U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #79, 98-07-01
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
992
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, July 1, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 Deputy Secretary Talbott's trip to the Baltic States and
Under Secretary Eizenstat's trip to Lithuania
1 U.S. contributions to the Sierra Leonean crisis and
Liberian repatriation programs
PAKISTAN
1-2 Reports of Pakistani nuclear scientist seeking asylum in
the U.S./Nuclear arms testing
ARMS CONTROL
2-3 Brookings Institute report on the cost of nuclear weapons
3-4 U.S. policy on Russian ratification of START II and the
possibility of START III
NATO ENLARGEMENT
4-5 Timing of Polish, Czech and Hungarian entry into NATO
ISRAEL
5 Reports of construction of cruise missiles capable of
carrying nuclear weapons
RUSSIA
5 Update on financial markets
FRY/KOSOVO
5-6,9 Update on U.S. diplomatic efforts/U.S. goals of cease-fire
and political agreement
6 Reported presence of mercenaries in Kosovo
6-7 U.S. contact with both Dr. Rugova and KLA
7-8 Contact Group requirements for a peace agreement /
Pres. Milosevic's compliance
8,10-11 U.S. policy on a UNSC resolution on Kosovo
8-9,11 Update on fighting/Risk of conflict spilling over to
neighboring countries
9 Amb. Holbrooke's travel plans
9-10 Extent of Pres. Milosevic's control within territorial
boundaries/International consequences to internal
conflict in Kosovo
11-12 Accelerated NATO planning
IRAN
12-13 Pres. Khatemi's remarks on Secretary Albright's speech
13 Trial of the mayor of Tehran
13 U.S. policy of dual containment
IRAQ
13-15 Assistant Secretary Indyk's meeting with Iraqi National
Congress leader Chalabi/U.S. program in support of Iraqi
opposition
IRELAND
15 Departure date and status of a replacement for Amb. Kennedy
Smith
ARGENTINA
15-16 Extradition of U.S. citizens to testify in a corruption
case
CYPRUS
16 Extension of UN peace force/Reaction of Turkish- and
Greek-Cypriot communities
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #79
WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) _
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. We have
two statements we'll be posting after the briefing - one regarding Deputy
Secretary Talbott's trip to the Baltic States, as well as Under Secretary
Eizenstat's trip to Vilnius, Lithuania; and a statement laying out U.S.
contributions to assist in the Sierra Leonean crisis and Liberian
repatriation programs. They're quite detailed and extensive, and they will
be put out after the briefing.
With that, let's go to our questioners, Barry Schweid.
QUESTION: This probably is a dry hole because of the usual response to a
question like this; but let me try anyhow. Is there any point in asking you
any questions about the Pakistani defector, or will you say it's an
intelligence matter?
MR. RUBIN: Maybe it's not such a dry hole after all.
QUESTION: Has the U.S. been told that Pakistan was in the midst of
preparing a nuclear strike against India?
MR. RUBIN: We have seen reports of a Pakistani who claims to have worked
in his country's nuclear weapons program, and that he has asked for asylum.
We have no information beyond what has been reported in the media that can
confirm or deny this gentleman's story. We have no comment on his claims
about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
However, we do believe in general that the nuclear tests that took place
have led South Asia in a dangerous direction. We face a new and more
dangerous security environment as a result of those tests. Both Pakistan
and India are less secure, and we want the two countries to work together
to resolve their disputes. We don't comment on specific asylum requests.
I'd have to refer you to the INS.
QUESTION: That would be another question; and you're not commenting on
that. In a general sense, can you say if he's provided any useful
information to the United States about that dangerous nuclear race in South
Asia?
MR. RUBIN: Let me repeat what I said, and maybe that can answer it. We
have no information beyond what is reported in the media that can confirm
or deny his story.
QUESTION: His lawyer is saying he's spoken - it's gone beyond reports in
the media. I mean, there's no doubt that he has had contact and said
various things. But that's it - if you can't generalize what he's told the
U.S. --
MR. RUBIN: We don't have enough at this point to advance the story.
QUESTION: Is anyone at State talking to him?
MR. RUBIN: As far as who might or might not talk to him with respect to
asylum, that would be a question for the INS. With respect to this
gentleman's story and what we think it might mean, we don't have information
to confirm or deny the story at this point.
