U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #68, 99-05-21
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1081
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, May 21, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 UN Humanitarian Assessment Mission to the Former Yugoslavia
1 Kosovar Refugees Resettle Across US; Nearly 4,200 evacuated from
Macedonia
SERBIA (Kosovo)
1-2,13 NATO Bombing Damage to Embassies/Diplomatic Residences in Belgrade
2 Status of Protective Power Issue
2-3,12 Deputy Secretary Talbott's Consultations/Meetings Regarding Kosovo
3,6-8 Russian Envoy Chernomyrdin's Meetings in Belgrade
3 Composition of International Presence/Russian Participation
3-5 Use of Ground Forces/Assessment/Planning/Deployment/Environment
5 Reported Split in the Alliance Regarding Kosovo
6 PRC Decision to Deny all Pending US Port Visits to Hong Kong
8 US to Present Findings of Investigation into Accidental Bombing of
Chinese Embassy
9,10 Reports of Yugoslav Army Desertions/Young Men Fleeing to Escape Draft
9-10 Status of Delivering Aid to Internally Displaced Persons in
Kosovo/Air Drop Prospects
10 Turkey's Support in Helping Alliance Meet Its Humanitarian and
Military Objectives
11 Status of Visit and Search Regime regarding Sending Oil to Belgrade
Regime
11 Greece's Role in Supporting the Alliance
12-13 NATO's Five Conditions/Security Situation in Kosovo
CHINA
6 PRC Decision to Deny all Pending US Port Visits to Hong Kong
8 US to Present Findings of Investigation into Accidental Bombing of
Chinese Embassy
9 Expected Release of Cox Report and US Reaction
NORTH KOREA
13-14 US Team Visit to Kunchang-ni
14-16 Dr. Perry's Visit to North Korea/Itinerary/Agenda/Meetings
IRAQ
16,17 Iraqi Opposition Meetings in London/Invitation to Meet in Washington
NIGERIA
16 US Representation at Nigerian Presidential Inauguration
COLOMBIA
17 Congressional Request for Department Records Regarding Contacts
with FARC
17 Prospects for US Visa for Former President Samper
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #68
FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1999, 12:55 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Hello and welcome to the State Department briefing on this
Friday. It's very bright in here.
We have two statements we'll be issuing. One is about the UN humanitarian
assessment mission to the former Yugoslavia. We know that the UN has sent a
team to Yugoslavia. This 15-member team will be in the region from May 16
through 27. It is essential, in our view, that the team have unhindered,
unmonitored access to a large cross-section of the roughly 700,000
internally displaced persons, and that the team must have unimpeded access
to the sites of FRY atrocities. We are, therefore, concerned by reports
that the UN team has been allotted only three days in Kosovo itself,
with the remainder of the time being spent in the other parts of the
former Yugoslavia.
It goes without saying that it will not be able to assess humanitarian
needs in Kosovo without concentrating its time and efforts there. We
understand that UN officials have pressed for more time in Kosovo but
without success. In our view, it is obvious that President Milosevic does
not want the international community to bear witness to events in Kosovo.
It is essential that the United Nations not allow itself to be forced into
cooperating with his agenda to use the mission to generate favorable
propaganda while denying it access to some of the most needy in the region.
We have made this view known to the UN leadership.
Let me also say we've moved significantly forward with the resettlement of
refugees in the United States. We'll have a statement on that as well.
Almost 4,200 Kosovar refugees have been evacuated from Macedonia to the
United States since May 5; 364 arrived on Thursday on a chartered flight at
JFK Airport in New York City. This arrival brings to 693 the total number
of refugees joining relatives in the United States. This statement will
have more information about the other 4,200 refugees that have been brought
to the United States since May 5.
With those opening remarks, let me turn to your questions. The Associated
Press.
QUESTION: Jamie, I guess NATO bombs hit the Swiss Ambassador's residence
and bombs have hit - or there's been damage to the Indian, Norwegian,
Hungarian, Spanish embassies/residence. I don't recall - did you warn
diplomats to leave Belgrade because of the bombing, or would you make such
a warning now?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, I think any diplomat who is aware of the
situation knows that Yugoslavia is a dangerous place. We certainly have
warned American citizens about the dangers of travel to Yugoslavia, to
anywhere in Yugoslavia. We've put out very explicit travel warnings; we
withdrew our embassy employees in full -- and that was an ordered departure
-- as many NATO countries did.
I understand that NATO said that Secretary General Solana has been in touch
with the relevant embassies to express NATO's apologies for any collateral
effects to their embassies that may have resulted from NATO air strikes.
Whatever damage may have occurred was entirely unintentional.
