U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #86, 98-07-15
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
392
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, July 15, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
NORTH KOREA
1 1994 Agreed Framework froze their nuclear weapons
development
2,4-5 GAO report correct: North Korea still hasn't clarified key
discrepancy
2 IAEA has necessary access to monitor the freeze, which is
still in effect
2 US has no evidence of a secret nuclear program
2-3 US continues to withhold key components of light water
reactor
3 Continuing discrepancy not a violation of the Agreed
Framework
4,6-7 US will continue to live up to its KEDO commitments
5-7 US is stepping up efforts with Congress and internationally
to provide heavy fuel oil
JAPAN
7 Secretary has had good working relationship with FM Obuchi
INDIA
8 Head of atomic energy commission applied for, then withdrew
visa application
8-9 US is reviewing policy in the area of scientific and
technology exchanges
RUSSIA
10 Success of reform effort extremely important for future of
Europe
10 US works hard with international organizations to assist
Russian economy
10-11 Not realistic for US to deny assistance because of foreign
policy disagreements
10 US welcomes announcement of investigation of nine companies
doing business with Iran
11-12 US will suspend any US government program or assistance to
entities on Russian list
CUBA
12-13,16 US Coast Guard has placed a security zone around Florida
14 Direct flights to Cuba resumed today
BELARUS
15 US supports Radio Free Europe's efforts to broadcast in
central, eastern Europe
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
15-16 US has special responsibilities as a global power
KOSOVO
16 Serb military activity has modified somewhat recently
Military contingency planning continues on an accelerated
basis
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #86
WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 1998 1:00 P.M
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing room.
If I'm not mistaken, today is Wednesday. Our schedule for the rest of
the week is to have a briefing tomorrow, but most likely not on Friday.
There are three statements that we will be posting after the briefing.
One is on the visit of the President of Romania. Another is on the
strategic partnership between Egypt and the United States - the results
of our strategic dialogue that has occurred over recent days. And
finally, we'll be giving you a copy of a statement made by Ambassador
Scheffer in Rome, regarding our effort to try to create an effective and
successful International Criminal Court.
QUESTION: Have you seen the General Accounting Office report which
raises the possibility of North Korea having hidden quantities of
weapons-grade plutonium?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'm familiar with the report in general and have been
briefed on it. I think - let me make a few comments about this issue,
because it's an issue that is easily misunderstood.
At the time of the agreed framework being signed, the world, the South
Koreans, our troops and the United States faced a frightening prospect;
and that was the prospect of North Korea developing a nuclear weapons
capability of significance. This arose not only because of a
discrepancy with regard to what North Korea had declared in terms of
weapons-grade plutonium, but as well the fact that they now had in place
spent fuel that could be used to build nuclear weapons. Thirdly, there
was the prospect of them building new and even more powerful reactors
that could have given them not only a capability to have their own
nuclear weapons, but perhaps the even greater frightening prospect of
them selling those nuclear weapons they could create with the third set
of new reactors.
So we did something very significant: we pushed very hard for the
creation of an agreement to freeze North Korea's nuclear program; and we
did so at a very dangerous time, with the possibility of sanctions being
imposed and knowing, as well, that the North Koreans had indicated that
sanctions being imposed was an act of war. That is what happened in
1994. This was a very dangerous moment, and it posed a frightening
prospect for the world.
What this agreement did was to freeze the facilities that the North
Koreans could have used to create a significant nuclear weapons
capability. And it froze those facilities and laid out a time frame for
North Korea to provide the international community information about
what activities had occurred in the past, previous to that freeze. What
we laid out in this agreement was a flat prohibition on providing to
North Korea the key components the light water reactors were going to
provide them, unless and until they clarified the discrepancy about what
they had done in the past.
What the GAO report correctly points out is that the North Koreans have
still not clarified that discrepancy, and they have not given the IAEA
the access that they need to clarify that discrepancy. We agree with
that. We would like to see North Korea provide now the IAEA with all
the information and access the IAEA needs to clarify this discrepancy.
But because of the nature of this threat and the importance of stopping
its current capability and its potential future capability, we indicated
that the lever we would have to ensure that that happened was the fact
that we would not provide the key components for these new reactors
unless they clarified the discrepancy; and the agreed framework sets
that out.