QUESTION: But my question was, whether anyone in the government would
talk to him beyond the asylum request --
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that when people of this nature come forward with
information that would matter to our national security interests, that we
would want to try to ascertain the veracity and utility of that information.
QUESTION: Technically speaking, Jamie, is it possible for someone to
defect from Pakistan? Is that word applicable in this case?
MR. RUBIN: Well, seeking asylum --
QUESTION: They called it a defector. I didn't know there was any such
thing any more, since the fall of the Soviet Union.
MR. RUBIN: Right. Well, it's a word that helps to improve the headline
creation quotient.
QUESTION: So this is someone --
QUESTION: You can defect from North Korea, for instance.
QUESTION: From North Korea, or from Syria, I suppose. But as far as his
status, as far as the US Government is concerned, he's seeking asylum in
the United States?
MR. RUBIN: What I'm prepared to say on that is that to the extent that we
can talk about individual asylum requests, that would be something the INS
would have to cover.
QUESTION: Here's something that will take both of us way, way back. Have
you, like a lot of reporters, read the first three and the last two pages
of the Brooking's report which --
MR. RUBIN: The nuclear-weapons-are-expensive report?
QUESTION: Stunningly expensive. But besides that, not only are they
expensive, some interesting propositions are raised. The Administration and
past administrations really haven't a great theory what they are doing with
these weapons. And this challenges the notion - or at least leaves it open -
whether having this incredible devastating force through the years - and
expensive, too -- caused the Soviet Union to collapse, which the Reagan-
nauts, of course, said all the time: our might caused the empire to
collapse. Is this the place to address any of these conclusions? Do
you have any responses?
MR. RUBIN: Let me give you some off-the-cuff responses, because we
haven't had a chance to study this report. Number one, the fight to contain
communism and to deter the outbreak of war in Central Europe and to deter
the use of nuclear weapons against the United States necessitated a
deterrent posture that we were correct to create and correct to ensure its
viability and effectiveness.
Clearly, to the extent that one can judge anything, that deterrent posture
worked. There was no conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union that nuclear weapons could have deterred that didn't deter. So to
that extent, that was successful.
Number two, nuclear weapons and the fight against communism was an
extraordinarily expensive proposition. That should not come as a surprise.
Some people may have been surprised by the numbers. I don't think we've had
a chance to assess them and assess their accuracy; but again, I certainly
think we would agree that it was an expensive proposition.
I think as a government we would also argue that it was worth the expense --
that communism was worth deterring through a combined policy of containment
and modernization of nuclear forces. But those days are gone. Now we're in
a different time, and the time we're in is a time of disarmament and a time
of deep cuts in nuclear arms. We're in a time when we're trying to bring to
bear the arms control experience across a whole panoply of activities that
was never part of the arms control process during those days; including,
for example, the fact that we're trying to bring fissile material into the
equation, that we're trying to include the counting of warheads, not just
the counting of missiles and delivery systems.
So as far as the third point, the fact of the matter is that the Soviet
Union collapsed and that communism collapsed in Eastern Europe. I think we
all know that is a very good thing for the peoples of those countries, and
an even better thing for the rest of the world.
I'm sure the historians will be examining for the rest of time what the
precipitous cause was or what the historic cause was. It's a matter for
historians to decide and not for spokesmen to beat their chest about.
QUESTION: One last thing - before the Soviet Union collapsed, in those
heady days when Gorbechev would announce a massive unilateral reduction of
one weapon or another, compelling the Bush Administration - maybe the word
compelling is editorial - to respond with cuts, there were sharp reductions.
Is this Administration now simply in a position of having to wait for
Yeltsin to push the START treaty through, which he can't apparently - he
hasn't so far - to reduce arsenals? Is there any notion that maybe the U.S.
doesn't need 10,000 nuclear weapons these days?
MR. RUBIN: Again, without crossing some tricky thresholds that have not
been crossed, let me say the following. We think the best way to pursue
deep reductions is through a controlled process of treaties, and a
controlled process of verification; that this is the best way to assure the
world and assure the United States - and for that matter, the Russians -
that this is being done in a controlled, organized and stabilizing way. We
are prepared to be as innovative as possible in trying to examine how to
proceed, including, as I said, things like including warheads and
fissile material.
With respect to the size of the cuts, the President of the United States
and the President of Russia have already agreed on some general ranges on
the objectives of START III. But to get down and negotiate that agreement,
both the President of Russia and the President of the United States believe
the necessary prerequisite is ratification of START II. We do not think the
prospects for START II ratification are dead. We think that it would be
better for START II to be ratified sooner rather than later; and we're
certainly not encouraged by the recent events in recent weeks in which it
has been delayed.