In our view, NATO's air campaign clearly represents the most accurate and
discriminating use of air power in history. NATO pointed out today that out
of the total of approximately 10,000 guided bombs dropped thus far, only 12
- that is 0.12 percent - one-tenth of one percent - have gone astray.
Obviously, we all want to avoid any potential for civilian or unintended
casualties. We have made clear to Americans that this is a dangerous place.
I suspect other diplomats are wise enough to know that as well.
QUESTION: On the same diplomatic line, this is something that I don't
think has been brought up recently. But was the protective power issue ever
settled?
MR. RUBIN: Has not been resolved; still working to resolve it.
QUESTION: Jamie, have you received protests from any of these countries
whose --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any direct protests at the State Department.
My understanding is the Swedish Ambassador is still prepared to work with
us on the protective power issue.
QUESTION: Just to follow on that, are you suggesting the various
embassies there should leave because they cannot be protected. And secondly,
the fact that the Secretary General of NATO has sent his regrets or
whatever, does it mean that the country whose plane actually did the
bombing will not be sending any apology, as was done in the case of
China?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think there's a difference between a bomb landing on
an embassy and killing diplomats who were there, or journalists who were
there, and the shattered glass damage that has been primarily what we're
talking about from nearby explosions.
With respect to the first question, I indicated to you that the Secretary
General of NATO would be in touch with the relevant embassies, and I'm not
aware that other steps are planned.
QUESTION: Strobe Talbott briefed the NAC and can you tell us if you're
able to report that there's going to be movement by Belgrade closer to the
NATO conditions, or acceptance of the NATO conditions?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright received an extensive briefing from Deputy
Secretary Talbott earlier today. We have not achieved major movement
forward. I think this is a very slow process. We are very clear that what
we are trying to do is achieve complete acceptance by President Milosevic
of the conditions NATO has spelled out. We will continue to work with Mr.
Chernomyrdin and Mr. Ahtisaari; but this is not going to be an overnight
diplomatic process. We have not been able to achieve a breakthrough, nor
did we expect to achieve a breakthrough. We continue to work with Russia --
and along with Russia with Mr. Ahtisaari -- because we believe that is an
appropriate way for President Milosevic to signal acceptance of NATO's
conditions.
As I understand it, Deputy Secretary Talbott will be returning to the
region next week to continue, essentially, the same process, with the focus
on intensive expert discussions on the details that need to be fleshed out.
I would point primarily to the issue of the composition of the international
security force with NATO at its core, and that intensive expert work will
be done next week. I would expect him to see Mr. Chernomyrdin and Mr.
Ahtisaari again, and that is where we stand.
QUESTION: As a result of the meetings with Chernomyrdin, do you have a
better sense of the mood or the willingness to talk these details in
Belgrade?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there have been a number of signs that Belgrade would
like to make an agreement. I mean, their spokesmen have said that; their
public position is clear. We're not interested in negotiations. We're only
interested in seeing whether, through this channel of Chernomyrdin, and
possibly Ahtisaari meeting with the leadership in Belgrade, that Milosevic
can accept these points. There's no middle ground here; either he accepts
the points, or he doesn't. We'll know whether the Serbs are serious about
ending the terrible tragedy they've caused against their own people -
the Serbs in Belgrade, their leadership there - when they've accepted
NATO's conditions and not before.
QUESTION: In your talks with Russia, has there been - let me rephrase
that. Is there a way that Russia can participate in this force, and have --
be something more than just a participant? In other words, is there some
command role that Russia could have, even if it's just over its own small
contingent, that might make it a little more palatable to them, as far as
NATO and the United States is concerned?
MR. RUBIN: We worked out arrangements in Bosnia through I-FOR whereby
NATO has deployed a force in Bosnia, that Russia has deployed forces as
well; acceptable command arrangements were worked out in the circumstance.
We're prepared to operate on that same principle, that NATO would have
command arrangements and Russia would have arrangements that would be
worked analogously to those in Bosnia. But beyond saying that, I don't
think it would be constructive to say any further detail.
QUESTION: Just to clarify - Secretary Albright and Foreign Secretary Cook
indicated that the alliance is united as ever and that there's no
difference between their positions. But when it comes to the British and US
position and the British indicating that they want planning and also the
thought of troops going in to bring the refugees back to Kosovo even if
Milosevic doesn't agree and if his forces are so degraded that they're not
a threat, isn't that a difference between what the US is thinking?
MR. RUBIN: Broadly speaking, in a group of 19 democracies, you will never
have every country saying every option for the future in precisely the same
way, and I don't think we've ever suggested that.
What we have agreement on - and what all 19 countries have agreed on - is
that the air campaign is the right course. They have confidence that the
air campaign can succeed and that the refugees must return home, that their
security must be assured by an international security force and that every
day, NATO is making progress in weakening Milosevic's war machine.