As a matter of national policy, we would like to see North Korea provide
every piece of information and cooperation the IAEA needs. But pursuant
to the agreed framework, that requirement only kicks in prior to the
provision of these key components for the nuclear reactor. So while it
is correct that the North Koreans are not providing the IAEA all the
access we, as a matter of principle, would like them to have, we've
built in a safeguard in that regard by ensuring that none of the key
components that would allow them to use this reactor will be provided
unless they do so.
In the meantime -- and this is critical -- we believe the IAEA does have
the access to monitor the freeze; and the freeze, in our view, is still
in effect. We have frozen and stopped the North Korean nuclear program
from moving in a direction that would have threatened the world -- and
that that freeze is still being monitored and we believe it is still in
effect. The questions about the history of their reactor, the
discrepancy, have not been resolved. And the GAO report correctly
points out that those questions are still out there.
Third point and then I'll go to additional questions - there have been
suggestions that there are some other secret program out there that the
North Koreans are working on. We do not have evidence of a secret
program above and beyond the program we are now monitoring. Are there
additional things we would like to learn about what North Korea does in
the nuclear field? Absolutely. But the suggestion that they are
secretly building another nuclear program is something that we don't
believe is true.
QUESTION: This report also suggests, though, that the North Koreans may
be trying to destroy evidence that in fact would clarify its past
history. Are you concerned that the North Koreans are actively moving
to destroy evidence that would answer that question of what their past
program capability was?
MR. RUBIN: The briefing that I received on the report and the
preliminary look I had referred to things that they are not letting the
IAEA do in this area, but not that - first of all, we're always
concerned that North Korea will take steps in this area. But so far as
I know, they have not taken such steps, and suggestions that they have
are not consistent with the information I've been provided.
It is still an open question whether the North Koreans will clarify this
discrepancy, and it has always been an open question. That's why we
built in the safeguard of not providing the key components for the new
light water reactors until they do so. But what I'm suggesting to you
is that because the North Koreans have not provided the IAEA all the
information and cooperation and access that we would like them to
provide in the area of the history and the discrepancy does not mean
they are in violation of the agreed framework. The agreed framework was
a very practical, real-world step to protect the world against a North
Korean nuclear program. We worked on it very hard; it was elaborately
negotiated, carefully crafted and has been working successfully. We
intend to fulfill our share of the bargain by providing the necessary
heavy fuel oil and other aspects of the agreement, and we fully expect
the North Koreans to live up to their share.
QUESTION: Jamie, to what do you attribute the reason for them doing
this report now? I mean, it seems a bit like GAO doing a report on
Israel-Palestinian negotiations and saying they haven't made peace yet.
Why do you think they chose to do this now?
MR. RUBIN: Assigning motivations to congressional investigators is
probably not a growth industry for a spokesman.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Would you say it's possible there's a political motivation
behind this report?
MR. RUBIN: There's no secret that there are those who've never liked
this agreement, who've thought somehow magically we could have done
better; that we could have gotten the North Koreans to go further. I
think the generally accepted view of those who have been in the business
of trying to negotiate with the North Koreans and those who live in the
real world was that it was a major accomplishment. There have been
critics of the agreement -- that's no secret - and critics will continue
to try to see their position vindicated.
But it's our view that this was an important accomplishment that
protected the national security of our troops in South Korea, our South
Korean allies and the United States; and we are working to try to ensure
that this agreement is carried out. We certainly hope that critics who
would have liked to have seen a better agreement do not place at risk
the national security of our troops and the United States by withholding
the necessary funds for us to pursue this agreement.
QI'm sorry, just one more quick one. Do you think that might be the
financial aspect of the oil and so forth - might be the agenda behind
it?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'm not going to divine the agenda of critics; other
than I'm happy to discuss their criticisms on the merits and, as you
know, I occasionally try to rebuff them.
QJust to clarify something - the North Koreans are not in violation of
the agreed framework, but is it fair to say that the implementation of
parts of the agreed framework are stalled because they have not provided
this information, and therefore, the US has not done the next step?
MR. RUBIN: Well, that is several years down the line. Right now, as I
understand it, we're several years away from the actual building and
construction of the light water reactors - the key parts of them. It is
not new that the North Koreans are failing to provide the IAEA the
information access and cooperation the IAEA needs to resolve this
discrepancy.
But what I'm saying is that pursuant to the agreement, the big benefit
they're going to get - the light water reactors will not accrue if they
don't provide that cooperation, information and access. That is our
built-in safeguard, and it is certainly not news that the North Koreans,
for many years now, have been unwilling to give the IAEA the information
and access that it needs.
