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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #85, 98-07-14

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


332

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Tuesday, July 14, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

BELARUS
1-4		U.S. Response to Violations of International Law
2,3,4		--Travel Restrictions on Belarusian Officials
2-3		--Suspension of Programs
3		Status of US-Belarus Relations

NARCOTICS 4-5,13-14 US View of Netherlands Anti-Narcotics Efforts

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 5-6 Israeli-Palestinian Upcoming Meeting/Level of Meeting 6-8 Reported Israeli Acceptance of US View on Changing PLO Charter 8-9 Status of US Diplomatic Efforts/Secretary's Contact with Parties

COLOMBIA 9 President-Elect Pastrana's Efforts to Set Up Peace Talks 9 US-Colombia Bilateral Relationship

ECUADOR 10 Elections in Ecuador

CHINA 10 Senator Lott's Remarks re Transfer of Sensitive U.S. Technology to China 11-12 Alleged US Technology Used in China's Missile Systems

RUSSIA 12 Political Stability in Russia

INDIA 12 Reported US Barring of Indian Scientists from US

INDIA/PAKISTAN 12-13 Pakistan Proposal for Bilateral Test Ban Treaty

CUBA 14 Next Steps in Helms-Burton


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #85

TUESDAY, JULY 14, 1998 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today is Tuesday; that would make yesterday Monday.

QUESTION: And tomorrow Wednesday.

MR. RUBIN: Precisely.

Over the past several weeks, the regime in Belarus has orchestrated a campaign that challenges one of the basic principles of diplomatic relations. By its actions, Belarus has denied the legal right of nations to conduct their diplomatic business without interference or intimidation from host governments.

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which Belarus subscribes to, embassy, chanceries and residences of ambassadors are protected by the principle of inviolability. They cannot be entered by host governments without permission, and they must be protected by host governments. These norms of behavior are essential to the conduct of normal diplomatic business. They are not privileges to be doled out by a host government, but rather basic legal rights that must be protected in a world based on international law.

Three weeks ago, Belarus took the unprecedented action of forcing ambassadors of the United States and a dozen other countries to leave Minsk. The Lukashenko regime did this through a crude campaign of harassment, carried out under the guise of conducting urgent repairs to utilities in the neighborhoods where the ambassadors resided. In reality, the repairs could have been conducted in an orderly fashion without disrupting the activities of the diplomats residing there, had that been the issue; but it was not the issue.

What the Lukashenko regime really wanted was to evict the diplomats and restrict their diplomatic freedoms and activities in Belarus, effectively impairing their ability to monitor the steady slide of Belarus away from democracy and respect for fundamental human rights.

The United States and the other countries represented in Minsk have attempted to resolve these matters in a reasonable fashion. The Lukashenko regime seems intent on exacerbating the problem, and again today, President Lukashenko made excuses instead of addressing the fundamental problem.

Last week, Belarus took the further step of tearing down fences and, in effect, seizing control of our ambassador's residence. Belarus has refused the right of the governments involved to post their own guards and to protect their compounds. This new violation was tantamount to forcible seizure of a diplomatic compound. Such behavior cannot be tolerated.

Over the past week, the United States and the nations of the European Union communicated with each other and privately to the Lukashenko regime that failure to restore the security of the residence would force us to respond. The European Union is imposing travel restrictions on most senior Belarusian Government officials; visas will be denied to those officials or their replacements.

The United States fully endorses the restrictions that the European Union is imposing, and will likewise restrict the travel of Belarusian officials to the United States. Each travel request, except those to international organizations in the United States, will be examined with the presumption of denial. We will be suspending the small number of programs in which officials of the Belarusian Government participate. These include exchange programs, certain assistance activities and the remaining low level military-to-military programs.

It is not our intent or desire to see Belarus isolated from the rest of the international community. By its own actions, the Lukashenko regime has isolated Belarus. We again call upon Belarus to respect its international obligations, to respect foreign missions, as well as the fundamental human rights of its citizens, and rejoin the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations.

