely points out what every resolution
points out, which is that Iraq is not in compliance with those provisions
and that if it were, that would be a different situation. So that's, as far
as we're concerned, a statement of the obvious.
QUESTION: Does the fulfillment of Paragraph XXII of that resolution
satisfy the obligations? Or are there a whole series of other obligations
that have to be carried out by Iraq in connection with other resolutions?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's been our view that Iraq has to comply with all
relevant resolutions. And that goes beyond simply the question of weapons
of mass destruction. I would caution you against tossing around the word
"Paragraph XXII." There is a preamble to the Resolution 687 that talks
about Iraq's peaceful intentions. The point there is, if Iraq has not
changed its pattern of behavior, and it were to temporarily comply with
weapons of mass destruction provisions, but demonstrate flagrant abuse
of all the rest of the Council's demands, one would have justified
doubts as to whether the moment they had oil to export and money to import
and pour into its weapons of mass destruction, whether they would just kick
the inspectors out and the long-term monitoring system out and begin
building weapons of mass destruction in earnest.
So our view has been based on the rather straightforward premise that we
are looking at Iraq's peaceful intentions. We're looking at a pattern of
compliance with UN resolutions across the board; and that one shouldn't
over-interpret these things when one's dealing with a dictator as dangerous
as Saddam Hussein.
QUESTION: What are the other relevant resolutions - other relevant things
that Iraq must do in order --
MR. RUBIN: Well, there is a list, and I will get that for you. But there
are more than one, and I will try to get you a considered legal judgment on
this. But they include things like accounting for Kuwaiti prisoners of war
that are still missing - cooperating in that effort, which they have not
done so to date. They include returning Kuwaiti property that was stolen in
the invasion that the Security Council authorized a force to reverse.
And there are other provisions, but those are two examples.
QUESTION: You've spent a lot of time today talking about the technicalities
of the agreement and how it was negotiated and what it means. The Iraqi
deputy prime minister, who signed the agreement yesterday said, "We will
live up to this agreement. It is our agreement; it was not imposed upon
us." My question to you is, does the US see anything qualitatively
different about the nature of this agreement as distinct from all the other
resolutions which it embodies and so on? And is there, in your view, any
more hope that because of the way this agreement was reached, that
perhaps it has more success at security compliance?
MR. RUBIN: Let me answer it this way - Iraq is a dictatorship, and Saddam
Hussein has been in charge of that country all along. And if Saddam Hussein
wanted his people to comply with UN resolutions all along, I am confident
they would have followed his orders, lest they suffer the fate of those who
have not.
So we do not think that the simple fact that Saddam Hussein had a
discussion about this necessarily leads us to be more optimistic about
their intentions. But frankly, it's not intentions, with regard to this
agreement, that matter. What matters is whether Iraq lives up to the
agreement, and the proof of that will come in the testing.
Saddam Hussein has had numerous opportunities to live up to the resolutions
of the Security Council over the last five and a half, six years. He's
failed to capitalize on those opportunities. If he does so this time,
that's fine and good. That is the best way for the United States and the
international community to combat the threat he poses from maintaining
weapons of mass destruction. But we have no illusions about who this man is
and what his pattern of behavior has been. If he decides to change that
pattern of behavior, we will be pleasantly surprised.
QUESTION: And if I can just follow up, in light of the comment by Tariq
Aziz -- and also in light of your comment about the fact that Saddam
Hussein had a discussion about this agreement -- is there any consideration
being given in the Administration now to having any kind of discussion with
the Iraqi Government; that is, the US having such a discussion with the
Iraqi Government, or perhaps the US in conjunction with others on the
Security Council -- the P-5 or any other combination the US might want to
suggest?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding, the existing pattern has been as follows, is
that we do not have bilateral meetings with the Iraqi leadership. We have
met for what we in the diplomatic business call demarches, where a specific
message is delivered. Ambassador Albright - or Secretary Albright, when she
was Ambassador Albright, in New York, has done that in the past with Iraqi
Ambassador Hamdoon. That kind of contact has existed, so it's not that
there has been no contact.