QUESTION: Is there a time frame built into the agreement for them to
provide that information?
MR. RUBIN: I'll get you a copy of it, but it is prior to the provision
by the KEDO - the Korean Energy Development Organization. I've been
criticized secretly for using acronyms so I'm going to try to spell them
out in the future - KEDO - the Korean Energy Development Organization -
what?
QUESTION: Peninsula.
MR. RUBIN: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization - this
could be a dangerous precedent to try to spell out acronyms, but I'll do
the best I can and I hope you correct me and I correct myself.
(Laughter.)
But the idea is that prior to the provision of the key components, they
have to have resolved this discrepancy to the satisfaction of the IAEA.
QUESTION: Jamie, you keep using the word discrepancy. Are you
referring to a specific discreet amount of nuclear fuel that's missing?
MR. RUBIN: A discrepancy between the amount that the North Koreans
declared they had as a result of previous activity and the amount that
evidence suggests that they really had, and there is a significant
discrepancy -- the specific nature of which I'm not in a position to
state publicly.
QUESTION: The discrepancy, again, isn't the worry that there was enough
of this for them to have either in the future built a bomb or even now
build an atomic weapon?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we did not minimize this danger. What we did was
build in a process by which we might achieve an answer to the question;
and once we answer the question, we'll obviously want to take steps to
resolve any concern that results from the answer to the question.
So we were fully cognizant of the danger that accompanied this
discrepancy, and it is a significant danger of a nuclear capability.
I'm not in a position to get into the exact amount that different
estimates are, but it's enough for us to be very, very concerned; and
that's why we are making clear - we made clear in the agreement to the
North Koreans that they would not get those key components in the
absence of clarifying that discrepancy.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - said yesterday that the North Koreans had begun
maintenance work. I wanted to know when that actually happened and how
you guys are interpreting that. Are you concerned about that or what?
MR. RUBIN: The North Koreans have several times in recent weeks made
suggestions that they would react if they didn't think we were
fulfilling our part of the bargain, and we want to make clear that we
are going to work with Congress to provide the necessary funds and to
work with other countries to provide the necessary funds to allow the
heavy fuel oil to be sent to North Korea. We are stepping up our
efforts internationally to try to get other countries to assist us; but
we're also stepping up our efforts with Congress to try to get that
heavy fuel oil.
With respect to maintenance issues, maintenance is a term of art that
only becomes important if it interferes with the information that the
IAEA would want to get. I am not prepared to describe, because it's the
job of the IAEA, precisely what maintenance has been done. But again,
there's a difference between maintenance and maintenance that interferes
with the implementation of the agreement.
QDo you know when this happened?
MR. RUBIN: That would be up to the IAEA to detail.
QThere's one Japanese wire report this morning that says North Korea's
Foreign Minister has sent warning - (inaudible) - says if US doesn't
meet - (inaudible) - requirement, they will resume the program within a
month. Can you confirm this later--
MR. RUBIN: There is correspondence that regularly goes back and forth
between us and the North Koreans. I don't make a practice of detailing
each correspondence. But let me say that the substance, as described by
you is precisely what I just said - that we're aware of public
statements by the North Koreans that if they believe that we are not
providing the necessary fuel oil, that they will not pursue the
agreement.
What I am saying to you is that we have been and will continue to meet
our share of our responsibilities, and we expect the North Koreans to do
so.
QBut you're not confirming the letter that --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to get into a practice of confirming every
document that goes back and forth between the United States and North
Korea.
QI believe that letter also describes a deadline of, I believe - the
letter is dated, I believe, June 19, and it says that a month from that
time if the US continues to have delays in heavy fuel oil shipment that
their nuclear program will restart.
MR. RUBIN: As you probably just heard, I'm not prepared to confirm the
existence of diplomatic correspondence between us and the North Koreans.
I am prepared to discuss the substance. What I'm saying to you is that
any suggestion that we have not fulfilled our share of our
responsibilities in the area of heavy fuel oil is incorrect - that we
have done so. As I indicated to you last week, we received an
additional $5 million from Congress to allow for a delivery this month.
We are seeking additional funds upwards of $10 million from Congress to
provide further heavy fuel oil. We're going to fulfill our part of the
bargain, and the North Koreans, we expect to fulfill theirs.
QAny response to that ultimatum, though?
