Peacekeeping on Cyprus: A Conclusion

PEACEKEEPING ON CYPRUS: A CONCLUSION

Before discussing the potential roles of UNFICYP and the U.N. following a solution, I will offer some conclusions about UNFICYP and the current problems it faces. First, I'm not sure how well Cypriots understand what UNFICYP does for them on a daily and routine basis. UNFICYP successfully tames the vast majority of the 1000 or so incidents it confronts every year. The odds of conflict and war on Cyprus would increase significantly without UNFICYP. On the other hand, UNFICYP has trouble with some of the more serious and exceptional incidents. When UNFICYP has to confront demonstrations, it can only concentrate about 250 of its 1150 peacekeepers in one place, and these peacekeepers are unarmed. One or two peacekeepers can calm a slingshotting incident, but 250 peacekeepers can do little against hundreds of motorcyclists.

UNFICYP's effectiveness can be conceived of in what I call the Roulette Wheel analogy. Every time there is an incident, there is a risk of escalation, tragedy, and even war. Thus, every time there is an incident, the roulette wheel of tragedy and war gets spun. Of course, the chance of war is slim when insults or slingshots are involved. But the chance of tragedy or war goes up considerably when more serious incidents are involved.

UNFICYP can't eliminate the possibility of war on Cyprus, but it effectively shifts the odds on the roulette wheel away from war. With UNFICYP on Cyprus, there is less chance of the wheel coming up war whenever it is spun. UNFICYP's benefits are probabilistic, not cast in stone. Moreover, UNFICYP can't prevent war if one side wants one or if an incident gets out of hand and escalates beyond UNFICYP's limited ability to control it.

If UNFICYP reduces the probability of war on Cyprus, then removing UNFICYP would increase the probability of war.³³

Second, UNFICYP's effectiveness helps create a better atmosphere for the Cypriots to make peace. Without UNFICYP, more incidents would escalate, tensions would be higher, and peace would be even more distant.

Third, the sorts of incidents described above underscore the utility of confidence-building measures such as unmanning along the buffer zone, not carrying loaded weapons, and establishing a code of conduct for behavior in and along the buffer zone. Those sincere about reducing tension should push for these and other incident-reducing measures.

Fourth, both sides have to get along after a solution or it invites strife and tragedy. The incidents I have described cast some doubt on the ability of the two sides to get along. Slingshotting and insulting don't cast a favorable light on either side. The shootings of last summer show outright Turkish brutality. No one had to die last summer. Violent demonstrations involving manipulated schoolchildren and motorcycle hooliganism³⁴ are needlessly provocative and do little to gain respect for the Greek Cypriot cause.

Why do the Greek Cypriots resort to risky and sometimes deadly provocations when they have most of the facts and international sympathy on their side?³⁵ From what I have learned and can deduce, the main reason for these provocations is to keep the international community engaged in trying to solve the Cyprus problem. Politicians may also be trying to achieve a level of domestic mobilization -- keeping schoolchildren indoctrinated and keeping passions from waning.

I believe that a strategy of provocation achieves both these goals.³⁶ But I also believe that a strategy of provocation is self-defeating in the short and long term. Here is why:

Provocations detract from the sympathy for the Greek Cypriot cause.³⁷ They hurt the moral authority of Greek Cypriot case. The violent demonstrations in particular are not those of Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King.
If the provocations work and create enough international pressure to lead to a solution, the solution is likely to be premature and break down. This will be in part due to the feelings of hostility perpetuated and inflamed by the provocations. The danger of break down is most acute under a federal solution in which hostile parties are forced to live and govern together. So if the international community is pushed to impose or coerce a solution, it may be compelled to push for partition or near-partition.
The provocations and massed charges at the Turkish cease-fire lines create fear on the Turkish side and help them justify the presence of Turkish forces on Cyprus.³⁸ The more provocative the Greek Cypriots are, the more viable these justifications will appear.³⁹ Protection of nationals and near-nationals is one of the two principal justifications for keeping Turkish forces on Cyprus.⁴⁰
Increased provocations and violence and rising ethno-nationalism are likely to delay E.U. accession.
Increased provocations and violence are likely to scare away tourists.⁴¹
Finally, the provocations and violent demonstrations stiffen ethno-nationalist identities and increase each side's fears. They reflect and create rising ethno-nationalism. These effects are antithetical to a solution. To quote (as closely as my notes allow) Professor Caesar Mavratsas, University of Cyprus, from his April 5 presentation at the conference: "Greek Cypriot nationalism is incompatible with federation and the Greek Cypriots are anything but prepared for a federation."

