U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #27, 98-03-02
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
762
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, March 2, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 Secretary's Travel to Europe and Canada
DEPARTMENT
1,12 Secretary's Meeting with Pope John Paul II
CANADA
1,2 Quebec Referendum/Bilateral Issues for Discussion: Pacific
Salmon, Border Issues & Iraq
2 Helms-Burton Warning Letters and Canadian Businesses
KOSOVO
3 Disputes Between Belgrade and Pristina/Sanction Against
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Kosovo Educational
Agreement / Terrorism
IRAQ
3,6 Diplomats (Special Group), No-Notice Inspections and UNSCOM
4 Discussions About Iraq With Allies on Secretary's Trip to
Europe and Canada
4,5-6 Iraqi Compliance with Agreement/Possible Use of Force and
Ally Support
5,6 Language of the Agreement/Message Contained in Language
6 Opposition Parties to Iraq
6,10 UN "Special Group," and UN and Ambassador Butler's Authority
10,11 Russian, Chinese Pope's Remarks Concerning Possible
Military Conflicts
11 Timeline for Iraq's Implementation of Agreement
11 US Ambassador to Kuwait Meetings with Iraqi Mr. Al Bakr
MEPP
7 Update on MEPP/Communications between Arafat and Albright
7 Albright's Trip to Europe and Possible Discussion on the
MEPP
7,8 Israel's Remarks Concerning Lebanon and Syria/Resolution
425
7,8 Foreign Forces in Lebanon
8,9 Sheinbein's Extradition and Court Case
NORTH KOREA
9 Food Aid/Shipment of Aid
10 Four-Party Talks/Preliminary Meetings in Geneva in March
IRAN/ITALY
11 FM Dini of Italy Meetings with President Khatemi in Tehran
11,12 Discussions Between FM Dini and Albright During Her Visit
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #27
MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I have
two announcements this morning. First, on the Secretary's travel. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright will travel to the Ukraine, Italy, Germany,
France, the United Kingdom and Canada; departing from Washington on
Thursday, March 5. The two-fold purpose of her trip will be to maintain our
close relationship with some of our strongest allies, especially in light
of recent events in Iraq, and to nurture our relationship with a new and
important partner, Ukraine.
Secretary Albright will make her first trip to Ukraine as Secretary of
State on March 6 to demonstrate US concern for pressing forward on market
reform and democratization. During her visit to Kiev, she will meet with
President Kuchma. Their discussions will focus on nonproliferation concerns
and the business and investment climate in Ukraine.
From Ukraine, Secretary Albright will travel to Rome, Italy, for meetings
on Saturday, March 7, with Prime Minister Prodi and Foreign Minister Dini.
Secretary Albright will also visit the Holy See to meet with Pope John Paul
II. On Sunday, March 8, the Secretary will travel to Germany and France. In
Cologne, Secretary Albright will meet with Foreign Minister Kinkel. The
Secretary will then travel to Paris to meet with Foreign Minister
Vedrine.
Her final stop in Europe will be the UK, where she will meet with Foreign
Secretary Cook on Monday, March 9. From Europe, she will travel to Ottawa,
Canada, for meetings with the Foreign Minister on March 9 and the Prime
Minister on March 10. As the United States' closest ally and great neighbor,
she will follow up on discussions with the Canadian Government from the
APEC meeting.
She's scheduled to return to Washington on the afternoon of Tuesday, March
10. Any questions on that trip before I turn to the other statement?
QUESTION: You mentioned one non-official with whom she would be meeting
in Europe, the Pope. Will she be meeting with other officials who are not
European while she's in Europe, for example? Any plans for meetings with
folks from other regions?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any other discussions of that kind. I think I
laid out all I know about the agenda at this point.
QUESTION: On Canada, on that trip, this building would be aware of the
constitutional issue that's being raised there at the moment, and the
resignation this afternoon of the liberal leader in the province of Quebec,
and speculation that a referendum will be held shortly. We understand as
well that the premier visit of Mr. Romano, when he was speaking with Mr.
Pickering, that the government would like to see from the Secretary of
State a strong endorsement of Canadian confederation. Is that likely to
happen?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think she will certainly reiterate our long-standing
view on the subject, which you're quite familiar with. I'm not aware - in
fact, I'm aware that the purpose of this trip was not to discuss that
issue. It was to discuss a series of bilateral issues that have been on the
agenda for some time, including Pacific salmon, border issues; I suspect
Iraq will come up. But if asked, I'm sure she would repeat our long-
standing position.