MR. RUBIN: I'm really trying to be as helpful as I can, and I'm not in
a position to talk about the context of a diplomatic exchange.
QIs that shipment on schedule - the additional one for this month that
you referred to last week?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QMr. Rubin, the South Korean Defense Minister, Mr. Tong-Chin Kim, last
week said very clearly that the KEDO agreement would not fail; that
there would be sufficient fuel oil, et cetera. Have the South Koreans
said anything about helping boost the economies of this fuel supply
thing, where about 40 percent of the fuel oil has been delivered and
there's only about maybe 25 percent of the time remaining to do it? I
mean, it seems there's quite a large gap there in regularity.
MR. RUBIN: And the question is?
QWell, the question is, have the South Koreans given any assurance to
the US Government that they'll step in here with money or whatever;
because they seem confident it's not going to fail.
MR. RUBIN: Well, we are also confident that it's not going to fail. We
share the judgment of the South Koreans, that it's too important to
fail. This agreement is too important to the security of South Korea
and the world to fail. That is the point I've been making here. We are
going to work in a stepped-up effort with other countries, and in a
stepped-up effort with Congress to make sure that we provide the
necessary funds. There is sufficient time remaining in the year to
provide the necessary fuel oil. It's a question of whether the North
Koreans are going to look for excuses to not live up to their share of
the responsibility or whether they want to see this agreed framework
continue. We believe the agreed framework is in our interest, it's in
their interest and it's very much in the interest of the world.
QUESTION: But aren't these oil shipments behind schedule, and don't the
North Koreans have a legitimate concern that they might not get what's
coming to them?
MR. RUBIN: I've indicated to you that we expect to be able to provide
the necessary fuel oil to allow this agreement to be implemented. It
is, in our view, up to the North Koreans to decide whether they're
looking for excuses to scuttle the agreement or whether they want the
agreement to continue. We've built safeguards into this agreement in
case they make that decision, but it is our view that is should be
continued.
QUESTION: On the same subject, you said that an additional $5 million
is going to allocated to provide heavy fuel oil later this month. And
then you also said later that an additional $10 million is going to be -
is it something like --
MR. RUBIN: What I said was that we are going to be working with
Congress for additional funding -- which is what I said last week -
beyond $5 million, and that additional funding will be upwards of $10
million.
QUESTION: The chairman of the Indian atomic energy --
MR. RUBIN: Anybody on the same subject?
QUESTION: Not the same subject, but the same area -
QUESTION: The chairman of the Indian atomic --
MR. RUBIN: You've used that one, let's go over there.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Thanks. Secretary Albright - she's met with Japanese Foreign
Minister Obuchi a few times now. Could you characterize their working
relationship; and what do you know about him?
MR. RUBIN: I'd rather not get myself in the middle of a Japanese
domestic decision as to who the next Prime Minister would be. But I can
tell you that Secretary Albright had a very good working relationship
with Foreign Minister Obuchi, and they were able to do some important
business together and she enjoyed working with him.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - anything on --
MR. RUBIN: Again, I don't want to insert the United States into the
middle of, obviously, a political exercise going on in Japan.
QUESTION: The chairman of the Indian atomic energy commission says that
the US Government denied him a visa to go to a conference in Alabama
this week. Is that so?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. This doctor applied for a visa on June 29 -
Chidambaram -- sorry, Doctor. His passport and application fee were
returned to him on July 9, and he was informed that our current visa
procedures were under review as a result of the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests.
This isn't technically a refusal; we told them it was under review. He
hasn't persisted in his effort. We are reviewing our science and
technology engagement with both countries. This could have an impact on
Indian and Pakistani scientists engaged in nuclear and missile
development programs. A part of that review includes the visa
application process for such individuals. It is not - let me emphasize
- not an across the board restriction on scientists from either country.
QUESTION: Well is it across the board for nuclear scientists?
MR. RUBIN: We are engaged in a review across the board of our science
and technology engagement, and it could have an impact, that review, on
India and Pakistani scientists engaged in nuclear and missile
development programs. Because of that review and the specification I
just gave you, his visa request and application fee were returned to him
on July 9.
QWhat was he going to be doing that was --
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is he was attending a conference.
Q(Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: At a university that I will provide you the name of after
the briefing.
QI mean, was it specifically nuclear-related or missile-related or
something like that? I mean, presumably it was.
MR. RUBIN: It's my understanding that it was a technical scientific
conference.