With respect to ground forces, NATO is updating its assessments for
deployment of a military force in both a permissive and a non-permissive
environment. It's only proper and prudent for us to have those kinds of
assessments. But with respect to the future, I think neither the Secretary
of State nor Foreign Secretary Cook thought it was helpful to discuss
hypothetical situations down the line in any great detail, other than to
make clear that both she and Foreign Secretary Cook were determined to
prevail.
QUESTION: Judging by what was said on television last night, would it be
reasonable to assume that Foreign Secretary Cook did, in fact, urge the
United States not merely to plan but actually to start moving forces into
the Balkans in readiness for deployment either under an agreement with
Milosevic or without? There seemed to be a clear distinction between
planning and deploying - or preparing to deploy.
MR. RUBIN: I was with the two of them almost the entire time, and I never
heard him make such an argument.
QUESTION: One gets the idea that the US might be more comfortable if
Foreign Secretary Cook and others on that side of the Atlantic would stop
talking so publicly about these preparations and planning for ground troops
that should be done. Is that --
MR. RUBIN: Well, look, the bottom line is Milosevic receives every day
hundreds if not thousands of incoming military attacks. That is what has
the biggest effect on him in his thinking. We are an alliance of democracies.
We recognize that in a democracy with free press and all that goes with
that, it is impossible for every tactical and detailed issue to be bottled
up and not discussed publicly.
On the other hand, I think so long as President Milosevic understands that
the alliance is committed to pursuing the air campaign and is committed to
prevailing, I think the right messages are being sent. We think that
message is being sent. And as far as other issues are concerned, we and our
allies will continue to discuss a number of different options, as we
should.
QUESTION: Would you be happier if the Brits stopped blabbing about this
so much?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Now, that doesn't sound like the King's English to me.
(Laughter.)
Secretary Albright and Foreign Secretary Cook had a very constructive
visit. There was not a disagreement on substance that I was familiar with
or saw, and I spent most of the time with them. I think for those of you
who saw their television appearances, there wasn't any of what you just
described as something with an "ing" at the end.
QUESTION: Well, what if we had had a chance to talk to them ourselves --
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure they would have stayed on message, thanks.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - something like that.
QUESTION: Just following up on the message, I heard a reporter who is
in
Belgrade with CNN reporting that the message that the Yugoslav Government
is getting from all these different reports -- reports about the British,
the reports of the Italian Prime Minister saying that NATO shouldn't target
Belgrade anymore, should go after Kosovo - says, oh, wow, we're seeing a
lot of conflict in NATO; we're seeing cracks in the alliance; look, you
didn't see this in the Gulf War, and look what we're seeing here.
MR. RUBIN: This is the same Belgrade Government that probably thought the
bombing would stop within a few days, that the alliance would never
maintain for nearly two months now the unanimity to continue these air
strikes. I think what I indicated earlier is that they may read the press
and draw certain conclusions and speculate about what may or may not be
going on, but what they can't speculate about and what they know is
happening is that every day hundreds of military strikes are landing on
Yugoslavia and causing great damage, increasing the strain on the regime,
increasing their inability to operate. So that's what's real; everything
else is in the ether.
With respect to what that ether discussion is about, I would point out to
you it's about whether to put more military pressure on the Serbs, beyond
the air strikes. So I don't think it's giving them much comfort.
QUESTION: Related not directly on Kosovo, but very related to --
MR. RUBIN: Let's just see if we have any more Kosovo.
QUESTION: Well, it's about China and Kosovo and --
MR. RUBIN: All right. The judges will agree that that's within the
realm.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: I'll hold off if everyone --
MR. RUBIN: No, go ahead.
QUESTION: I'm wondering if the US has made any diplomatic approach to the
Chinese on the decision to block US military ships going into Hong Kong due
--
MR. RUBIN: You just added a third element; the judges may not be happy in
their after-action review.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: -- due to the accidental bombing of the embassy in Belgrade,
which is north of Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: You brought it home. You brought it home.
(Laughter.)
Let me say that with respect to China, we do understand that the Chinese
have denied all pending US port visits to Hong Kong. Few planned port
visits are affected. The Pentagon can probably give you more details.
We are prepared to resume our regular schedule of routine port visits to
Hong Kong when the Chinese Government is prepared to approve the necessary
clearances. This is the first instance since Hong Kong's reversion to
Chinese sovereignty that the government has disapproved an application for
a port call by a US Navy ship. Under Hong Kong's basic law, matters of
foreign affairs and defense are reserved for the Chinese Government, which
made this decision under its own authority. Nevertheless, we regret that
these mutually-beneficial port calls, which bring economic benefit to Hong
Kong as well as shore leave benefits to US Navy personnel are unable to
take place at this time.