QUESTION: What about the folks here - I came in a couple of minutes late, but did you speak of the diplomats they have here already, the embassy - is there any -

MR. RUBIN: We are not taking steps in that regard, to my knowledge. What we are now doing is creating a list which includes Lukashenko, all the leaders of the presidential administration, all ministers, certain deputy ministers, the head of the KGB and their equivalents in other agencies. All of these officials will be covered by the presumption of denial policy.

In addition, we are proceeding from presumption of denial for all requests for travel to the United States by Belarusian Government officials except, as I indicated, for travel to international organizations.

QUESTION: So they'll be at the UN?

MR. RUBIN: Assuming if they wanted to show up; if they want to participate in the international community, which they have not signaled they want to. We have also suspended programs that, although relatively small, did involve a selective engagement policy -- including a DOD joint contact team program designed to foster cooperation and openness between the US and former Warsaw Pact countries; educational and exchange programs involving government officials attending higher institutions of education and English language programs; and US bilateral financial assistance for Belarusian participation and Partnership for Peace activities under the Warsaw initiative program.

QUESTION: Let me ask you just one quick one about - maybe it sort of sounds like fishing, but is there any Russian input one way or another on this, given Belarus' affinity and almost nostalgia for being part of Russia, or the Soviet Union with Russia? Has Russia weighed in one way or another? Has it been positive, negative or not particularly influential in this?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think it's been particularly influential. The Russians have agreed with us on the principle and made those points to the Belarusian authorities; but obviously that has not yielded significant change.

QUESTION: Can you quantify this in any way? Are we talking three dozen officials? Have they made --

MR. RUBIN: I gave you a list that included the president, included the leaders of the presidential administration, all ministers, certain deputy ministers, the head of the KGB. So we're talking about several dozen people here.

QUESTION: Have they made a lot of trips to the United States?

MR. RUBIN: I'd have to get that for the record. But certainly as we saw, President Lukashenko regarded this as a painful sanction; he made that clear today in his comments that I saw in some news agency's account.

QUESTION: Same subject - if what Belarus has done is tantamount to preventing the United States and the European Union from practicing diplomacy, I'm not clear why the United States doesn't do the same thing to the Belarusian diplomats here in this country now. Is that the shoe next to drop?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, as you know, we have told the ambassador that it wouldn't be a good idea for him to come back to the United States; so their ambassador is not now able to function in the United States, and therefore interferes with their ability to conduct bilateral diplomacy. With respect to going further to some break in diplomatic relations, we certainly hope it will not come to that. However, the actions of the Belarusian Government have effectively brought our relationship to a standstill; and they know what they need to do to return to a more normal relationship. Obviously we will be looking at additional options, but I'm not going to speculate as to what they might be.

QUESTION: I think Jim's point probably includes why you're not impinging on their folks here the way American diplomats were clearly curbed there; and, indeed, of the fact that a Belarusian might come here to go to Disneyland in three months. Your retaliation seems somewhat softer than what they did to the US.

MR. RUBIN: I think that's not correct. What they did to the US was deny the American ambassador's residence access. So the ambassador - not all the people who work at the embassy there - they're still there; we have a Chief of Mission there. And we similarly denied, or made clear to them, that it would be a bad idea for their ambassador to come back here. So in that sense, it's precisely analogous.

But more so even than that specific proportionate response, we've now taken another response, which is to effect the ability of the leadership to travel to Europe and to the United States.

I can assure you that they like to be able to travel to Europe and the United States; and so this stings well beyond their ability to impinge on our effective diplomatic operation in Belarus.

QUESTION: Is this being coordinated with the European Union? Are they taking similar steps?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: Jamie, this includes their family members as well?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that this, at this point, includes family members. This is designed to include the specific individuals themselves.

QUESTION: Just for clarification, Jamie, this affects only the ambassador's residence? The mission still, as you said before, is working -- US diplomats are working there?

MR. RUBIN: Correct. Any more on the Belarus situation? No. Any other topics?