QUESTION: Which she most certainly will be asked, of course.
MR. RUBIN: And she most certainly will repeat it, then.
QUESTION: One must also say that you can easily admire American diplomacy
at this particular time --
MR. RUBIN: Would you stop there, please, Henry?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: No, no, I'm going to go further. The fact of the matter is that
she's arriving in Canada at the same time this building is sending out yet
more warning letters to Canadian companies, and I believe European
countries (sic) on Helms-Burton. What kind of explanation is she going to
have for the Canadian Government?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware there are any new letters being sent out on
that. Certainly, we intend to comply with the law and will be investigating
whether it's appropriate, under Title IV, to send out such letters to
companies doing business with those who have expropriated property from
American citizens. But I'm not aware there are any new letters that we've
just come up with, and neither is my able staff. But we will check that
for you, Henry.
QUESTION: Just a second question. Is the rationale for the Cologne stop -
is there anything substantive about that rationale?
MR. RUBIN: No, it's the location to meet the Foreign Minister.
QUESTION: They'll be meeting, essentially, at the airport or --
MR. RUBIN: It will be a brief visit.
QUESTION: A brief visit.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
On another subject, Kosovo. The United States is appalled by the recent
violent incidents in Kosovo, which only underline Belgrade's ready recourse
to force to address the serious political dispute between Belgrade and
Pristina. At least 20 people have reportedly been killed since Friday.
US Embassy officials are in Pristina and have visited the region where the
violence began on Friday. Our charge in Belgrade has already protested to
Serbian and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities. Let me remind those
authorities that the outer wall of sanctions against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia remains in place. Belgrade will live with these sanctions
until Serbian and FRY authorities have taken meaningful steps to address
the legitimate grievances of the Kosovar Albanian community.
We call on all sides to enter into an unconditional dialogue and for
authorities in Belgrade to implement immediately the Kosovo education
agreement on an effective basis, as an important step to reduce tensions.
We have also called on Kosovar Albanian leaders to condemn terrorist action
by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. The United States expects the
Serbian police in Kosovo to act with maximum restraint and the Yugoslav
army to take no action that might lead to further violence.
Further state-sponsored violence would only deepen Belgrade's isolation and
dim prospects for the integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
the FRY -- the former FRY -- into the international community.
What are we calling that? Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
QUESTION: I have a question about the diplomats and the inspectors, on
Iraq.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Is there any concern here that the diplomats might be there to -
or some of them might tip off the Iraqis about inspections, and so
forth?
MR. RUBIN: Chairman Butler, I think, has spoken to this. We do not
believe a properly organized inspection, even one including diplomats, need
be one that would change the procedures that UNSCOM has followed to allow
for no-notice inspection. This is not a complicated problem. It's one that
we have every reason to believe Chairman Butler and Ambassador Dhanapala,
the Sri Lankan diplomat and expert who will be involved in this, will be
able to organize quite easily. There are mechanisms in the arms control
business to ensure that inspections are not carried out in a way that
the Iraqi side knows well in advance where they're going. For example,
in the past, UNSCOM has only told their minders where they're going at the
last minute. So there are procedures that can be worked out, and we have
every reason to believe they will be. We have no reason to believe that
this is an insurmountable problem.
QUESTION: Jamie, you said that the Secretary's trip was also to reinforce
the relationship between our closest allies and that Iraq would come up. Is
it fair to presume that she's going to be following up discussions about
military action with our allies, should the deal that was brokered last
week fall through?
MR. RUBIN: I would assume that, yes. The view of the United States is
that we are better off either way with this agreement. If the Iraqis were
to reverse course in action the way they reversed course on paper and allow
UNSCOM to have the unconditional, unfettered access across the board to all
the sites in Iraq they have been previously denying access to, the best way
to confront this problem will be able to be achieved.
If, however, the Iraqis continue their past pattern and block inspectors
and interfere with the work of UNSCOM, we have concrete assurances from key
allies that they will be more supportive of the need to use force. And
President Clinton and Secretary Albright have been quite clear that a
failure by Iraq to comply with this agreement will yield the most severe
consequences. We have reason to believe that that view is one that is more
widely shared than it would have been had Iraq not signed this agreement.
