U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #162, 97-11-10
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
595
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, November 10, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
IRAQ
1,2-3,4-5 Secretary Albright's Conversations with Allies (Russia,
France, etc.) on Options
1,5-6 No Interference of U2 Flights/U2s Flying for UN, not US
2,3-7 Possible UNSC Resolution
4 Suspension of UNSCOM Inspections Today
1 Status of US Military in Region
6,7 Connection to Doha Economic Conference
KUWAIT
5 US-Dialogue with Kuwait Regarding Iraq
5 Purchase of Chinese Howitzers
MEXICO
5-6 Pres. Zedillo's Visit to DC Later this Week/Secretary
Albright Out of Town
CUBA
7-8 US-EU Talks on Helms-Burton
CHINA/TAIWAN
8-9 Pres. Lee Tung-hue's Remarks on "Independence"
NIGERIA
9 2nd Anniversary of the Assassination of Opposition Leader
Saro-Wiwa/US Policy Review
YEMEN
9 Kidnapped American Citizen
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #162
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1997, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Good afternoon. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I
have no statements. I'm here to take your questions.
QUESTION: Has Secretary Albright taken the pulse lately of the allies and
other members of the Council on Iraq? And if so, how is the attempt to have
a united front standing up, specifically as to sanctions, and should it
come to that military action?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright has been in regular contact with her
counterparts, including discussions with Foreign Minister Primakov and
Foreign Minister Vedrine of France over the weekend. She has consulted with
them about the urgency of convincing Saddam Hussein and Iraq to reverse
course. She is feeling quite good about the discussions she had, in terms
of getting widespread and overwhelming support in the United Nations for
action that we hope will convince him to reverse course.
So what we're looking for is the strongest possible action to convince Iraq
to change its mind; to allow the UN to do its job; and to do what the
Secretary General of the UN just said - which is to let the UN do its job
and not try to pick and choose how the UN does that job.
So she's feeling quite good about the conversations she's had over the
weekend.
QUESTION: What do you read into the fact that Iraq did not shoot at the U-
2 flights that resumed today? Is that an indication of them trying to find
some way out of this?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think we're going to do any good by trying to
speculate on what went on in Saddam Hussein's mind when that decision was
made. It was an unjustified threat to begin with. As we have said, it would
have been a serious mistake with consequences. The fact that this flight
went forward and was not interfered with by Iraq makes it better for the UN
to be able to know what's going on in Iraq, and to be able to keep
track -- to the extent possible without inspections - of Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction.
So the U-2 UN mission flew. There were no attempts, as far as I'm aware, to
interfere with the mission. Any further missions will be decided upon by
the UNSCOM chairman, the able Ambassador Butler.
QUESTION: Well, a follow-up to that. If the U-2s continue without
interference, does that diffuse the crisis? I mean, you said the U-2s can
find out a lot without the inspections going on.
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, without the UN inspectors being able to do
their job, we are in a mode of Saddam Hussein in confrontation with the
world. So long as he refuses to let the inspectors do their job, we will be
working to get strong Council action - the strongest possible action - to
convince him to reverse course. Without inspectors, you don't have enough
capability to keep track of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and build a
system with which you can establish a baseline and then, hopefully, some
day be sure that that baseline has not been changed.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you expect to table a resolution at the UN today? Or
do you think within the next couple of days?
MR. RUBIN: There will be a series of meetings involving the Council today,
with the Secretary General. I believe the permanent five met with the
Secretary General this morning, as well as the Secretary General's meeting
with the three envoys reporting to the Security Council
I think we just saw what the essence of that report is: the mission has
failed, and Saddam Hussein has not changed his mind. The ball remains in
his court to change his mind, and if he won't change his mind, the Security
Council will take up a resolution to try to convince him to do so.
We will obviously be seeking a strong resolution -- a resolution that will,
first of all, condemn his action; second of all, demand that he reverse
course; and third of all, take up where the Security Council left off in
Resolution 1134, namely, the travel restrictions that were considered
several weeks ago.