QUESTION: I have a question about drug policy. General McCaffrey last week on CNN called the Dutch drug policy an unmitigated disaster. Is that the US point of view of Dutch drug policy?

MR. RUBIN: In the course of a trip to Europe, General McCaffrey will be stopping in the Netherlands to meet with Dutch officials and drug experts. He hopes to learn firsthand about Dutch drug policy.

The United States and the Netherlands have a close working relationship in the fight against drug trafficking and related money laundering in Europe, the Caribbean and Latin America. We highly value this cooperation.

US and Dutch domestic policies concerning some issues do differ. But our close coordination and shared goals overshadow any differences of emphasis we may have. We fully appreciate and respect that each country's circumstances will shape its approach to our common global drug challenge. We clearly do not wish to be perceived as interfering in Dutch domestic policy.

QUESTION: So does it mean that you disagree - that it's not an unmitigated disaster? Was General McCaffrey wrong?

MR. RUBIN: I think what I said was that we do have a close working relationship; that we value this cooperation; that we do have differences on US and Dutch domestic policies concerning some issues. But our close coordination and shared goals overshadow any differences in emphasis we might have.

QUESTION: Can we go back to the Israeli-Palestinian thing? Yesterday --

QUESTION: McCaffrey is going there to discuss these differences or to learn about the Dutch drug policy?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's my understanding that he's not going solely to the Netherlands. It's a general trip in Europe where he will stop in the Netherlands. I'm sure they will discuss both domestic policies of the United States and The Netherlands and the global fight against terrorism - I'm sorry, against drugs.

(Laughter.)

The drug czar has not become the terrorism czar.

QUESTION: This Israeli-Palestinian likely meeting - anything more on it? Is the US hosting it, by any chance? Do you know the location? And while we're at it, have we put to rest or do you need to say something about the Palestinian request that the US lay out its - make public its proposal, which of course, the Administration has been threatening to do if things really ran aground?

MR. RUBIN: On the first question, it is our understanding that a meeting will be held; that the Palestinian Chairman Arafat and his people are in China right now and are expected back Wednesday-Thursday, and that soon after that such a meeting will be arranged.

In short, we believe that there will be a meeting between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the coming days. That is not a meeting that we are hosting; it is a meeting of direct contact that we believe is an important part of our efforts to try to get the two sides to agree on a way to put the peace process back on track.

With respect to any decision we might take, hypothetically, in the future, all I can say is that we are now focusing on the job at hand. The job at hand is to see whether, through these bilateral contacts that I just described, as well as contacts we would have with the Israelis and the Palestinians, whether we can put together the package that puts the peace process back on track. We have not made a decision about what to do if we are unable to do that, if the mediation effort is unable to do that. If we make a decision that we have said we are unable to do it, we will let you know and act accordingly.

QUESTION: Jamie, I know you've described this meeting as a ministerial level between the Palestinians and the Israelis; and they're going to announce it when it's going to occur and Arafat's still in China and what have you. But would you say it's possible that Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat might meet face-to-face during this meeting?

MR. RUBIN: We're not aware - certainly, the discussions that we've had with the two parties does not indicate that the intention is to create a meeting at the leadership level in the coming days. That doesn't mean it can't happen. We take the position that Palestinians and Israelis should meet more rather than less; and so we wouldn't have a problem with that. It's just our understanding that in the current phase, the likelihood is to be a meeting not of the character that you described. But the participation and timing and whereabouts is something that really they ought to discuss for themselves.

QUESTION: On the same subject, and Israeli newspaper is reporting today that the Israeli Government has accepted the American view on changing the PLO charter. Has there been such a notice to the United States that the Israelis have, in fact, accepted that deal?

MR. RUBIN: With the exception of yesterday's discussion about the American position on the charter, I think we've been very assiduous and careful in not getting into detail about the specific elements of the US ideas, including that issue and what positions the two sides may or may not have taken.

We have said that the Palestinians accepted the ideas in principle, but we haven't gone into detail along those lines; and I don't intend to break that precedent, especially in the final phase of this effort, the end game that we've talked about.

