U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #161, 97-11-07
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
763
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, November 7, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 Statement on Kenya Available in the Press Office
IRAQ
1 Secretary's Consultations with Members of the
Administration and with UN Officials
1 Outcome of UN Diplomatic Mission/Continued Iraqi
Interference with UNSCOM Monitoring
2,7 Issuance of Visa to Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz for
Meetings at UN
3 Option of Additional Sanctions to Induce Compliance with
UNSC Resolutions
4 Chairman Butler's Decisions on Composition of Inspection
Team
5,7 History of Iraq's Non-Compliance with UN Resolution 687 re:
UN Weapons Inspections
5-6 Iraqi Threat to Shoot Down U-2 Flight
5,8-9 US Efforts in UNSC to Develop Action to Ensure Iraqi
Compliance with UNSC Resolutions
9-10 Allied Response to Iraqi Actions
MIDDLE EAST
10 Participation at Doha Economic Conference/Absence of
Israeli Foreign Minister
10-11 Secretary's Upcoming Meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu
and Chairman Arafat
12 Linkage between Doha Economic Conference and Progress in
Peace Process
NORTH KOREA
11 Return of Food Assessment Team
SRI LANKA
11 Challenge by LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) to
Designation as Foreign Terrorist Organization
ALGERIA
11-12 Arrest and Sentencing of Newspaper Chief Omar Belouchet
SERBIA
12-13 Revelations of War Crimes by Serbian Soldier, Slobodan
Misic
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #161
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1997, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today is
Friday. I have a statement for you on Kenya that we will post after the
briefing.
Let's start with a new person today; Barry Schweid, from the Associated
Press.
QUESTION: What is it that you can contribute at this point - because the
rhetoric from both ends is getting familiar on the Iraqi situation. Let me
ask specifically whether the alliance is holding, and what the Secretary
may have done, who she may have spoken to; and does she find the same
unanimity that was apparent at the beginning of the week?
MR. RUBIN: With regard to how to respond to Iraq?
QUESTION: Indeed, yes.
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary has been consulting widely in the Administration,
and talking to UN officials. I think she's reported several different
conversations with the Secretary General to you.
Our sense and her sense, from the preliminary assessment she has obtained,
is that the mission of the UN envoys did not - I repeat, did not - achieve
the desired result. They do not appear to have convinced Saddam Hussein to
stop his flouting of the United Nations; to reverse his decision on
prohibiting the work of UN inspectors without preconditions; and to start
getting in compliance with the United Nations.
This is a most disturbing development. Both the Secretary and the President,
as he said this morning, doesn't see much hope for this kind of diplomatic
solution. But obviously, we will want to wait and hear a full and complete
assessment of the UN mission, and wait until we receive that assessment
through the channel of their meeting in New York before we evaluate how to
proceed.
I could talk to you a little bit about the various comments of the Iraqis,
but in terms of where we are today is worse than yesterday because it's
another day in which Saddam Hussein is flouting the will of the international
community; and it's another day in which the sign of him getting the
message is that he isn't getting the message - that he continues to try to
wiggle and obfuscate and delay and confuse, instead of bringing closer the
day when he could come into compliance with the United Nations.
QUESTION: Where is France today, as far as --
MR. RUBIN: Right, I think as this issue unfolds, I certainly will
understand your desire to determine where the other countries are. But I
think you'll understand if I say that it's really up to them to speak for
themselves.
As far as the Secretary General's sense is concerned, is as follows. There
were those who thought it was very important to try to resolve this issue
diplomatically through this mission. We went the extra mile diplomatically
by allowing and supporting the idea of this mission, by supporting the
delay of the U-2 flight on the theory that maybe Saddam Hussein would get
the message if it was delivered in person to his Deputy Prime Minister
Tariq Aziz, and change course and start complying.
To the extent that governments around the world want to see all diplomatic
means pursued before going farther in the Security Council towards firm
action, this mission hopefully will have united the world in the conclusion
that we've done all we can and Saddam Hussein is just determined to flout
the will of the international community.
QUESTION: One last one - haven't you lost ground, the alliance, by this
extension?
