Demonstrations are the second type of incident that risk violence and serious escalation. Most demonstrations are usually held by Greek Cypriots to protest the Turkish invasion and occupation. Many demonstrations are peaceful. And many are not. Demonstrators frequently try to cross into the buffer zone and this can create havoc for UNFICYP. The demonstrators also may throw rocks, bottles, and occasional molotov cocktails across the buffer zone at Turkish Cypriots or other targets of opportunity, including UNFICYP personnel. According to the U.N. Secretary-General: "Civilian demonstrations near the cease-fire line on the Greek Cypriot side have often degenerated into individual or mass attempts to enter the buffer zone with the declared purpose of crossing to the other side. Sometimes, such demonstrations have been accompanied by considerable violence on the part of the demonstrators."26 Motorcycle demonstrators have proven to be particularly troublesome for UNFICYP.
UNFICYP's responsibility during the demonstrations is to protect the integrity of the buffer zone. The Cyprus police (CYPOL) are supposed to help control the demonstrators and help prevent entry into the buffer zone (and thus help UNFICYP), but CYPOL's level of cooperation is spotty. In ideal circumstances, CYPOL forms the first line of crowd control, U.N. civilian police (UNCIVPOL) personnel then talk to any demonstrators that get by, and unarmed UNFICYP troops and their barbed wire form the third line of restraint.
The Greek Cypriot demonstrators typically consist of school groups (children sometimes led and often encouraged by their teachers),27 women's organizations such as "Women March Home," relatives of missing persons,28 or motorcycle clubs. The number of demonstrators can vary from several tens to several hundreds to the low thousands. Authoritative sources, as well as conversations with Greek Cypriots, indicate that less than half (perhaps 30-40%, according to one source) of the demonstrators are primarily motivated by their feelings about the Cyprus problem. The remaining demonstrators (60-70%) are "professional demonstrators," or people going along more for excitement or because of social pressure than because of deep commitment to the cause.29
The Turkish side organizes what are usually counter-demonstrations that occur during or following the Greek Cypriot demonstrations. The Turkish demonstrations tend to be more controlled and orchestrated, even though plenty of rocks be thrown from Turkish side. According to authoritative sources, both sides' demonstrations are often triggered by politicians.
The large motorcycle demonstration of August 11, 1996 (and subsequent events) which led to two deaths and many injuries shows how dangerous protests can be. The U.N. Secretary-General described the lead-up to the demonstration:
First announced in January 1996, it was to take the form of a symbolic motorcycle ride, undertaken by Greek Cypriots and persons from other countries, originating in Berlin and ending in Kyrenia on 11 August. This meant that the demonstrators intended to cross the United Nations buffer zone as well as the Turkish forces cease-fire line, a course of action that was bound to cause the utmost provocation. During the period leading up to the demonstration, the media on both sides publicized a large number of increasingly acerbic statements by the demonstration's organizers and by Greek Cypriot political leaders, as well as counter statements by the Turkish Cypriot side.30
UNFICYP warned President Clerides and the Government of Cyprus about the potential for danger on a weekly basis for three months before the demonstration. Various embassies began to chime in several weeks in advance. In addition, UNFICYP repeatedly urged CYPOL to help fulfill its obligations to prevent violations of the buffer zone. Given the problematic history of motorcycle demonstrations and the avowed purpose of this one in particular, there could have been no doubt that this one would lead to violence.
President Clerides did agree to call off the demonstration on the morning of the 11th, and this appeal was relayed to the demonstrators by the head of the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation as some 1500 motorcyclists and others met in Nicosia's Makarios stadium (out of 3500 people who had gathered throughout Cyprus for the demonstration). As could or may have been predicted, the message was too late to stop the demonstration and groups of demonstrators began to move out. In some areas, the subsequent demonstrations remained peaceful. Others did not.