QUESTION: Without getting into the details, has the Israeli Government signaled to the US Government any change in its views?

MR. RUBIN: Again, when it comes to the specifics of the further redeployment, the timing, the size, the elements of the anti-terrorist infrastructure we're trying to create, when it comes to the question of the time-out, when it comes to all the details, including the issue that you mentioned, we are keeping those discussions private.

QUESTION: Not meaning to be tedious, but using a phrase "in principle" may not be the best way to address this issue, because the Israeli position is whatever the Palestinians have "in principle" said they would do, they haven't done enough in fact to meet their concerns. So could you just roll back - I realize it's nit-picking, but would you roll back and tell us if the US view is that the Palestinians have not only "in principle" done right on the charter, but in action have done right? You get me, don't you, why I bring it up? Because you use the phrase --

MR. RUBIN: On the charter? Now we're on the charter again?

QUESTION: Yes, because you use the phrase "in principle," and I don't know if you want to let it sit there.

MR. RUBIN: I was talking about the set of ideas.

QUESTION: I know, but you see why I asked you - because it's, to the Israelis, more than a matter of principle; it's a matter of actually doing things to tear it up, nullify it and grind it into the ground. Okay? It's action, not principle they're looking for.

MR. RUBIN: As I said to you yesterday, through the decision in 1996 and the letter provided the beginning of this year, we think the Palestinians have gone a long way towards meeting the problem. If the Israelis have additional ideas, they should address those directly; and I would expect they would if there were a meeting of the kind that I discussed.

But let's bear in mind that we are in a discussion precisely because there is no peace process being implemented, including the additional measures to fight terrorism that we think are necessary and important that will be put in place as a result of agreement of the American ideas.

So one of the reasons, for example, why we think it's so important to have these ideas agreed to is so that additional measures like the across the board anti-terrorist infrastructure can be put in place and that terrorists can be prevented from doing their dirty business. That would happen better if the agreement were reached. Similarly, there are other concerns that both sides have with respect to the further redeployment and other issues that would be implemented if the agreement were reached.

I suggested to you yesterday that included in the array of issues that constitute the American ideas is the question of the PNC and how that issue could be moved down the field considerably more.

QUESTION: Are you saying that the Palestinians can do more and they will do more if Israel agrees to an additional withdrawal and if you agree with that approach?

MR. RUBIN: No, if someone is seeking to suggest that we don't think the Palestinians should be doing 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year fighting terrorism now, that is not our position. Our position is they should be doing that now.

But as a practical matter, both sides have not fulfilled their commitments under Oslo; and that's well-known, and both sides have acknowledged that. So the fact of the matter is that the sooner we get these American ideas agreed to, the sooner that both sides' issues of concern can be addressed through implementation of such an agreement.

QUESTION: When you say both sides have acknowledged, you mean the Palestinians have acknowledged they haven't fulfilled their obligations on countering terrorism?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the Israelis haven't pursued a further redeployment. And the Palestinians, in our view, have not done all they could do to fight terrorism. You'll have to ask them about their views.

QI'm not really arguing with you, honestly. Your statement was, both sides have now acknowledged.

MR. RUBIN: I'm saying the Israelis --

QUESTION: The Palestinians haven't stood up and said, we're not doing as good a job as we should. The US says they're not; the Israelis say they're not, but they haven't --

MR. RUBIN: Both sides have either acknowledged their own doing - have either talked about the other side's failure to implement or talked about their own, and you'll have to get them to describe for you how.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - giving you another shot at --

MR. RUBIN: I certainly wasn't meaning to suggest that the Israelis and Palestinians agree on the extent to which each other are not fulfilling Oslo.

QUESTION: But Jamie, -- (inaudible) - there is an equivalency here between a nation giving up territory it controls and a movement agreeing to do better at stopping terrorist attacks against this nation. I don't see how you can make those two things equivalent?

MR. RUBIN: I think, Sid, that you could probably recount for me the number of times the Secretary of State has said there is no moral equivalence between those two things. So why you're asking me the question, I don't know.