But what we want to focus on -- and the reason why we do not believe it's
appropriate to change that pattern -- is the fact that Iraq is in flagrant
violation of Security Council resolutions. Iraq's complaint has often tried
to direct itself at the United States, but it's not the United States that
passed this resolution demanding compliance and making clear that military
force was a realistic threat if they did not comply; that was the United
Nations Security Council.
So we think that so long as Iraq is not in compliance with UN resolutions,
there is no point in having meetings. I am not aware, therefore, that
there's been any rethinking of that position in a comprehensive way.
QUESTION: Also on Iraq, have you heard of an Iranian incursion into what
would be Eastern Iraq, in which there were reported scores of casualties?
MR. RUBIN: I've heard some reports and rumors about that, but I have no
details about it.
QUESTION: Could you look into that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, going back, you were just saying, in answer to Ralph's
questions, that Iraqi intentions did not - it's not the intentions that
matter in the carrying out of the Annan agreement. But when I was asking
you about sanctions, you were saying what we want to look at is the
intentions - the peaceful intentions.
MR. RUBIN: Boy, you really can work the nit-picking, Roy, go ahead.
QUESTION: Well, it may sound like nit-picking at the podium, but it
sounds awful like an inconsistency to my ears.
MR. RUBIN: No, it's not an inconsistency. In the one case, what we are
dealing with is a regime that has shown a pattern of disregard for the
international community; that has violated resolutions, invaded another
country, failed to comply with the resolution setting forth the cease-fire.
In the other case, we are having our doubts about the intentions of Iraq,
and waiting to see its pattern of behavior.
So I really don't understand the inconsistency. I mean, it's useful,
perhaps, in argumentation to note the inconsistency; but I don't see the
inconsistency.
QUESTION: Well, it's very simple. If you are looking for compliance,
according to a written agreement, then there's a way to measure whether
there's compliance. But if you're going to try to read people's intentions
by overriding other measures, then --
MR. RUBIN: But, Roy, if you listen to what I said, what I said was that
we're not - the words "peaceful intentions" are significant, and we are
going to measure them by actions, Roy. I said actions in the case of
Kuwaiti prisoners; actions in the case of Kuwaiti equipment. In other words,
I said that peaceful intentions can be measured by actions, just the way
intentions, in the case of this agreement, can be measured by actions in
its implementation.
QUESTION: Well, doesn't compliance - just to finish up, doesn't
compliance with this agreement -- and this is a hypothetical, to say the
least - constitute a demonstration of intentions?
MR. RUBIN: The Iraqis have a long, long way to go to build back the
confidence that was lost by the international community on the day they
invaded Kuwait and the day that they ravaged the country of Kuwait; the day
that they burned oil wells; the day that they slaughtered their own people
in the Kurdish areas. They have a long, long way to go to build back
confidence by the international community in their pattern of behavior.
QUESTION: -- back to the next phase, the testing of the accord. Does the
United States feel, then, that military action might be warranted at the
first glitch?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll make that judgment at the time and place of our
choosing. But we are making clear the principle underlying our policy,
which is that a violation of this agreement is one that will, in our view,
justify the use of military force.
QUESTION: Could you comment on a report that the FBI has been made aware
that an Iraqi spy passed information from the Pentagon to a senior
intelligence official in Baghdad? And has this individual been captured or -
-
MR. RUBIN: I'm smiling because I think I counted the word "FBI" once, the
word "intelligence" three times in the question, and I just wondered what
your hopes were in terms of me answering the question.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Well, you know what my hopes are; you know I have to ask the
question.
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: We also know that you do occasionally address all of those
issues from this podium.
MR. RUBIN: Never when they're combined like that. No, no comment.
QUESTION: Never say never.