I think the important point that we are likely to see and that the
Secretary discussed with her counterparts is, we're going to see greater
support in the Council for the kind of ratcheted-up pressure that such a
resolution would entail. That would obviously be different than a
resolution where there were a significant number of key abstentions.
So, assuming we are successful in our continuing consultations and the
Council does take up its first order of business, which is this kind of a
resolution, then what we will be seeing is a growing unanimity in the world
that Saddam Hussein cannot thumb his nose to the United Nations Security
Council and get away with it.
As far as next steps after that are concerned, that would be premature. But
the first order of business is to try to convince him to change his
mind.
QUESTION: According to your timetable, then, you all have decided to put
off military action for whatever time period it takes to go through those
three steps?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I don't want to be stating things that make
people in the Iraqi regime gain additional comfort, but I can say that the
focus of our action now is in New York, to get the strongest possible
resolution along the lines that I just spelled out for you, and that has
the most support in the Council, so that Saddam Hussein can see what he
obviously missed over the last couple of weeks -- that it is Saddam Hussein
against the world; that the Council is virtually united in demanding
his reversal; and that he allow the UN to do its job; and that the
Council is prepared to step up the pressure, with the objective of getting
him to do so.
QUESTION: It creates the appearance, at least, that the United States is
backing down.
MR. RUBIN: Well, you know, there will be a lot of commentators who will
love to write their commentation about - I guess that's not a word -
(Laughter)
MR. RUBIN: -- about who's up and who's down. Let's bear the following in
mind. The most comprehensive embargo in history has been in place for six
and a half to seven years on Iraq. Saddam Hussein, every once in a while,
tries to get out of his box; and every time he does so, he's slapped down
and returned to the situation where he gets weaker and weaker every
day.
That is his own fault, and it's because he and his regime refuse to comply
with the requirements of the Security Council. We are determined to achieve
Iraqi compliance, one way or another. What tactical steps we choose to take
are ratcheting up of the pressure. That doesn't mean that - I think if you
see the U-2 flight, if you see the announcement of the Secretary General
that was just made, it's Iraq that's getting weaker every day that his
position gets weaker, in terms of the court of world opinion, which
is the United Nations. The Secretary General of the UN has just said,
I tried to get him to do the right thing; he wouldn't. That mission failed
and now it's up to the Security Council to take action.
We're going to be looking in that deliberation in the Council to ratchet up
the pressure. If the Council ratchets up the pressure, I fail to see how
Saddam Hussein is stronger.
QUESTION: I want to be clear on what you mean by the strongest possible
action. Are you talking about simply returning to the travel restrictions
on certain Iraqi officials, or are you now thinking of going beyond
that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, you put the word "simply" in there. What I'm saying to
you is that several weeks ago, the Council said - by a vote, I believe, of
ten to five - that if Iraq was in noncompliance, they would consider the
possibility of travel restrictions.
What we are now doing is saying Iraq has taken a turn for the worst. Its
compliance has taken a turn for the worst since that resolution. We are
going to be working with our partners as a result of the consultations
Secretary Albright has made to bring a strong and overwhelming support in
the Council for those very steps that he obviously felt pinched, or we may
not have been in this position.
It's clear to us that one of the factors that generated his concern was
that he was concerned that these types of very restrictions would pinch;
and that's when this development ensued. So I fail to see how moving
forward in getting those very restrictions - and probably by a much greater
support - would be putting anything other than Saddam Hussein in a much
weaker position.
Beyond that, our options remain open. As Secretary Albright, Secretary of
Defense, the President, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger have made
clear, we're not ruling any options out.
QUESTION: In the meantime, though, Jamie, the inspections do not
continue. That's solely up to Saddam Hussein. You're not making any
provision to force the inspections on him. And he can be busy cooking up
batches of nerve --
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, we can't force inspections. We've never been able
to do that for six and a half years. I mean, there's no way to actually
force your way in the door when you're civilian inspectors in that kind of
situation.
