U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #61, 98-05-15
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1141
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, May 15, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1,2,12 Status of Peace Process / Discussions Between PM Netanyahy
& Amb Ross
9-11 Situation in West Bank & Gaza / Use of Violence & Delay in
Process
11-12 Amb Ross Mtg with PM Netanyahu on Sunday
ISRAEL
1-2 Jonathan Pollard's Deportation or Extradition / Clemency
Denied
INDONESIA
2-3,5 Situation Update / US Encourages Dialogue / Security
Situation Deteriorating / AmbRoy's Contacts With Pres
Soeharto & Govto
3,7-9 Ordered Departure of All Dependents of US Employees /
Charter Flights / Travel Warning / US Naval Task Force /
Access to Airport/ /#s AmCits / Evacuation of Other
Nationals
4,5 Political and Economic Crises and Reforms
4-5 US Strategic Interests in Region
6-7 Islamic Fundamentalist Govt Hostile to West / President
Soeharto's Future
ILSA
12,14 No Decision on Sanctions Against Total and Gazprom / Topic
for Economic & EU Summits
14 Israeli Lobby Against A Waiver
RUSSIA
12-13 Actions Taken to Strengthen Export Control Regime
13 Reaction to Pres Yeltsin's Speech re Controls on Technology
Transfers
14 Bombing of Synagogue
IRAN
13 Cultural Exchanges with US / Visas
COLOMBIA
15-16 US Denies Visas to Military / Review of Visa Status
18-19 FARC Denies Kidnapping AmCit New TribesMissionaries
CUBA
15 Sen Helms' Bill on Humanitarian Assistance
CANADA
16 Transshipment of Weapons to Iran
TURKEY / GREECE
16 Pres Demirel's Stmt re Power to Destroy Greece
INDIA
16-17 High-Level Misrepresentations to US
17-18 Declaration as Nuclear State / UNSC Permanent Member /
Definition of Nuclear State
PAKISTAN
17 Talbott Mission & Meetings
NICARAGUA
19 President's Visit to US / Use of Plane Owned by Drug
Traffickers
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #61
FRIDAY, MAY 15, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing here on
Friday afternoon. I have no statements for you, so let's go right to your
difficult questions.
QUESTION: Could you tell us what Dennis Ross and the Prime Minister may
have accomplished today or didn't accomplish today?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Ross met with Prime Minister Netanyahu for, I
believe, roughly an hour. He then followed that up with a couple of hours
of meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu's advisers. It is part of the
serious work that Secretary Albright asked him to conduct. We still believe
there's sufficient reason for serious work to continue, and I would expect
that work to continue this afternoon.
As far as the question of whether we have bridged the gaps, I cannot say
that we have, and I cannot say that we're on the verge of putting the peace
process back on track. What I can say is that we're engaged in a process of
serious work; that serious work is going to continue this afternoon. Based
on that and any additional phone calls that may occur between the Secretary
and Prime Minister Netanyahu, Secretary Albright will be reporting
to the President on the current state of play when she meets with him on
Sunday night.
QUESTION: That will be her first contact with him since yesterday, let's
say?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Okay. There's a sum-up context --
MR. RUBIN: What's happened in the meetings the President asked her to
conduct here in Washington; and where are we; and are we any closer to the
breakthrough that is so desperately needed; and whether there's any point
in continuing the effort.
QUESTION: When did she depart, or has she?
MR. RUBIN: She'll be departing tomorrow at some time.
QUESTION: Indonesia --
QUESTION: I have a related question - 30 seconds, okay; may I? Now that
Israel has admitted its relationship with Pollard, is the US more likely to
have him deported or extradited?
MR. RUBIN: Jonathan Pollard was tried and sentenced according to US law.
The President has denied his application for clemency, taking into account
the recommendations of the Attorney General and the unanimous views of the
law enforcement and national security agencies, including the State
Department.
Any decisions about Pollard's release would be made in accordance with US
law and be based on the advice of the relevant government agencies. This is
a domestic legal issue. Jonathan Pollard was a spy who broke the law, and
was convicted for doing so.
QUESTION: This presidential denial of the petition is not recent, though,
right?
MR. RUBIN: It's come up from time to time, and I'm just saying that he's
denied it.
QUESTION: Again?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any recent petition.
QUESTION: Was the Pollard subject discussed between Secretary Albright
and --
MR. RUBIN: I can't rule out that it came up, but it certainly wasn't the
essence and the bulk of their discussions.
QUESTION: Have there been any requests from the Israelis, perhaps, or
from Mr. Pollard short of his actual release -- for example, a change of
his status or a change of -
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard anything about that.
QUESTION: Back to the peace process again - I'm sorry, you lost me. Is
the Secretary meeting again with the Prime Minister?