QUESTION: Is this trip in response to what happened last week?
MR. RUBIN: No, the trip is not in response to what happened last week.
The trip is scheduled for the reasons that I stated. But when one meets the
German Foreign Minister, the French Foreign Minister, the British Foreign
Minister at a time like this, I would fully expect them to go over the Iraq
issue in great detail and plan for possible contingencies if past is
prologue and Iraq does violate the agreement.
QUESTION: Jamie, following up on that, you used the phrase, "the most
severe consequences" just now, and I'm sure you didn't just happen across
that phrase in your brain. But that does not appear the way the resolution
is going at the moment, unless you have something you want to tell us about
that.
MR. RUBIN: Let me make this point very clear. It's not so important what
this resolution says. What we have is concrete assurances from key leaders,
from key governments around the world, that they will be more supportive of
the possible use of force if Iraq violates this agreement.
I would urge you to contact your colleagues in New York and you may
discover that the wordings have changed a couple of times on that
resolution. What we care about is that the resolution is a strong signal to
Iraq that if it does violate this agreement, if it reneges on an agreement
made before the whole world, that they understand what the consequences
would be.
We have made clear what those consequences would be. We have also made
clear that we don't see the need to return to the Security Council. And we
also have very clear assurances from key governments that they would
understand and be more supportive of that position, if it comes to
that.
QUESTION: Would you agree that resorting to language other than "the
severest consequences," which the United States had urged last week, is a
step back for the Security Council?
MR. RUBIN: Let me put it this way -- I am not sure that's going to be the
result, so I don't want to speculate on what the result is going to be.
They are still consulting right now on this. The process is underway. What
I can tell you is that our view is that if Iraq violates this agreement,
President Clinton and Secretary Albright have made clear the United States
will act. And we have assurances from key governments, including those
who are on the Security Council, that they would be more supportive of that
action if Iraq were to violate this agreement.
I don't know what the final resolution will say. That's still under
discussion. But it's not as relevant as the kind of private discussions
that we've had that let us know where people are, because we've made clear
that we don't see the need to return to the Security Council if there is a
violation of this agreement.
QUESTION: Do you think that Iraq is going to understand this as a strong
signal, if the language does get watered down from "most severe" to "mild"
or "moderate"?
MR. RUBIN: I think that Iraq knows full well the views of the United
States, and they will be no under no illusions about the consequences, if
they violate this agreement.
QUESTION: Does the fact that you're saying that the resolution is still
under discussion and it could change again, and so on - is the US still, at
this moment, urging the Security Council to use the language the US favored
last week? Or is the US saying, as you seem to be saying publicly, you guys
can say whatever you want to say, because we don't think it's important to
go back to the Security Council and because we believe we have these
private assurances from the allies; go ahead, do whatever you want
to do?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this. As someone who has worked in New York and
knows how we talk about resolutions, we try not to say what exact words we
want, because then if the words change just the littlest bit, reporters are
fond of writing about American walk-backs and failures and disappointments.
QUESTION: What are you talking about?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: So we try to make clear what the point is. And the point is to
send the strongest possible message to Iraq that if it fails to comply, it
will pay a severe price.
The language is being talked about right now. I am not saying we don't care
about the resolution. I am not saying that at all. On the contrary, the
stronger the message from the Security Council that comes out, the more
likely, in our view, it is that Iraq will comply, and the more clear it
will be to them. However, at the end of the day, I don't think they have
any doubts as to where the United States stands, and I think that we have
made clear that we don't need to return to the Security Council.
QUESTION: Jamie, how frequent are your meetings with the representatives
of the opposition who are here? How active is this government in trying to
deal with them?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this. Secretary Albright and National Security
Advisor Berger have made clear in recent days that we will find more
effective ways to work with opposition groups; and we want to do that. But
beyond that statement, I can't give you an actual number of times. I know
that David Welch has been active in our building, and NSC officials have
been active over there in meeting with Iraqi opposition figures. We will
find more effective ways to work with them.
QUESTION: How cohesive a group is this really? I mean, is it really
effective to continue to work with these people? Are they really a viable
opposition that presents a united front against this man?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I am not going to malign one force or another, one group
or another by answering your question directly. What I can say is that by
saying we need to work with them more effectively in the future, I think
implied in that is a concern regarding a lack of effectiveness in the
past.