But what we can do is keep the pressure on. Let's bear in mind that these
kind of stand-offs have occurred many, many times in the past when UNSCOM
has tried to do its job. Often when UNSCOM thinks it's about to find
something, we have the most difficulty with Iraq. So we're going to keep
the pressure on. We're going to ratchet that pressure up. Our goal is very
clear. It's to convince Saddam Hussein to reverse course; to let the UN do
its job; and to make clear that he cannot pick and choose who these
inspectors are.
So we're very cognizant of what hasn't been happening in Iraq in terms of
inspections. That's why we're here, and that's why we're going to be
pushing for resolute action by the Council to convince him to change
course. At the end of the day, if he continues to delay, all he's doing is
making it more and more difficult for the UN team to ever give him the
clean bill of health that he obviously wants; without which, it isn't even
possible to begin to address the sanctions relief issue. So with each
passing day that he refuses to let these inspections do the job, he's
only hurting himself
QUESTION: You mentioned that Madame Secretary had a conversation with
Foreign Minister Primakov.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: And there's an agreement on action.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: You are asking for the strongest possible action. Does this
agreement on action include agreement on military action?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to get into the substance of her conversations
with Foreign Minister Primakov. Again, I think I've tried to make clear the
focus of our effort now in New York will be a demand for Iraq to comply. It
will be a condemnation of his failure to comply, and it will be a
ratcheting up of the pressure, starting with the very restrictions that
some members didn't think were wise several weeks ago. So now we hope that
they will see the wisdom in those measures, and therefore the pressure
will be significantly ratcheted up.
QUESTION: And as part of what you're seeking in this resolution, do you
want it to state that Iraq is in breach of the Gulf War cease-fire?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think it's clear that Iraq has violated Resolution 687
with it's refusal to allow the UN to do its job. As far as the kind of
declaration you're talking about, that's not necessary at this time.
QUESTION: Have you given any assurances to Kuwait against the Iraqi
threat?
MR. RUBIN: I think we have been in touch through diplomatic channels with
our friends in Kuwait, and talked to them about the steps that we are
taking and why we are taking them, and the progress of efforts in Secretary
Albright's conversations with her counterparts, and Ambassador Richardson's
conversations in New York.
So they are fully consulted about what we're doing. Beyond that, I wouldn't
be in a position to comment.
QUESTION: Speaking of Kuwait, Kuwait has apparently agreed to give China
a $200-million contract for howitzers, at the expense of US bidders. Do you
have any comment or reaction?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We would have preferred that Kuwait purchase howitzers
from the United States or another of its allies in the Gulf War coalition.
However, we recognize Kuwait's sovereign right to make such decisions.
QUESTION: Yes. We understand that a few hours ago, Iraq has announced
that the U-2 planes belong to the United States and they do not work for
the UN. Second, the rumor right now in the Middle East says that the United
States is ready to strike militarily in the next couple days. So what are
your comments on these two issues?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, the United States has provided the
services of a U-2 aircraft to help UNSCOM and the IAEA monitor Iraq's
weapons production facilities. The UN directs the list of facilities for
which it wants U-2 photographs. The UN also does a lot of photography from
its other aircraft, Chilean helicopters, with three resident photographers.
The UN makes final determinations on when the U-2 will fly. It is the UN
that notifies Iraq in advance of UNSCOM flights. It is the UN that provides
acknowledgments of these flights back to Iraq. The aircraft have UN
identifications, markings, on their tail. The pilot carries a UN certificate
provided by UNSCOM in his pocket, witnessing his legal status as a UN
expert on missions. Photographs directed by UNSCOM are given to and kept by
the UN, for analysis by its international team of experts.
If that's not a UN plane, I don't know what is - a UN mission, rather,
sorry.
QUESTION: We came to find out at the end of last week, there are other U-
2 missions being flown over Iraq - solely US missions. What is the calculus
for provocations or firings on that plane? It's kind of a confusing
situation.
MR. RUBIN: I don't quite see the connection. Iraq has made a specific
threat about a specific aircraft flying over its airspace that is not
controlled by the no-fly zone; that is, the airspace essentially in the
center of Iraq. Those threats we have said were unwise and foolish, and
carrying them out would be a serious mistake. They did not carry out their
threat today. Those are the planes that are the subject of this discussion.