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, I think. With every --
QUESTION: The messing with the cameras, for instance; the moving of
equipment. He had the time to do that while these three diplomats trotted
out there presumably to tell him to just comply, not to negotiate.
MR. RUBIN: I think you're missing the way UNSCOM works. He could have
done that tampering with UN inspectors' abilities to operate with or
without this mission. He was not allowing - I believe today is the fifth
day in which he refused UN inspectors to do their job.
This crisis began when he would not let UN inspectors do their job. It's
our view that this relatively short mission - a few days - is now over. As
I understand it, the officials are in Kuwait and are heading home; and by
Monday, they will have reported to the Council and the diplomatic mile will
have been traveled. Those who want to see maximum diplomacy pursued before
stepping up the pressure with firm action should be satisfied. We'll,
hopefully, then be in a better position to support whatever it is we
want to do.
QUESTION: Jamie, are you going to issue Tariq Aziz a visa to come to the
United Nations?
MR. RUBIN: We do intend to grant Tariq Aziz a visa to come to the United
Nations. It's been our practice to - as the President said this morning -
to allow for visas to do the UN's business. He will not have any problem
coming and visiting with UN officials because of visas. We intend to grant
him a visa, yes.
QUESTION: Did he ask for a visa?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: What?
QUESTION: Yes, he asked for a visa.
QUESTION: Oh.
QUESTION: Defense Secretary Cohen today talked about potential for
additional sanctions or military action. I mean, really, in this situation,
do you consider sanctions - some sort of additional sanctions, like the
travel restrictions you were talking about a couple of weeks ago, would
they be appropriate in this case?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's an option we've already discussed in the Council.
As you know, it's contained in UN Resolution 1134. So it is a way, we think,
to ratchet the pressure up on the Iraqi regime, and to convince them that
they're making a mistake by not complying with the United Nations. So that
is clearly an option that we can consider pursuing in the Security Council
next week.
QUESTION: Really. But is it a realistic option, given all that's taken
place in the last two weeks. As you say, his continued flouting of the
Security Council and every effort to try to be diplomatic in finding a
solution.
MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll have to see what course of action we should pursue
upon a full and final report from the mission to the Security Council on
Monday. We do believe that the kind of travel restrictions that we sought,
that some governments thought were difficult - so difficult that they
abstained - must have some sting, or those governments wouldn't have
abstained.
QUESTION: So would it be accurate - maybe I should ask the question this
way. Would the United States see these additional economic sanctions - or
these additional sanctions as the next step in its approach to this crisis
with Iraq rather than going directly to military action?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to tell you or steer you towards one option or
another in the Security Council. As Secretary Cohen said this morning,
there are options. I'm not going to rule any option out. I'm not going to
exclude options. And one of the options includes a ratcheting up of the
pressure through sanctions.
QUESTION: Jamie, I'm a little confused.
MR. RUBIN: I hope not.
QUESTION: Does the US think it needs further resolutions from the
Security Council to use military force in this instance?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: I have another question, if I may.
MR. RUBIN: Are you less confused now?
QUESTION: No, it's just something you said before, which was open to two
interpretations, and I wanted to clarify.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: It is your position that it's up to Butler to determine the
makeup of the inspection team; is that correct?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: If he were to decide that he didn't need all six Americans and
Saddam were to accept that, would that be acceptable to the US?
MR. RUBIN: If my aunt had whiskers, she would be my uncle. We have no
reason to believe that Chairman Butler is going to allow Saddam Hussein to
choose between experts from one country as against the other.
It's clear the United States has special expertise in this area. We've been
a country that's been involved in arms control for a long, long time; and
it's very difficult to imagine you could get better experts in this area.
We have no reason, nor have we heard any indication, nor is there any
reason to speculate that UNSCOM Chairman Butler would be prepared to accede
to Iraqi demands.
QUESTION: I want try to clarify something that's been swirling around the
edges of this, Jamie. The Iraqis are apparently saying that their beef is
with the Americans, in particular, because they believe that the purpose of
the United States is not arms control here, but the downfall of the regime.