QUESTION: Jamie, this weekend the Iraqi ambassador to the UN seemed to
suggest that the chain of command within a special group as regards the
palaces was open to interpretation, and it depended on how one would look
at it or how you look at it. Do you have anything to say about that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, the simple answer is Ambassador Hamdoon was wrong;
Chairman Butler was right. Ambassador Hamdoon is doing what he normally
does, which is try to color clear language with obfuscation and ambiguity.
The Secretary General, the Chairman of UNSCOM Ambassador Butler, have both
made clear that Ambassador Butler is in charge of the inspection process in
Iraq, everywhere in Iraq. Diplomats may accompany UNSCOM inspectors on
their tasks at these particular sites, but there's no doubt in our minds,
Ambassador Butler's mind, or, as far as we can tell, in the Secretary
General's mind, that Ambassador Butler is in charge.
QUESTION: As far as you can tell. Have you had a discussion with the
Secretary General about this subject? And if not, why not?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we have. And "as far as we can tell" was not a weasel
phrase. The Secretary General has provided us concrete assurances that
Ambassador Butler is in charge. It was just one of those words to lengthen
the sentence.
QUESTION: You were ad-libbing. Okay.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'll try to avoid that in the future.
It's a quiet group.
QUESTION: With regard to a related subject, there's a story from AP this
morning concerning Benjamin Netanyahu sending aides to talk with Congress
about his stance on the Middle East peace process because the President is
getting ready to issue a take-it-or-leave-it. Now, I don't expect you to
confirm or deny that, but what can you tell us is happening in the Middle
East peace process in the next ten or 15 days?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not going to preview for you here today any of the
next steps we might be considering. I can say this -- that Secretary
Albright and Sandy Berger and others are quite aware of the difficulties
the Middle East peace process has been facing. As she said, 1997 has not
been a good year for the peace process. They are looking at ways to
revitalize it.
We have proposed ideas to the leaders. We think it's up to them to make
hard decisions. Clearly, those hard decisions have not been made. And we
are looking at whether there are other steps we could take to try to
revitalize the process that has been so moribund over the last year.
QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the exchange of correspondence
between the Secretary and Palestinian Authority President Arafat last
week?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen any specific correspondence related to the
Middle East peace process. It's possible that in the aftermath or preamble
to the possible use force, that messages were transmitted back and forth.
But I'm not familiar with any new plans or proposals that we put forward
with regard to the Middle East peace process in the last week or so.
QUESTION: And is there any possibility that the Secretary might engage in
that process again while she's in Europe next week?
MR. RUBIN: I have not heard this trip - which gets back to your original
question, Ralph - I haven't heard any indication that this trip will have a
Middle East peace process character to it. And I don't believe Ambassador
Ross is manifested.
QUESTION: Jamie, the Israelis are saying today that they've given up
pretty much on making peace with Syria and Lebanon, and they simply are
interested in a deal to get themselves out of Lebanon. Do you have any
reaction to that? Do you concur with that assessment?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't concur with the assessment. Certainly, our task
continues to try to see if we can find a way to bridge the gap between
Israeli views and Syrian views on how to close the circle of peace. That is
what the Israeli government has asked us to do, that is what President
Clinton wants us to do, and I know Secretary Albright and others have been
working on that. It's hard to be optimistic, but "given up" is too
strong a word.
With regard to the Lebanon issue, we would welcome any effort by the
parties to the Middle East peace process to engage with each other on the
issues dividing them. We have voted for Resolution 425 and continue to
support it. It has consistently been our position that all foreign troops
should withdraw from Lebanon. We hope that Lebanon-Israeli negotiations, if
they were to bear fruit, would provide a way for Israel and Lebanon to
resolve all the issues that divide them and to enhance Lebanese sovereignty
and territorial integrity, as well as the security of both countries.
QUESTION: Should there be negotiations about an Israeli withdrawal or, as
the Lebanese and Syrians are claiming, should Israel just get up and leave
unilaterally?
MR. RUBIN: We've made clear our view, I think. We have said that all
foreign troops should withdraw. I think this has been a topic that has been
discussed in the past. It's hard to imagine that that kind of action could
take place without some discussion of some kind.
QUESTION: You say all foreign forces should withdraw from Lebanon.
MR. RUBIN: That is our position, yes.