³³ Some argue that removing UNFICYP would make the two sides face more squarely the possibility of war, increasing their incentives to negotiate a peace while also leading to greater discipline along the buffer zone/border. There is some logic in this point. There is currently poor discipline along the buffer zone (compare to the Cold War inner-German border for contrast). Also, the Greek Cypriots in particular use the U.N. to communicate to the larger world and they rely on UNFICYP and the buffer zone to save them from their own provocations. The Turkish side grumbles about UNFICYP (half of which is paid for by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots), but they tolerate it. They aren't too worried about war and aren't lobbying heavily to change the status quo because they enjoy decisive military superiority and the benefits of de facto partition currently outweigh the costs (a central argument of this paper is that these benefits rise with increased tension).

Despite these points, removing UNFICYP would be very risky and the probability of disaster resulting from removal outweighs the possible benefits. First, who or what would manage the land-grabbing that would result when UNFICYP gave up control of the buffer zone (three percent of Cyprus' land)? This alone could lead to war. Second, if there are 1000 recorded shooting, antagonism, and other incidents a year when there is a buffer zone separating the two sides, why is there any reason to believe that there would be less rather than more of these incidents if the two forces became face to face over the 180 kilometer border? Deterrence theorists would argue that removing the buffer zone would make the costs of conflict more obvious, and thus enhance deterrence (note that the real costs of conflict remain unchanged, with or without the buffer zone). On the other hand, there are two reasons why deterrence theorists may be wrong. This is because there are two groups of Greek Cypriots who may not be swayed by a relatively small shift in the perceived costs of conflict (here I am speaking of Greek Cypriots because I assume that if the Turkish side wasn't happy with the status quo, they would either use their superior force or negotiate more seriously to change it). In the first group are those who don't recognize Turkey's overwhelming superiority. They are likely to be so blinded by ethno-nationalism that they can not be deterred from provocations under any conditions. They are also likely to be willing to pay high costs to make political points. The second group is more subtle. They already don't want war, especially because they know they would lose. Thus, they too would scarcely be affected by a relatively small shift in the perceived costs of conflict. But this group still harbors hostility and contempt toward Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Their persistent ethno-nationalism is likely to lead to continued incidents along any common border. There may be fewer incidents because of the subtle increase in deterrence or there may be more incidents because of closer proximity. Whether there would be fewer or more incidents is indeterminate, so the real question then becomes: is war more likely when hundreds of incidents a year occur in a land with UNFICYP and a buffer zone or when hundreds of incidents occur in a land without them? UNFICYP and the buffer zone are preferable because of UNFICYP's demonstrated daily success in taming incidents.

In the end, I think removing UNFICYP would clearly increase the odds of war, while doing little to increase the odds of peace. Removal of UNFICYP could easily backfire and lead to war.

³⁴ I was criticized by some at the conference for using this term. One argument against the term was that the demonstrators had a legal right to cross the buffer zone and go wherever they wanted in the North (the Government of Cyprus, the only internationally recognized government on Cyprus, claims sovereignty over the whole island). Another argument was that the term cast aspersions on motorcycle-riding patriots who felt strongly about the Cyprus problem. One person likened the violent demonstrations to the intifada.

