U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #66, 99-05-18
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1021
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, May 18, 1999
Briefer: James B. Foley
STATEMENTS
1 US-Baltic Partnership Commission Meeting
1 Violation of Cease-Fire by Government of Sudan
SERBIA (Kosovo)
1-3,4 Deputy Secretary Talbott's Meetings with Russian Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin
5-6,9 and Finnish President Ahtisaari in Helsinki Regarding Kosovo
2,4-5 Reported Rift in Alliance Regarding Kosovo
3,4,8 Indications Belgrade Government Moving Towards NATO's Conditions
3 Update on NATO Military Activity
6-7,8,9-10 Prospects for the Use of Ground Forces/Environment
7-8 UN Special Envoys on Kosovo
10-11 Release of Serb POWs/Timing
DEPARTMENT
11,13-14 Brian Atwood Withdraws His Nomination as US Ambassador to
Brazil
14 Status of Richard Holbrooke's Nomination as US Ambassador to UN
ISRAEL
11-13 Reaction to Elections in Israel/Impact on Peace Process
IRAN/SYRIA
13 Iranian President Khatemi's Visit to Syria
NORTH KOREA
14-15 State Department Team Visit to Suspect Site at Kumchang-ni
15 Prospects for Visit by Dr. Perry to North Korea
SOUTH KOREA
15-16 Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Hong's Meetings
CHINA
16-17 Status of US Embassy and Consulates/Damage/Operations
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #66
TUESDAY, MAY 18, 1999, 1:55 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: Welcome to the State Department. Sorry to have kept all of you
waiting so long. I hope you at least -
QUESTION: This better be good.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, this better be good, and I hope you at least had an
opportunity oh have your lunch, unless I'm going to be the main course.
(Laughter.)
That remains to be determined. I'm going to post some messages -- some
statements in the Press Office. One, I regret that because Deputy Secretary
Talbott had to go to Helsinki, we had to postpone the US-Baltic Partnership
Commission meeting. He met with the Baltic ambassadors here to express our
continued commitment to that forum on May 17.
Secondly, the US has learned that the government of Sudan bombed the towns
of Akak and Nyamlel in Bahr el-Ghazal on May 16 and 17, killing at least
one person. We strongly condemn this bombing attack, which clearly violates
the humanitarian cease-fire in place there since July of 1998. With that,
George, let me go to your questions.
QUESTION: You mentioned Strobe Talbott's travels. Do you have anything on
his meetings today?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have a read-out yet of his discussions in Helsinki
with former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari. I
know he spoke with Secretary Albright at some point this morning, but those
meetings were ongoing. Clearly, the purpose of Secretary Talbott's meetings
in Helsinki is to advance the diplomatic track. Even as we intensify the
air campaign - and if you're interested, I can get into that in a minute -
the growing results of the air campaign on the ground, we are also
intensifying diplomatic work in the hopes of achieving a diplomatic
settlement.
Now, there's a lot of speculation, a lot of activity about what's happening
diplomatically. However, I think the critical point is that the diplomacy
is something that can be accelerated and that can reach a successful
conclusion if Mr. Milosevic makes a simple decision to accept the NATO
conditions, to accept the G-8 principles. Therefore, we could end the
bombing campaign, obviously, if he agreed to those conditions and we saw a
withdrawal taking place along the lines of what was called for in the
NATO summit communique.
So Deputy Secretary Talbott is in Helsinki. I don't have a read-out at this
point, but clearly what he is doing is with our Russian partner, he's
working to flesh out some of the details further of the principles that
were agreed in the G-8. That process will also occur at a lower level
beginning tomorrow in Bonn, where the G-8 political directors will be
meeting, and they will be discussing coordination of diplomatic activity.
They'll be looking at the possibility, as we've stated previously, of
moving towards a UN Security Council resolution, in the event that we're
able to reach consensus in the G-8 on all the details that have continued
to elude us. Even though we have agreement on the general principles, the
hard work of fleshing out those details is ongoing.
So I don't have, as I said, a read-out, but Secretary Talbott will be
reporting at the conclusion of those talks to Secretary Albright, and
perhaps we'll be in a position tomorrow to talk more about it.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - excuse my pronunciation - has said that President
Ahtisaari and former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will be going to Finland
this week.
MR. FOLEY: Going where?
QUESTION: To Belgrade this week. Is that your understanding? And there's
also some word of a rift on one side - the British and the French - the
other side, the Americans, having to do with President Ahtisaari's role in
these consultations.
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of any rift of that nature. I believe that all
the allies are supportive of President Ahtisaari's role. In fact, the EU
yesterday formally designated President Ahtisaari as their Kosovo envoy, so
I believe they have confidence in him.
Your first question was - oh, about their travel, yes. Well, I wouldn't
rule that out. I'm not aware that that has been decided. I suppose Deputy
Secretary Talbott will learn more about that on the basis of his discussions
with them tomorrow. I wouldn't rule out that one or both would go to
Belgrade at some point.