But we do believe that, as President Yeltsin continues to put the pressure
on and explain to the members of the Duma that it is hurting Russia for
START II not to be ratified, that logic and wisdom will prevail. It
sometimes takes time for treaties to be ratified. In the meantime, we
continue to have exploratory discussions, as we have had for some time, on
where we go from the point that START II is ratified.
So we want to see deep cuts in nuclear arms. We want to see all the
different capabilities taken into account. And we want to move forward. One
of the prerequisites for moving forward in sort of a traditional negotiating
context is the ratification of START II.
QUESTION: Still on security, the Polish Defense Minister is suggesting
that the dates of admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into
NATO might be advanced and take place before next year's summit. Is there
any truth in that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think there is a ratification process that has to go
on across the board for all the 16 countries. We have done so, and some of
the other countries have done so; but not all have done so. So the actual
incorporation into NATO is a subject that is dependent upon the ratification
by parliaments of the NATO charter amendment, which I don't believe is
complete yet. Am I right about that? We'll check that. There was a
proper nod over there, but I don't believe it's completed yet. That's
the first step.
As far as the timing of accelerating, we've moved this quite far along and
quite quickly, and much quicker than a lot of people thought was possible.
I'm not aware that there's a push to accelerate it even further.
QUESTION: As far as I know, it's always been assumed that subject to
ratification and so forth, that they would be formally admitted at the
Washington Summit; is that still the case?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there have been several ceremonies that constituted the
recognition - the signing, the ratification documents. I believe the
Washington Summit would include a discussion of next steps in the area of
NATO enlargement. Whether that would be the formal moment at which they're
approved, I do not know. But we will get that for the record. And to those
of you who report to the Poles and the Czechs and the Hungarians, my
ignorance on this subject should not be perceived as any change in
American policy.
QUESTION: Can I go back to nuclear weapons or dry holes, as the case may
be? Reports that Israel's new submarines that it's acquiring are nuclear
missile-capable, and that Israel intends to utilize them to that effect.
MR. RUBIN: We have no information to confirm reports that Israel is
building cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
With respect to the overall question of Israel and nuclear weapons, let me
say that we want to see, over time, a weapons of mass destruction-free zone
in the Middle East. But we believe that has to happen in the context of a
comprehensive peace agreement. Other than saying that Israel has said it
will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region, all I can
say is that we want a process to marry the political requirements of a
comprehensive peace with the technical requirements of a weapons of mass
destruction-free zone in the region. We think that those need to go in a
commensurate way.
QUESTION: Mr. Kiriyenko of Russia said today that the Russian economy is
worsening daily. It continues to go down hill or down slope. Can you
comment on his assessment?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any comment on today's market figures and other
market assessments of the Russian economy. All I can say is that we want to
see the necessary reforms take place in Russia, and that, as the President
has said in the past, we'd be prepared to work with the international
financial institutions as necessary to provide assistance, provided the
reform process continues. But I don't have any comment on today's market
developments.
QUESTION: Jamie, can you bring us up to date on Kosovo, and whether or
not there's any change in plans on the diplomatic front in either
Ambassadors Holbrooke, Gelbard or Hill's meetings?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Let me say first, generally, we have been engaged in an
intensive effort, and that effort is going to only intensify in the coming
weeks. This diplomatic full court press is ongoing; and it will be ongoing
for some time.
Ambassador Hill is, I believe, in Tirana today, will be meeting with
relevant officials on it, has been in touch with both sides. Ambassador
Gelbard is expected to leave later this week to go to Bosnia and also,
perhaps, ending up at a Contact Group meeting in Bonn in the middle of next
week and perhaps having other meetings in this area.
With respect to what our goal is, our goal is clear: in the near term we
need a cease-fire, we need a cessation of hostilities. Over the longer term,
we need a political solution to something that we believe can only be
solved politically. This ongoing diplomatic full court press is one that
Ambassador Hill, Ambassador Gelbard and, as appropriate, Ambassador
Holbrooke will be conducting. They're in constant contact with each other.
We are trying, through this diplomatic full court press, to deter and
prevent the outbreak of a more general war that will redown to the
disadvantage of the people living there, as well as harm the interests of
our NATO allies and the United States itself.