QUESTION: Well, because there is a difference between words and actions, as this discussion started out --

MR. RUBIN: If you'd like to have a debate with me after the briefing, I'd be happy to.

QUESTION: The Secretary has said no matter what the outcome of this US set of ideas, that the United States will remain engaged in the region. How would that work? If it doesn't work out, you'd go back to the drawing board and come up with more?

MR. RUBIN: I'd rather not speculate for you now what we will do if it doesn't work out. We try to as best we can to retain a certain degree of optimism in this business when you're working tirelessly to try to put the two sides together. So rather than speculate for you what won't happen and what we will do if that doesn't succeed, we'd rather focus on working to make it succeed.

QUESTION: Can you say whether those American mediators who, of course, usually don't telegraph where they're going and when they're going - would it be fair to say they're going to take a pause at least for a few days to watch the outcome; or will simultaneously the US pursue its mediation efforts?

MR. RUBIN: During the period when the Palestinians --

QUESTION: -- the meeting period, yes.

MR. RUBIN: My impression is that our able team -

QUESTION: And tired team.

MR. RUBIN: -- and tired team is in daily and regular contact with both sides, and that that would continue through as long as we are continuing this effort.

QUESTION: Has the Secretary spoken to either the Prime Minister or the Chairman in the last couple of days?

MR. RUBIN: No, I don't think so.

QUESTION: Another topic - Colombia. The peace talks - (inaudible) - Germany - that seems that the new President of Colombia, Pastrana, has chosen Germany instead of the United States to participate in the peace talks. That doesn't mean that he doesn't trust the US in terms of the peace negotiations. And also the recent editorial in the Colombian newspaper is saying that Pastrana chose Germany because the United States has all interest in the war against drugs in Colombia.

MR. RUBIN: And so the question is?

QUESTION: What is your position in this Germany participation in the peace process?

MR. RUBIN: We want the Colombian Government to decide how to proceed with making peace with the rebels; that is not up to us to decide how to proceed. We've made very clear we're prepared to be helpful if the Colombian Government wants us to be helpful. So whether they choose to meet in Germany or some other country is not really relevant to what we have said. What we have said is we want to be of assistance if they ask and we want to be helpful if they want us to be, and we will respond to any suggestions they might have of how we can be helpful.

With respect to our relationship with Colombia, I think I made very clear when the new President was elected that we see the opportunity to open a new chapter in our relations with Colombia across the board. It is true that drugs and cooperating in the fight against drugs is an important part of that, but it is certainly by no means the only part.

QUESTION: Has there been any contact with him?

MR. RUBIN: I'd have to check who has - I'd be surprised if our Embassy in Colombia hadn't been in touch with him; I believe they have. But whether there's been contact with the officials in Washington, I'd have to get back to you.

QUESTION: The last one, in this hemisphere, do you have any reaction to the Ecuadorian elections or any comments on that?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say that with respect to the elections in Ecuador, the Department of State extends its warmest congratulations to the Ecuadorian people on the occasion of their presidential election on July 12. We understand that official results will be released on Wednesday, July 15.

QUESTION: Just to see if this is the place for the answer - it may not be and that's fine - probably the White House is the place. Senator Majority Leader Trent Lott in a speech today said Senate investigators have determined that China received sensitive technology and military benefits from US satellite exports. He also went on to call the Administration export controls for satellite wholly inadequate. The democratic leader found some politics in the statement. Can you - is this the place to deal with the substance of that, since State is so actively trying to stem proliferation of dangerous technology?

MR. RUBIN: Certainly we're doing that. On the other hand, as you rightly indicated, we try as best as we can to keep politics outside the briefing room, and the State Department and I will continue to do that. Let me make two points.

Number one, we do believe that being able to have a policy which allows for the launching of American satellites is in the national interest of the United States.