I think what's important, though, as I've indicated, is that the international
community reach consensus; that we speak with one voice; that we are able
to present President Milosevic with a sense of what he has to do. I mean,
it's clear that if he wants NATO to stop its bombing, he has to meet the
NATO five conditions. In that sense, it's very easy for President Milosevic
to know what to do and, in fact, to do it.
But in terms of bringing together the full weight of the international
community and of the G-8, of which Russia is a leading member, we need to
continue fleshing out those details, as I indicated.
QUESTION: There have been more reports of indications that the Belgrade
Government is adjusting its position towards meeting the NATO conditions,
especially through the Italians this time. Have you heard of any signs
along those lines?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we've been reading signs coming out of Belgrade for
several weeks now. If you go back to the period when former Deputy Prime
Minister Draskovic spoke out, and then was fired for having spoken out, the
interesting thing is the views that he was expressing have been echoed
increasingly in different circles in Belgrade and throughout Serbia. We've
seen cronies of Milosevic describe the G-8 principles as those that
Milosevic ought to accept. We've seen mayors around the country express
similar sentiments. We know that retired generals are deeply concerned
about the fact that the Yugoslav Army is being progressively destroyed.
There were even reports of demonstrations that came out of the Montenegrin
press yesterday, in several, or at least in two cities in southern Serbia
in response, I think, to call-ups of reservists to be sent into Kosovo. I
think there were two cities - let me see if I have those names here - but
in any case, we see growing signs of an awareness in Belgrade that the
result of continued air strikes is inevitable.
Secretary Albright and Foreign Secretary Cook wrote in their joint opinion
piece that appeared in the newspaper on Sunday, it's clear where this will
lead to if Milosevic does not reverse course, does not accept NATO's
conditions and allow this conflict to end. He will have no military when
this is over. His security forces, which are the underpinning of his regime,
are being weakened. He's going to have a lot to answer for to his people,
more and more, as this continues. So we see that these signs -- and I
think there were statements coming out of Belgrade today, semi-official,
indicating an openness to embrace the G-8 principles -- we see these as
signs that, indeed, the NATO air campaign is working.
In that regard, let me just give you a brief snapshot of NATO's military
activity in the last 24 hours. A very heavy series of attacks in Kosovo and
throughout Serbia. NATO is locating an increasing number of military
targets and of fielded forces in Kosovo. Yesterday, tanks, armored
personnel carriers, mortar positions and fielded forces were hit in the
areas of Junik, Prizren, Podujevo; two tanks were hit, a refueling truck,
three helicopters were hit. Throughout Serbia, NATO struck three highway
bridges on main re-supply routes into Kosovo. The military air field at
Batanica was targeted. A MiG 29 and MiG 21 located there were destroyed. In
addition to the one in Batanica, the military air fields at Sombor, Sjenica,
Nij and Obrua have been damaged, and are not now being used. NATO also
struck a surface-to-air missile site and its radar.
In other words, this campaign is punishing and there are only so many
assets in the Serb military inventory. Certainly we know where they're
concentrated in Kosovo, and they are being taken apart one by one. It is a
steadily intensifying campaign, the results of which I think are being
brought home in Belgrade. So if they are signaling an openness to the G-8
principles, that is a positive step. It's a sign that our dual strategy of
intensifying the air campaign, of intensifying diplomatic efforts is
beginning to show results.
QUESTION: On the diplomatic front, if Deputy Secretary Talbott and Mr.
Chernomyrdin are not able to bridge any of the outstanding gaps, does the
US think that it's still worthwhile for Chernomyrdin to go to Belgrade this
week?
MR. FOLEY: As I said earlier, the diplomatic solution can come quickly.
It's really in Milosevic's hands. As General Clark has said on many
occasions, when he's had enough, when his forces and his security forces
have taken so much punishment, he can decide at any point that he's got to
bring it to an end. So it's not so much, as Jamie Rubin has often said, a
question of who is the interlocutor, what the vehicle may be; it's
ultimately an easy decision for Milosevic to make. It would be better
if we're able to narrow the gaps with Russia. We've reached agreement
on the principles but, as you know, there are differences on the details.
Were we to narrow the gaps, were we to reach a sort of detailed, fleshed-
out consensus with Russia in the G-8, clearly that will put more diplomatic
pressure on Milosevic; and that's all to the good. But we believe that the
air campaign is also that which is going to produce movement on Milosevic's
part, to say the very least. So we are continuing the air campaign. So in
the absence of further progress among the G-8, I wouldn't want to rule
out that another trip by Mr. Chernomyrdin or someone else wouldn't
be fruitful because Milosevic simply knows that the air campaign, which is
becoming harder and harder for him and his regime to take, will continue
until he meets our conditions.
