U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #60, 98-05-14
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
953
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, May 14, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1,3,5 US Deplores the Outbreak of Violence in the West Bank and
Gaza
1-2,5-6 Secretary Albright's Meeting Today with Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu
2-5 Israeli Security Issues
6 Congressional Resolution on US Role in Middle East Peace
Talks
6 Secretary Albright's Discussions/Briefings on the Hill
7 US Assessment of Status of Peace Process
INDIA/PAKISTAN
7 Deputy Secretary Talbott's Mission/Discussions with the
Pakistani Government
8-9 Pakistan's Security Concerns
9-10 Discussions with Indian Regarding Nuclear Program
10-11 Assessment of US Embassy Reporting on Situation
INDONESIA
11-14 Deteriorating Situation/US Ordered Departure for
Non-Essential Personnel
12 Plans Dropped for US Military Delegation to Visit Jakarta
13 Prospects for Situation in Indonesia to be Discussed at G-8
Summit
SERBIA
14-15 Ambassador Holbrooke's Meetings with President Milosevic
and Ibrahim Rugova of Kosovo
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS
15-16 Responsibility for Failure of Talks on Cyprus
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #60
THURSDAY, MAY 14, 1998, 1:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. The air conditioner is a little strong in here, I
would say. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Let me start by saying
that we deplore the outbreak of violence in the West Bank and Gaza today,
which resulted in the deaths of eight Palestinians, apparently including
two children, and involved hundreds of people wounded. We deeply regret the
deaths that have occurred, and extend our sympathies to the families
of those killed and the many who have been wounded.
Clearly, this outbreak reflects a deterioration in relations between
Israelis and Palestinians, and underscores for all to see the need to break
the impasse in the peace negotiations. For the sake of Israelis and
Palestinians alike, it is essential that this process get back on track and
an agreement be reached. In this regard, it is critical that the decisions
required to do so be taken as quickly as possible.
We urge both sides to exercise maximum restraint and do everything possible
to diffuse the situation and to restore calm. With that, let me move to
your questions.
QUESTION: Unless there are questions on the Middle East, I'd like to do
South Asia.
MR. RUBIN: Anything on the Middle East?
QUESTION: Yes, do you have any idea what happened?
QUESTION: Can you give us an update on where you are in the talks?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this -- Secretary Albright is scheduled to meet
Prime Minister Netanyahu at 4:00 p.m. today. Clearly, we have not overcome
the differences - the differences that have prevented the peace process
from being put back on track.
As the Secretary said in her speech, we need a wake-up call; and clearly,
today's violence shows that the clock has chimed loudly in demonstrating
the dangers of not putting the peace process back on track.
With respect to your normal question about optimism and pessimism, let me
simply say that this is a see-saw affair, and with each meeting and each
discussion it's kind of a rollercoaster. But at this point, we have no
knowledge that we will be able to overcome the differences.
QUESTION: Jamie, on a more practical point, what are you going to do to
tell us whether you overcome them or not, after the 4:00 p.m. meeting?
MR. RUBIN: I think it will be easy for us to find a way to communicate if
we overcome it. If we don't, we'll have to figure out a way to do so. But I
think we've tried our best to keep in touch with the American media, and
we'll continue to do so.
QUESTION: Jamie, at the risk of getting into the substance of the talks,
what is your response to what the Prime Minister said this morning about
the absolute need, under any arrangement --whether the 9 percent, the 4
percent, escrow, whatever - to maintain the ability to operate early
warning stations in the West Bank, to guard aquifers in the West Bank, to
make security arrangements around the roads and so forth?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - I'm not going to be in a position to get
into specific security issues as they may reflect upon what the scope of a
further redeployment of Israeli forces would entail. But let's bear in mind
two things: number one, as Secretary Albright indicated in her speech, we
have moved the Palestinians from a very, very high number in the range of
30 percent down to a number that's much closer to what the Israelis
originally thought was possible. So clearly, whatever security effect a
large further redeployment would have had has been mitigated.