QUESTION: Jamie, does the U.S. have any evidence that veterans of the
Bosnian war have shown up in Kosovo, either on the Muslim or the Serb
side?
MR. RUBIN: The last time I checked into this, which was some days ago, we
were aware of entreaties that had been made, where the rogue's gallery of
mercenaries who look for a fight to which they can join would like to join
fights. That doesn't come as a surprise to us. But we have made clear both
to various factions within the Kosovo Albanians what a mistake this
would be; and we have made clear to the world that we think this would
be a mistake. At this point, we do not have any information that these
requests, these entreaties have led to real effects on the ground in
Kosovo.
QUESTION: In that overview which you gave us two minutes ago, it was
devoid of any criticism of Milosevic and the Serbs. Are you viewing
Milosevic and his allies as more or less moral equals with the KLA these
days?
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary. The principal responsibility for the current
situation lies with Belgrade. But we have to be realistic in terms of
getting the job done. We are urging all parties to cease the use of force.
This is not a conflict that we believe can be resolved with the use of
force. The diplomacy is not going to be helped by the use of force.
The central figure that we have expressed our strongest support and
understanding for is Dr. Rugova. We see him as central and indispensable,
and look to him and his team of advisors to speak for the interests of the
Kosovar Albanian people. That is the reason the President of the United
States met with him; that is the reason Secretary of State Albright met
with him.
With respect to the KLA, let's be realistic here. If we're going to get a
cease-fire, we have to be in touch with the people who can control one side
of the equation. If we don't have contact with the Kosovar Liberation Army
and we get Milosevic to do what he should have done long ago - which is to
stop the crackdown - the cease-fire will not be able to sustain.
Similarly, we have to be realistic that there is a large body of opinion in
Kosovar Albanian society; and it is our view that all of those opinions
ought to be part of the negotiating process, which should be led by - and
there's been a lot of misunderstanding in this regard - Dr. Rugova. Nothing
that we have done in the last week changes one wit our view that Dr. Rugova
is the correct interlocutor and that he is the central and indispensable
leader of the Kosovar Albanian side.
As a practical matter, we need to be in touch with those who can make it
possible for a cease-fire to sustain; and that's the reason - and the only
reason - we have been in contact with the Kosovar Liberation Army.
QUESTION: So is it fair to say that - (inaudible) - is Rugova with guys
from KLA and probably from the - (inaudible) - side, meaning someone who is
totally against Rugova's approach, you would have a whole team in Kosovo --
MR. RUBIN: Well, we are in touch with the Kosovar Albanian leadership
about how they should go about organizing themselves. I don't want to
prejudge what decisions they make. What I am trying to say is that in our
discussions with Dr. Rugova, he has welcomed the idea that in order for
cease-fires to sustain themselves, they need to include the acquiescence
and support of the KLA; and that's the principal reason for our discussions
with the KLA.
With respect to what his team should look like, we want it to be as full a
body of opinion as possible. Whether it's a direct or an indirect role for
the KLA is up for the Kosovar Albanians themselves to decide.
QUESTION: Jamie, has there been a change and is there no longer a demand
for a pull-back of Serb security forces and special police units from
Kosovo - because you didn't mention that.
MR. RUBIN: No, I didn't mention everything we think on this subject for
brevity's sake. But let me answer the question the following way. We set
out four conditions in the Contact Group statement. They included
humanitarian access, commitment to negotiate with outsiders present, the
allowance of monitoring missions, and the pull-back of forces that were not
in Kosovo and the cantonment of those that had been there. Those are our
standing requirements for the political conditions that would be necessary
for a successful peace agreement.
With respect to the near-term goal, we are focused on a cease-fire for
obvious reasons. But that doesn't change at all our desire to see President
Milosevic return those forces that were not there to their barracks.
Frankly, those are necessary prerequisites for any change in the sanctions
policies that have been adopted at the various Contact Group foreign
ministers meetings.
All I'm stating is what a real-world, real-time objective is now, which is
a cease-fire leading to a cessation of hostilities. And a cessation of
hostilities would include the kind of change in force structure and force
deployment, including the return to other parts of Serbia and Montenegro
the forces there. So it's not one or the other. We need a cease-fire now.
We need to be in a position to have that cease-fire hold. That is the near-
term objective of our diplomatic full-court press.