QUESTION: So does the US still believe that it's possible that Milosevic
would accept the conditions that the G-8 has laid out without Russia and
the United States having narrowed those gaps?
MR. FOLEY: Well as I said, it's preferable if we narrow the gaps and if
we achieve consensus. That's what Deputy Secretary Talbott is working hard
on; that's what the political directors at their level are working on. That
is a goal and we think it will increase the diplomatic isolation and the
diplomatic pressure. But as I mentioned, we have a dual strategy: one is
diplomatic, the other is an intensification of the air campaign.
QUESTION: Just to follow that line of thinking, can you foresee a
situation where, as the air campaign continues to punish Yugoslavia, that
envoys would go to Belgrade with not a complete consensus between the US
and Russia on the details of these G-8 principles, but sort of close enough
to a consensus?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not ruling that out. Certainly our preference is to
close the gaps with Russia, to achieve consensus on the details -- and we
already have consensus on the general principles. But it's always possible -
- we don't dictate the schedules of other emissaries and other diplomats --
it's always possible that they may go at a time and place of their own
choosing. The message that NATO's air campaign is continuing, I think, is
the one that has the profoundest impact on Milosevic.
QUESTION: Before you said it's important for the allies to speak with one
voice. But is that starting not to happen because Italy and Germany are
coming forward saying that there should be a halt to the bombing to see if
that would prompt Milosevic to go ahead and concede to NATO's demands? I
mean, are we starting to see some of those cracks?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure I used those words exactly, but the fact is that
NATO is united on the goals. There is absolutely no question of any NATO
member not continuing to support the goal of returning the refugees under
the protection of an international security force with NATO at its core and
the withdrawal of the Serb security, military and paramilitary forces. So
there's unity on the goals; there's unity on the air campaign. That came
out at the NATO summit. The 19 leaders agreed not only on the air
campaign, but on intensifying the air campaign.
It's perfectly natural in an alliance of 19 democracies that leaders speak
out publicly on the different tactics that we are currently examining and
the different diplomatic options and activities that are out there. But all
of the diplomacy is aiming towards the same goal, and it's the goal that
all the NATO allies support, which is Milosevic meeting the NATO five
conditions.
On the specific question about Prime Minister D'Alema statement or proposal,
I would simply say at this stage it's a hypothetical question because I
believe the Prime Minister's idea was that he would propose a pause that
would take place after the UN Security Council has passed a resolution.
This, obviously, would presuppose reaching detailed consensus in the G-8 --
in other words, with Russia - and in the Security Council, it would require,
obviously, Chinese acquiescence and a Security Council vote.
Our view in the United States remains that a halt in the bombing will be
possible once Milosevic has agreed to NATO's five conditions and has
demonstrably begun to withdraw his forces according to a precise and rapid
timetable. That's not, as you know, my normal elegant language; that's the
elegant language of the NATO communique that the leaders agreed to a number
of weeks ago.
QUESTION: You said earlier that you might be able to give us a read-out
on the meetings in Helsinki tomorrow. Does that mean that these talks are
going to continue tomorrow morning? Have they stopped for the night?
MR. FOLEY: No, I - first of all, it's not a commitment for me to give you
a detailed read-out. As you know, we've not given detailed read-outs
concerning Deputy Secretary Talbott's meetings, but we have indicated at
points when progress has been registered - we've communicated that. And I
would hope that Mr. Rubin would be in a position to give you a general
sense tomorrow. I am not aware that the meetings are continuing into
tomorrow; I just don't know that.
QUESTION: Are they still going on?
MR. FOLEY: They're still going on.
QUESTION: And is it your understanding that Chernomyrdin will go to
Belgrade tomorrow, with or without Ahtisaari?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't know if I adequately answered that a minute ago.
I'm not aware of what his specific plans are. I think Deputy Secretary
Talbott is ascertaining those now.
QUESTION: I believe it was last week, British Foreign Secretary Cook said
that NATO has to think about and come to some agreement on a position on
what happens if the situation - if the air campaign continues, if Milosevic
does not agree to the five points and the situation within Kosovo
deteriorates even further, but the air campaign is able to take out more
and more of the military - that NATO should be prepared to send a force
into Kosovo without Milosevic saying "uncle" and giving up, with any
kind of formal peace agreement; that NATO must not let Milosevic sort
of hold the key to whether NATO goes in or doesn't go in with a ground
force. Can you say what the thinking is in this building?
MR. FOLEY: Sure, I can clarify what our position is. I think that the
British authorities would be best to answer your question in terms of their
view on this. My understanding is that there's no daylight between the US
and the UK position. I've spoken to counterparts at my level in London, and
they affirmed that. I think Robin Cook made it clear -- that NATO first of
all is committed to the air campaign and that, as Foreign Secretary
Cook and Secretary Albright wrote in their op-ed piece, we believe
it's working; and we believe it's well understood in Belgrade that the air
campaign is working.