It's in the national interest of the United States for four reasons: because it promotes the competitiveness that we believe is an advantage for the United States -- it's an area of competitive advantage for communications technology. Number two, it promotes openness in China. As we saw with the President's trip, the more communication there is in China and the more technology for communication, the greater the likelihood that the Chinese people will see and have an opportunity to see and hear a wide variety of views. Thirdly, it's part and parcel of our engagement policy; and that is that we want to engage the Chinese across the board to promote improvements in the areas of concern to the United States. And finally, it's an important part of our non- proliferation policy to the extent that allowing these kinds of satellite launches can be used to encourage China to improve its non- proliferation practices - that is, not providing assistance to other countries in the missile and nuclear and chemical and biological areas - that's important to the United States.

With respect to the substance, our view hasn't changed; and that is that we do not believe that this policy has contributed to China's ability to launch ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons; that capability was there before. The experts have testified, from our perspective, of what the various incidents have and haven't done, and that has not been their conclusion.

With respect to the overall question of the investigation and other statements that the Majority Leader said, I think it's best left to the White House to respond. But that is still our view on the policy and on the specific incident.

QUESTION: Jamie, sort of a related matter - there was a story today in one of the local newspapers saying that the satellite program had enabled or had pushed China down the road to deploying multiple warhead ballistic missiles. If you could address that --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, this is not a new issue. I can't, obviously, comment on any alleged intelligence reports that allegedly found itself to an alleged newspaper in an alleged city in an alleged country called the United States. But let me specifically deal with the question, and tell you that the United States has not authorized the providing of China with technology useful in upgrading its ballistic missiles; nor, to my knowledge, is there evidence that the US actually provided China with technology for the delivery of multiple satellites.

The dispenser for iridium satellites was built by the Chinese, using Chinese technology; it was not American technology for dispensing satellites that then could be useful for dispensing warheads on a multiple warhead missile. By definition, because it was Chinese technology that created the satellite dispenser, it reflects Chinese capabilities; and the United States, to my knowledge, has not added to those capabilities.

QUESTION: Can these multiple satellite dispensers also function as multiple warhead --

MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, there are many technical steps that need to go between that. The objectives of a MIRV capability and a satellite dispenser capability are significantly different. The release of a satellite in orbit does not require much accuracy and allows for a wide margin of error. A MIRV capability requires extreme accuracy for re- entry to ensure the warhead hits its target. If it doesn't, it can burn up in the atmosphere. Thus, the standards and requirements for release of satellites into orbit are far, far lower than those necessary for a MIRV capability. That's a technical matter.

As I understand it, in this case, the satellite dispenser that was used in the launch of Motorola iridium satellites was designed, developed and produced by the Chinese, and that Motorola provided only the technical data sufficient to ensure that the satellite would work with the Chinese dispenser system. So these are the technical reasons why we don't believe that the charges by some experts about what the result of all this is not - are just --

QUESTION: And in just sort of a step back in sort of a broader picture, do you or the Administration see a use, a reason for China to have a multiple warhead missile in a time when the rest of the world is kind of going the other way?

MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly, it is our view that we are moving in the direction of disarmament, not escalating the arms competition. And in our efforts with the Russians, we have made great strides in reducing the size and the capabilities in the offensive area of strategic nuclear forces. And to the extent possible, we would like to see all countries in the world moving in the disarmament direction, not in the nuclear arms race direction, as part of not only a reduced risk for each country, as evidenced by the de-targeting agreement that came up in China, but also by the signal it sends to other countries around the world that nuclear weapons are not going to make you safer, nuclear weapons are not going to make your standing in the international community increase. So that is our general view.

QUESTION: There's a very disturbing article in the USA Today headline: "Fraying Economy Feeds Rumors of a Coup in Russia." Mr. Yeltsin took these rumors seriously enough to state - and I quote - "We are strong enough to curb all plans for seizing power and all other extremist plans" - something he said yesterday. Mr. Rubin, is the State Department concerned that there is - I understand the Russian military is quite disenchanted - is there a possibility of some kind of movement again in Moscow?