Back to Kosovo.
QUESTION: On the Moscow process, I'm still somewhat puzzled. Maybe you
can straighten me out.
MR. RUBIN: That's what I'm here for.
QUESTION: The negotiations or the talks or discussions that are taking
place in Moscow are about the package that is being taken from time to time
by Chernomyrdin to Belgrade, right?
MR. RUBIN: Mr. Chernomyrdin is acting for Russia, not for NATO. What we
have tried to do is explain to Mr. Chernomyrdin, as well as to Mr.
Ahtisaari, what NATO believes is necessary in detail and in formal ways for
a peaceful resolution, and that is based on the five conditions that you're
quite familiar with. So Mr. Chernomyrdin is acting for Russia, not for
NATO. We've explained to him in detail what we believe needs to be done
and what Milosevic must accept. But I wouldn't characterize it quite
the way you did.
QUESTION: Well, is it the case that he has declined to take to Belgrade
something that Russia does not agree with?
MR. RUBIN: You'd have to rephrase that; I didn't understand it.
QUESTION: Well, why is it necessary to discuss this with him? Give him a
piece of paper and say, this is what the position is; either take it or
don't take it.
MR. RUBIN: To whom, Chernomyrdin or Belgrade?
QUESTION: Chernomyrdin.
MR. RUBIN: We believe that Mr. Chernomyrdin is trying to play a
constructive role in settling the crisis. We believe Russia can play a
constructive role. We don't know whether this particular avenue will lead
to Milosevic's acceptance of our requirements. If they do, and Russia wants
to play a role in the resulting international security force, we would
welcome that. But we don't think there's a communications problem. We think
there is a policy problem in Belgrade. The Belgrade authorities have not
realized that with every passing day they make their situation worse and
harm their people even further.
So until that policy problem changes in Belgrade, there cannot be a
resolution to this crisis. We think it's important for us to let Mr.
Chernomyrdin know precisely what is necessary from NATO's standpoint to
have a peaceful resolution. We think it was very important when Russia
joined with the other members of the Group of Eight in establishing the
principles necessary for ending this conflict and that Russia joined with
us in support of an international security presence. We think that showed
further and further isolation that Milosevic faces.
So the more that Russia can agree with the West about what's necessary to
end it, the more Milosevic will be isolated in his opposition to that. But
what calculations Milosevic will make is not possible to ascertain from
outside, or probably even from those that meet with him. But what counts is
that we want to help the Russians know what precisely NATO needs to have
Milosevic accept. That's why we've been engaged in intensive discussion
with them, and we're going to intensify it further with the working groups
next week.
QUESTION: The question then is to what extent is NATO dealing with
Chernomyrdin as sort of a messenger back and forth between Milosevic? And
to what extent do you have issues with Chernomyrdin?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think it's quite clear that we and the Russians do not
have a full agreement on what the composition of an international security
force would be. That is an example, as I said earlier, of what the working
groups are going to focus on intensively next week.
But again, even if one had full agreement with the Russians, that is not
sufficient. The only thing sufficient is for Milosevic to accept these
conditions.
QUESTION: Do you expect that once you have full agreement with the
Russians, that this contact with Chernomyrdin will still continue as sort
of a conduit to Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I wouldn't see why it wouldn't. We feel we're working
closely and well with Mr. Chernomyrdin. We feel he is a problem-solver and
wants to solve the problem. What we've been making clear to him is what our
side of the equation is, in very detailed, careful, specific ways so that
there are no misunderstandings so that if Milosevic does move, that we
don't find ourselves having misunderstood crucial details.
QUESTION: China and Kosovo. Are there any plans for Mr. Pickering to go
to Beijing to placate the Chinese? And if so, might he wait until the
investigation is complete, or is there a possibility that he would go
before that?
MR. RUBIN: We will be presenting the findings of our investigation into
the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade to the People's
Republic of China. But there has been no final decision regarding when or
by whom this will be provided to the Chinese.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) the investigation?
MR. RUBIN: I would think this is the kind of thing that would be
finalized as the individuals decided who and when they would go to China. I
wouldn't assume that it's been finished, but I would have to check with the
Pentagon.
QUESTION: Is it proceeding, and what can you --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) Chinese?
MR. RUBIN: There has been no final decision regarding when or by whom
this will be provided to the Chinese, but I wouldn't rule that out.
QUESTION: But this thorough and complete investigation, what can you tell
us about how it is proceeding at present?
MR. RUBIN: They're working on it.
QUESTION: Well, thanks, that's enlightening. Could I ask about other --
QUESTION: One more --
QUESTION: Just a minute -
QUESTION: About 48 hours ago, you talked about defections from the
Yugoslav Army. The Yugoslavs today denied that there were any defections.