QThe vice chairman of the Association of Crystallographers.
MR. RUBIN: He's the head of India's atomic energy commission.
QRight, and he's vice chairman of this crystallography conference.
MR. RUBIN: Right, but because of the broad-based review that's ongoing
and because of his position as the head of India's atomic energy
commission, we told him that his application would have to be reviewed,
and he didn't persist.
QDo you have any idea how long this review is going to take?
MR. RUBIN: As long as it takes to do it right.
QJamie, are you aware of others being denied visas for this conference?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any further information on that. If you have a
specific question, I'll try to get you an answer.
QWere others denied visas for this conference?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think we normally provide broad-based information on
every visa application. If you have a particular person in mind, I'll
try to get you an answer if we can act on it. But let me say that
broadly speaking, we are reviewing scientific exchanges in this area.
So this is not a policy specific to this individual; it's a broad-based
policy.
QJamie, generally speaking, do you have a feel for how involved Indian
and Pakistani scientists have been in these types of exchanges over the
years, where they would have had access to American nuclear or missile
technology or discussions thereof? Was it a fairly open --
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't presume that because a scientist comes to the
United States that they are gaining access to technology or know-how
about how to build nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, which was
implied in your question. On the contrary, what we try to do is to
prevent that kind of thing from happening, and try to make sure that
those people who are seeking information, know-how or technology are not
receiving it here in the United States.
But as part of a broad-based sanctions policy, with respect to India and
Pakistan, that includes denial or opposition to loans in the IMF, it is
appropriate for us to put restrictions in this area, and we are looking
at what those restrictions ought to be.
QTheir program has been going on for decades, and I'm just wondering
whether that program might have benefited in the past, before you guys
were here, from those types of exchanges.
MR. RUBIN: The key ingredient in nuclear proliferation is the fissile
material -- material that has been enriched to a point that it can
create a nuclear chain reaction. That is not normally something that
you can obtain from a scientific exchange or a discussion of that kind.
It requires equipment, technology that you have to obtain from around
the world. So if the suggestion implicit in your question is that
somehow these exchanges are the cause of India becoming a nuclear power,
we would reject that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - contributed --
MR. RUBIN: I've told you what we regard to be the critical component,
and that is fissile material; and to create fissile material you need
very specific technology and very specific capabilities that you can't
obtain by going to a conference in the United States.
QUESTION: Now that Russia is getting this huge new loan from the IMF,
do you think the United States might be able to make a stronger argument
or be more compelling in trying to get Russia not to deliver those
weapons to Cyprus?
MR. RUBIN: That's an interesting linkage. Let me say this -- we
believe that the success of reform in Russia is an extremely important
thing for the future of Europe and the future of the security of the
world; that Russia is a large power holding nuclear weapons, and that it
has played an important role in Europe and in the world and it will
continue to do so.
Russian reform, if it succeeds fully in the democracy and economic area,
will help Russia play an important part in an international community
that we are trying to help construct. It is those reasons that
generated our decision to try to be of assistance to Russia. And we
believe that is so important that we are moving forward, with our
partners through the IMF and the World Bank and other mechanisms, to
try to assist Russian reform and assist avoid the country from
collapsing. A collapsing Russian economy would pose grave risks to the
national security of the United States. It is those reasons that led us
to make our facilities and assistance available in this regard. To try
to link every issue where we and the Russians disagree to this package
is simply unrealistic.
We have many areas of disagreement with Russia on foreign policy, and
the one that you mentioned is not the only one. What I am suggesting to
you is that we will, of course, be pushing very hard on the Russian
Government to stop the cooperation with Iran that we have been so
concerned about. As you know, today the Russian Government announced an
investigation into several companies that we have been concerned about.
We welcome that investigation, and we want to see the Russians get to
the bottom of the companies that we believe have been of assistance to
Iran in its pursuit of medium-range missiles.
We have raised at the highest levels -- the President has raised it,
Secretary Albright has raised it - our concerns across the board. There
has been progress. They have put into place catch-all legislation.
Some of the specific cases that we have been concerned about have been
resolved to our satisfaction. But there remain a significant number of
Russian entities - I believe the number is nine - that they have
announced an investigation of. We, on our part, are going to be
ensuring that those companies don't benefit from any US program. They
are going to be investigating their activities.