MR. RUBIN: When they're combined in that particular way, it's a standard
I don't think we'll meet in the next three years.
QUESTION: Can I ask a question about the report that the leader of Jordan,
who is coming here shortly, has suggested that what is needed is a dialogue
between the United States and Iraq directly now. In the last 25 years,
we've only had normal relations with Iraq, I believe, about five years. You
can blame that on them, of course, but what is your attitude on that?
Secondly, would you comment on the report in Maariv this morning that
there was a mission by Ambassador David Newton, a fairly senior Department
of State official, to Damascus, probably in connection with the possible
withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon?
MR. RUBIN: The first question I believe I gave an extensive answer that
required me to stop myself and drink water twice to that question when
Ralph asked it to me. The short answer is, I don't believe there's any
consideration being given to changing our view that Iraq should meet with
the United Nations and answer the concerns of the United Nations, not the
United States.
With regard to the second issue, I believe the ambassador that you're
referring to was not on a diplomatic mission, but was on a mission to
explain our policy to various governments and officials and journalists and
other interested figures in the region, and was not engaged in any
diplomatic exercise along those lines.
QUESTION: I'm tempted to ask you, did they clap him on the back and say,
atta boy, that's the way to go?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) in Paris, with representatives of Prime Minister
Netanyahu?
MR. RUBIN: Who?
QUESTION: Newton.
MR. RUBIN: I can assure you that the channel for dealing with the
government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the Middle East peace
process has not changed. That channel runs from the President through the
Secretary of State, directly into the special Middle East coordinator's
office; and that is where the business is done.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the talking at the White House today
about Middle East policy, by various people, including the Secretary?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Mike McCurry, I believe, mentioned - discussed this. But
to the extent that I asked the Secretary about this, she said that she has
been actively engaged in an internal process to try to see whether there
are steps we can take to revitalize the increasingly moribund Middle East
peace process. We have grave concerns about this. There hasn't been any
progress. Neither of the parties are making the hard decisions that need to
be taken. And we're looking at ways to revitalize it.
To this point, we have adopted the view that our role should be one of
promoting ideas, presenting those ideas, looking for ways to narrow the
gaps and expand the areas of agreement. Those have obviously not borne
fruit, and we're looking at what we can do to revitalize it. But I don't
believe any firm decisions have been made.
QUESTION: Let me ask a quick follow-up. We lost - at least some of us
lost the thread of this issue, because Iraq dominated the news.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Ned Walker, Ambassador Walker, was the next in line to try -- I
think you were working - I think downscale instead of upscale - but the
ambassador in Israel was the centerpiece, was the mediator. I don't know
where we stand; maybe you can tell us: where do the two sides stand now on
at least the Clinton suggestion of a procedural way to have withdrawal
synchronized to security steps? Has that been accepted?
MR. RUBIN: We believe there was generalized acceptance of the idea that
you would have a parallel process, but the devil was in the details; and
the details were how much land, what specific steps the Palestinian
Authority should take in the area of security, what the timing of any
transfer of land would be, what the quality of any transfer of land would
be. But the idea of a parallel process we didn't feel was running into
resistance. It was the substance of those four issues that I mentioned that
were unable to be overcome, and that is still the case.
The discussions that Ambassador Walker was having were primarily on the so-
called interim issues -- the airport, the seaport, the safe passage - and
to the, although not the surprise, but the continuing concern of the
Secretary, even on issues like that, there was no ability on the two
parties to overcome technical issues that seem to matter more than they
ought to, and not enough political will was being exerted to overcome those
technical issues. So that has not made a lot of progress, either.
QUESTION: Doesn't sound like it's right for her to see Netanyahu in
London, does it?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I can say that there - I checked this out all morning,
and there's no evidence that I'm aware of that anyone here is giving that
serious consideration.
QUESTION: There's another report in an Israeli newspaper this morning,
which on Prime Minister Netanyahu addressing a group, warned the United
States against going public with any plan designed to break the deadlock.