As far as the requirements for President Milosevic to shift the responsibility
off his shoulders, we've placed primary blame on his shoulders because he
is responsible for the decision of the government there to use military
force, and those forces are still there. If he wants to change that, he's
got to begin by pulling back those forces. If he wants to change the views
of the international community about sanctions and other matters, that is
still an absolute requirement.
QUESTION: From my understanding, the Contact Group statement which raised
the threat of possible NATO military action listed these things as
simultaneous requirements; that they all had to be done immediately.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Are you now saying that cease-fire first and then pull-back
later, or --
MR. RUBIN: No, we want - look, I mean, I would hesitate to divine - I
know that some are trying to make this point, and it's a mute point. The
simple fact is that we want a cease-fire yesterday, today and tomorrow; we
want a cease-fire. We want President Milosevic to allow each of those
conditions to be met. He has made some progress in the area of the
humanitarian access and some progress in the area of monitoring. That is a
process we're now trying to create -- an international Kosovo monitoring
mission.
He has not made any progress in pulling back those forces, and we want
those forces pulled back. All I am saying is as a practical matter, we
don't expect to see that kind of pull-back in the absence of a cease-fire.
That doesn't mean we wouldn't prefer to see it without a cease-fire. But as
a practical matter that is going to be, in our view, the most likely
sequence. If he wants to change the blame that the international community
has placed on his shoulders, he should take all four of those steps.
So long as he doesn't take all four of those steps, the primary principal
blame for this conflict will rest on his shoulders.
QUESTION: At that point, Jamie, what if Milosevic is not willing to do
this? Do you expect anything different after July 8?
MR. RUBIN: The Contact Group will meet. The NATO military planners
continue to accelerate military planning. We haven't ruled any options out.
We are supportive of a strong resolution in the United Nations, authorizing
the use of force. We believe that UN authorization would be useful;
depending on the circumstances; it may not be necessary. Certainly under
our domestic law, we do not think that we need UN authorization to act. But
we would like to see a strong UN resolution put forward at the appropriate
time, and we would like to see support for it. Beyond that, I'm not
prepared to speculate at this time.
QUESTION: And if I may, last one -- I'm still confused about certain
things. The situation is Kosovo is worsening day by day, but U.S. envoy
Richard Holbrooke defined it as a dangerous but not emergency. What state
of violence you would characterize as a war, or, let's say, emergency?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that question precisely. I know
that there is fighting in Kosovo. Our situation report for today includes
the fact that sporadic fighting continues in various parts of Kosovo.
Embassy Belgrade officials who visited the area around the coal mine
yesterday noted a cessation of fighting and minimal collateral damage
there. So there is fighting and the fighting continues. There is obviously
a conflict. We've called it an internal armed conflict for legal reasons,
previously. Those legal reasons include the fact that the international
tribunal would be in a position to investigate and act appropriately
on those investigations.
Beyond saying that people are dying and machine guns are firing and heavy
weapons are deployed, I don't know how to be more specific.
QUESTION: Point of clarification -- you said that the diplomatic effort
would be intensifying?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: And that Hill will be holding meetings and Gelbard more
meetings, which is basically what they've been doing in the last week. So
how is it intensifying?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I am using the word intensifying advisedly. I spoke to
all of the relevant people this morning, including Ambassador Holbrooke,
Ambassador Gelbard, who had been in touch with Ambassador Hill. We are
trying to intensify this process so that we can achieve the objectives
we've set out.
But we recognize that this isn't a one-mission, one-failure, one-success
operation. This is going to be over many weeks. It's going to take a lot of
time. There's a lot of bad blood, a lot of bad will and a lot of terribly
bad decisions -- most of them by President Milosevic. This will take time,
and we're going to intensify this effort in the coming weeks.
QUESTION: Where is Holbrooke now?
MR. RUBIN: He's in Oslo, I believe, doing the Cyprus meeting.
QUESTION: Has he any plans to do anything directly on Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: I have nothing to announce about future trips for him as of
now.
QUESTION: Does the Administration think that President Milosevic enjoys
sovereignty over his entire nation?
MR. RUBIN: I don't understand the question. I certainly know it's leading
somewhere, so why don't you get to the next one.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: It's really a simple question. Does he rule all - does he enjoy
sovereignty over all of his nation?
MR. RUBIN: I can say the following - we believe that Kosovar Albanian
forces control some 30-plus percentage of the territory in Kosovo.