Secondly, Foreign Secretary Cook, I believe, yesterday acknowledged and
supports the idea that we are not planning to fight our way into Kosovo;
that we will send ground forces into Kosovo, but they will be a peace-
keeping force. We continue to believe that the air campaign will produce a
change of course on Milosevic's part. We're beginning to see signs that
that is increasingly understood in Belgrade. We believe we'll know it's
over when it's over. We'll be able to ascertain that and there will be Serb
acquiescence at the end of the day. That's what we continue to expect.
QUESTION: I hear you say there's no daylight between the US and the UK,
but pick up any newspaper this morning and you'll see reports of the
British trying to convince the Americans to go forward with the ground
option. I mean, what do you attribute that to?
MR. FOLEY: Right. Well, the UK spokesman and political officials have
consistently and assiduously denied those reports all weekend long, and
including yesterday. So I can only refer you to what they're saying; I
can't refer to what the newspapers are speculating about in London. Having
spoken to one of my counterparts in London this morning, they affirmed that,
indeed, the British press is in a kind of frenzy on that issue, and that
the British spokesmen are continuing to maintain that those stories are
not true. And to my knowledge, they're not true, in fact. President
Clinton today made clear that we believe in the air campaign and it's going
to continue and it's going to work.
QUESTION: Could I clarify one point please? So, you are saying that you
agree with the British position, which is that there could be an international
force that goes into Kosovo without an explicit peace deal or okay from
Milosevic if NATO were to think that conditions were right.
MR. FOLEY: No, I did not say that - most emphatically. Our position is
that we will send ground forces into Kosovo in a peace-keeping mode, not in
a combat mode, and that this will occur in a permissive environment, not a
non-permissive or a semi-permissive environment, and that we will obtain
Serb acquiescence at the appropriate time. That's what I'm saying.
QUESTION: But before you go in with the troops, you'll get Belgrade's
acquiescence. You won't send -- in other words, ground troops will not go
in until Milosevic says "uncle"?
MR. FOLEY: That's our position, yes.
QUESTION: President Clinton this morning was asked about that, and he was
not nearly as categorical as you are. He was asked about those ground
troops, and his answer was that all options remain on the table. All
options would include a non-permissive environment. Would you agree that
there is a nuance of difference there?
MR. FOLEY: No. Secretary Albright said the same thing here when she was
standing with Foreign Secretary Cook, I think the day or two before the
NATO summit. That's always been our position and for that reason NATO
Secretary General Solana instructed the military authorities to update
their plans and assessments, and that's what the NATO military authorities
are doing currently. We're not ruling options out; we're not taking things
off the table. What we are doing is emphatically stating that the
air campaign is our strategy, number one; number two, the air campaign
is working; and number three, we expect to deploy ground forces into Kosovo
in a peace-keeping mode and not in a combat mode.
But I think just in terms of the President's statement, what he was really
emphasizing in that statement is that Mr. Milosevic should be under no
illusion that he can either outlast us or outfox us in Kosovo. We will stay
at the air campaign until our objectives are met.
QUESTION: Also on the diplomatic track, you haven't mentioned the United
Nations' special envoys, Mr. Bildt and the other gentleman. Are they
playing what you can describe as a healthy role, or are they noise on the
line?
MR. FOLEY: No, I think we've been in touch with at least one of them that
I'm aware of, and I think Mr. Bildt has been traveling to various European
capitals meeting with European leaders. Our understanding is that both the
envoys are currently at work thinking about focusing on the implementation
of a peace agreement, which is going to be a very complex undertaking
involving, obviously, many complicated matters - the reconstruction of
Kosovo; the civil administration of Kosovo; the coordination of efforts.
That's what they're working on, is my understanding.
QUESTION: So in other words, there is a distinct division of labor here.
They're talking about what comes after peace breaks out; you're talking
about making peace break out.
MR. FOLEY: Yes. Anyone I haven't called on yet on Kosovo? I'll come back
to you.
QUESTION: You reported to us earlier that you saw signals out of Belgrade,
some of them semi-official, that there was a greater willingness to accept
some of the G-8 principles.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: Will that be sufficient - just the G-8 principles?
MR. FOLEY: Well, as I stated a few minutes ago, quoting the summit
language - and I will read it back to you again - we are determined to
continue insisting that Milosevic meet NATO's five conditions. The G-8 went
a long way towards bridging the gaps among all G-8 members, coalescing
around some broad principles, the details of which need to be further
fleshed out. But we in NATO - and we're the ones conducting the air
campaign - will continue the air campaign until those objectives are
met.