First, is there any American plan per se - anything that you would regard
as a formal plan? And second, has the United States said it would go public
with it if there were not agreement between the parties?
MR. RUBIN: Let me begin that answer by saying, with regard to the Israeli
press, my normal rules of press criticism do not hold.
(Laughter.)
And there are many examples in the Israeli press of what I could call rumor
that somehow manage to get themselves into the newspaper, including the
firm statement that we were meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu in London, in
one of the Israeli publications.
With regard to your specific questions, there is no US plan; and we have
not told anybody that we intend to go public with our plan if they don't
agree to something that we don't have. We do have ideas for how to overcome
the gaps and the obstacles in the four areas that I mentioned earlier -
namely, the steps the Palestinians would have to take in the area of
security; the quantity of land; the quality of land; the timing for any
transfer of a further redeployment. We've had ideas, and we've been
discussing those ideas assiduously with the parties. That process is still
ongoing, but we cannot report any progress in that area.
QUESTION: Just to follow up, and without regard to US or Israeli
newspapers or reports, but isn't it possible that you're dealing with a
semantic difference in what you call ideas and other people are, loosely or
wrongly, even, interpreting as plans? Would the same - would your answer
hold for your ideas as well as the non-existent plan?
MR. RUBIN: Well, semantics matter in the Middle East; I've learned that.
By adding a comma here or a colon there or an adjective here, my phone
starts ringing off the hook. So let me just say that we have said what our
view is about the ideas that we've put forward. If the Secretary believes
that that effort of discussing those ideas has run its course and we intend
to pursue some other tactic to try to promote peace, we'll let you know;
but it hasn't run its course yet.
QUESTION: Another topic --
QUESTION: No, the same topic. (Inaudible) - object to you - they
certainly speak - the whole bit about semantics. We may be talking past the
point when they object publicly, as the ambassador to the UN did yesterday,
about anybody - any third party trying to impose a settlement. But is there
any resistance to Dennis Ross throwing out numbers as to how much ground
Israel should give up? You may call them ideas, but they come awfully
close to suggesting the contours of an agreement. Anybody dislike
that particularly?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure there are some critics, who must criticize to earn a
living, who don't like that. But as far as the Palestinian Authority and
the government of Israel are concerned, I think they have seen Ambassador
Ross' role of putting forward ideas and the Secretary's role of putting
forward ideas to try to overcome the impasse as useful and constructive, in
the sense that they continue to urge us to do more on the peace process
rather than less.
QUESTION: Can I try one fast? Months ago, when Israel and Turkey were
beginning to solidify some sort of a defense agreement, the State
Department said they thought it was a good thing. It's growing, and the
Greek Government is becoming increasingly uneasy and vitriolic. There's a
report that - I didn't check it out, so I shouldn't quote it - but that it
was called by a high-ranking Greek official a "pact of the wicked." What is
the US Government's view as to the bearing this Israeli-Turkish agreement
might have on Israel's confidence to make peace?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that this kind of a relationship between two
democracies, two allies -- Turkey being an ally and Israel being a country
we've committed to the security of in the Middle East -- is appropriate.
It's a dangerous neighborhood, and it's perfectly appropriate for those two
countries to work together on security issues. So if others don't like that,
we respectfully disagree.
With regard to whether it would improve the prospects for Israel being able
to sign a peace agreement, let me say this. We have been seeking, as our
overarching goal that President Clinton has laid out, a comprehensive peace
in the Middle East, including with Syria, including with Lebanon, including
with all of Israel's neighbors. That is the goal of the peace process. To
the extent that any security arrangements or relationships improve
Israel's security and willingness to enter into such an agreement,
that is a good thing for those who support the peace process, and
we are foremost among them.