MR. RUBIN: No, I said that as a result of any additional phone calls she
might have with him. He is not going to be back in Washington until Sunday;
and she'll be traveling to meet with the President, leaving tomorrow night
or tomorrow late afternoon -- I'm not sure exactly when.
QUESTION: Could we do Indonesia, with particular reference to the
Americans there and what the State Department is asking them to do?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Let me go on a bit, but tell you what we know. I spoke to
Ambassador Roy a few minutes ago. The situation is calm in the sense that
the city was calmer than on previous days. There are reports of scattered
looting and, clearly, some rioting and instability continues in central
Java.
With regard to this calm, however, we regard it as not the end of the
process, but a pause that should be used by Indonesia's political leaders
to seize the moment for dialogue that will deal with this critical
political crisis in Indonesia. We are urging the leaders to seize this
moment of pause, and to act to engage in a dialogue with the citizens of
Indonesia so that this economic and political slide into chaos can be
avoided.
Clearly, the situation on the security side has deteriorated such that
Secretary Albright ordered the departure of all dependents of US employees
of the American Embassy in Jakarta, and the consulate general in Surabaya,
as well as US employees who were in non-emergency positions.
For American citizens unable to depart on commercial flights, the US
Government is arranging for chartered aircraft to fly them from Jakarta to
Singapore and Bangkok. We expect the first two charter flights to depart
from Jakarta early in the morning of Saturday, May 16. These aircraft will
carry both Americans in Indonesia in an official capacity and private US
citizens. Ambassador Roy was unable to estimate how many people would
exactly show up for these charters; people were gathering at his residence
to be moved by bus from his residence to the airport for these charters.
Beyond that, let me say that it's clear that Indonesia is in a serious
political crisis; that the violence that occurred yesterday has not been
seen of that nature since the political crisis of 1965. We're in a serious
situation and we urge the leaders to show maximum restraint in dealing with
street demonstrations, and we urge them to engage in the kind of dialogue
and political reform that would stem this slide.
Furthermore, Ambassador Roy indicates that the President has returned and
has been engaged in meetings during the course of the day. There are a lot
of machinations and rumors going around, but he has no evidence that any
critical, new decisions have been taken.
QUESTION: Are you urging all Americans, or most Americans, in Indonesia
to leave the country?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we issued a travel warning, telling them of the dangers
of being in Indonesia. That warning is being provided to Americans through
the warden system, and we are doing our best to assist those Americans,
since the safety and security of US citizens is Secretary Albright's
highest priority.
QUESTION: Could you post that?
MR. RUBIN: I believe we did. All right, I can get you another copy of it;
I believe we did.
QUESTION: Did Ambassador Roy speak to Soeharto or has he tried to, or met
with him?
MR. RUBIN: I think the indication he gave me is that President Soeharto
has been engaged in internal discussions during the course of the day. I
did not get the impression that he met with him today.
QUESTION: Is there any thought being given by the international community
to rethink how they should approach the economic problems in Indonesia?
Should there be other ways of trying to fix that economy rather than
forcing them to raise prices so much, which seems to have led to some of
this violence?
MR. RUBIN: Right, I would object to your analysis of the situation. It is
our view that the political and economic crises are inextricably linked.
Part of the reason that some of the steps necessary to participate in the
IMF program are unable to be implemented is because of the political crisis,
and the fact that the government has been unable to convince its citizens
to go through the necessary steps that will allow for recovery, as has been
the case in other countries, like South Korea.
So we do not believe that the IMF program is the source of Indonesia's
troubles. We continue to believe that a key component in restoring economic
growth in Indonesia will be a vigorous program of economic reform, as
proposed by the IMF, and political reform shaped through dialogue between
the government and its citizens. In other words, the more the government
engages in political reform, the more it engages in a dialogue with its
citizens, the more this political slide is stemmed, the more likely it will
be for the leadership in Jakarta to be able to convince its citizens of the
necessity of taking these steps.
So contrary to the suggestions of some, we do not believe the source of
Indonesia's trouble is the help that the international community has been
trying to give. And frankly, the assistance we've been trying to give is
designed to meet the needs of the poor. If we were to deny assistance, we
would be basically making the situation far, far worse for the bulk of
Indonesia's citizens.
QUESTION: Jamie, how would you define the US strategic interests in
Indonesia? What exactly are the strategic interests?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Indonesia - we do have strategic interests. Clearly, the
interests the United States have in the region include not only the
minerals and other essential fuels that are available through our
activities in Indonesia by American companies, but more importantly is the
sea lanes that need to remain open in that part of the world. We have vital
strategic interests in Asia, and maintaining the sea lanes in that part of
the world is very important. For any of you who've looked at a globe or a
map, you can see that Indonesia spreads along a whole series of key
sea lanes; and being able to have a relationship with that government
and having that government stabilized in such a way that that can continue
is part of our strategic relationship.