QUESTION: On a related point, what degree of credibility do you attach to
these statements that are floating out of Belgrade today - more official or
less official?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we're not going to attach credibility to anything short
of acceptance of the NATO five conditions. It is simply, from an analytical
perspective, noteworthy that the kind of debate we've seen in Belgrade over
the last few weeks about the need to come to terms with the international
community, based on the growing awareness that the air campaign was
becoming too punishing and that the future would be disastrous for Serbia,
is perhaps - I stress perhaps - beginning to be reflected in official
circles. But clearly, we will want to see a clear-cut acceptance of the
NATO conditions. In that case, under the conditions or circumstances that I
mentioned, we would be prepared to halt the bombing.
QUESTION: I just want to go back to that ground troop thing. This
debate's gone up and down. At one stage, senior US officials, including, I
think, Secretary Cohen, at one stage, did talk about the possibility of
using ground troops in a semi-permissive environment.
MR. FOLEY: I've never heard that, Jonathan, not from a US Government
official.
QUESTION: So you don't - there's no thinking that there might possibly be
some circumstances in which there's no serious resistance but Belgrade has
not accepted the presence -
MR. FOLEY: No - well, we've said we're not ruling out options, we're not
taking things off the table. But we - to repeat myself - believe in the air
campaign; we believe it's really taking apart the Serb military both
throughout the FRY and increasingly on the ground in Kosovo. It's going to
work. But we're going to keep at it until it's over, unless Milosevic
reverses course in the meantime.
What Robin Cook, I think, was saying yesterday was that this air campaign
is working and we need to keep an eye on its progress; it's going to
achieve our objectives. Remember what the President said when we launched
the air campaign on March 24 - that one of the aims was to cripple
Milosevic's military forces in Kosovo. We're in the process of destroying
them, as well as crippling much of what he's got militarily and security-
wise throughout Serbia. So that's what's happening; that's what Robin Cook
was talking about. We need to keep an eye on that - the progress on
the ground. Our position remains, though, that we're not going to send
ground forces into a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment.
QUESTION: Is it a fair assessment that the US position right now -- we've
got Deputy Secretary Talbott in these talks in Helsinki - is that the idea,
should Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari go to Belgrade, that Chernomyrdin would
be in charge of relaying to Milosevic one more time the G-8 principles and
that Ahtisaari would concentrate with Milosevic on talking about the
modalities of setting up post-conflict Kosovo? Is that a fair description?
MR. FOLEY: First of all, I don't know the answer to that. Secondly, I
wouldn't probably get into that level of detail if I had the answer, simply
because this is a very important and sensitive and ongoing negotiation
we're involved in.
QUESTION: These are all reports coming out of Helsinki, quoting
diplomats.
MR. FOLEY: Right, but that's quoting diplomats; that's not the US
Government speaking authoritatively from the State Department podium. I'm
not going to talk about, though, Deputy Secretary Talbott's ongoing
negotiations.
QUESTION: Two things. First, not to belabor this point on Robin Cook, but
I believe -
MR. FOLEY: But we're going to belabor it.
QUESTION: Yes, I know, but I believe in today's New York Times he was
quoted as saying that NATO must be prepared to send ground troops into
Kosovo, even before the Belgrade government is ready to accept the terms of
a UN-backed settlement - something to the effect of we're not going hang
around waiting for Milosevic to invite us in. Now, doesn't that - if that
statement's true -
MR. FOLEY: I think he said we're not going to necessarily need some kind
of a signing ceremony, a formal event of that nature. Our position is that
we will know it's over when we see it; we'll know it when we see it. We'll
be able to ascertain at the appropriate time that we've completed our
military objectives, and that Belgrade has given its acquiescence to its
acceptance of the five conditions.
QUESTION: Based on those words you just used, would that be in agreement
with what Foreign Secretary Cook is saying?
MR. FOLEY: You'd have to read all of what he said. He makes clear that he
backs the air campaign -- that is the only strategy that we're pursuing now
-- and that we need to be prepared to act when our objectives are
met.
QUESTION: To the POWs, just a question on the release - the timing today.
I know the Administration has said that it should not be viewed as a
goodwill gesture, but couldn't it be argued that since it's today, it might
be a sign to sort of jump-start the diplomatic efforts?
MR. FOLEY: Why today -- because of meetings going on in Helsinki?
QUESTION: Just because of intensification of the diplomatic efforts this
week and the time of the day.
MR. FOLEY: I don't believe it had - no, it had no connection to the
diplomacy. The fact of the matter is I can give you some of the information
about the release of the POWs, but Mr. Bacon at the Pentagon will be in, I
think, a more authoritative position. The two Serbian prisoners of war were
returned to Yugoslav authorities at a border crossing in Hungary earlier
today. During their captivity, we have ensured their humane treatment and
protection and have complied in every respect with the Geneva Convention.
During visits by the ICRC, the prisoners expressed appreciation for the
treatment they received. This is in sharp contrast with the treatment
that the American soldiers received while in Yugoslav custody.
As we've made clear previously, there was no quid pro quo involved in their
release. These soldiers were combatants while our servicemen were on a non-
combat patrol on Macedonian territory and should never have been abducted.