QUESTION: Right. But legally speaking, is there any reason that President
Milosevic doesn't have the rights of a president over his entire nation?
Those rights include the ability to deploy military force, to make foreign
policy, et cetera, et cetera.
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this, without, again, answering it directly because
you've stated it in a very legal formulation, and, therefore, I would want
to get our legal advisor to give me his advice before I answered it. We do
not believe this is a simple matter of what goes on inside Serbia-
Montenegro. The international community has made clear there are international
consequences for what he is doing there. The 10,000-plus refugees in
Albania, in Macedonia, make that clear. So we don't believe it's a simple
question of what a sovereign may do inside his territory.
Furthermore, the Security Council has imposed an arms embargo on that
territory, and has done so on the logic that there are consequences
internationally for what is going on there. So it is not a simple legal
question. Certainly the international community believes, through that
resolution, that it has a right to make decisions to protect international
peace and security there.
The Contract Group has gone further. With the exception of Russia, the
Contact Group has imposed economic sanctions on President Milosevic for
doing things within the territory of the former Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. So whatever the technical, legal point that you're asking, the
answer to, I will give you shortly. The policy answer is that we believe we
are well within our rights to be acting because of the risks to international
peace and security created by his decision-making.
QUESTION: The precedent it sets for the United States and any countries
that care to join it, absent Security Council authorization, to intervene
in a conflict - a domestic conflict in another country - when the U.S.
feels it's in its national interest to do so, it will do so?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to answer such a general hypothetical question
about when we would use military force. What I can say --
QUESTION: In a domestic dispute?
MR. RUBIN: When we would use military force ever. I don't intend to
answer a hypothetical generality like that because every circumstance
differs.
We do expect to act within a NATO context. We are planning through NATO to
proceed. With respect to a Security Council resolution, what I am pointing
out to you is that, number one, there has been a Security Council
resolution already making clear of the dangers; the Contact Group countries
have made clear that this is a danger to international peace and security;
and NATO's charter talks about the need to act - or the possibility of
acting -- in the context of dangers to Europe. So we are not waking up one
morning and inventing theories to apply to this situation. These are well-
established principles. Some may disagree; but they are not invented for
the convenience of the United States.
QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, Mr. Holbrooke was quoted as saying that, one, there
was the Kijevo -- a particular Kijevo situation in Kosovo was the most
dangerous place in Europe and could lead to a general war. Mr. Holbrooke
also said that they were only a few steps from all-out war in Kosovo. Does
the State Department agree with that particular assessment of that - let's
say -
MR. RUBIN: The danger?
QUESTION: The danger or the seriousness of the --
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this -- Ambassador Holbrooke is there under the
authority of President Clinton and Secretary Albright. His activities have
been directed by President Clinton and Secretary Albright. As far as his
characterization is concerned, it strikes me as about right. If we don't
get a handle on this situation and it does spin out of control, I have said
from this podium - and others have, as well - that there is risk, a serious
risk, of a conflict in Kosovo spilling over into other countries and
creating an even more dangerous instability and conflict in the region.
That is what the word general war presumably means. I haven't asked him for
his definition of general war. But that would strike me as quite reasonable.
Therefore, it's an accurate representation of what could happen if we don't
succeed in stopping the conflict from growing.
As far as what the current situation is in Kosovo today, I have given you
the current situation report.
QUESTION: Jamie, can I just follow then? Mr. Berger said that, NATO - and
I quote - "NATO is ready to intervene." Does that mean some decision has
been made as to an option of intervention?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen Mr. Berger's quote. But let me say that my
understanding of the situation is that NATO is actively and aggressively
and on an accelerated basis, preparing plans for possible decisions by
decision-makers. To my knowledge, the United States Government has not made
such a decision, nor has any other government.
QUESTION: No decision on the contingencies.
MR. RUBIN: But being prepared to act is a very serious matter. NATO
military planners and political leaders don't ask military planners to
engage in military planning, to narrow the options, flesh them out, as
they've been doing in recent days, unless they are very serious. But as far
as a decision having been made, this is planning prior to decision-making.
You cannot make a decision until you've planned for it, prepared for it,
thought through the consequences. That's what responsible governments need
to do before making decisions.
QUESTION: I have a planning question. Does planning just involve
literally planning, meeting, and working things out on paper? Or are there
actually things being done on the ground now to prepare for --
MR. RUBIN: You would have to address that question to the Pentagon.