In addition, the economic health of Asia in general is a strategic interest
of the United States. If Asia were to engage in economic collapse, it would
be dangerous for our economic growth. Not only would we lose markets where
our goods are sold, but it would also make goods more expensive for
Americans who buy them from companies and production facilities in that
part of the world.
So we have economic interests, we have classic security interests and then,
of course, we have the humanitarian interest in the people there who
obviously have gone through a great deal of suffering and deserve our
support in trying to pursue a basic, normal life.
QUESTION: Jamie, to follow on the earlier question regarding the IMF, I
mean, the issue is not that the international help had anything to do with
causing the crisis; it was the IMF conditionalities which had to be re-
negotiated three times. I'm beginning to believe that every time Soeharto
got on the phone with President Clinton, the President encouraged him to
follow the program and Soeharto says, I'm doing that - it doesn't work; is
there anything else? And there really was nothing else offered, and as a
result, the whole thing got destabilized. My question is, do you think
any kind of Administration that would replace Soeharto, if this is
now the thinking of the US, would be willing to implement the IMF
conditionalities after they see what happened to a relatively stable
government?
MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously the government wasn't relatively stable, and
that's the problem. There has been a slide; there is a serious political
problem in Indonesia. The relationship between the government and the
governed has broken down. The re-establishment of that relationship is a
necessary condition for the kind of economic reforms to take place with the
support of the people.
What we are saying here is that rather than finding blame with those who
are trying to assist the problem and thinking that there is a magic
economic solution to this problem that the economists and the investment
bankers can figure out in their boardrooms, is to recognize that there is a
political component to this crisis. That means that the politicians have to
get together, develop a new compact with their people so that the necessary
economic reforms that will bring the assistance in will be supported
rather than seen as another example of precisely what the people are
rebelling against.
So we believe political reform and economic reform are inextricably linked;
they go together. That's why Secretary Albright made an important statement
on Tuesday, as the situation was emerging, urging the government to engage
in a process of political reform. It is why President Clinton put out a
statement yesterday from Birmingham, emphasizing and urging the government
to initiate quickly a dialogue on reform. So we are trying to deal with
both the political and the economic and financial sides as best as
we can, while bearing in mind that this is an Indonesian problem that
cannot be necessarily resolved by someone waving their magic wand from
outside.
QUESTION: Can I follow? Do you think Soeharto can still fashion that
compact you just referred to?
MR. RUBIN: Well, all I can say is: That is a decision for Indonesians to
make, and that is what we are hoping this dialogue will spawn, which is a
government that will be in a position to conduct that kind of activity. We
are urging that such a political dialogue take place as soon as possible.
QUESTION: Is there any concern here --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - quotes him as saying - Soeharto, that is - that
he would leave if the people have lost confidence in him. Would the US help
him do that - find a place to go?
MR. RUBIN: It's not up to the United States to pick and choose the
leaders of the world. This is a decision for Indonesians to make.
What I am saying, however, is that it is extremely important for a
political process to begin in earnest so that the confidence can be
restored in the government in Indonesia so that the people can have the
benefits of the international assistance that is inextricably linked to
political reform, as I indicated.
QUESTION: Is there any concern here that an Islamic fundamentalist type
government, hostile to the West, could emerge from this chaos?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly, Indonesia is a large country with a large Muslim
population. But we don't ipso facto assume that a Muslim government is a
government that we need to be concerned about, George.
What we look to is the policies of any government. For now, what we are
saying is we believe there needs to be a dialogue, and I haven't heard
panic on the sixth floor of the kind that your question suggested.
QUESTION: But he didn't say Muslim; he said Muslim fundamentalist.
QUESTION: Muslim fundamentalist, hostile to the West, was my phrasing.
MR. RUBIN: Right, and I think I answered the question both in its general
sense and its specific sense.
QUESTION: So you don't have to worry about a Muslim fundamentalist
government, hostile to the West; or you don't worry about Muslim governments,
necessarily? I think you don't worry about Muslim governments.
MR. RUBIN: We certainly worry about governments that are hostile to the
West, Barry, you can rest assured.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - that some of them are Muslim fundamentalists? You
can't acknowledge that?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not sure that those terms of art help anyone but those who
are trying to make trouble.
QUESTION: Among the machinations and rumors that you spoke of just now is
one that I believe originates on the financial market - that Soeharto has
actually quit or he's quitting. Have you heard anything about that?
MR. RUBIN: Again, Ambassador Roy, I just spoke to an hour ago. He did not
tell me that. He said there were a lot of rumors, a lot of machinations;
but as far as any critical decisions having been taken, he's unaware of
them.
QUESTION: Jamie, going back to the evacuation or possible evacuation of
Americans, there's a US naval task force in the approximate region. Did
Ambassador Roy ask that naval facilities be brought up for a possible
evacuation?