I think if you're asking something about the timing, because we've had them
in custody for several weeks, let me just say we take very seriously our
responsibility under relevant Security Council resolutions to cooperate
with the ICTY as well as our responsibilities under the Geneva Convention.
So we specifically undertook to ascertain whether the POWs would be willing
to speak to the ICTY. Under the Geneva Convention, POWs are not required to
provide any information beyond their name and rank and service number. In
this case, the US, thanks to the good offices of the ICTY, was able to
ascertain that the POWs did not provide the required consent to proceed
with such interviews. Once that was completed, they were released.
QUESTION: Why is it so important for the US to stress that this is not a
goodwill gesture? I mean, certainly it's not a gesture of ill will, so -
MR. FOLEY: No, it's not - you're right. But it was not sort of diplomatic
signal or a move tied to something else.
QUESTION: Is there anything so wrong with saying that it's a gesture of
good will?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I wouldn't want to mischaracterize what we've done. I
wouldn't want to mischaracterize because it would be nice simply to say yes
to your question. But the fact is we didn't seek out these POWs. They
weren't captured by US forces; they were given to US forces; they were
turned over to us - we had not sought them out. We sought no gain in
keeping them, and so we released them as soon as it became practical to do
so, having fulfilled our obligations to the ICTY.
QUESTION: Okay, so that means that they were released once it had been
determined that they wouldn't cooperate with the ICTY?
MR. FOLEY: Right.
QUESTION: Atwood has been your chief coordinator for humanitarian issues
there. Now he's asked the President to withdraw his nomination and said
he's a short-timer now for his other responsibilities. So a number of
things: how will this impact on the management of the refugee issue, which
is pretty important, I think you would agree, in the region? Had he been
figuring in this evolution of a reconstruction strategy for the region,
given his previous experience in Bosnia? And what does it say about the
rest of the nominations that you have stacked up befor the same committee
that he expressed frustration with?
MR. FOLEY: Well, first of all, Secretary Albright regards Brian Atwood as
a fine public servant, and he is a long-time friend of the Secretary's. She
believes he would have made a really effective Ambassador to Brazil, but
she supports his decision.
He has, obviously, as you say, played a critical role in our Kosovo policy
and in dealing with the humanitarian crisis, the plight of the refugees. He
will be staying on for some time. I don't have the answers, specifically,
to your question as to how long he will stay on. But it clearly will be a
high priority of the President and the Secretary to nominate a very capable
replacement, but I have nothing to announce on that today.
QUESTION: Changing the subject again, now that the Israeli elections are
over, how does the US plan to proceed in reviving the peace process?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, well, first of all, let me tell you that Secretary
Albright spoke last evening - it was about 3:00 a.m. Israel time - to Prime
Minister-elect General Barak. This was following the President's conversations
with General Barak and Prime Minister Netanyahu. Secretary Albright
congratulated him on his victory, said that we look forward to working with
him in restarting or resuming the Middle East peace process. He was
obviously very elated with his election victory, but also he indicated to
the Secretary that he is ready to roll up his sleeves immediately and get
to work on the important agenda facing him; first of which, of course, is
to constitute his own government.
Secretary Albright spoke, I think in the last hour and a half, to Prime
Minister Netanyahu. She wished him very well - both him and his family - in
their future endeavors. She has been through the political process herself
on both the winning and losing ends, and I think they shared some thoughts
on the vagaries of political life. But she thanked him for their work
together. As you know, the President saluted Prime Minister Netanyahu last
evening in a telephone call and in a statement, and she echoed those
sentiments.
In terms of specifically what the next steps would be with the next Israeli
Government, it's a little premature. As I indicated, General Barak has 45
days to constitute a new government. Obviously there's a patchwork
composition of the new Knesset, and he's going to have to determine the
shape of his government; so it's premature to talk about specific steps
with the next government, at least related to the peace process. Once he's
taken office, we will consult to elicit his thinking about how he sees the
period ahead. We have made clear for some time now that it is, in our view,
important to implement the Wye River memorandum and to launch permanent
status negotiations on an accelerated basis. We are also committed to
reaching a comprehensive agreement and we want to see how best to resume
negotiations on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks.
QUESTION: How many ambassadorial levels -- (inaudible) - before the
Foreign Relations Committee now?
MR. FOLEY: That's a very good question. I'm ready for Kosovo and the
Middle East and other subjects today, but I'd have to find that out for
you.
QUESTION: Just a quick - you say he's willing to roll up his sleeves and
get to work.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: You meant on the peace process, or just on --
MR. FOLEY: I think, including the peace process, yes.
QUESTION: He said that he's ready to go?
MR. FOLEY: Yes. I mean, he's got a heavy domestic as well as international
agenda, and he indicated to the Secretary that he was ready for some hard
work.