They said that these people were just going back from - on home leave or
something - recruits going back home. Has there been any further evidence
of people leaving -- of soldiers leaving the Yugoslav Army, deserting?
MR. RUBIN: Well, if you believe the Yugoslav Army on that one, I have a
really big bridge I'd like to offer you.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: I didn't say I believed them.
MR. RUBIN: We have very concrete evidence that there was a large number
of army units - soldiers from three army units that deserted their posts,
and they returned to three towns in Serbia. There is no question that the
Serbs would not want that known, and so they would try any number of tricks
to try to pretend that didn't happen; but we're quite confident that it did
happen.
There have apparently been some additional public expressions of opposition
to Milosevic's policies in several other towns, but I'm not aware of
desertions of the magnitude that we described a couple of days ago.
QUESTION: I have two issues on Kosovo. Number one, have you heard any
more from the AID people? Brian Atwood told us on Monday that he would tell
us when the air drops will begin, if they would begin. Have you heard any
more on that? And secondly, what about the targeting of power grids in the
FRY? They've been putting the lights out pretty regular. Is that a part now
of the strategy to take out civilian power?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to the targeting question, I'd urge you to
discuss that with my counterpart at the Pentagon, who you discuss things
with regularly. That's a targeting question; I'd urge you to put that to
the Pentagon spokesman.
We continue to be extremely concerned about the fate of the estimated 700,
000 internally displaced persons in Kosovo. We are looking at various
options to deliver them humanitarian assistance. Some NGOs and the ICRC are
exploring how to provide humanitarian assistance by land. Humanitarian air
drops are another option that we are seriously exploring, and we will
continue to do that. The mission that I mentioned at the opening of the
briefing is also looking at ways to provide humanitarian assistance.
QUESTION: So I understand there are over-land supplies going by Red Cross,
going by NGOs of Greece. Is this opening the door to further supply of the
internally displaced people? Is it moving that way, or do you see --
MR. RUBIN: Well, we would want to see the kind of humanitarian assessment
mission by the United Nations that would be given real access to Kosovo
over many, many days so they could find out what's really going on in
Kosovo -- where the people are, how needy there are and how they could best
be helped -- so that assistance could be brought to them. We've always been
very supportive of that and tried to make sure that that could occur.
QUESTION: There have been reports that young Serbians have been fleeing
towns in southern Serbia and others have been going to Hungary and Croatia
to escape the draft. Do you know anything about this? Do you have any sense
of the numbers?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any numerical analysis to offer you on that,
other than to say that is something we've been hearing for some time. If I
were in Serbia, as young as I would be, I certainly wouldn't want to be in
that army.
QUESTION: Turkey helping as much as she can to assist Kosovar refugees
and providing bases for the NATO aircraft operating in Yugoslavia. Do you
have any revelation on the subject?
MR. RUBIN: Turkey has provided exceptional support and leadership in
helping the alliance meet its humanitarian and military objectives in
Kosovo. Turkey was the first ally to agree to accommodate 20,000 refugees
and establish camps in Macedonia and Albania for 20,000 more. It has
already accepted and provided significant assistance to thousands of
refugees.
On the military side, Turkey has been an important participate in Operation
Allied Force both through the deployment of its own F-16 squadron and
through its approval for NATO to station 74 fighters and tankers at Turkish
air bases. The United States greatly appreciates the leading role Turkey
has played in all of these efforts.
QUESTION: How about Greece?
(Laughter.)
You came very well prepared. It seems to me you have press guidance - what
about Greece?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Well, he called in advance; you didn't.
QUESTION: No, how can I call in advance? I have a question. You have to
answer.
MR. RUBIN: No, but if you call in advance I could have given you a nice
prepared answer.
QUESTION: But this answer was prepared in advance by a call from a
Turkish colleague?
MR. RUBIN: We often prepare answers in advance when you call in advance.
You just forgot to call today.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: No, I'm not (inaudible). I have another question. Anything on
the naval blockade of the Adriatic Sea for the oil embargo against
Yugoslavia? And do you know when Holbrooke is going to go again to the
Balkans?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information on any plans for Mr. Holbrooke to go to
the Balkan region, and you have to repeat the first question because I
didn't understand it.
QUESTION: I said anything on the naval blockade of the Adriatic Sea for
the oil embargo?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we continue to work within NATO to develop the first
phase of the two-phase visit-and-search regime that we think will deter any
of those countries, or shipping left that would even consider sending oil
to a regime that has been responsible for the worst kind of atrocities and
policies since World War II in Europe.
QUESTION: Can you said something nice off the cuff about Greece?
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely. You want me to? I thought he was joking. You're
looking for that?