MR. RUBIN: I don't believe so. Let me say this - obviously, we always
have contingency planning for evacuating Americans working for the US
Government and others. I don't think it's very helpful to get into such
contingency planning, but it's always part of the operation of embassies
overseas, especially in situations like this.
For now, the road to the airport is open, the embassy is conducting an
evacuation of non-essential personnel, leaving the essential personnel of
some 50 or so that will remain in Indonesia, and assisting Americans who
are looking for assistance getting out. If commercial flights are not
available, we're going to be working through charter flights.
With regard to any contingency operations, the White House has pointed to
the fact that this task force is there for other reasons; and of course,
the highest priority of the President and the Secretary is the safety of
American citizens. But I will not be drawn into any discussion of
contingency planning.
QUESTION: Are the roads now open?
MR. RUBIN: The road to the airport is largely open.
QUESTION: I've seen counts of up to 10,000 Americans in Indonesia. Is
that what you think?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Roy indicated to me that - he said it is very hard
to get an exact number. Many of the Americans are in outlying areas working
for American oil companies and other companies. But his number was 8,000-to-
9,000.
QUESTION: 4,000 in Jakarta.
MR. RUBIN: In Jakarta, he said it was very hard to give an accurate
number, and the best number he would offer me is several thousand.
QUESTION: The statement was distributed, for those of us who were manning
the news room at 11:00 p.m. last night, it was very useful to --
MR. RUBIN: It was an estimate.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: Good, well --
QUESTION: But the roads were then - the airport was open; the roads were
not open; and Singapore was the destination.
MR. RUBIN: The airport is largely open at this point.
QUESTION: So that just happened.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: On the numbers - again, the estimate last night was 11,000-
something, total. Can we just assume that some have left since that was
compiled?
MR. RUBIN: No. Again, it's always difficult for us to identify how many
Americans are in a country, so there will always be difficulty. The
difference between 8,000-to-9,000 and 11,000 last night is not a result of
2,000 people leaving last night.
QUESTION: Not necessarily overnight, but over a period of days?
MR. RUBIN: I'm giving you the number I got from Ambassador Roy. We do our
best in a quick situation to try to get you a general number and, obviously,
the number is somewhere around 10,000. We would not like to be more
specific than that, given the difficulty of accounting for each and every
American in a country as large and diverse as Indonesia.
Any more on Indonesia? One here and then we'll go to the back.
QUESTION: On the Middle East --
MR. RUBIN: Excuse me, we're on Indonesia.
QUESTION: There appears still to be some aftershocks in the demonstrations
in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem.
MR. RUBIN: We're going to stick with Indonesia with Charlie, yes.
QUESTION: Just to review because I didn't get it going in - the
evacuation of Americans in terms of commercially chartered flights would
start when - Saturday?
MR. RUBIN: It's going to be beginning tomorrow morning, and there are two
flights and there will be more, if necessary.
QUESTION: To Singapore?
MR. RUBIN: To Singapore and, I believe, to Bangkok.
QUESTION: Any requests from foreign nationals - are there --
MR. RUBIN: I believe Canadians will be part of it. We're working closely
with the Canadian Government to help their citizens both participate in our
evacuation, and then there may be some of our Americans working with their
planes if additional planes come through.
QUESTION: You'd be receptive of that, I assume.
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely; we always are. But again, we have to give priority
to Americans.
Back on the Middle East, then we'll go back to -
QUESTION: Back on the demonstrations in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem
- have you been keeping an eye on them? Do you think they are ominous? Do
you think that this --
MR. RUBIN: According to reports that we have received, the situation was
quieter today in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem than yesterday. Minor
incidents were reported at the Temple Mount Wailing Wall. As I said
yesterday, we continue to urge both sides to exercise maximum restraint,
and to do everything possible to de-fuse tensions and maintain calm.
Secretary Albright did speak with both Prime Minister Netanyahu and
Chairman Arafat on this issue, reiterating our strong view that both sides
must exercise restraint. We have made it clear to the Palestinians that
restraint must be exercised both in terms of rhetoric and actions. At the
same time, as I also indicated yesterday, the outbreak of violence reflects
a deterioration in relations between Israelis and Palestinians, and
therefore underscores the need to break the impasse in the negotiations.
Relatedly, for some of you who asked these questions, the reporting we have
from the region suggests there was cooperation between Israeli and
Palestinian security forces, and that efforts were made by Palestinian
security forces to restore and maintain order.
QUESTION: A couple of questions on that. The restraint part - the Israeli
version yesterday, what he asked - Netanyahu asked Albright was to tell the
Palestinians -- tell Arafat -- that these demonstrations aren't helping the
Palestinian cause - aren't helping get their objectives from Israel. I know
you said she urged restraint on both sides, but did she say or is
there a feeling here that the violence is not helpful? You're sort of doing
the reverse, which is not unprecedented. The State Department is seeing the
violence as a reflection of the lack of agreement. I'm asking if the
reverse is true - if the violence is contributing to the lack of agreement.