QUESTION: The Secretary has said in the past that when she hits an
impasse and one party or the other is not cooperating, she will give
details in public, she'll be candid. Since you're saying that both sides
have failed to show the will to move ahead, and they're raising technical
difficulties, is this a reason you can't give us some elaboration of
exactly what each side is doing to --
MR. RUBIN: I believe, in answer to a question, two questions ago, I said,
when the Secretary of State is ready to say that and to state publicly her
views on what ought to be done, she will do that. In the meantime, we are
continuing to work on our assistance by presenting ideas, in the hopes of
overcoming them. And if that tactic reaches the end of its diplomatic
string, we'll let you know.
QUESTION: I have an Iraq question also. Mr. Chalabi - Ahmed Chalabi spoke
in Congress yesterday, in the Senate, and talked about guarantees that had
been written to the opposition as early as 1993 that were then not carried
out. He also called for a lot of support for the opposition to establish a
base in, I think, Southern Iraq. Two questions - one is what your comment
is on what he had to say. And secondly, what kind of reception is
he getting in the Administration? Has he seen top people at the State
Department?
MR. RUBIN: We do have meetings with Iraqi opposition figures on a regular
basis. It's not our practice to detail every meeting; but we do meet with
them.
As far as the set of ideas put forward - and I'm not going to be able to
comment on the specific ones he put forward, because I haven't seen them -
but there has been a set of ideas out there that we have talked about in
the past, including Radio Free Iraq, and other steps to work more
effectively with an Iraqi opposition. We examine and review those ideas,
and some of them appear worth exploring, and we're exploring them.
QUESTION: Secondly, on the question of the guarantees that the Iraq
opposition had and that the Administration failed to carry out - he says he
has a letter from Vice President Gore that promised support.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I can't comment on somebody saying they have some letter
that I haven't seen.
QUESTION: Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, and then we'll go over here and then we'll go in the
back.
QUESTION: Going to Cuba, there's been some travel --
MR. RUBIN: Going to the Cuba issue.
QUESTION: Yes, well, the - yes, whatever. Let's just --
MR. RUBIN: We're not going to Cuba.
QUESTION: We're not traveling there, right. Leonardo DiCaprio and a
couple other celebrities have been in Cuba recently. He was there about two
weeks ago, and he said he wanted to go down and see things first hand.
Harper's Bazaar had a photo shoot down there with Kate Moss and Naomi
Campbell, I'm told.
MR. RUBIN: This is news to me.
QUESTION: The question I have is, are these sort of visits - does the US
consider them productive? I believe that Kate Moss and Naomi Campbell
actually met with Fidel, and Naomi came out saying that he was a swell
guy.
(Laughter.)
And I'm just wondering what the US thinks about this?
(Laughter.)
And if this would --
QUESTION: Is that the Kate Moss guidance?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: And if this would in any way --
MR. RUBIN: It doesn't say Kate Moss in here.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Does it say the Pope? He's a somewhat larger figure in
this.
QUESTION: Are these visits a good thing?
MR. RUBIN: At the risk of putting us in disagreement with any honorable
figures in the fashion industry, we do not think that Fidel Castro is a
swell guy.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: You don't include the Pope in the fashion industry, but the
Pope is looking for some conciliation and she's going to see the Pope.
MR. RUBIN: With regard to the idea of visits, the - we understand that
this group did go there. The spending of funds in Cuba by US citizens and
residents is strictly limited to avoid providing the Cuban Government with
the financial resources needed to continue its repressive policies. Certain
categories of travelers can be authorized to spend money in Cuba. Some,
such as journalists, can travel under general license.
We think that the relevant restrictions of the US Government should apply;
that the gentleman you referred to was operating under those restrictions.
We have no reason to believe otherwise. Our effort has been focused on how
to promote democracy in Cuba. And we have said for some time that we are
hopeful that Fidel Castro will change his policies, and that if there is
fundamental change in Cuba's policies, we are prepared to respond
appropriately.
We haven't seen that, even in the case of the prisoner releases. We have
concerns that some of these people were forced into exile; others face re-
arrest. That is not what the Pope envisaged, I suspect, when he called for
people to be able to express their views.