QUESTION: Yes. I mean, it's on the record - out there now -
MR. RUBIN: Well, thank you for --
QUESTION: You don't want to snub Greece here, do you?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't think I was doing that. I thought that was
joking. If it was serious, then I will seriously answer the question. The
serious answer is that Greece is a very important part of the NATO alliance,
has always been an important part of the NATO alliance. The alliance has
been united in its determination to confront President Milosevic's evil
policies with the use of air power and Greece's efforts, both in support of
the alliance and especially in the humanitarian area that we've talked
about before, are greatly appreciated by the United States.
QUESTION: What do you think of Greece's decision to obstruct NATO
operations by denying permission for Turkish fighter jets to cross Greek
air space on their way to Germany?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't assume that there are obstructions that can't be
overcome through operational arrangements, and I'm not aware that the
Pentagon or NATO is particularly concerned by what you just described. It's
news to me.
QUESTION: Back on the working groups you mentioned, can you describe them
at all, even if it's just the broad title? Is it military guys? Is it --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think - go ahead.
QUESTION: If you could describe those, and whether the Secretary's
military advisor is part of that.
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The Secretary's military advisor has been traveling with
Deputy Secretary Talbott on, I think, every one of his trips - at least the
last two. He will be expected to be part of that. I would expect there to
be interagency expertise from the Pentagon and from the State Department
and elsewhere to try to work on those details.
I think the most specific I can be at this time, given the nature of these
discussions, is to say that one focus of that work next week would be on
the composition of an international security force, including the very
command arrangements that you asked me about earlier.
QUESTION: And also, maybe you can't go into this kind of detail, but
under the five demands, there's one that all Yugoslav forces are removed
from Kosovo. In a definitional sense, how would, for instance, a customs
guard at the border with a side arm, or a guard at a tomb or a monument
within Kosovo with a rifle or a side arm - how would they be viewed in
terms of those five - that one specific demand?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I make two points in response to that. One is we've made
clear that the police, the paramilitary, the special police and the
military have to leave Kosovo. That is our view. I've also said many times
in this room that I wouldn't rule out some return of some very small,
symbolic presence. But when you talk about the border, you have to bear in
mind that the Serbian policy of ethnically-engineering the composition
of Kosovo has included this rather dastardly practice of destroying
people's documents, destroying their proof of citizenship, destroying the
documentation that proves where they come from. We are very clear in our
mind that it is not going to be the Serbs, it is going to be the international
community that decides who returns, because of the Serb effort to try to re-
engineer the composition of Kosovo precisely by destroying documents.
So whatever presence symbolically may be at the border, it's not going to
change the most important function of any border, which is to make sure
that the Kosovars can get back, and therefore the international community
decides who gets back. Beyond saying that as an example, I don't think it
would be particularly useful to get into the details. But clearly the units
that have been responsible for this kind of massive ethnic cleansing and
brutality and atrocities that we have tried to make clear in the recent
weeks will make it impossible, if not extremely unlikely, for the people
who've suffered under them to return. What other symbolic steps might be
taken consistent with our view that Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia, I
wouldn't be prepared to detail.
QUESTION: The symbolic - if there is a small symbolic presence, would
there not be concerns that it not protecting them - the Serbian symbolic
presence - from retribution from these ethnic Albanians that are returning?
How do you --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think that every aspect of the security situation in
Kosovo would be changed fundamentally and permanently by the arrival of an
international security force with NATO at is core and the removal of the
Serb forces that were responsible and the demilitarization program we would
work with the KLA on. So it's not - we would be interested in protecting
everyone in Kosovo, but that doesn't strike me as something that the
planners have been particularly worried about.
QUESTION: I'm just curious if you can walk me through the process of how
this conflict - the warnings that you made about people getting out of
Belgrade, compared to that of Iraq when you made it explicitly clear that -
get out, or suffer the consequences; and that wasn't as explicitly done
here, in the Belgrade case.
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to check the analogy, but I think we certainly, on
the American side, made the same decisions, which is that we can speak to
our citizens and tell our citizens how dangerous it is and make arrangements
for our diplomats to have an ordered departure so that they're not there.
But as far as other countries are concerned, we don't make those decisions
for other countries, and certainly we told all Americans to leave
both places. So those were not inconsistent on our part.
As far as what other countries choose to do -- other sovereign countries --
they will make those decisions.
QUESTION: The US team at Kumchang-ni -- what did they find, and how many
more days are they planning to stay?
MR. RUBIN: They continued their work. I'm not in a position to report
their findings. They will have to report into official channels before I am
in a position to report to you on what their findings are. They'll stay as
long as necessary to satisfy themselves that the work has been completed
and they have the necessary access to the facility and to continue their
work. There is no time limit set, and they will make that decision. But
it's my understanding they're still there as of today.