QUESTION: So that would mean that you'd have - it wouldn't just be
Lebanon and Israel, presumably, that would discuss that issue, would
it?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there may be a distinction between those which the
government has a different view about.
QUESTION: Which government?
MR. RUBIN: The Lebanese Government.
QUESTION: Does the US make a distinction along those lines?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand, Resolution 425 -- and I will get you a legal
exegesis, and clearly we've missed you here in the briefing room, Ralph --
but as I understand it, the position that I stated is our position and I
will get you more detail on it.
QUESTION: The US - I guess my question on this is, the US --
MR. RUBIN: I know what your question is, and I want to get you more
detail on it.
QUESTION: Does the State Department have any information on whether the
Sheinbein case should be resolved by having the trial here and the
imprisonment in Israel?
MR. RUBIN: We do not have a position on that. We do believe Sheinbein
ought to be extradited to the United States to face justice here. I gather
there are some discussions ongoing about possible alternatives. But we
don't have a view at this time.
QUESTION: Should he face trial here if he were - if justice were carried
out elsewhere, in the State Department view?
MR. RUBIN: If we were to answer that question, we would be having a view
as to whether this particular proposal is a good idea or not.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Precisely.
MR. RUBIN: And I think I just said we don't have a view at this time;
we're discussing it.
QUESTION: So that would mean - that would leave open the possibility that
justice could somehow be faced somewhere else.
MR. RUBIN: No, that would leave open the possibility that we're
discussing it.
QUESTION: The North Koreans apparently believe they're going to run out
of food in the next two weeks. Should more be done to help them?
MR. RUBIN: This is not a surprise to us. The WFP predicted this kind of
situation. That is why the United States made its decision to make
available 200,000 metric tons of food aid to North Korea this year. We
encourage other members of the international community to contribute. As we
understand it, the statement refers to the DPRK's own harvest, and does not
include international assistance or purchases. In that sense, it is not
inconsistent with WFP and US assessments.
However, we can't be sure because the DPRK, North Korea, regrettably
remains an opaque society, and precise figures are difficult to confirm. We
have no plans for further USG assistance. This pledge of $75 million - 200,
000 metric tons - is a significant pledge, and we'd like to see others
contribute. But this is not a surprise.
QUESTION: Has any of our aid been shipped yet, do you know, Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: I believe the first tranche is for the - the first US shipment
of approximately 22,000 metric tons was scheduled to arrive around the
beginning of April, so it's in the process.
QUESTION: I had the same question.
QUESTION: Still on Korea?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Where do we stand with the negotiations that were begun in
December?
MR. RUBIN: We are planning to have meetings in Geneva -- on March 14,
preliminary meetings; March 16, the plenary meetings -- to consult the
preliminary meetings in advance of the four-party talks - that's North
Korea, the United States, China and South Korea - to hopefully develop ways
to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and replace the armistice with a
permanent peace treaty. That process is ongoing. We continue to, obviously,
talk to the North Koreans through the mechanism of the UN mission of
North Korea, and that process continues. And now with the election
and ascension of President Kim Dae Jung, perhaps it can move a little
more quickly.
QUESTION: Back to Iraq. I asked this question on Friday, and I will ask
you. How did the diplomatic component of the escort of Mr. Butler's groups,
how did that get entered into the negotiations? Who asked for it and why
was it asked for; do you know?
MR. RUBIN: It's not normal practice to credit ideas of that sort to
different governments or different ideas. Let me say this -- that our
objective was to get UNSCOM back in with UNSCOM inspectors doing the
inspecting, Chairman Butler being in charge. And it was suggested that the
Iraqis might be prepared to reverse course and allow UNSCOM to do what it
has not been able to do -- that is, change their position 180 degrees
from what it has been over the last several months: no longer interfering,
providing information, allowing the UNSCOM people to go wherever they want
to go, whenever they want to go. That would be a major reversal of Iraqi
behavior if it were to happen. They've now agreed to it on paper.
We were advised that, but for a few diplomats, they might be prepared to do
that. And so long as we were confident that UNSCOM would remain in charge,
that the inspection process would be upheld and that Chairman Butler would
be in a position to ensure that those diplomats did not interfere with the
integrity of his inspections, that was a detail, as far as we're concerned.