So there are rules and regulations that apply even to important figures in
the fashion industry, and those applied in this case.
QUESTION: So do you think - but should - does US feel it's good for
celebrities to continue these visits? Are they promoting something? Is it
deterring or what?
MR. RUBIN: I'm going to have to get you a considered answer for the
record on that. But we certainly don't think Fidel Castro is a swell
guy.
QUESTION: I have a Cuba question. There's some tea leaf-reading going on
down in Miami with regard to some of the meetings that the Secretary had
with Cuban-American groups. She evidently met for quite a while with a
group called El Dictorio, which is a group which seems to favor democratic
transition in a peaceful means in Cuba; and that she kept the other group,
the Cuban CANF organization, waiting. And there is - they are reading the
tea leaves and saying, is there a change in US policy because this
other group was kept waiting?
MR. RUBIN: I was at those meetings with the Secretary, or I accompanied
her to Florida, and I know that she had very constructive and excellent
meetings with all the Cuban-American groups that she met with. And I don't
know whether some thought they were kept waiting, but certainly there was
no intention whatsoever by the Secretary of State to signal a change in our
Cuba policy, based on the fact that somebody may or may not have been
kept waiting. There was certainly no intention.
Those meetings can be pretty hectic. They can run a little longer than
planned. She had excellent discussions with all the Cuban-American groups
she met with. She inquired of them, as she intends to inquire of the Pope,
what they make of Cuba in the aftermath of the Pope's visit -- whether they
see any openings that didn't exist before, whether they see any fundamental
changes on the ground in the views of the Cuban people and their commitment
to democracy and their willingness to act to promote democracy.
So it was very much an analytical discussion of what is the best way to
meet the principles of our Cuba policy, which are to promote democratic
government there; to ensure that civil society is expanded; to make sure
that migration is safe, legal and orderly. Those are the primary principles
of our Cuba policy. This was an analytical discussion there, as I suspect
she will have in the Vatican with the Pope, about how best to achieve those
goals.
QUESTION: On Cuba also. The ambassador of Canada, at the Organization of
American States, yesterday said that they are trying to - a group of
ambassadors, they are trying to propose, in the Summit of the Americas, the
re-installation of Cuba as an active member of the Organization of the
American States. And they say they are going to try also at the same time,
to build up a new mechanism inside of the OAS to reject the unilateral
actions of the United States, like the Helms-Burton. Have you hear anything
about this, or do you have any reaction to this?
MR. RUBIN: I'm unfamiliar with the proposal and therefore have no
comment.
QUESTION: I wanted to beat the Iraqi dead horse one more time.
MR. RUBIN: Okay. Let's do it.
QUESTION: And I'm going to rephrase my question and take out the
buzzwords "Pentagon" and "FBI." Is the State Department aware that a spy
passed information about a military attack, about a U.S. military attack,
to the Iraqis?
MR. RUBIN: You didn't take out all the key words. I cannot comment on
that. Thank you.
QUESTION: Yes, I would now like to --
MR. RUBIN: Please.
QUESTION: Kosovo, we didn't talk about it yesterday.
MR. RUBIN: We did.
QUESTION: We did?
MR. RUBIN: I read a statement about that, yes.
QUESTION: Oh, okay. Currently, Jamie, the - Mr. Bulatovic, the defense
minister of Serbia, has said - stated that Kosovo separatists are
supporting - getting support from part of the international community;
that's why there has been this terrorism and killing in Kosovo. Once again,
where does the US stand on the implementation of - or putting in SFOR
troops or does that have to be NATO troops or what?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not familiar with any proposal to send in military forces
into Kosovo on the ground. Let me say this - we are appalled by the recent
violent incidents in Kosovo. We continue to call on all sides to enter into
an unconditional dialogue, and for authorities in Belgrade to implement
immediately the education agreement on an effective basis. This would be a
way to reduce tensions.