QUESTION: Did they give any indication of how much cooperation they were
receiving from --
MR. RUBIN: If there had been problems, I think I probably would have
heard about them. I haven't heard about them. But bear in mind, they're in
North Korea, so the communication has not been perfect. But so far as I've
been made aware, they've been receiving the necessary cooperation.
QUESTION: Jamie, William Perry is going to be going there. I guess he
leaves over the weekend and gets there next week. I don't expect you to
give us any of the incentives, specifics on them, as to what he'll be
bringing with him, but can you speak to those critics who say we've already
done enough and we've already given enough and we need to get something
back from the North Koreans before we would offer them any other incentives?
And specifically, to stop proliferating?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, let me say that Dr. Perry is not going to North
Korea to negotiate and offer incentives in some negotiation. He's going
there to get an assessment as the final piece in his review to try to
ascertain whether the North Koreans want to see a change in their
relationship with the outside world. This trip is the culmination of an
extraordinary set of consultations and detailed discussions with leaders in
South Korea, with leaders in Japan, with congressional leaders, with the
President, with the Secretary of State, trying to ascertain whether there
is a willingness in Pyongyang to make fundamental changes in their
policy.
We do not believe that anything we've done so far has done anything other
than advance the national security of the United States. Most of those who
have objected to our policies have proposed no alternatives. We've managed
to achieve the freezing of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, something
that most people thought couldn't happen. We've managed to achieve the
access to the site without any compensation, which most people thought
couldn't happen. Because we don't base our relationship on trust -- we base
it on verification - we have no illusions about the North Korean
regime. But we want to ascertain whether, through a step-by-step process
that deals with the proliferation concerns you mentioned - that is, the
North's willingness to test long-range missiles and medium-range missiles
and sell ballistic missiles - can be constrained through discussions.
We also want to make sure that the limited nature of the Agreed Framework,
which only applies to one site, can be made more comprehensive so that we
can achieve the objectives that I'm sure both we and our critics share,
which is to make sure that North Korea is not in a position to present a
danger of non-proliferation of either nuclear weapons or missiles to the
world. We think that a visit by Dr. Perry to obtain a first-hand discussion
with the leadership in North Korea will help us to make judgments about how
to proceed.
QUESTION: When Secretary Albright announced the dates of the trip
yesterday, she said that Dr. Perry would be meeting with senior North
Korean officials. I'm wondering if you can tell us if not who exactly he'll
be meeting with, at what kind of level they are? Are they in the Foreign
Ministry; are they in the executive --
MR. RUBIN: I don't have the schedule to offer you right now. As we get a
little closer to that, I can try to get you that. I can say that we do
expect meetings with a range of high-level North Korean officials, and
these will constitute the bulk of the team's schedule in Pyongyang. A
meeting with Kim Jung-Il would, of course, be desirable.
QUESTION: So Dr. Perry will not be offering to lift the trade embargo
when he goes to Pyongyang, as one newspaper reported today?
MR. RUBIN: What Dr. Perry will be doing will be exploring the views of
the North Korean leadership about where they want this relationship to go.
He will not be offering or negotiating anything. He will be exploring what
their views are so that as he completes his assessment of North Korea
policy and American policy towards North Korea and discusses that with the
Japanese and the South Koreans, that he can present the President and
the Secretary of State the most comprehensive view of what is possible,
what is not possible and what is worth pursuing.
QUESTION: Would it be fair to say that we'd be laying out a road map with
opportunities to improve the relationship along the way?
MR. RUBIN: No, he would be - it will be an opportunity for him to obtain
first-hand authoritative policy views from the senior levels of the North
Korean leadership, which is the kind of thing that's pretty difficult to
obtain.
QUESTION: When you said that a meeting with Kim Jung-Il would be
desirable, does that - is it implied in that that a representation to the
North Koreans has been made, that Dr. Perry would like to have this?
MR. RUBIN: I'd rather not get into the diplomatic details. That is our
view that we would regard such a meeting as desirable. Every discussion we
and the North Koreans have about the schedule, I don't think needs to be
made public.
QUESTION: On a purely logistical matter -- and maybe you can't tell me
yet - do you expect him to meet the South Koreans and the Japanese together
in Tokyo before he goes to Pyongyang or after or --
MR. RUBIN: The delegation plans to stop in Tokyo for bilateral meetings
with Japan and South Korean officials and a trilateral meeting on May 24
before going to Pyongyang on May 25. On its return, May 28, after briefing
the Secretary and the President, probably by phone, the delegation will
stop in Seoul and similarly have bilateral meetings with the South Korean
and Japanese officials, along with a trilateral on May 29. So going in it
will be in Japan; going out will be South Korea with the same group.