Evidently, that's not the State Department's view.
MR. RUBIN: Do you have another question?
QUESTION: No, no, that's it, because that was his request - tell her to
tell him that it ain't helping.
MR. RUBIN: We don't ask him to - we don't urge restraint to further the
peace process. We urge restraint to avoid violence and save lives.
We don't think that violence should be used as a lever to promote peace. At
the same time, we're very cognizant of the fact that the failure to make a
breakthrough, which has been so evident in the last two weeks, is a
contributing cause to the disillusionment that has made this violence so
widespread. We're particularly regretful of the Palestinian children that
were killed, the hundreds of Palestinians that were injured and those
additional Palestinians who were killed.
At the same time, without getting into what Secretary Albright said to
Chairman Arafat, our view is as I expressed it - we don't advocate and we
don't support using violence as a lever; but we recognize that disillusionment
is a fact. It's a fact of life that is a result, partially and substantially,
from the failure to have a viable peace process.
QUESTION: Mr. Rubin, if I could follow that, please there were reports
that some Palestinian leaders were urging demonstrators yesterday. Is there
some hint of there being some leverage in the peace process while Mr.
Netanyahu was here by the sacrifice - well, say sacrifice - of those
demonstrators yesterday?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - we have opposed incitement to violence; we
continue to oppose incitement to violence. But there are two other facts
that are relevant: number one, Palestinian security forces did restrain the
demonstrators, and are responsible for the reason why more people didn't
die and more people weren't wounded - that is the Palestinian security
forces. Number two, the nature of the demonstrations and the nature of the
violence is a result, substantially, of the failure to have a viable
peace process.
With regard to any specific incitements to violence, we oppose that and
we've made that clear.
QUESTION: But isn't the timing of that demonstration yesterday evidence
of incitement to violence?
MR. RUBIN: I think if you look at the calendar and you understand what
they were demonstrating about, you'll see that it was more about a 50-year
situation than it was a time for any --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - weren't the demonstrating because Israel was
established 50 years ago?
MR. RUBIN: Right, so it was not timed for --
QUESTION: No, it's just against Israel, period; it isn't against
negotiations. It's anti-Israel demonstrations, but it comes at a time --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to begin to assess the motivations of every
person who went out there. All I'm saying is that the suggestion that
yesterday there was demonstration because yesterday there was a meeting
between Secretary Albright and Prime Minister Netanyahu doesn't hold water
to me.
QUESTION: Unfortunately, I have to prolong it a little bit, because this
is the opportunity -- I'll try to keep it brief - to check off a couple of
things that were said publicly in the last few days and see if the State
Department has a reaction to it. Netanyahu said that Arafat is violating
Oslo by declaring that he will establish a state. Netanyahu himself,
yesterday, last night said he would not permit a state and he would not
permit the re-division of Jerusalem. Do any of those things, in the
US view, conflict with the concept of the final status talks being
the place to deal with such things.
MR. RUBIN: Our position hasn't changed on that - and that is --
QUESTION: Now that they don't say these things.
MR. RUBIN: We'd rather to have both sides make sure that none of the
things they say or none of the things they do prejudge final status issue;
that's our view.
QUESTION: Jamie, you just finished saying that the recent outbreak of
violence, while you understood it, it was coming out of disillusionment.
You also just said that the Palestinians shouldn't use violence as a lever
or leverage in the peace process.
MR. RUBIN: You've accurately quoted me.
QUESTION: Oh, I got it right for a change. Would it also be true that
Israel, on the same token, on the flip side of the coin, Israel shouldn't
use delay as a leverage? Is that a fair analogy?
MR. RUBIN: We want to see the negotiations proceed as rapidly as
possible. Time is running out for the peace process, and we want to make
progress as soon as we can. Serious work is going on, and that serious work
will continue.
QUESTION: How about delay - let me try another question. How about, would
you say delaying by either party is also bad and seen as using --
MR. RUBIN: We're not in a procedural problem; we're in a substantive
problem.
QUESTION: Is Dennis going to meet with Netanyahu on Sunday?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't rule that out. I mean, he meets with him a
lot.
QUESTION: But you're not aware of a meeting planned, that is set?
MR. RUBIN: Not a particular time and location having been previously -
but I would be surprised if there wasn't.
QUESTION: With reference to the talks, in the last couple days you used
some variation of a formulation that we have no reason to believe, but
we're working very hard that we will overcome --
MR. RUBIN: We have yet to overcome the differences, but serious work is
continuing. We're ever hopeful, but given the history, it's hard to be
optimistic.
QUESTION: Can I ask you something on something in today's Washington
Post? Do you have anything new on the sanctions against Total and Gazprom?