That is not to say that we are going to make a determination about Israeli
security; but it is to say that as evidenced by what occurred today in the
West Bank and Gaza, the absence of peace creates insecurity and that needs
to be taken into account in making any judgment about security. But at the
end of the day, that is a judgment for Israel to make, but I have no
comment on any specific need for specific early warning stations.
QUESTION: The Prime Minister turned that argument exactly around. What he
said is that peace does not bring security; security brings peace. And I
would imagine that he would argue that today is a sign that the Palestinians
are not ready to provide the kind of security that he requires.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not going to comment on what you would surmise he
might say. But let me say this -- I think, as the statement I just read
indicated, we believe that the kind of violence that was seen today is a
manifestation of greater and greater disillusionment. As that disillusionment
is compounded by the increasing inability to put the peace process back on
track, that does not improve the security of any of the peoples of the
Middle East. That is our view. And as Secretary Albright said, there is no
security without hard choices in the Middle East and that is part of
the package.
But again, it is up to the Israeli Government to make a decision at the end
of the day on what they think is best. All we can do is, as mediator, as
facilitator, as catalyst, as the creator of ideas, as the compiler of ideas
is try to develop a set of ideas that can put the process back on track..
We have done so and we are hopeful that despite the inability to overcome
the differences, we're ever hopeful that can happen.
QUESTION: Jamie, two things that the Prime Minister said this morning on
the subject that you just started the briefing with - first of all, about
the violence on the West Bank, he said that there was incitement by the
Palestinian authorities. He said it's very simple and easy to whip up a
frenzy of hatred and violence. He blamed what happened today, in part at
least, on the Palestinian authorities. I wonder if you agree with him. And
secondly, you've talked about this being part of - a manifestation of the
increasing disillusionment and the need for speed on decisions. Mr.
Netanyahu said what's important to him is not speed on decisions and
timing is not his main issue; it's the content of the decisions he
cares about and not when they're made.
MR. RUBIN: We've already made clear that the content, we believe, is
balanced, is fair, meets the needs of both sides; so we believe the content
has been dealt with.
QUESTION: And on the question of today's violence and whether or not it
was incited?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly there are statements that have been released out of
the Palestinian side that are unacceptable. We have made clear to both
sides that both sides need to refrain from actions and rhetoric which
inflame tensions and which serve to reduce even further the confidence and
trust needed to move the peace process. But we do not believe that that is
the sole reason for this kind of wide-spread activity.
QUESTION: Jamie, going back to what some comments the Prime Minister said
this morning, he said that Israel initially began with a much lower amount
of land they wanted to give up this go-around, and that they've already
been stretched beyond their limit - they've stretched and stretched and
stretched. He seemed to imply that the US is asking them to stretch to a
place beyond a number that I know you don't want to talk about publicly
that he's not just going to do. He belabored the security and land link.
Why not just - is there ever - are we ever going to get to the point
where the US is just going to accept their position? I mean, he seemed
to be pretty hard and fast about the limits he's reached.
MR. RUBIN: Right, I'm not sure I know how to respond to that question,
other than to say that Secretary Albright has made clear that we have put
together a set of ideas that we believe are as fair as we can make them.
Obviously, discussions include refinements, but the key elements of those
ideas, we believe, are fair. That is our view.
QUESTION: But how do you respond to him saying that Israel has stretched
to the limit - to the point where they're not going stretch any more to
give up any more land?
MR. RUBIN: All I can say is that's not the quote I'm familiar with; I
think that's your characterization of it. All I can tell you is that at
this point, we have not overcome the differences. We are ever hopeful that
we can, but it's hard to be optimistic based on past experience. This is a
see-saw affair, and we're going to continue to go the extra mile and do
what we possibly can to make it possible to put the peace process back on
track.
QUESTION: You think they can stretch themselves a little further on
this?
MR. RUBIN: I think I'm purposefully avoiding using your analogy.
QUESTION: It wasn't my analogy.
QUESTION: Do you actually know what happened in the incidents today - how
you had eight people killed, including two children?