So we are working with the Russians on an issue like Iran, where we have
big differences. We are working with the Russians on tactical
differences we have on subjects like Kosovo and sometimes on Iraq. In
addition, we have tried to convince the government in Cyprus not to
purchase the S-300 missiles.
But to suggest that we need to start down the path of linking every
disagreement we have with the Russians to the important efforts we're
making to prevent a collapse of the Russian economy is simply not
realistic in our view.
QWell, I mean, I didn't suggest that you linked every issue. But it
seems to me that having supported this enormous aid package, that the
United States may have a more compelling case to make or be heard more
clearly in Moscow when it raises concerns about issues like the missiles
in Cyprus, which Turkey has said if delivered would cause a war.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm suggesting to you that we have many issues of
concern - Russia, Iran, in the area of missiles - the missiles in
Cyprus, Kosovo, Iraq, other subjects where we either have fundamental
disagreements or tactical disagreement. What I am suggesting to you is
that we fully intend to push our agenda with Russia in our meetings with
the Foreign Minister, in Vice President Gore's meetings with Prime
Minister Kiriyenko and in the President's summit meeting with President
Yeltsin. We will have several important opportunities in the coming
month to push our agenda; and we would expect the Russians to perhaps
hear us a little more clearly in the context of this effort that we've
made on their behalf.
But to suggest that we ought to deny Russia the assistance that we think
it needs to prevent a collapse because of a disagreement like this is
simply not realistic in our view.
Q(Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I think I answered your question.
QJamie, the investigation you say the Russians announced - the nine
entities - those are the ones, correct me if I'm wrong, that are on the
so-called "watch list" that the State Department issued some --
MR. RUBIN: We didn't issue a watch list; that I remember. There was a
discussion of a watch list by some. What I am saying is that the
government commission on export controls is conducting special
investigations on nine entities. I can give you the list of the
entities after the briefing.
These entities are believed to have violated Russian export controls and
attempted to export goods or services which could contribute to weapons
of mass destruction or missiles to deliver them. These investigations
may result in administrative actions. Consistent with this action, and
we're consistent with our own assessment, the United States will suspend
any US Government program or assistance to entities on the list.
What I have suggested to you is that we have many cases of concern in
this area. We have made significant progress both in general terms by
the Russians putting forward this catch-all legislation, and in specific
terms by resolving concerns we had about several companies. There are
additional concerns that we have. These nine entities are on our list
of entities that we have concern about. We are going to, as I
indicated, take action to ensure that no assistance is provided by us to
those companies.
We do not have a master watch list of the kind that was reported several
weeks ago; but we do watch very carefully to make sure that companies or
entities that we have concerns about don't get assistance from US
programs.
QI believe, though, when that spate of stories came out a month ago or
so, that you all had already suspended that type of activity with these
companies. Is that --
MR. RUBIN: I believe the suspension that we take in this area is a
rolling process. I'm not in a position to answer the question of which
of the nine that we're taking this action on now have previously taken
action on. It may be something that's been happening over the last
weeks. We've amalgamated the fact of that and told you that nine have
had their programs curtailed. But I'll have to get someone who monitors
each one of these entities and each one of these programs on a daily and
weekly basis to answer such a difficult and specific question.
QDoes the State Department have any comment on the Coast Guard declaring
a security zone around Florida for Cuban dissidents?
MR. RUBIN: We have put out a statement that addresses this issue in
some detail. But let me say as follows - that this statement was issued
on the 10th of July.
Q(Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Didn't we issue it? Yes. I guess you missed that.
Q(Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Or maybe that day you had a dentist appointment; I don't
know.
QOr an appointment with my wedding counselor --
MR. RUBIN: Whatever the appointment might be. We recognize and support
the right of the participants to engage in peaceful protest against the
Castro regime in international air space off Cuban shores. They do have
the right to engage in peaceful protest.
But we do caution that persons who enter Cuban air space without
authorization from the Cuban Government place themselves and others in
serious danger. The FAA notices reinforcing this warning remain in
effect.
The Cuban Government proved itself willing to take actions in clear
violation of international law and international aviation standards when
they shot down two unarmed planes in February. They have reiterated
publicly that they will continue to use measures they deem necessary to
protect and defend their sovereignty and unauthorized incursion.
In the interest of avoiding unnecessary risks to all concerned, the US
Government has informed the Cuban Government of the planned
commemoration and of US Government actions to help ensure a safe and
lawful event. We expect the Cuban Government to act consistent with law
and to avoid the use of force and to act with the utmost discretion.