And is a waiver in the works?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that often newspapers, many newspapers, are
premature in their declarations of decision-making. Not only has the
Secretary not made a decision on the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, she has not
even received a recommendation which will have a box that she could check.
So any suggestion that it's all but checked box is factually and substantively
inaccurate.
I can say that this is a topic that we would expect to be discussed at the
meetings in Birmingham and the meetings in London. We have been working
intensively with other nations -- particularly with Russia and our European
allies - over the past month to carry out the fundamental objectives of the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. That is to strengthen the international efforts
to constrain Iran's ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction and
support terrorism. That is the purpose of the law. We are working closely
with the governments there in that regard, and we are hopeful that we
can get more and more agreement with other countries of the world
to take stiffer and stiffer measures to prevent that.
For example, in the case of Russia, which you might be interested in,
Russia has taken a number of actions to strengthen its export control
regime. On January 22, the Russian Government issued an executive order,
strengthening Russia's export control system, giving the Russian Government
broad authority to stop transfers of dual-use goods and services to foreign
missile programs.
For those who are still rolling their eyes, today Russia took another step
and published regulations for implementing the catch-all authority. These
regulations established supervisory bodies in all enterprises dealing with
missile or nuclear technologies to ensure compliance with relevant
regulations and executive orders. This is the meat and potatoes of
nonproliferation and arms control.
These procedures describe exporting enterprises must follow to insure
proper controls and outlines -- so-called "red flags" -- which could
indicate a proposed purchase is not legitimate. It is also important note
that President Yeltsin and other high-level officials have emphasized in
the strongest terms the Russian commitment to strict controls on sensitive
technologies. I won't go beyond saying that these are useful and positive
steps, but we will continue to work with the Russian authorities to assure
full implementation of these steps.
QUESTION: I'm sorry; I got so much that I'm almost embarrassed to ask for
another comment. But do you have anything on President Yeltsin's recent
speech to the foreign office?
MR. RUBIN: President Yeltsin delivered a foreign policy speech May 12 at
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And we welcome President Yeltsin's
call for tough, uncompromising controls on the transfer of technologies
related to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well
as his urging the immediate ratification of the START II Treaty.
The United States and Russia have a constructive partnership, which is
based on mutually shared interests.
QUESTION: The Los Angeles Times story on the subject didn't say a
decision has been taken, but saw the Administration moving in that
direction - to look the other way on the gas fields project for those three
countries, including Russia. Also, Senator Brownback had very much that
impression after testimony by Martin Indyk --
MR. RUBIN: No, it said that he had heard rumors. That's what the article
said; I read it very carefully.
QUESTION: All right.
(Laughter.)
There's another part - it's more than rumors. The story suggests that you
want to signal - and if you want dispute that, that's okay - but you want
to signal Iran that you're interested in these overtures of a relationship,
and this is one of the areas where there might be a signal sent. Another
one they raised is changing the visa procedures for Iranians so that they
can come here for longer stretches of time - a year long, perhaps. Is that
under consideration?
MR. RUBIN: My crack team did not provide me an answer to the question on
the visas, which was in the last sentence, and I remember reading it. But
let me say this --
QUESTION: Is that your crack team?
MR. RUBIN: Whoever they may be. Let me say this - that we have been
working on trying to facilitate cultural exchanges between our two
countries, and we have been working on visa adjustments in that regard.
What specific adjustments and whether the specific dates and timelines
discussed in that article are being considered, I can't answer for you, but
in general, working.
However, on your first point, I do not think the decision-making, with
regard to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, is being used to signal anything to
anybody. We are pursuing the law; we are going to implement the law. The
purpose of the law is to try to garner increased international support for
steps to prevent weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism
heading in that direction. That will be the basis of our judgment and the
basis of the effectiveness of imposing sanctions, not signaling.
QUESTION: The article also suggests what the writer calls "the Israeli
lobby." There's lobbying against any such waiver. Does the Administration
have to take Israel's views into account in deciding this?
MR. RUBIN: We pursue America's national interests, and that's what we do
on the Middle East peace process; and we will do that on every country in
the world. Others may have views and we will welcome the interest they show
in an issue, and we'll always listen; but we will decide based on what's in
America's interest.
QUESTION: I don't know who the lobby is. But while we're on Russia, does
the State Department or the Embassy there have any information what group
or whatever bombed the Moscow synagogue? The First Fascists say they did;
then they say they didn't do it. It's not a country where people regularly
telephone the AP and say they set off a bomb.
MR. RUBIN: Right, the United States deplores in the strongest terms the
bomb attack that occurred at the synagogue in Moscow. Several people were
injured and the building was damaged. The attack was particularly repugnant
because children were in the temple for a holiday celebration and had just
departed. This is the third attack in recent years on this synagogue. We
urge the Russian authorities to move swiftly to bring the perpetrators
of this crime to justice. Such acts of violence underscore the importance
of the national leadership in Russia condemning all expressions of anti-
Semitism and intolerance.