MR. RUBIN: I mean, I have - this is a real-time affair, Roy, and being
able to be more specific than the information that I just had. But clearly,
to the maximum extent possible, we believe the use of lethal force against
demonstrators must be avoided.
QUESTION: Secondly, in his speech this morning, the Prime Minister spoke
about a critical issue being the third redeployment and the amount it
should be, and that would determine very greatly what they do in the second
redeployment. Can you confirm that this is one of the major issues that is
right now on the table; that it's been discussed overnight or --
MR. RUBIN: The question of the third phase of further redeployment has
been part and parcel of the discussions throughout, and still is.
QUESTION: Is it now the critical issue, as he was saying?
MR. RUBIN: All I can say is it's been part and parcel of the discussions
throughout, and still is.
QUESTION: Jamie, does there have to be a third redeployment?
MR. RUBIN: We stand by Secretary Christopher's letter.
QUESTION: Jamie, going back to other things that the Prime Minister said
this morning, he said that Israel insists that the Palestinians convene the
Palestine National Conference, or whatever - the PNC - and formally revoke
a covenant; and that the letter that was handed to Secretary Albright is
not sufficient. Does the United States believe that the letter accomplishes
that?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - at the time that the letter was provided to
President Clinton by Chairman Arafat, we indicated that we thought it was a
step in the right direction. We still believe that letter is a step in the
right direction.
With regard to the question of what comes next, obviously this is an issue
between the Palestinians and the Israelis and we want to see that kind of
concern ameliorated and alleviated; and all I can say is that, obviously,
this is something that comes up. The letter was a step in the right
direction, and with respect to what more needs to be done and when, that is
something that is between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
QUESTION: And another point that he raised when he says Israel insists on
is that the Palestinians cease their "hostile propaganda" against Israel.
And he suggested that a tripartite committee be set up -- Palestinians,
Israelis and Americans -- to review these various manifestations and take
action against them. Does the United States accept that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say that I think I just indicated that both sides
need to refrain from actions and rhetoric which inflame tensions, so that
would certainly include the Palestinians. With respect to the incitement
issue in general, certainly part and parcel of any infrastructure to deter
violence and fight terror would need to include a process by which that
issue could be fully reviewed and explored and improved.
QUESTION: Yes, Jamie. Pardon my ignorance if you have been over this in
the past, but is there something in Netanyahu's proposal that would allow a
certain percentage of land to be given over to the Palestinians and a
certain amount reserved based on performance according to security? Have
you gotten into this and can you tell us about it?
MR. RUBIN: What I can say about that is that, obviously, a key element of
this issue that needs to be resolved is the question of the further
redeployment of Israeli forces. Within that construct, the timing of any
further redeployment is one of the issues that we do not believe is yet
ripe for discussion, and specific ideas that are out there about how to
refine such timing is not something we care to discuss publicly -- just the
way we don't care to discuss the number publicly.
QUESTION: Has the Secretary or has Ambassador Ross spoken or attempted to
speak with Chairman Arafat today regarding the violence?
MR. RUBIN: I would expect that during the course of the day that
Secretary Albright will be in touch with Chairman Arafat to talk about the
tragic events of today and to urge restraint on both sides.
QUESTION: The division of the 13 percent -- the division 9-4 - where is
the land proposed to be parceled?
MR. RUBIN: I think that I can't possibly respond to any of the numbers in
your question other than to say that Secretary Albright made clear that the
decision about what land would be redeployed is for Israel to make. She
made that clear in her speech.
QUESTION: Mr. Netanyahu, in some Israeli reports, is saying that he had
invited Minister Sharon to come with him to Washington to take part in
these talks and that he refused. Are you aware that there had been a
possibility that Sharon might have come?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Yesterday I was asked this question and I'm sure you read
very carefully my answer to it, which is that if I were to comment on every
machination in the Israeli Government, I would find myself quickly drifting
into what is not the proper purview of the State Department spokesman --
that is, commenting on internal issues within the Israeli Government.