We have also called on the leaders of the Kosovar-Albanians to condemn
terrorist action by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, noting that
violence does not contribute to a just and durable solution to the problems
there.
As the events over the weekend demonstrated, however, the vast majority of
violence in Kosovo is due to actions of government authorities. We expect
the Serbian police in Kosovo to act with maximum restraint, and the
Yugoslav army to take no action that will further incite violence there. We
have made these views clear to the authorities in Belgrade. Special
Representative Robert Gelbard has communicated directly with President
Milosevic, making clear the consequences that will ensue if they don't turn
around. And Secretary Albright spoke today on the phone to Foreign
Minister Cook and Foreign Minister Primakov about the situation. So
we're seized with the subject. We have grave concerns in this area,
and we're continuing to act.
QUESTION: Did Albright, when she talked with Cook and Primakov on this
subject, discuss the possibility of the need for a foreign ministers',
foreign secretaries' meeting, perhaps of the Contact Group or anything of
that sort?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't rule that out.
QUESTION: When would you not rule that out? Would that be not ruled out
in London?
MR. RUBIN: Not ruling out is the best I can do for now.
QUESTION: Before you change the subject, did they discuss the continuation
of the force in Macedonia?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know the full extent of the conversation. I know that
the main topic was Kosovo, however.
QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, this is Mr. Arshad from the Daily Inquilab from
Bangladesh. Turning onto Bangladesh, traditionally the United States have
been championing the cause of democracy and free press around the world. It
has become lately very much visible that the press has been gagged in
Bangladesh, with the new democracy taking off under the leadership of Prime
Minister Hasina. In fact, it has been to such an extent that my editor,
of the Inquilab, and several publishers and weeklies' journalists have been
prosecuted under high treason, which means they are going against a high
treason notation.
Under these circumstances, and basing on the traditional notion of support
for democracy and free press by the United States, what is the current
stand of the US Government policy toward press freedom and democracy in
South Asia, particularly in reference to the lapses in Bangladesh?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say, I'm unfamiliar with the specific circumstances of
your editor's situation, and we will inquire into that. But I can say that
Secretary Albright believes in the strongest possible way in the principle
of freedom of the press and the practice of freedom of the press. That is
our view.
QUESTION: Lately the Turkish Foreign Ministry make several dialogue calls
to Greece, not only the Aegean subject, but all other subjects we disagree.
But the Greek side officially refused this dialogue call directly and
indirectly. We believe that the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Pangalos, will
be in Washington late of March. Do you plan to discuss on this subject and
dialogue calls with the Greeks?
MR. RUBIN: I am unfamiliar with the schedule as it is developing, but I
can assure you the question of Greece-Turkey relations would come up in any
such meeting.
QUESTION: In Russia, the atomic energy minister, who has been promoting
nuclear supplies to Iran, has been fired. Do you have a comment on that or
any other changes Mr. Yeltsin has made?
MR. RUBIN: I thought I had a comment on that. Excuse me.
QUESTION: -- things in your head, Jamie.
MR. RUBIN: Well, sometimes.
QUESTION: Maybe Albright discussed that with Mr. Primakov?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that that came up in her discussion with - there
we go. I did have something on that.
We did not have any indication that he intended to resign in our recent
contacts with him, and we had anticipated his participation in the upcoming
session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.
As far as whether this will change our cooperation in nuclear matters is
concerned, given the strong presidential and vice-presidential interest in
this area, and the leadership that President Clinton and Vice President
Gore have shown in this area, we expect our dialogue and cooperative work
on nuclear matters to continue without interruption.
QUESTION: On Mexico. The government of Mexico has just asked the State
Department to provide them with the supposed draft of the secret memorandum
that was made by the DEA about the certification - the way that Mexico
fight the drugs in 1997. I just wonder when are you planning to give the
answer to the --
MR. RUBIN: I'm unfamiliar with whether that request has been made and how
we're going to respond to it, but we would always want to work in close
cooperation with the Mexican Government in our fight against drugs.