MR. RUBIN: Moscow is a place where a lot of rumors begin in this area, and we hear rumors all the time in this area. But as far as I know, President Yeltsin is working very closely with his government to try to help the Russian economy come out of the situation it's been in. The IMF has expressed its confidence in the Russian Government's commitment to take the necessary fiscal and structural measures to address Russia's economic difficulties; and obviously, therefore, they believe the government is in a position to act and to have its actions implemented, which means they are stable.

QUESTION: Jamie, another thing - there's a report in the Indian press that the US is keeping Indian scientists, including the head of the Atomic Energy Commission, from entering the country - some sort of - if you'll pardon the expression - fallout from their nuclear explosion. Do you know anything about it?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that particular report.

QUESTION: I don't mean to blind-side you but I just became aware of it.

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that I will get you an answer as soon as we can talk to our visa people.

QUESTION: Pakistan has proposed talks with India on a test ban - bilateral test ban treaty. Does the United States have a view on that?

MR. RUBIN: Our view is very clear - that Pakistan and India should not deploy ballistic missiles and not conduct further testing of nuclear weapons and not weaponize its ballistic missiles or deploy its nuclear weapons. That is our view. We think that that is something that's going to take time to implement and we're working very assiduously on it. Deputy Secretary Talbott will be leaving this weekend for visits with both Pakistani and Indian officials in Pakistan and India to try to advance our objectives in this area.

To the extent they talk to each other and move towards commitments that are demonstrable and verifiable in this area, that would be a help not a hurt.

QUESTION: Would the United States be willing to supply verification technology in such a case?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we would certainly not, as you know, Jim, from the discussions we had at the time, not be willing to supply technology or expertise to lock in in any way the Indians or the Pakistanis as nuclear powers. We are not going to provide that. To the extent we might provide assistance in the confidence-building area, such as helping them to ensure they don't have miscalculations or bad warning about conventional developments on the ground, that's something we're prepared to look at.

As far as if your question is verification technology for a bilateral CTB between the Pakistanis and the Indians, that's beyond my competence.

QUESTION: Going back to the drug issue, it still remains very hard to see for me how these harsh words that have been traded over the last couple of days are just policy differences between allies - domestic policy issues. I mean, General McCaffrey has blasted the Dutch Government's policy on CNN; the Dutch Ambassador wrote an official letter of protest, saying he is confounded and dismayed and astonished by the timing of these remarks. Today, again, General McCaffrey in Sweden makes further remarks criticizing The Netherlands.

I mean, this does not look like the way that allies treat each other's domestic policies and little minor differences in that regard. So I wonder is the United States actually afraid that the Dutch drug policy is in a way having a negative effect on international efforts against drugs, or that the Dutch drug policy is sort of having a negative effect on internal US debate on drugs?

MR. RUBIN: I'm surprised that you think that my answers to the previous set of questions didn't answer your question. We obviously have differences in how we approach drugs and domestic policies; and we, as friends, are also democracies and believe in the ability to have a difference expressed publicly. So the fact that we expressed our difference publicly, I don't think should be exaggerated.

The question is, what is our overall view? And our overall view is that US and Dutch domestic policies concerning some issues may differ, but our coordination and shared goals in the fight against drugs overshadow any differences of emphasis we may have on domestic policies.

QUESTION: But, Jamie, aren't those differences generally conveyed in a different manner than in the way General McCaffrey has chosen to?

MR. RUBIN: I think you seem - and I certainly can understand it - to want to talk a lot about General McCaffrey's comments and why he said what he said; and I've said what the State Department view is. If you have further questions about why General McCaffrey said something in a specific way or might he have said it in a different way, I suggest you get on the horn and call General McCaffrey.

QUESTION: Has there been any contact with the General while he's in Europe?

MR. RUBIN: We're still on General McCaffrey?

QUESTION: Yes. Has there been any contact in the sense that you've asked him to back off for a while?

MR. RUBIN: I certainly wouldn't comment on the internal government deliberations.

QUESTION: Do you have any information when it's going to be announced that the next waiver for Chapter III on Helms-Burton?

MR. RUBIN: I believe the timing is the middle of next week. But what the decision would be --

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: Next month.

(Laughter.)

We'll get you a date.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)


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