QUESTION: But you were not aware of the invitation?
MR. RUBIN: Sorry?
QUESTION: You were not aware that he had asked Sharon to come with him,
to take --
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that.
QUESTION: A resolution was introduced in Congress yesterday, regarding
the US role in the negotiations. Do you feel that Congress is undermining
your position at the negotiating table with the Israelis?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this -- Secretary Albright had a series of
briefings two days ago with the over 50 members of the Senate and dozens of
representatives from the House. At the end of those consultations and
discussions, she felt that the overwhelming majority of the senators,
certainly in that case, were extremely supportive of what she is trying to
do, and believe that she is doing her best in an extremely difficult
situation.
With regard to any potential resolution that presumably would be critical
of what we have been doing so far, I haven't seen the text of it. But I can
say this, and that is that Secretary Albright and President Clinton believe
they are doing their best to promote peace, and they're doing it in the way
they believe is the best way to promote peace. The Constitution is rather
clear when it comes to the conduct of diplomacy, that this falls exclusively
in the purview of the Executive Branch. Secretary Albright and President
Clinton will continue to do what they think is best. And although we might
be interested in the views of members of Congress, we are going to continue
to do what we see as the best way to promote peace.
Secondly, Secretary Albright discussed in her speech a tradition of
bipartisanship when it comes to the security of the United States and the
conduct of these kind of activities, and urged members of Congress to think
about the national interest in deciding how to comment and critique what it
is that we're trying to do.
We believe we're doing it as well as it can be done. This is an excruciatingly
difficult situation. I think the Secretary's speech makes clear the
extraordinary efforts we've gone to and the extraordinary lengths we've
gone to try to come up with creative solutions. It's not up to the United
States to make the final decisions. But clearly the time is rapidly running
out when this phase of US mediation and US putting down ideas can occur;
and it's time for tough decisions.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you think the US will ever exhaust its creative
solutions? You talk about time running out --
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Are you getting close to that point?
MR. RUBIN: I think I just said time was running out. You want me to find
another metaphor.
QUESTION: No, no, time is running out for the parties - I thought that
was what you were referring to.
MR. RUBIN: No, for the role of the US putting down its ideas.
QUESTION: New subject - South Asia. Have you received any assurances from
the Pakistanis that they won't take any action until after the Talbott
mission is completed?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - we are deeply concerned about the possibility
of Pakistan following suit and conducting nuclear weapons explosions. We
are aware of the strong political pressure that now exists in Pakistan to
do that, and we have reason to believe that that is a live possibility.
With regard to the timing of any such activity, I really can't comment;
other than to say that President Clinton made clear to the Prime Minister
of Pakistan the importance of restraint. He has now sent Deputy Secretary
Talbott along with General Zinni and others, to Pakistan. They left last
night; they're expected to arrive in Pakistan tomorrow. The hope is that as
a result of those discussions, the Pakistani Government will see that it
will be in a much better position by not testing, and that it will
be in a much worse position by testing.
Other than saying that we recognize and have reason to believe it is a live
possibility that Pakistan will follow suit, I am not in a position to get
into matters that fall into that I-word that we don't use around here.
QUESTION: Are they stopping anywhere else? That's a long flight.
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure there will be refueling stops. But the sole location -
or rather, the sole destination for their mission is Pakistan.
QUESTION: Is there going - can you talk at all about whether there might
be some incentives offered to the Pakistanis to not do this?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'd rather give the officials an opportunity to have
those discussions directly with Pakistan before discussing them publicly.
But as I just indicated, their hope in what I think is obviously an
extremely difficult mission, but their hope is through their discussions,
to make clear the advantages to Pakistan of not testing - and as the
sanctions decision by the President indicates, the extreme disadvantages of
testing. So that is the hope.
QUESTION: You're not prepared to say whether Talbott and company will try
to find a way around the Pressler Amendment or to find a way to get the F-
16s, which are sitting in Arizona, to the Pakistanis?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I can say they're not going empty-handed; but I don't
want to get into the details of what it is that they are bringing with them
before they've had a chance to discuss it with the Pakistanis.