Ambassador Collins has been in contact with the synagogue, and is planning
to visit the site today. But I don't have any information on who is
responsible.
QUESTION: The fact that the Secretary has not received a recommendation
on sanctions yet - on what to do about sanctions, does that make it
difficult for a decision to be announced in London on Monday?
MR. RUBIN: All I can say is that we're working on this issue very
intensively. I would expect a decision very soon. But as far as the
newspaper accounts of it -- essentially that a memo is on her desk, and
it's just a matter of her checking the box - that's not correct.
QUESTION: On Colombia, there's a news report that the Government of the
United States denied or cancelled the visa of some Colombian generals. Can
you tell us what exactly is the situation?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, after the briefing.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: On Cuba, Senator Helms introduced yesterday a bill trying to
give some humanitarian aid to the Cuban people. Do you think that idea of
Senator Helms' could be helpful to restoring democracy in Cuba?
MR. RUBIN: To what democracy? Restrained?
QUESTION: Restoring.
MR. RUBIN: Restore, okay. Let me say this - we have just seen the bill
announced by Senator Helms.
I just got an urgent fax with regard to the visa revocations, which was not
urgently provided. Is it true that a number of Colombian military officers
have had their visas revoked? This is not true. Press reports stating that
the visas of numerous Colombian officers have been revoked are not correct.
But we do try to avoid commenting on specific visa cases because of privacy
concerns.
With respect to your question on Cuba --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: On that?
QUESTION: On Colombia, yes.
MR. RUBIN: Can I finish answering his question and then come back to
you?
QUESTION: Sure, sure.
MR. RUBIN: We have just seen the bill announced by Senator Helms, and
will be reviewing its provisions over the next days. We will work on a
bipartisan basis with the Congress on finding ways to increase support for
the Cuban people by facilitating the transfer of food and humanitarian
assistance.
We're going to pursue these discussions with Congress, and pending these
discussions reaching a riper phase, we are not going to comment on any
specific provisions while these discussions are ongoing, and therefore we
have no official position on Senator Helms' legislation.
QUESTION: Is the US Department reviewing the visa status of any Colombian
military man at this point?
MR. RUBIN: As a general rule, we try to avoid commenting -- especially in
a general way on a general point like that -- on specific visa cases
because of privacy concerns.
QUESTION: There was a report in The New York Times today that American-
made weapons are being shipped to Iran through Canada. Do you have any
position on that; and are you consulting with the Canadian officials on
it?
MR. RUBIN: The State Department has been working diligently with law
enforcement agencies to shut down diversion networks with significant
success. One example of this is the recent indictment by a US federal grand
jury of two Iranian nationals residing in Canada, who are charged with
conspiring to divert parts of the Hawk surface-to-air missile system. The
international traffic in arms regulations under which US defense trade is
regulated provides an exemption from licensing certain defense exports
for Canada. This exemption reflects the largely open borders that
exist between the two countries for trade purposes.
US and Canadian authorities are cooperating to prevent the misuse of this
exemption to divert items to third countries, and the Department is
considering options that would narrow this international traffic in arms
regulations exemption so as to better support the law enforcement efforts
already undertaken.
With regard to any specific cases, I, of course, would have to refer you to
the Department of Justice.
QUESTION: Mr. Rubin, how do you respond on Turkish President Suleyman
Demirel's statement in the World College of Constantinople that Turkey has
the power to destroy Greece and Turkey itself will decide when it will show
its power, provided a good choice is made at the time. If Turkey is faced
with - (inaudible) - accomplishment in the issue of the islands in the
Aegean, these will create annoyance for us. There is a phrase by -
(inaudible) - that war is a crime unless there is a vital need.
MR. RUBIN: I think I would prefer to wait to have our Greek-Turkish
scholars examine that document and give me a considered response for the
record.
QUESTION: Let me lump India and Pakistan into a nuclear competition. The
question, part one, is India has claimed that its lower-level officials did
not know that the five nuclear tests were coming; and there have been
accusations that they have been deceitful towards the United States. Could
you address that issue, number one? And secondly, tell us what, if any,
progress Mr. Talbott and General Zinni have made?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The question of what India told us or didn't tell us, I
think I dealt with rather clearly yesterday; but I'll be happy to repeat it
for you. On more than a dozen occasions, high-level representations were
made to the United States that restraint would continue, that a lengthy
review would take place. Therefore, we regard those representations as
misrepresentations, in light of the decisions that were taken by the
government of India to conduct nuclear explosions.