In one case, about 350 demonstrators made it into the buffer zone (after CYPOL had lifted the NG cease-fire line barrier), went up to the TF cease-fire line and lit fires as they went along. After a few hours the situation had calmed down. In a second instance along the link road to the Dhekelia SBA [a British sovereign base area], about 150 Turkish Cypriot demonstrators met 200 Greek Cypriot motorcyclists (and several TV crews) and both sides began to throw stones. Some Greek Cypriots crossed onto the Turkish side and planted a Greek flag. The Turkish Cypriot demonstrators then fired shotguns at the Greek Cypriots who set fires as they retreated. Ten Greek Cypriot demonstrators were wounded, some by shotgun pellets.
The most serious incident occurred around Dherinia, a frequent hotspot. According to an UNFICYP press release on the demonstration:31
At 1430 hours, some 300 motorcyclists together with some 700 persons in vehicles escorted by Cypol arrived at the NG cease-fire line checkpoint in Dherinia [250 demonstrators were already in the area]. Cypol deployed along the NG cease-fire line but left the checkpoint unattended, thus enabling the demonstrators to enter the United Nations buffer zone unimpeded.
In the meantime, the Turkish forces had allowed some 1,000 persons in buses to pass through their 3 km deep military zone and to assemble along the TF cease-fire line, including persons carrying the flag of the Grey Wolves [ultra-nationalists] who had come from Turkey.
The situation soon became violent, after Greek Cypriot demonstrators entered the buffer zone and approached the TF cease-fire line to provoke the TF, the TCPE [Turkish Cypriot Police Element] and demonstrators assembled there with verbal abuse and throwing stones. Cypol was not effective in controlling the Greek Cypriot demonstrators.
At about 1600 hours, the Turkish forces allowed the Turkish Cypriot demonstrators to enter the United Nations buffer zone armed with bats and iron bars. The Turkish Cypriot demonstrators, joined by the Turkish Cypriot Police, then proceeded to pursue the Greek Cypriots and mercilessly beat all those who they were able to catch. At the same time, there was shooting, including by Turkish Cypriot police, from behind the Turkish forces cease-fire line towards the Greek Cypriot demonstrators.
During this period, a Greek Cypriot demonstrator, Anastasios Isaak, was beaten to death by a number of Turkish Cypriot demonstrators, including three Turkish Cypriot policemen. By 1800 hours the situation began to calm down. In addition to the one dead, it was reported that some 54 Greek Cypriots and 17 Turkish Cypriots were injured. 12 UNFICYP personnel suffered injuries.
Isaak's funeral followed three days after his brutal and avoidable death. The funeral led to another deadly demonstration. According to UNFICYP's press release, "The Demonstration of 14 August 1996":
On Wednesday 14 August, about 3,000 people and some 500 motorcyclists attended in Paralimni the funeral of Anastasios Isaak. After the funeral service, at about 1345 hrs, some 200 motorcyclists and a number of vehicles arrived at the northern outskirts of Dherinia where members of Cypol had been stationed. As during the events on Sunday, Cypol was not effective in preventing the demonstrators from entering the United Nations Buffer Zone (UNBZ). Some 150 Greek Cypriots passed the police line and outflanked the UNFICYP troops deployed inside the UNBZ.
As the Greek Cypriot demonstrators made their way into the UNBZ, Turkish forces and Turkish Cypriot military and police, which until then had remained out of sight, deployed in full view and in added strength along the TF CFL. UNFICYP requested both Turkish forces and Turkish Cypriots military and police to exercise restraint and not to over-react. It also reminded them that UNFICYP has sole responsibility to deal with incursions into the buffer zone and that there must be no interference.
By 1420 hours, some 200 Greek Cypriots were inside the UNBZ, but UNFICYP was in control of the situation. The demonstrators were being rounded up and moved out of the UNBZ. The main group of Greek Cypriots were no closer than about 30 metres from the Turkish forces Cease-Fire Line (TF CFL).