QUESTION: When you say not going empty-handed, are you saying they're
going with something to allay their security concerns?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly, the mission is well-prepared; but again, it's an
excruciatingly difficult task, given the current political pressures that
exist in Pakistan, to try to combat what that pressure that is a result of
this outrageous decision by the Indian Government to violate international
norms, to put itself outside the mainstream of countries that are trying to
move the world away from proliferation towards this unfathomable decision
that has put South Asia in a much more dangerous situation.
With respect to what they are bringing and the specific issues that you
mentioned, again, I would prefer to let them get there and discuss that
with the Pakistanis before we discuss it publicly.
QUESTION: Leaving aside any specific incentives in the security area, is
there some way the United States can allay their security concerns? Because
they are legitimate concerns, clearly, because of what India has done. In
other words, in other parts of the world, take, for example Israel, we have
supplied even some very hi-tech weapons and developed them with Israel for
protection, and other places we've given security guarantees - our own
security guarantees. What is the thinking in these areas now?
MR. RUBIN: To answer that question properly would be to give the same
answer that I didn't want to give to George, which is to discuss publicly,
in advance of their mission, on a subject of extreme importance to the
security of the world and the security of the Indian Subcontinent, what
precisely they're going to be discussing. And it is too important to risk
any untoward effect from premature public discussion.
QUESTION: Well, you said that your mission was very well prepared. I mean,
I think it was just announced, and then they flew off. How could you have a
very thorough --
MR. RUBIN: If you'd like to get into a quibbling discussion with me,
we'll do it after the briefing.
QUESTION: Jamie, on April 3 of this year, the Pakistani Prime Minister
sent a letter to the President and Secretary Albright warning that,
according to the Pakistanis, they felt that the operationalizing of India's
nuclear program was imminent; and the US ambassador from Pakistan says that
those concerns, he felt, were not taken that seriously. Two weeks later,
Ambassador Richardson and Assistant Secretary of State Inderfurth arrived
in India. Mr. Richardson was full of praise for the restraint of the
new Indian Government; and Mr. Inderfurth said that the centerpiece
of our relationship with India should be economic and commercial concerns.
Were there any mixed messages sent?
MR. RUBIN: No. I think you may not have read my discussion of this
yesterday, but I will be happy to repeat it for you.
I think the serious scholars of this issue -- the people who understand the
Indian Subcontinent well -- believed that engagement with India and
engagement with Pakistan were the best ways to bring home to them the
advantages of not going outside the mainstream in the nuclear area. We did
so, but never did we downgrade the importance that we assigned to restraint
in the nuclear and missile area. We had, in recent weeks and months, 20
very high-level contacts with the Indian Government in which we made clear
the consequences of a failure to have restraint; and frankly, they engaged
in a campaign of duplicity. If that's going to go on, I think it's
all fine and good for the Monday morning quarterbacks to know everything
perfectly, but we did what we could to make clear to them what the dangers
of failure to act with restraint would be, and obviously, we were
mislead.
QUESTION: Jamie, Indonesia for a minute?
QUESTION: No, no, wait - duplicity - that's the first time you've used
that word, isn't it?
MR. RUBIN: You'll have to check the transcript.
QUESTION: No, no, but I mean, that's close to - you've been careful to
say the Indian Government didn't lie about this issue, and that sounds --
MR. RUBIN: Do you want me to repeat my statement?
QUESTION: No, but am I misunderstanding something here? I mean, it sounds
--
MR. RUBIN: I haven't used that word before.
QUESTION: Okay, we'll leave it at duplicity.
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I'm sorry - you wanted to move back to Indonesia for
minute. Any more on India, Pakistan?