QUESTION: Did he say that he stood by the Wye accords?
MR. FOLEY: I don't know if they got into that level of detail. What the
Secretary told me was that General Barak had just come back from that rally
that you saw on TV. It was 3:00 a.m. in the morning. I think the duration
of the call reflected the lateness of the call.
QUESTION: Does the United States believe that the prospects for progress
are much greater now than they were, say, a month ago in the Middle East
peace process?
MR. FOLEY: Well, General Barak has indicated, I believe, throughout the
campaign, his commitment to the peace process. So we fully expect to move
forward with the Israeli Government, with the Palestinian Authority. Also,
as I indicated a minute ago, we would like to see a comprehensive peace
settlement in the Middle East and we will be looking toward the revival of
the Syrian and Lebanese tracks as well.
QUESTION: Do you have any observations on the news stories suggesting
Administration elation over the outcome of the election?
MR. FOLEY: I really don't put a lot of stock in those stories. We've been
very careful, as is normal and as is appropriate, not to take any position
on the Israeli election. I can assure you that had the result gone the
other way, that I would be standing here today saluting someone else as the
next or the continuing Prime Minister of Israel. So we have not taken a
position before the elections; there's no reason to take a position after
the elections. We work with every government of Israel. It's a democracy,
and we have historic ties and common interests, and we work with every
government of Israel. We look forward to working with the new one.
QUESTION: If it had gone the other way, would you be standing here saying
we fully expect to move forward?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we felt that the electoral period had, by its very
nature, created an interruption in the peace process. We were very
realistic about that and said so from this podium. If the other party had
won the election, we certainly would be calling for a return to the peace
process.
QUESTION: To follow on that - if the election had gone the other way,
would you be saying that Netanyahu had indicated his commitment to the
peace process all the way through -
MR. FOLEY: You know, we don't answer advance hypotheticals from the
podium. We're not going to answer sort of retrospective hypotheticals, I
can assure you of that.
QUESTION: You just did. You answered -
MR. FOLEY: I said answer; I think that was a unilateral statement.
QUESTION: Over the weekend, President Khatemi was in Syria, and referred
to Hezbollah as a humanitarian organization. I'm just wondering if the
State Department has any reaction to that.
MR. FOLEY: Well, we're not changing our designation of Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization.
QUESTION: But what do you think of the Iranian President's -
MR. FOLEY: That's one of the, as you know, major points of separation
between us and the Iranian Government - terrorism, support for terrorism,
notably.
QUESTION: I want to go back to Mr. Atwood withdrawing his candidacy. You
all aren't concerned at all that Senator Helms has the ability to
intimidate your candidates?
MR. FOLEY: Secretary Albright has an excellent working relationship with
Senator Helms. It's really been one of the hallmarks of her tenure as
Secretary of State. She likes and respects the Senator, and because they
have such a good relationship, they're able to get a lot of important work
done for the country. I'm not going to comment about the particulars of
this nomination. As I said, Secretary Albright respects the decision that
Brian Atwood has taken. She is a long-standing friend of his, and
would look forward to continuing that relationship in whatever capacity
Brian Atwood might be able to fill in the future.
QUESTION: To follow on that, it has been a year since Ambassador
Holbrooke's nomination as put before this Committee, and you have not been
able to get that - even a vote in the committee, never mind onto the floor.
Are you going to continue to press for his nomination? Should you now, as
with this nomination, which had been before the Committee for a year, move
on to another candidate?
MR. FOLEY: Well, concerning Ambassador Holbrooke, I think we've stated
our position many times from this podium. There's no need to restate that
today.
QUESTION: Anything further you're going to do to press for him?
MR. FOLEY: I really have nothing further to say. I think we've made very
clear our position on his nomination, and that it's not a new story.
QUESTION: What could you tell us about what's been done so far by the US
team visiting North Korea?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I believe they arrived today; and, therefore, I don't
have a lot to say about what they've done, except that they arrived. Let me
try to expand, elaborate on that.
QUESTION: Safely?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, safely, thank you. That sounded like Charlie Wolfson's
cough and it was not. Arrival network.
The State Department team, as I indicated, arrived in North Korea today to
begin preparations for the first visit to the suspect underground site at
Kumchang-ni. The team expects to travel to Kumchang-ni and begin its work
on May 20 and stay in the vicinity until it completes its work. That's
really all I have on the visit today.
QUESTION: Can you tell us not who they are by name, but what exactly -
what type of people are these? What do they - what kind of jobs do they do
normally? Are they State Department people or do they have --
MR. FOLEY: They come from a number of government agencies, I believe.
There are 14 individuals, including technical specialists. That's all I
have, though.
QUESTION: How long are they expected to stay at the site?
MR. FOLEY: Well, until they complete their work. I don't think we have a
scientific sense of how many days they're going to be there. But obviously,
they have an important job to do and they'll leave when it's finished.