QUESTION: And Senator Helms has just introduced a resolution trying to
reject the certification of Mexico. Do you have any --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm familiar with the fact that several members of
Congress have indicated their intention to introduce measures of that kind.
We believe the certification process worked extremely well this year.
Secretary Albright was particularly pleased with the cooperation with
Attorney General Reno and General McCaffrey. I think you all saw them here
in this room. We would hope and expect that after receiving all the
information, understanding the rationale for all of our judgments, that
Congress would not take any action to undercut these important tools we
have in the fight against drugs, and not take any action that will
undermine our ability to fight drugs, such as resolutions of disapproval.
QUESTION: Jamie, I think yesterday, when we were discussing Iraq and you
had announced the Secretary's trip, I asked whether since she was meeting
the Italians, the French, the Germans, the Brits and the Canadians, at
least in part to discuss that subject, whether she also had plans to do so
with the Russians. In light of your disclosure of the phone conversation
today with Mr. Primakov, could you revisit the question of whether --
MR. RUBIN: This sounds like another way of getting at the meeting of
foreign ministers, which I said I couldn't rule out.
QUESTION: No, I --
MR. RUBIN: So what I would say is, I wouldn't rule it out.
QUESTION: The question is - what you didn't rule out was a meeting of the
Contact Group on the subject of Kosovo.
MR. RUBIN: Right, of which Foreign Minister Primakov is a member.
QUESTION: Exactly.
MR. RUBIN: Normally, if they meet as a Contact Group, they would meet
privately.
QUESTION: They would have other discussions.
MR. RUBIN: But I can't rule out a Contact Group meeting, and therefore I
can't rule out a bilateral discussion.
QUESTION: Are there foreign ministers or foreign ministry level officials
with whom the Secretary might meet on this trip, other than the ones you've
announced already?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to confirm any meetings that I didn't
announce yesterday.
QUESTION: And can you say whether the subject of these - either - could
you perhaps revisit the question of the conversation the Secretary had with
the Russian Foreign Minister today, to see whether topics other than Kosovo
were discussed, and perhaps give us a more full description of that
conversation?
MR. RUBIN: I will see what I can do on that. I mean, we don't normally
talk about the entire content of conversations with foreign ministers. In
the context of a particular question, however, I often express topics that
were discussed and give the general impression of what the U.S. side said,
but it would be up to other foreign ministers to talk about what they
said.
QUESTION: If you would prefer a series of specific questions on specific
topics, I'll be happy to do that for you.
MR. RUBIN: I don't understand your point.
QUESTION: If you'd like me to ask about whether topic A was discussed,
and then whether topic B was discussed, and topic C was discussed, happy to
do that.
MR. RUBIN: Well, fortunately, this will be the last briefing of this
week.
QUESTION: Which is why I'm asking that question today. It would be nice
to have --
MR. RUBIN: So it would be hard for you to follow through on your threat.
Let me say this --
QUESTION: I beg to differ. Let's go - let's start. Can you tell us
whether the Secretary --
MR. RUBIN: I have no comment.
QUESTION: -- and the foreign minister discussed the subject --
MR. RUBIN: I have no comment.
QUESTION: - of Iran in that --
MR. RUBIN: I have no comment.
QUESTION: You have no comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on whether they discussed --
MR. RUBIN: Ralph, you're not really making much progress here. I'm trying
to keep the jocular atmosphere in the briefing room going, and what I'm
trying to tell you is that if we have anything more to tell you about
private phone conversations, we'll decide when and where to do that.
QUESTION: These were private conversations?
MR. RUBIN: Between a foreign minister and a foreign minister, yes, those
are called private. They weren't miked into the briefing room; right.
QUESTION: I don't know whether they were or not. I wasn't here to
determine whether they were or not.
MR. RUBIN: I think we've exhausted this. Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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