QUESTION: Yes, one more. It was a fact that the BJP, when they came into
power, they didn't hide at all what they wanted to do and I'm sure - could
you just tell us a little bit about the actual discussions that Richardson
or Ambassador Pickering might have had on this particular issue; because in
one sense it maybe came as a surprise, but in another sense it was
also --
MR. RUBIN: Well, all I can say is that following this election in the
month of April and prior to that, although we had heard these kind of
things publicly - and, as some members of Congress point out, we can read --
we did directly address these questions with the Indian Government. The
reaction we got was that they would continue their policy of restraint, and
that they were engaged in a several-month review.
Therefore, when the nuclear explosive devices were set off in recent days,
they were acting inconsistent with high-level representations made to the
United States Government. And although we always understood that this was a
possibility, as a result of reading as well as other factors, that does not
mean that if there is a serious misleading of our highest level officials
that we are in a position to read the minds of other people.
QUESTION: Are you aware of any provocative actions vis-a-vis Pakistan's
nuclear program that Pakistan might have engaged in during the very month
of April?
MR. RUBIN: There was a missile test, but with regard to the nuclear
program, I'm not aware of that; and frankly, I've seen the government of
India's explanations for this testing and they just simply don't hold
water. The situation has not deteriorated. They raise the question of China
and they raise the question of Pakistan; but frankly, the recent months
have seen a time when security was not decreased substantially for the
Indian Government. Clearly, the desire to do this was for political reasons
because we do not believe that they have improved their security by
potentially setting off a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
QUESTION: Jamie, when you accuse them of duplicity and misleading top US
officials, it implies that you really have evidence you can document. That
statement is a very strong statement. Could you provide the documentation
to us, or more details of exactly what was said?
MR. RUBIN: Within the realm of what is normally provided publicly; I'd be
happy to describe meetings. But beyond that, I'm not a position to do
that.
QUESTION: Well, it's just that if they're lying or deliberately
misleading, then it certainly makes your case all the stronger to back it
up with facts.
MR. RUBIN: Again, I will endeavor to provide what information I can, but
I am drawing conclusions based on conversations with the players who were
misled from my discussions with them. That includes the top officials of
our government. I'm telling you that we feel misled.
QUESTION: Secondly, was there - do you think that the embassy in Delhi
reported with sufficient depth and breadth the --
MR. RUBIN: You know, this happened two days ago. When we have time to do
a full-fledged review of all of the cables and all of the information we
received from the embassy, we will do so. I am sure it will be part and
parcel of any review the Administration will conduct, including other
agencies will conduct.
But again, I think all of you who are looking for scapegoats in the United
States should target your attention on the government of India's decision
to mislead the rest of the world and act on their determination to launch
nuclear explosives. This is a world in which all knowledge cannot be had in
advance.
QUESTION: I thought you might have said, in fact, in this case that the
embassy's information was, in fact, the source of this questioning done at
the very highest level. I mean, it's possible the embassy did thoroughly
prepare you and that's why you now feel that you were told --
MR. RUBIN: Roy, I know you'd like to plum the depths of these details,
and it's just not possible to do that in an open forum.
QUESTION: Jamie, -- (inaudible) -- include the meeting in India with the
Secretary?
MR. RUBIN: Well, that occurred last year, as you know, so that was prior
to this new government.
QUESTION: Do you have any concerns that the Indians may be planning any
other steps that you might consider destabilizing? There have been reports,
for example, that they may be considering testing some longer-range
missiles than they've so far.
MR. RUBIN: Right, I'm always interested to see reports about military
matters that I can't speak about from the podium.
QUESTION: You sometimes warn people off, though, actions that you fear
they may take.
MR. RUBIN: Certainly not in this forum.
QUESTION: Can we go to Indonesia? What preparations are the US Government
making for Americans in Indonesia? Stanley Roth just suggested that an
evacuation was imminent.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think what I can say is that in light of the
deteriorating situation, Secretary Albright met with Under Secretary
Pickering this morning and has approved an ordered departure for non-
essential personnel from Indonesia. Given the deteriorating situation there,
it would not be responsible to delay such a request or to otherwise request
non-essential personnel to be placing themselves at risk.