QUESTION: Dr. Perry's - do you have any dates Dr. Perry's visiting North
Korea? There's one report that Dr. Perry's going to bring a letter from the
President. Can you confirm this?
MR. FOLEY: I think Secretary Albright was very clear yesterday in what
she wasn't going to get into, and I'm certainly not going to do things
differently. She indicated that Dr. Perry has indicated in the past that he
would travel to North Korea under the right circumstances, and that such a
visit would be a valuable part of the review that he is conducting. When
the circumstances are correct and such a trip could do the most good with
respect to the purposes of his review; then we will make an announcement
to that effect. I have no such announcement to make today.
QUESTION: This has to do with kind of Kosovo, but not really. The
embassies in China, did they re --
MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry, go back to North Korea.
QUESTION: Yesterday both the Secretary and the Foreign Minister talked
about -- (inaudible) - lost in the shuffle, but they talked about whether
the United States had degraded its ability to defend South Korea. There
were two passing comments on --
MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure they formulated it in that way.
QUESTION: Something like that. Can you amplify on that at all? Has there
been a sucking away of assets from South Korea? I know there were some
troops taken from there. Have they been replaced? What have you done to
maintain --
MR. FOLEY: The particulars of the answer, I'd have to refer you to the
Pentagon for. I don't have that at my fingertips, in terms of the troop
numbers and the status and the readiness. I think the political message,
though, was clear that Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Hong made
yesterday, which is that we are vigilant and that we are capable and that
has not changed. But in terms of the specifics, I don't have those; so I
urge you to talk to Mr. Bacon about that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- the South Koreans raised? I mean, clearly there
is some concern -
MR. FOLEY: Not in the bilateral meeting.
QUESTION: They didn't raise it as a concern yesterday?
MR. FOLEY: No. I think that - the Foreign Minister made a little joke at
the start of his remarks. I don't think he considers it a joke, but he made
in a light-hearted manner - that it was good that he'd come to make sure
that our attention was not simply focused on Kosovo. Of course, that's not
the case; we remain focused all around the world, and the Secretary was
able to assure him of that. But the specific question, though, you're
asking didn't come up in their bilateral meeting.
QUESTION: Last week it was said from this podium that the embassy and
consulates that were damaged in China were going to reopen for at least
some services I believe yesterday. Has that happened and has an assessment
of monetary damage been done; and has a decision been made on who is going
to pay for this?
MR. FOLEY: Yes. That's not the answer to your question; it's yes, I have
an answer. Over the weekend and on yesterday and today, there were no
significant protests in the immediate vicinity of our offices in Beijing or
elsewhere in China. Ambassador Sasser and embassy staff are now able to
move freely between their residences and the embassy. Consulates general
Guangzhou and Shanghai did not sustain significant damage and have reopened
for most routine business including American citizen services.
Until further notice, no non-immigrant visa services are available at any
of our posts in China. Immigrant visa services, including orphan processing,
resumed in Guangzhou today - I'm sorry - yesterday, excuse me. Due to the
more extensive damage inflicted on the embassy in Beijing and the
consulates general in Chengdu and Shenyang as a result of the violent
demonstrations May 8-11, these facilities remain closed to the public for
routine business through yesterday. I don't have an update - I'm sorry -
today and if there is any change in that status, I'll let you know this
afternoon.
We will decide on the resumption of other activities, including routine non-
immigrant visas processing, as repairs are made and as conditions warrant.
Our travel warning issued on May 9 has been superseded by a public
announcement advising American citizens in China to review security
practices, remain alert to the changing situation and avoid areas where
demonstrations are in progress. Official travel by US Government employees
to the People's Republic of China remains temporarily suspended because our
China post cannot yet provide appropriate support to official visitors.
In terms of the damage that you were asking about, the embassy and other
missions suffered broken windows and other damage from rocks. There were
small fires in the motor pool at the embassy that also caused some damage.
The Consular General's residence in Chengdu was destroyed by fire. That was
the one really significant damage; the others are sort of a relatively
minor order that can be fixed. We have not yet been able to conduct a
comprehensive damage assessment, but this process has begun now that the
security situation allows us unimpeded access to our facility. So I
can't answer your question while that review is underway.
QUESTION: The "until further notice no non-immigrant visa service," is
that purely because of damage or is that punitive?
MR. FOLEY: It's not punitive in any way whatsoever.
QUESTION: I don't know if this has been answered or not in response to
Matt's question, but does the United States have to pay China for
destroying their embassy?
MR. FOLEY: That was not Matt's question; Matt was asking about damage to
US facilities.
QUESTION: No, but I mean - right --
MR. FOLEY: What we have stated is that we are conducting a thorough,
detailed review -- at the Chinese request - investigation of what happened;
of what led to the tragic and mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade. Until that review is completed, it's premature to talk about what
will ensue as a result of that.
Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:42 P.M.)
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