We've also spoken, as the FAA has, directly with organizers of the event
and warned them of the potential serious consequences.
We intend to fully enforce existing US laws and regulations pertaining
to the activities of US-registered aircraft that may involve the Cuban
air space. Those orders remain in effect. These were intended to
discourage US-registered aircraft from unauthorized entry.
The point of all this is that we recognize people's right to protest.
We want to act not only to ensure the safety of our citizens, but to try
to prevent the kind of tragedy that occurred when Cuba so blatantly
violated international law by shooting down two unarmed planes. We try
to balance the need for protecting the security of our citizens with the
important right to engage in peaceful protest.
QUESTION: But that's reminiscent of previous statements on
commemorative events - (inaudible) - shoot-down of the two planes. And
I can recall the same kind of statement being made. Why is the - you
may not want to answer this because it's another agency of the US
Government - but what prompts the Coast Guard, if I may ask, to take its
steps now?
MR. RUBIN: The security zone was established in March 1996, following
the tragic shoot down of two US civilian aircraft. This zone is
intended to protect the lives of innocent people, as I indicated, by
authorizing the Coast Guard to ensure that vessels and their passengers
do not intend to place themselves at risk.
When there is a reasonable basis, the Coast Guard is permitted to
receive assurances from the master of vessels leaving the security zone
that they do not intend to enter Cuban waters. The security zone, which
previously covered Southern Florida, is now being expanded north to just
below the Florida panhandle. This is being done to ensure that vessels
do not intend to circumvent the previous regulations, and it is not
being done to block legitimate protests against the Cuban Government.
QUESTION: What's the date on that?
MR. RUBIN: I just - that's today.
QUESTION: That's the news - that's the question he was asking about.
QUESTION: Jamie, is the FAA also --
MR. RUBIN: Isn't it really up for you to determine the news, not me.
It's up to us to present the policy and then you make the judgment about
what's new.
QUESTION: Is the FAA also involved in this zone of security? Have you
all coordinated?
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated in the statement, the zone at sea is
monitored by the Coast Guard. I am sure the Coast Guard does its best
to stay in contact with other agencies. These are about vessels that
are operating, and the FAA is about aircraft.
QUESTION: I understand that. But I am asking you if the zone of
security also extends to the aircraft that will be flying and could go
into Cuban air space?
MR. RUBIN: I will have to get an answer for the record as to whether
there's been a change in the practices of the FAA. As I understand the
practices of the FAA, it is to ensure that pilots set their flight plans
in a certain way that they don't enter Cuban air space, and that pilots
who have made a practice of violating their set flight plans have their
licenses taken away. But I don't see the connection between that and a
sea zone for vessels trying to engage in peaceful protest; but perhaps
we can discuss this after the briefing.
QUESTION: Has there been an increase in the number of illegals coming
into Southern Florida from Cuba lately?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of anything that's come across my desk
indicating that.
QUESTION: On the same subject, do you have anything on the resumption
of the direct flights that started today?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The first direct flight today is based on the measures
that President Clinton announced on March 20 to build on the recent
visit by the Pope to Cuba. We are supporting increased contact with the
Cuban people, and that is part of our effort to promote a peaceful
transition to democracy in Cuba. This first regularly schedule direct
passenger flight departed this morning. The Cuban Government gave one
of the carriers of this flight permission to conduct direct flights.
There obviously were some discussions with the Office of Foreign Assets
Control at the Treasury Department, which arranges for these licenses
and different companies are putting forward proposals.
But this is part of the President's policy to increase contact with the
Cuban people, give a greater opportunity for the Cuban people to create
efforts to move towards a democratic transition in Cuba.
QUESTION: It was originally billed as an opportunity to increase
humanitarian cargo. It seems to me --
MR. RUBIN: No, not the passenger flights. There were humanitarian
cargo flights, then there were passenger flights. There are
humanitarian reasons to allow people to go, but it's part of a general
policy of trying to create a greater space for the Cuban people to
operate outside of Castro's control.
QUESTION: Is there a Radio Free Belarus, and is the US paying any part
of it?
MR. RUBIN: There is an RFE issue that you'll have to raise with RFE,
and I'm sure you'll know where to go. This is about the Polish --
QUESTION: There's a newspaper report out of Poland that Belarus'
Government is complaining that a radio - the EU and the United States
are supporting a Radio Free Belarus that's beginning to broadcast.