There has been widespread looting and burning of shops and major markets
spread to all areas of Jakarta today. We have reports of Sino-Indonesian
shops and homes being targeted by looters and Sino-Indonesians being
killed. Students are gathered on the campuses. High school students, office
workers and other residents have joined in demonstrations near the
campuses. Students themselves do not appear to be responsible for the
rioting.
Clearly, there is a cycle of violence that is escalating in Indonesia. The
demonstrators are acting with increasing boldness and intensity. What we
can say and have said over the recent days is that we deplore the killings
which have taken place, and we strongly urge the security forces to show
restraint and refrain from using lethal force. The bottom line is there is
a deteriorating political situation and the government of Indonesia would
do well to engage in a dialogue with other groups in Indonesia to try to
stem this slide. We believe the dialogue is the best way to achieve the
political reform necessary.
QUESTION: What does that mean for American private citizens in Indonesia?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we've just put out a travel warning for American
citizens. We've advised all Americans to defer unnecessary travel to
Indonesia, and we have approved the - yes, we've put out a new travel
warning, which I'll be happy to give you after the briefing, that advises
Americans not to go there.
QUESTION: Do you have any figures on how many non-essential personnel?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you a number, but that's in train right
now.
QUESTION: Same question - figures on Americans?
MR. RUBIN: I'll do the best I can, as soon as we can.
QUESTION: There was a US military delegation on its way to Indonesia,
arriving, I think, it's supposed to be today. Is that still going or is it
being called back?
MR. RUBIN: In light of the ongoing unrest and security situation in
Jakarta, Admiral Prueher has dropped plans to visit Jakarta for the
moment.
QUESTION: When you speak of political reform, would you be able to more
specific? Does this extend to the replacement of the man who's been in
power for 30 years?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think you know that we have said that it is up to the
people of Indonesia to choose their political leaders and shape their own
future. We believe that a resolution to this crisis, however, will require
a dialogue between the Indonesian Government and its citizens on political
reform. Beyond that, we believe that it's up to them to make those
decisions.
QUESTION: This may be better addressed to the Pentagon, but the
cancellation of this military mission - I thought they were going over to
talk to the security forces and try to - and to--
MR. RUBIN: Right, I think you would have to direct this at the Pentagon.
Clearly, we're sending messages to the Indonesian military. But the
appropriateness of trying to fly into this situation and whether it would
be effective was clearly taken into account by the Pentagon in deciding not
to go forward with this mission.
QUESTION: A point of clarification - the Americans who are covered under
the ordered departure, they would leave by regular commercial flights?
MR. RUBIN: Again, this just happened a couple of hours ago, and I'll get
you additional detail as it becomes available.
QUESTION: Okay. One more question -- do you have any announcement on ILSA
today - sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: You said numerous times that you look forward to working with
the post-Castro regime and Castro is --
QUESTION: Can we go back to Indonesia for --
QUESTION: -- one of the longest standing leaders, along with Soeharto.
MR. RUBIN: We're staying on Indonesia.
QUESTION: I am, saying Castro and Soeharto are the world's longest
lasting leaders. Are you also working forward to working with a post-
Soeharto regime.
MR. RUBIN: That was good; that was good.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: I've heard it many times. I'm wondering what your views are to
a post-Soeharto regime. And what is your view in terms of what the rest of
the world should be doing to prepare for that, given that the G-7 meeting
is coming up?
MR. RUBIN: Well, in the meeting in Birmingham, the leaders of the G-7 and
Russia will be discussing this issue. I'd like to leave it to them to draw
their own conclusions. All I can say is that we believe that everyone in
the world should be calling on Indonesian security forces to show restraint
and we believe that everyone should be deploring the violence that has gone
on there.
With respect to the post-Soeharto regime, I suspect you heard my answer to
Roy's question, and so all I can say is that we do believe that the
government should be in a dialogue with its people in the hopes of
achieving the kind of political reform that will be necessary to stem this
slide into chaos and ease this crisis. But beyond that, it is not for us to
say at this time.