I'm not going to comment on other U-2 aircraft and other U-2 missions and
other intelligence aspects of our efforts around the world with other
means. So I don't see the connection.
QUESTION: In her conversation with Primakov, did the Russian Foreign
Minister volunteer to go to Baghdad and talk to his old pal?
MR. RUBIN: I don't believe that came up.
QUESTION: If this situation worsens, what effects would that have on the
situation in the Middle East, and even, like, the Doha Summit? And do you
think this Iraqi action has something to do with the timing of this - has
something to do with the Doha Summit?
MR. RUBIN: You know, I got this question last week, and I can't - no
matter how I try to put all those pieces together, I can't see it. I've
heard speculation that seemed reasonable that the UN Chairman himself made -
that perhaps Iraq was concerned that the UN was about to discover something,
and that caused this kind of a problem.
I've heard our own experts talk about the perhaps mixed message that Iraq
received from the UN resolution that I was just referring to as potential
causes for him to miscalculate and make this kind of stupid decision.
So those seem plausible to me. The Doha Summit, I just can't imagine placed
high on the list of Saddam Hussein's calculations.
QUESTION: But when you have many of the Arab nations not attending the
summit, or sending lower-level officials to the summit, you don't see any
tie-in whatsoever?
MR. RUBIN: Again, you all may, or some of the people you're talking to
may have a better way to devine the intentions of the Iraqi leadership. To
the extent one can rationally analyze the situation - and that may be
limited - the views that I expressed are the ones that we think have some
plausibility.
As far as the Doha Summit is concerned, we don't think this is a - let me
rephrase that. As far as the Doha Economic Conference is concerned, we
don't think this is a meeting that benefits any one party or another. This
is a meeting that benefits the people of the Middle East. We think that
people ought to participate in that meeting, and governments ought to
participate so that they can help provide benefits for their people. That's
what this conference is about. That's why Secretary Albright is following
through on the US commitment to go to this conference, and that's why she
has, in the past, urged governments to participate.
But we have no illusions that there will be high-level participation in
this meeting. We want to go forward and keep the process alive of the
economic improvement in the region. But we have no illusions that this
summit will yield a ground swell of support from many different governments
in the region.
QUESTION: Do you expect the Secretary to meet with Ahud Barak when she's
in Doha?
MR. RUBIN: I don't believe that's on the schedule right now. I don't even
know whether he's going. But she has met with him when she was in Israel,
as Secretary Christopher met with political leaders from other parties when
he was in Israel.
QUESTION: Change of subject?
MR. RUBIN: Somehow I think we're moving to another continent.
QUESTION: Yes, Mexico. As you know, this week President Zedillo is coming
to visit President Clinton. There is a signal in Mexico that they are
thinking that because Secretary Albright is going to be out of town, that
the United States is trying to build a policy with Mexico in terms of
domestic relationship, instead of bilateral relationship. And according to
President Clinton, Mexico is one of the most important relations to
the United States. So what is the assessment on that?
MR. RUBIN: The assessment on that is that it's simply not true. Secretary
Albright has had numerous meetings with Foreign Minister Gurria. They speak
on the phone regularly. She has a very cordial and, she hopes, effective
relationship with him. I think if you look at her schedule and look at the
schedule for other Secretaries of State and look at the schedule for
other Cabinet members, you will see that scheduling is a difficult
process.
She led the US Cabinet group down to Mexico during the President's trip
there. She's been a regular participant in discussions on matters related
to Mexico. She consults regularly with her department officials on that.
She talks to Barry McCaffery, the US National Drug Control Director, about
our efforts to try to improve cooperation with Mexico on drugs. So the fact
that she's out of town shouldn't signal anything to anybody.
QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to the decision by the leaders of this
hemisphere, regarding the Helms-Burton? They were made yesterday,
no?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I haven't seen the specific text. But we intend to go
forward with the law as it's on the books. We believe that as a result of
our work with our European allies, improvements have occurred in terms of
general support for democracy in Cuba. As the President said over the
weekend, we're waiting to see moves by Cuba towards democracy, and then
things can change.
The fact that more and more countries in the world support that goal of
democracy in Cuba and support linking improvement in relations to
improvement in democratization is a sign that we're making some progress.
QUESTION: On Taiwan, The Washington Postpublished a story on Saturday
quoting President Li Teng-hui saying that Taiwan is an independent,
sovereign state. It seems then the Taiwanese Government has claimed that
the Post story was misinterpreted. The Post published another story today
to rebuff the Taiwanese Government's claim. Do you think there is the
slightest tendency that the Taiwanese Government is bearing a course toward
independence, from the State Department's point of view?
MR. RUBIN: I read both stories. I can only refer you to the latest
account, which reports clarification by the Taiwanese authorities that
there is no change in its position or policy. There is also no change in
our position or policy.
This position, which is based on our three communiqués with the
People's Republic of China and the Taiwan Relations Act is clear to both
Taipei and Beijing. We recognize the Peoples' Republic of China as the sole,
legal government of China, and acknowledge the Chinese position that there
is one China, and that Taiwan is part of China.
The U.S., as you know, maintains cultural, commercial and other unofficial
relations with the people of Taiwan. We do not pursue a policy of two
Chinas or one China, one Taiwan. We do not support Taiwan independence or
Taiwan's membership in the United Nations. With respect to Taiwan's future,
this is a matter for the Chinese people themselves on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait to resolve. Our sole abiding interest is that any resolution
be peaceful. To this end, we encourage the two sides to reestablish their
cross-strait dialogue.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, there have been so many different accounts of
what he was intending to say, what he did say, and I'm not going to get
myself in the middle of the debate; other than to say that, obviously,
there was an attempt made by Taiwanese authorities to clarify that they had
not changed their position or policy. And we have not changed ours.
QUESTION: Taking for granted that the words The Washington Post put in
quotes are correct, which I'm sure they are, because the reporter seemed
quite careful in his story, that Taiwan is a sovereign nation, is
apparently what he said. Is that helpful, given the situation there? Is it
provocative? Would you prefer he not say it?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to comment on the motivations or the words that
he chose to use in that interview. What's important to us is that the
Taiwanese authorities have indicated they have no change in their policy.
That's what's important. And we certainly have not changed ours.
QUESTION: Did the American Institute in Taipei seek a clarification from
the Taiwan Government on this, or did they weigh in in any way on
that?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that. I wouldn't be surprised if any person
anywhere, who reads a newspaper and sees something that is played up the
way that was, and then wants to be sure, whether there's a - I just don't
know whether our folks did that, because that isn't a diplomatic mission,
as you know; it's an unofficial role. But for whatever reason, the
Taiwanese authorities certainly sought to clarify what they thought might
have been a perceived misimpression.
QUESTION: Can we go to Africa?
MR. RUBIN: Sure.
QUESTION: Today is the second anniversary of the execution of Ken Saro-
Wiwa, the Ogoni activist in Nigeria, and there are a number of groups
calling for imposing new US sanctions on Nigeria because it's been two
years and there's been no progress. About a year ago, the US said it's
reviewing its policy towards Nigeria. Do you have any update on that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say, I think our government was quite clear in
condemning that event when it occurred, and we've taken quite strong steps
since then. I know that Secretary Albright and Under Secretary Pickering
and our new Assistant Secretary for Africa have been looking at this
question of Nigeria and what is the best way to achieve our objectives, but
I don't have anything new to report for you as to what next steps we may or
may not take.
QUESTION: You might not have this update, or if you could take he
question.
MR. RUBIN: Sure.
QUESTION: A Mr. - I don't know his first name - Carpenter, who works for
a division of Hunt Oil, was taken hostage in Yemen. Is there any update on
that?
MR. RUBIN: Let me try to get you some information as soon as possible. We
can get that. Yes.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:05 P.M.)
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