MR. RUBIN: We support Radio Free Europe's efforts to continue its
broadcasts in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond. The specific
decisions that are made as to where to broadcast and what to say are
made by an entity that we don't control, as you well know. You should
know better than most, if I might say.
QUESTION: Does the State Department agree with the Pentagon's effort
apparently to threaten some of the allies in Europe that if it didn't go
along with on the world court language, that the United States may alter
its troop presence in --
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, there has been some misunderstanding
about whether Secretary Cohen actually said that; and his spokesman made
very clear that he didn't say that.
QUESTION: Well, I don't think the issue is whether he said it, but
there are apparently written talking points.
MR. RUBIN: Right, but I think that the fact that he didn't say it means
that it doesn't reflect the position of the US Government, and that
somebody may have written some sentence that wasn't used. And I can
assure that happens every day - they write sentences for me all the time
that I throw out and that doesn't constitute American policy, the
thrown-out sentences.
But with respect to our view on the International Criminal Court, let's
bear in mind that we do want to create a successful and effective
International Criminal Court. We are, however, a global power; we have
forces deployed around the world. As a global power - a permanent
member of the Security Council - we have special responsibilities that
many other governments don't have. We take those responsibilities very
seriously, and we try to make sure that any proposals that are put
forward with respect to this court don't impinge on those
responsibilities; and if they do, they would obviously effect those
responsibilities.
But to suggest that if we don't like one particular sentence in a
document that we're going to threaten to remove all our troops from
Europe is not something that Secretary Cohen said nor as I understand
it, is the position of the any branch of the government. But we will
work very hard to make sure that whatever provisions are made for an
international court comply with and comport with our special global
responsibilities, and we will not support a court that doesn't.
QUESTION: The statement that you read about the extension of the
security areas - it's from today, but --
MR. RUBIN: They just told me that my statement wasn't about the
extension of the security zone, but something I said after was. But in
any event --
QUESTION: The one that you read about the extension of the security
zone - this is from today?
MR. RUBIN: That was the Q & A, not the statement.
QUESTION: But, did it go into effect today or is it going to go into
effect at a later date - it's already extended?
MR. RUBIN: I believe it's already in effect, because the Coast Guard
announced it apparently, according to reliable sources, yesterday.
QUESTION: About Kosovo - there was a panel of Defense Department
experts this morning briefing on the subject. They said that since -
and I would ask you to - how does this sound to you - since Milosevic
went to Moscow and talked to Mr. Yeltsin, there hasn't been the kind of
Serb offensive that was so indeed so offensive and so damaging. In
other words, the Serbs have been laying off somewhat. The NATO people,
when asked - not NATO, excuse me - the military people, when asked what
the solution to this problem would possibly be, they said they have not
a solution. Does the State Department have a better idea; because they
were looking for better ideas today?
MR. RUBIN: I received a report of that briefing and it was ever so
slightly different than the one that you just provided me.
QUESTION: It was?
MR. RUBIN: Just ever so slightly. I think I indicated to you about a
week ago that it is correct that there has been some modification in
Serb activity, and that the kind of massive crackdown that we saw has
not recurred, but there continues to be fighting that we're concerned
about; that the issue is complicated - that on the one hand, as I've
indicated to you, it is clear that President Milosevic is still
President Milosevic and he is still pursuing policies that are
reprehensible and ill advised, the way he did in Bosnia; but that the
situation between Bosnia and Kosovo is not the same -- that Bosnia was a
country that was recognized by the international community, that it had
leaders who were capable of exerting influence over its citizens, and
one could therefore pursue a policy with that difference.
The Kosovar Albanian situation is different. The people there have
every right to be very, very angry at the Serb authorities who have
stripped them of their legitimate rights. We support their legitimate
rights and we want to see fundamental changes in the way the Yugoslavia
is made up so that the fundamental rights and the legitimate rights of
the people of Kosovo can be improved.
But that does not mean that military planning for a military action is
easy. As I understand it, DOD officials were simply pointing out the
complexity of military planning. But that planning continues; it's on
an accelerated basis; and no options have been ruled out.
QJust to make sure we hit all the buttons on the Middle East peace
talks, is there any new information on --
MR. RUBIN: I have nothing new for you today.
QAnd is Dennis Ross still --
MR. RUBIN: He's still here, yes.
(The briefing concluded at 2:45 P.M.)
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