QUESTION: Jamie, am I correct that your emphasis today in repeating the
phrase that the government should be in a dialogue with its people is a
shift to a more political aspect of change? In the past, it strikes me,
you've been emphasizing the economic reforms.
MR. RUBIN: Well, since Secretary Albright's statement on Tuesday, which
I'm sure you're familiar with, Charlie, which was the first time that we
did talk about the need for political reform and dialogue between the
government and its citizens, we have been emphasizing these points over the
last three days. That is certainly new in the last three days.
Any more on that? Let's go to a topic where I can answer questions for the
record.
QUESTION: Kosovo, Kosovo - anything on the upcoming meeting between
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova of Kosovo, arranged
by Richard Holbrooke?
MR. RUBIN: You took me totally by surprise.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Gradually, we are going to the others.
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that the meeting will be without preconditions, and
it is a procedural breakthrough. They've agreed to meet on the 15th. It
will be followed within one week by a series of meetings to take place at
least once a week between the delegations of both sides. These meetings
will take place in Pristina, and they will alternate between sites chosen
by both sides.
It is only the first step toward a political solution of Kosovo. We commend
President Milosevic's willingness to assume personal responsibility in the
search for a resolution of this problem. Dr. Rugova has agreed to meet with
Milosevic without international participation, but also now without any
preconditions. We support Dr. Rugova's efforts to resolve the crisis in a
peaceful manner. The United States and the international community will be
watching the situation very closely over the coming days.
Ambassadors Holbrooke and Gelbard will be available to facilitate the
dialogue if called upon by both parties. At this point, we have not made
final decisions with regard to the sanctions issue. There is a Contact
Group meeting expected in a short number of days, and Ambassador Gelbard
will be in discussions with them about what next steps the international
community should take.
QUESTION: Finally, who is the spokesman for the --
MR. RUBIN: I knew we were - we're going to stay with Kosovo.
QUESTION: On the role of the international community, I thought the
Contact Group had laid it down in very clear words that they wanted an
international participant in all future talks.
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this, Roy, we're available; and clearly, the
desire for that was partially a function of a lot of other factors about no
preconditions. We believe this meeting is now taking place without
preconditions. President Milosevic, for the first time, has taken personal
responsibility for this issue.
Ambassadors Gelbard and Holbrooke are available to assist if the parties
need it. We believe that this is a procedural breakthrough that will
promote peace, and that, of course, is what we're interested in.
QUESTION: But is this, though, the unilateral US decision to --
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, if you've seen the commentary from Europe, I
would think that you will see that the rest of the world is quite pleased
by this development.
QUESTION: On Cyprus, it seems there is a lot of confusion. Could you just
clarify once again, who is responsible for the failure of the talks on
Cyprus under Holbrooke?
MR. RUBIN: The primary responsibility lies on the Turkish side.
QUESTION: Can you say Turkish means Ankara, Rauf Denktash or some
individuals?
MR. RUBIN: I'd like to leave it at a level of generality that includes
the Turkish side.
QUESTION: One more - according to the --
MR. RUBIN: Since we're normally not willing to assign blame, I would
think you'd be thrilled.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: According to reports, Turkish state terrorist killed, the other
day, human rights activist downtown in Ankara. Do you have anything on
that?
MR. RUBIN: I do, apparently.
MR. MCCLENNY: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Not as able as deputy number one. Yes, we put out a statement
on that two days ago. I'd be happy to read it, but I can't imagine you
wouldn't want me to just give it to you after the briefing.
QUESTION: I would like you to read it on the record.
MR. RUBIN: It's seven paragraphs long. I think that's a little unbearable.
QUESTION: Summarize it; say something to do with Ankara.
MR. RUBIN: I think it's a little unfair to your colleagues to ask me to
sit through with that reading.
QUESTION: This will be quick, I think. Does North Korea continue to
uphold the framework of the agreement?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, what I said yesterday - we still believe --
QUESTION: Oh, still?
MR. RUBIN: It still holds.
QUESTION: Still holding, and no activity?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Okay, good.
(The briefing concluded at 1:50 P.M.)
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