I regret that my remarks caused some to feel badly. I recognize that not all motorcyclists are hooligans. And I don't want to anger those I am trying to persuade. Yet on balance I can not come up with a better term. As an outsider brought to the conference to present views from the outside, I feel that relaying these views without sugarcoating may help the Greek Cypriot cause and a Cyprus solution more generally by helping the Greek Cypriots avoid miscalculation.

The evidence presented here (repeated violence by motorcycle demonstrators, lack of sincerity, etc.) supports the term hooligan or a synonym for many if not most of the motorcycle demonstrators. It is also worth considering that that which is legal is not necessarily that which is wise. The real question for Greek Cypriots is not what is legal with respect to where the demonstrators can go but: "what is the best and most effective way to achieve a solution in which a permanent peace is established and the three freedoms (movement, property ownership, and settlement) are restored?"

³⁵ The point here is not to blame the victims but to question the wisdom of a strategy of provocation. The Turks did not have to kill anyone to prevent people from crossing their cease-fire line (or to return those that did manage to cross). The Greek Cypriots didn't make the killings happen, the Turks did. However, two Greek Cypriots would be alive today had the demonstrators not entered the buffer zone.

³⁶ It is widely recognized (as has been indicated by some Government of Cyprus officials) that a principal motivation for the purchase of the S-300s as well as for provocations along the buffer zone is to focus attention on the Cyprus problem. For example, Michael Theodoulou reports in "Divided island faces critical year of talks," The European, April 3-9, 1997, p. 24 that "President Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, attributes heightened US interest to Washington's realisation that the densely militarized island is not an 'extinct volcano,' and that any eruption could suck in the feuding Nato allies, Greece and Turkey."

Even more specifically, the evidence above makes quite clear why there is a "strategy" of provocation. To focus on the August demonstrations, politicians encouraged the motorcycle demonstration and President Clerides didn't try to stop it until it was too late to effectively do so (despite ample warning -- warnings which should not have even been necessary given the predictable, near inevitability of violence). Further, CYPOL was not just lax in its duties to prevent violations of the buffer zone, but it left checkpoints abandoned and removed barriers for the demonstrators. If the Government of Cyprus had wanted to prevent violence, it could have. What happened was quite the opposite.

The same goes for continued ethno-nationalism in textbooks and elsewhere, demonstrations by schoolchildren and so forth. If the government wanted to stop these things, it would try harder to do so. Technically, the Government of Cyprus has apologized for the violence against the Turkish Cypriots in the 1960s. However, that apology would mean a lot more if it were accompanied by a toning down of ethno-nationalist historical interpretation and propaganda.

³⁷ Many of these points apply equally, if not more, to the Turkish side.

³⁸ Likewise, the Turk's lethal brutality creates fears in the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriots feel very vulnerable on Cyprus. But when the Greek Cypriots look out at the region, they are the ones who feel vulnerable.

³⁹ Of course, the more Greek Cypriots the Turks kill, the worse Turkey's human rights problems become. These are already frequently cited as a barrier to further integration with the West.

⁴⁰ The other interest is to prevent Cyprus from becoming the final Greek or near-Greek island to encircle Turkey in the Mediterranean.

⁴¹ I would like to add two personal observations here. First, tourism creates friends of Cyprus. Second, there is a book where people, especially tourists, can write their comments about the Cyprus problem. This book (or series of books as they fill up quickly) is located at the Greek Cypriot observation post at the end of Ledra Street which abuts the buffer zone. Here tourists are invited to peer into the buffer zone, see barbed wire, and can see many photos depicting the pain-filled Greek version of the 1974 invasion. By far the most prevalent reaction of the writers is sadness about the whole situation on Cyprus.

Most of these comment writers ignore the propaganda that surrounds them at the end of Ledra Street and cut straight to the human side of the Cyprus tragedy. To see any land cut in two by barbed wire and U.N. patrol tracks is fundamentally sad. Everyone with a heart wants to see a solution to the Cyprus problem. The question is: does the degree of ethno-nationalism (and other factors which affect how peacefully the communities on Cyprus could live together) require the necessary expedient of continued separation?