If they are prepared to cave completely, reverse course, allow these
inspections, allow total access, cooperate in ways they've never cooperated
before by having a few diplomats along, we didn't have a problem with
that.
QUESTION: Let me ask you another, if I could, unless somebody has a
follow-up for that question. The other would be this: Jamie, the Russians,
the Chinese have warned about the dangers of military conflict over Iraq,
punitive measures. And the Vatican has joined in that, the Pope saying that
he hopes the danger of a recourse to arms has been definitely averted. Is
that a hope of the United States Government, as well?
MR. RUBIN: Our preferred course of action has always been that UNSCOM --
the people who are best able to combat directly the weapons of mass
destruction threat -- can get in and do their work. And if Iraq were to
reverse course in practice the way they've reversed course on paper, that
would be the best way to combat the threat, and we would be most pleased. I
don't think anyone around here has great expectations that that is what
Iraq is going to do, based on past behavior; but it would certainly be the
preferred way to combat directly the threat that we're facing from
weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: Do you have an idea - does this government have an idea of when
the testing in Iraq on the ground will begin?
MR. RUBIN: Chairman Butler made public yesterday his general time frame.
I believe he said it wasn't a matter of days and it wasn't a matter of
months. And we would expect him to be moving quite rapidly in the coming
days and weeks.
QUESTION: The US Ambassador at Kuwait, he met lately with the Iraqi
Shiite leader,
Mr. Al Bakr, in Kuwait City. What was the purpose of this meeting?
MR. RUBIN: Between a Kuwait and --
QUESTION: No, in Kuwait, the US ambassador in Kuwait, he met with the
Iraqi Shiite leader, Mr. Al Bakr.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't have any information on that meeting, but it
would fit right into the question that Betsy asked. I don't know whether he
had such a meeting; but if he did, and that person was a legitimate member
of the opposition, it would be to meet with effective oppositions groups,
as we've said is our policy.
QUESTION: Still on the Gulf, Italian Foreign Minister Dini is visiting in
Tehran at the moment. Does the US have a view on Italy's decision to become
the first to reinstate high-level visits to Iran after the EU decision last
week?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we've made clear that what we want to see happen during
those meetings is a focus on our issues that we have in conflict with the
government of Iran, and that European governments also have in conflict
with the government of Iran - and that is terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, and the Middle East peace process.
As far as we can gather from Foreign Minister Dini's description of his
discussion with President Khatemi, it was encouraging that Iraq has - I'm
sorry, that Iran has stated its opposition to terrorism. We have said for
some time --
QUESTION: Forgive me for interrupting you, but would you please start
that sentence again so we can get it right?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. RUBIN: Foreign Minister Dini has described his discussion with
President Khatemi in encouraging terms; namely that the government of Iran
has indicated that it opposes terrorism. This is encouraging to us. We have
said before that we have problems with Iran in this area; we have problems
with policies they've pursued in this area. It is, therefore, premature for
us to reach any conclusions about whether such patterns of activity have
changed. But the statement is certainly welcome.
QUESTION: Would you expect Secretary Albright to discuss further with
Foreign Minister Dini, and perhaps others, his visit to Tehran and maybe
more broadly the usefulness or lack thereof of such high-level visits?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. She has made a practice in her discussions with Foreign
Minister Vedrine and others who have contact with the government of Iran
through one form or another, to discuss what is going on in Iran. She, like
the President, has been intrigued by the election of President of Khatemi;
intrigued by the success he had in getting his people put through the
parliament. We welcomed several of the points that he made in his statement
and interview with the American people, and we are looking forward to the
time when we can have an official dialogue with Iran. We've made clear
that we believe our concerns about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
and the Middle East peace process can be overcome in such a dialogue.
So she has made it a practice of discussing a matter like this with those
who have been in direct contact with the Iranian Government.
QUESTION: Can you explain why the Secretary is meeting with the Pope? I'm
sorry, I might have missed it.
MR. RUBIN: I would expect her to talk about Iraq. I would expect her to
talk about the Pope's reflections and analysis of the situation in Cuba. He
obviously was there for some time. He made a difference in bringing to the
fore incredible support for him, as was seen evidently on television and
from the outpouring of support. He's someone who understands the value of
human liberty, of political rights, of religious rights; and has played a
key role around the world in the promotion of those religious and
political rights. So she will be looking for his assessment of what he
found in Cuba.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. RUBIN: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)
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