QUESTION: Would you rule out that subjects like the easing of sanctions
or the potential of reestablishing diplomatic relations would come up
during Mr. Perry's visit?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think it would be useful for me to speculate on what
Dr. Perry will or won't say.
QUESTION: Just to clarify, he will not be stopping in China, either going
in or going out?
MR. RUBIN: Not according to the schedule I have right now.
QUESTION: One more on Turkey. Have you had a chance to make any
observations about this woman member of parliament, who was denied the
right to take the oath because of her American citizenship?
MR. RUBIN: I have had such an opportunity. I'd like to get you the
precise words on that.
QUESTION: There are reports that the Iraqi opposition leaders will be
coming to Washington next week for talks with the Secretary of State and
the National Security Advisor, presumably to discuss ways to topple Saddam
or moves against Saddam Hussein?
MR. RUBIN: The Interim Leadership Committee of the Iraqi National
Congress today concluded an important meeting in London. The Interim
Leadership Committee, which consists of leaders of seven of the INC's
opposition groups, have agreed to work together with other Iraqi opposition
groups outside the INC for the purpose of uniting the Iraqi opposition. We
are encouraged by this development. A delegation of the INC Interim
Leadership and other opposition leaders have been invited to Washington to
exchange views on how to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people by
promoting the transition to a democratic and pluralistic Iraq at peace
with itself and its neighbors.
The delegation from the INC Interim Committee Leadership with consist of
several leaders, and I prefer to put it on paper for risk of not getting it
exactly right; there are about a dozen or so. My understanding is that the
Secretary intends to meet with them, but we're still working on the
scheduling for such a visit. Obviously, some of these activities are being
supported by funds appropriated for the Iraqi opposition; others are
being supported by the opposition leaders themselves.
QUESTION: Who will represent the United States at the inauguration of the
Nigerian President next week?
MR. RUBIN: I think that's normally a White House decision, and I will
have to get that for you.
QUESTION: I've tried there twice, too.
MR. RUBIN: I'll try to get it for you.
QUESTION: Back to Iraq.
MR. RUBIN: But I will try to get that for you. Can we make a note that we
should be able to get that? That's a totally reasonable question.
QUESTION: I see that Senator Lott and Senator Helms did in fact invite
these INC leadership back to Washington. Is this in response to the
Congressional invitation, or is this an Administration invitation that
they're coming here (inaudible)?
MR. RUBIN: Well, this is an interim leadership that's larger than the
original INC leadership, and I make that known. I think that we and
Congress share the same view that we need to work toward the change of
regime in Iraq.
As far as who suggested to whom first that they come visit, I just don't
know.
QUESTION: Do you have any idea how much money --
MR. RUBIN: That I can try to check, but some money would definitely come
from the funds that have been appropriate for this purpose.
QUESTION: Was any of the money spent on the meeting in London, do you
know?
MR. RUBIN: Probably some funds are made available for precisely the idea
of getting as much unity as possible, and I'd be surprised if this process
wasn't funded in significant ways.
QUESTION: Have you submitted today, or are you planning to submit today,
any of the records that were subpoenaed by Congressman Dan Burton on the
alleged phone conversations and e-mail messages between US Department
officials and the FARC guerrilla group from Colombia?
MR. RUBIN: We have certain legal obligations that ensue when a subpoena
has been made. We are being fully responsive to the request from Congress
for information, and we intend to turn over the relevant documents. In
response to the chairman's May 17 subpoena, we did offer on January 27 to
make available reports on our meeting with the FARC. That was obviously
insufficient and didn't yield the proper attention. So other means were
proffered and we are going to comply with that subpoena.
QUESTION: Can you confirm press reports from a Washington daily today
that at least one US Department official has e-mailed and had phone
conversations at least three or six times?
MR. RUBIN: That's the kind of detail that is encompassed in the subpoena,
and our lawyers advise us that it's more important to respond to the legal
requirements of the subpoena than to answer the questions about the
subpoena. But I will check on what detail we can provide you.
QUESTION: And one question, just out of the blue --
MR. RUBIN: I hate those.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: You might not be prepared to answer this, but is your
government prepared to give back former President of Colombia Samper the
visa that was revoked in 1996?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know, and I will check for you.
QUESTION: The Cox Report is expected to be released Tuesday.
MR. RUBIN: At which point I will be in a position to comment on
it.
QUESTION: You can't comment on it?
MR. RUBIN: On a report that hasn't been released?
QUESTION: Well, actually, Congressman Cox -- and he has said publicly
what the report has found - that China did -
MR. RUBIN: We'd prefer to wait until we have the whole thing.
QUESTION: Can you say - okay. No comment at all?
MR. RUBIN: No comment.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:50 P.M.)
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