QUESTION: On Iran. Have you seen President Khatemi's remarks concerning
the Secretary's offer for a road map leading to normal relations.
MR. RUBIN: First of all, I could note that he welcomed the tone; and
certainly that's a good thing. I can also note that we don't expect this
kind of serious speech by Secretary Albright and the follow-up comments by
the President to yield an immediate reaction on the part of the Iranian
Government, including its president. I believe these were comments made in
a press conference in response to questions. I believe they also refer to
the possibility of further reaction by the Iranian Government in the
future.
So we have not regarded any of the statements that have been made in the
days after the Secretary's speech and the President's comments as
definitive reactions to her speech; in much the same way that we did not
react immediately to all of the things that he said. And frankly, the most
formal, comprehensive reaction to what President Khatemi said in January
just came about a month ago. Nevertheless, we are prepared, as the
Secretary said, to pursue parallel steps, to respond as they respond. We
would obviously respond appropriately, and it would depend on what they do
and what they say.
So this process is continuing. Certainly to the extent that President
Khatemi recognized the effort on the Secretary's part to reflect the
realities of Iran and the fact that the Iranian people have spoken in
dramatically overwhelming numbers for change and for openness and for the
rule of law, that's certainly a god thing.
QUESTION: But he specifically mentioned that her words will be evaluated
based on concrete measures and not words.
MR. RUBIN: That's not the quote I read; you have to read these things
real carefully if you want me to give you a hand.
QUESTION: We would evaluate that sincerity in concrete gestures and not
in words - basically, reiterating what conservatives were saying.
MR. RUBIN: The tone of these things is extremely important. I don't want
to get ahead of the tone or the substance. Both governments - us and the
Iranians - are governments - presumably, on their part - let me just speak
for ours - care about policies and care about, in our case, stopping the
support for terrorism and stopping the pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction programs. They have their own concerns, and they can speak to
them.
What we have said is that as a starting point, understanding the motivations
of each side and understanding the significance of statements of each side
can help create a parallel process where steps are taken by one side,
reactions are appropriately taken by the other and we can move down the
road. We believe the Secretary's speech was designed to not only make clear
that we understood what was going on in Iran, but also that in the absence
of direct dialogue, parallel steps were possible. So we'll have to
see.
QUESTION: Jamie, I know you don't usually comment on municipal matters,
but do you have any observations about the trial of the mayor of Tehran?
Are you observing it?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that our analysts are carefully watching that trial.
I don't care to get into who's up or who's down discussion in Tehran, in
terms of moderates and conservatives and clerics and all of that; other
than to say that we as a nation are a nation of laws, and to the extent
that other countries act pursuant to the rule of law, we think it's good
for the world.
QUESTION: Apparently, Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National
Congress, had a meeting yesterday with Martin Indyk here. Do you have any
information on that?
QUESTION: Can we stay on Iran?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, let's stay there and then go back.
QUESTION: With apologies because I was out during the time of the
Secretary's speech, but just for the record, is the U.S. policy of dual
containment still the policy?
MR. RUBIN: We had an extensive discussion on this, and I recommend - I
mean, it went on for many minutes. I don't see any need to replay
that.
QUESTION: I'll spare my colleagues.
MR. RUBIN: I believe it was had with the gentleman who is not sitting
over there, and I will be happy to give you the transcript afterwards. If
you have a further question, we can go back at it tomorrow.
QUESTION: Shall I repeat it?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, Chalabi. I spoke to Martin this morning; he didn't tell
me what exactly happened in the meeting. My guess is they talked about the
program that the United States is going to be preparing, pursuant to
authorization we've received from Congress to better coordinate the
activities of the Iraqi opposition and to create a more effective process
for laying out the evidence for crimes that Saddam Hussein and his cohorts
have committed - crimes against humanity, war crimes. This meeting was part
of the planning that would be going on in pursuit of that program,
as well as a regular contact.
QUESTION: Is this going to be a secret, covert program or something you
can --
MR. RUBIN: I hardly think it would be a secret program when we've been
talking about it rather extensively publicly. As far as whether every
dollar is accounted for in public, that is not often the case. But
certainly, the idea of the program, the idea that we want to better
coordinate the activities of the Iraqi opposition, if it's a secret, is the
worst kept secret in Washington. We do not - this is an overt effort.