As I indicated yesterday, we feel seriously misled; and it is very hard to
conduct diplomacy with another country when high-level officials have
misled you so severely and so seriously. Whether that means they didn't
know or they did know and now they're saying they didn't know, we have no
way of knowing. What we know is that we have to be able to rely on the
representations of senior Indian officials in order to conduct diplomacy
with them. That's why this is so troubling.
With respect to the trip of Deputy Secretary Talbott, I just spoke to the
delegation. They have completed a full set of meetings. They spent an hour
with Prime Minister Sharif. They met with the chief of staff of the army;
they met with the Foreign Minister and other officials from the Foreign
Ministry. They were able to consult with the leaders. They will report to
President Clinton in Birmingham.
The discussions were good. As far as we can tell, the Pakistani Government
is analyzing the situation in determining what its next steps will be. We
did not receive assurances one way or the other with regard to their
testing plans. But they are analyzing very carefully the international
reaction. We did discuss various issues with them that all I can say about
is that we made very, very clear to them the seriously negative consequences
that would ensue from testing; and the fact that they would be far, far
better off if they chose the diplomatic road, the high road, the road
of the rest of the world, and didn't go forward with testing.
Deputy Secretary Talbott is going to be reporting to the President. He
spoke to Secretary Albright earlier today. At that point, we will know
more. But let me say this - that we believe that testing is a live
possibility. We're very aware of the political pressures that exist in
Pakistan, but we hope that as a result of this mission, that the government
there analyzes the situation and concludes that not going forward with the
testing program will redown to the advantage of Pakistan and testing will
not.
QUESTION: Jamie, this morning India's Prime Minister initially said we
have a big bomb. Later, apparently, another statement was released from the
Prime Minister's office saying they have the capacity for a big bomb, but
not necessarily the big bomb itself. It seems like a big mistake, in terms
of words. What's the State Department's take on that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, with regard to India's apparent declaration of itself as
a nuclear weapons state, we regard this action as another deplorable step
that further escalates an already unfortunate situation. We hope India
refrains from taking any further steps to further isolate itself from the
international community.
According to international law, a nuclear weapons state, by definition,
must have detonated a nuclear device before 1968. So at this point, what I
can say is I'm not going to be in a position to make an analysis of what
kind of nuclear capability India has. Clearly, explosions took place;
clearly they were nuclear explosions; and clearly, India is paying a very,
very heavy price for doing so.
QUESTION: You're saying they can't classify as a nuclear state --
MR. RUBIN: According to the NPT --
QUESTION: No, no, I hear you, but you know what they're saying about the
Test Ban Treaty and all - that they would come in as a nuclear state.
You're saying that's precluded, or is it still unclear?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I mean, it would require an amendment to the 1968
Nonproliferation Treaty, which would be quite an enterprise. But I'm not
suggesting we would even consider it; I'm just simply pointing out the
legal situation.
We do believe that India should join the Comprehensive Test Ban, and should
put on the brakes on its slide towards being outside the mainstream of
countries. But as far as what they're saying about their particular nuclear
capability, it would require me to make an assessment of what they have,
other than saying that this whole situation is astounding to us, having
been misled so seriously by the Indian Government, and how they seem to
care more about narrow political interests and the role of India in
the world. I've heard talk of India becoming a permanent member of the
Security Council; and when apprised of their views in this time frame, I
believe Secretary Albright's comment was that she didn't regard that as
very likely, given the current circumstance. If they think they've helped
themselves move to a status that will permit them to be a permanent member
of the Security Council, they should think again; because Germany and Japan
- two countries that we have supported for permanent membership in the
Security Council - are members in good standing, unlike India, of the
Nonproliferation Treaty.
QUESTION: On Colombia, a different question - it's related to the US
missionaries from the New Tribes mission that were kidnapped in Colombia in
1993. The FARC put out a report on the Internet saying that they had done
all the investigations they could do, and that they certainly think they
never had any contact with them; they're not responsible. Do you have a
response?
MR. RUBIN: We have heard these denials by the FARC before, and we reject
them. We repeat our February 16 appeal to the FARC to return these three
Americans to their families out of a sense of compassion, justice and
simple humanity.
We have no doubt that the FARC perpetrated this heinous crime of kidnapping
these missionaries, as well as many other Americans over the years. This
conclusion is based on credible information which, frankly, we're not in a
position to share publicly.
QUESTION: If I may do a follow-up, why aren't you in a position to share
it?
QUESTION: Because you're the State Department.
MR. RUBIN: Because I'm the State Department.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: This is about Nicaragua. There were a lot of reports that the
President of Nicaragua was using a plane owned by narco-traffickers, or
provided by narco-traffickers. He just spent two days in Washington, and my
question is, was there any discussion with State Department officials with
his government about it?
MR. RUBIN: About the plane?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you an answer for the record on what was
discussed.
QUESTION: Okay, can we suspend?
MR. RUBIN: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)
|