At about that time, a Greek Cypriot male, later identified as Solomos Spyrou Solomou, broke free from the main group and ran towards the Turkish Cypriot check point. He was chased by two UNFICYP soldiers, who caught up with him at the guard post, but the demonstrator broke free and began to climb a flag pole which was flying the Turkish flag just inside the Turkish Cypriot check point. The UNFICYP soldiers were pursuing him a few feet behind.
Solomou was some 3 metres off the ground (less than a fourth of the way to the top of the flag pole), when he was shot by a Turkish or Turkish Cypriot soldier and fell to the ground with blood flowing profusely from his neck (the autopsy revealed that Solomou was hit by five bullets). Turkish or Turkish Cypriot soldiers then proceeded to fire some 25 to 50 rounds indiscriminately into the crowd inside the buffer zone. The whole incident was witnessed by the UNFICYP Force Commander and the Commanding Officer of the Austrian Battalion who were in the UNBZ some 35 metres from the TF CFL. They observed uniformed Turkish or Turkish Cypriot military personnel kneeling down and firing in the direction of the demonstrators inside the UNBZ.
As a result of the indiscriminate shooting by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot soldiers, two British UNFICYP soldiers were shot from behind and two Greek Cypriot civilians were also hit by gunfire. Three were inside the buffer zone and one of the civilians, who sustained a serious gun shot wound to the abdomen, was standing outside the UNBZ close to the National Guard checkpoint. During the demonstration, two Cypol officers and five Greek Cypriot civilians suffered non-gunshot related injuries.
The Force Commander of UNFICYP accompanied by the Chief of Staff met with the Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus late in the afternoon of 14 August to strongly protest the totally unwarranted use of force by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot military personnel.
These quotes describe in some detail the lethal and unnecessary brutality of the Turkish forces. Such excessive use of force does little to advance Turkey's interests, assuming that one of their main goals is closer ties to the West.32
Violent demonstrations and other provocations are also counter-productive for the Greek Cypriot cause. This cause has most of the facts on its side and it is a cause which enjoys the support of the world community (evidenced by non-recognition of the "TRNC," and so forth). It is in part because of my fond feelings for Cyprus that I hope Cypriots consider my arguments that rising ethno-nationalism and policies of provocation are likely to do more harm than good. They do not help promote a peaceful and desirable settlement for the island.
27 Even schoolchildren can be aggressive. In October of 1993, 5000 schoolchildren left their schools to protest at the Ledra Palace, violated the buffer zone and injured five members of UNFICYP (Report of the Secretary-General on in Connection with the Security Council's Comprehensive Reassessment of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, November 22, 1993, S/26777, paragraph 68). Two years later,
28 There are approximately 1500-1600 Greek Cypriots (1619 is the figure most often heard) and 500-800 Turkish Cypriots unaccounted for since the 1974 invasion. Since 1984, the U.N. has run an autonomous (ie. not a U.N. organ) Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) which is supposed to coordinate the activities of the two sides to ascertain the whereabouts of these persons. Of the missing, there are currently 1493 Greek Cypriot and 500 Turkish Cypriot cases officially before the CMP. The U.N. has signaled its displeasure with the CMP's lack of progress and has grumbled about ending the committee. See Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020 and June 7, 1996, S/1996/411, paragraphs 32-33, and 31respectively.
29 Of course, most demonstrators feel some commitment to the cause and feel some hostility toward the Turkish invasion and occupation. Most observers, myself included, object to many aspects of the Turkish invasion and occupation.
30 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, S/1996/1016, December 10, 1996, paragraph 2.
31 The press release, "The Demonstrations of 11 August 1996," also supplied most of the previous information on the day's events.
32 In the short term though, the Turks may be calculating that it is in their interests to aggravate the Cyprus problem. The reason for this line of thought is that the Turks may want to delay Cyprus' entry into the E.U., thinking if they can't get admitted, then Cyprus won't get in either. If this explanation is correct, an ironic situation becomes apparent: the Greek Cypriots stir up problems thinking it will help propel a Cyprus solution while the Turks stir up trouble thinking it will delay a Cyprus solution.
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