QUESTION: Well, once you get the plans together, is it possible to maybe
just lay it out step by step for the press corps?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I doubt we will ever be in a position to lay it out to
your unending curiosity and interest satisfaction. But we could certainly
try to brief you on the basic objectives of the program as far as
possible.
QUESTION: Are there other groups in the Iraqi National Congress that
you'll be meeting on this?
MR. RUBIN: There are many groups who comprise the opposition to Saddam
Hussein; in fact, I would suspect that most Iraqis, if they could speak,
would comprise the opposition to Saddam Hussein. But as far as who would we
be dealing with and how would we best coordinate this effort, that's the
kind of information that I just promised we'd get to you as the program
emerges.
QUESTION: But do you look at the Iraqi National Congress as sort of the
umbrella organization that you're trying to fold everybody into?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that we need the most coordinated effort possible
to hold out to the Iraqi people what the future could hold. That is the
objective of this program. We want the most coordinated effort so that
there is an understanding on the part of the Iraqi people of what a
democratic alternative to Saddam Hussein might look like.
QUESTION: You said at the outset of that answer that you assumed that's
what they talked about --
MR. RUBIN: I will check that.
QUESTION: Could you post something to --
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I can confirm my assumption in a one-sentence statement
posted immediately after the briefing.
QUESTION: Can you tell us where we're at with the selection of a new
ambassador for the Republic of Ireland; and whether you anticipate, when
Jean Kennedy Smith leaves at the end of July as she's supposed to, she's
expected to actually stay on until a new ambassador is in place?
MR. RUBIN: Let me get you some information for the record on that. But as
far as selection of ambassadors, that is most certainly a prerogative of
the President. As far as her current plan and where this general time frame
is, I will try to get back to you on that.
QUESTION: I have something on Argentina. Today the Argentinean congress,
along with the foreign minister there, the justice minister and the
ambassador to the U.S., they're putting together a declaration demanding
greater cooperation from the U.S. on a corruption case involving IBM and
the nation's largest bank over there. The conflict comes from the fact that
an Argentinean judge wants to extradite four IBM executives to testify in
Argentina. The Justice Department is saying that until they're formally
charged, they will not hand them over.
At this point, since the foreign minister, the justice minister - who used
to be the ambassador here in the U.S. - and the ambassador are all involved
on this declaration, does it become a diplomatic issue? I know the two
countries have been working really hard in the last few years to --
MR. RUBIN: There's not a lot I can say on this, and let me tell you what
I can say, given the nature of the subject. First of all, we do have an
extradition treaty with Argentina, and we intend to uphold that treaty and
we intend to act within the boundaries of that treaty and other relevant
law.
Number two, we expect to be receiving a formal extradition request shortly.
As far as how we will handle that extradition request, that is a matter for
the Justice Department to discuss. But we do intend to live up to the
extradition treaty and operate within the boundaries of it.
QUESTION: Extradition is the sole purview of the Secretary of State; is
that correct?
MR. RUBIN: I will get you a -- sole purview sounds like one of those
phrases that -- certainly the Secretary of State is an influential player
and how one defines the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Department with
respect to extradition, I will get you a legal answer to; but it generally
involves the Justice Department, certainly in responding to legal points
that are made by another country and that's quite normal. But as far as a
final act and whether the decision is made to extradite pending a
recommendation from the Justice Department, I'll get one of our legal
beagles to get you even smarter on the law.
QUESTION: It seems as if the Justice Department has been saying that
they're going to comply with the extradition treaty - I think the specific
one is from 1990. But the Argentineans have not been satisfied with the
level of cooperation, which is why they're pushing forward this declaration.
Is there any reaction other than we will cooperate with them?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen the resolution. I think there's an Argentinean
congressional resolution of some kind. And after seeing that, we'll perhaps
be in a better position to react to it.
QUESTION: The UN Security Council yesterday extended the UN peace force's
duty in Cyprus. But, the wording of this decision got a strong reaction
from both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots in the island. It looks like this
kind of attitude is getting wider differences between the two communities.
Do you have any reaction to yesterday's decision?
MR. RUBIN: Between the Turkish Government and the Turkish-Cypriots?
QUESTION: Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots.
MR. RUBIN: We passed the resolution. I know Ambassador Richardson put out
a statement on that; and I will certainly be happy to give you a copy of
that.
We think the best way to improve the relations between the two communities
is for the process of dialogue and hard decisions and tough decisions to be
made by their leaderships. In the absence of that, it's hard to improve the
relationship between the communities.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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