Is it your position that compliance with the UN resolutions would be
sufficient to lift the sanctions, or are we actually seeking the downfall
of Saddam?
MR. RUBIN: Our view has been very clear, and when I finish explaining it
to you, I hope you will conclude that this is another excuse on the part of
regime in Baghdad. If Saddam Hussein complies with the relevant UN Security
Council resolutions, we will support a process by which sanctions can be
suspended and lifted. There is no question about that. That has been our
policy for some time; it has not changed.
That does not mean we are optimistic that this kind of a dictator, who has
flouted the will of the international community over and over and over
again, would reverse course and come into compliance with the United
Nations. Let's remember, the United Nations Security Council 687 was
supposed to be complied with in a matter of days. If they had given up all
their weapons, given up all their evidence, given up all their programs,
this whole process of sanctions might have been much shorter.
There were people who thought if they just allowed the UN's inspection
teams to do their job in 1991, this could have been over -- the phase of
weapons disarmament. But instead, they've hidden, they've dodged, they've
weaved, they've lied, and they've done everything to prevent these
dedicated UN officials from getting to the bottom of their programs.
It's 2,000 days later, and we're still waiting for Saddam Hussein to
finally do what he was supposed to do in Resolution 687, which is come
clean; tell the world what he was planning; give up the evidence and allow
the UN to certify him as having a clean bill of health on weapons of mass
destruction.
QUESTION: Jamie, it seems that Mr. Aziz is pretty clear in his views. He
wants to travel to the United Nations, but at the same time, he's calling
the United States an adversary. He's saying that the Special Commission
can't really do its job because it's led by the big, bad cop, the United
States, who wants to bring the downfall of Iraq. So isn't his visit really
just a way of delaying the proceedings even further, by him trying to
come to the United Nations?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the United Nations is located in New York. New York is
in the United States. It's our view, as host nation, that we should allow
the United Nations to do its job; and that includes talking. That is what
the United Nations often does, is have discussions. So it would be passing
strange for us, as the host country, to prevent Tariq Aziz from coming here
to have those discussions.
As far as what our policy is, come Monday when this report is made to the
Security Council, we will be seeking firm action from the United Nations
Security Council to compel Iraqi compliance with the United Nations. That
is what we will be doing come Monday, whether Tariq Aziz is stalking the
halls of the United Nations, having lunch in a fine restaurant in New York,
or meeting with any particular colleagues. That's what we'll be doing, come
Monday.
QUESTION: On Tariq Aziz, I wonder if you want to respond to some of the
things he said in a rather long news conference today.
MR. RUBIN: Sure.
QUESTION: For example, he said, "I know that the U-2 is entering Iraqi
airspace in order to take photographs to enable the American army to attack
Iraqi targets." Why don't you start with that, maybe.
MR. RUBIN: Let me start by making very clear for all of you that the U-2
flight that they are threatening to shoot down last week and again is a
United Nations flight. Chairman Butler has made clear that it's a United
Nations flight. These planes serve the United Nations; they have United
Nations markings on their tail.
The sites are selected by United Nations inspectors. They are critical to
the inspection regime. The photography they create is processed by United
Nations inspectors. They are focused on what the resolutions are focused on,
which is ballistic missile programs above 150 kilometers; chemical weapons
programs; biological weapons programs.
The information we need and needed to conduct the Gulf War was easily
available to the United States through a variety of means, without the U-2
flights. I can't, obviously, discuss what means those are. But I think it's
well-known, and demonstrates the fatal flaw in his argument that this U-2
flight is somehow part of our effort to keep track of Iraq's military. I
think senior officials have made clear that even without this U-2 flight,
we are able to keep pretty good tabs on what the Iraqi military is
doing. So this is obviously a specious argument.
QUESTION: Do you want to respond to any of the other comments he made in
the news conference?
MR. RUBIN: Do you want to be specific, or have me just generally go down
and rebut each one of them?
QUESTION: I'd be happy to have you just respond to whatever you want to
in that news conference.
MR. RUBIN: Let me put it this way. Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz are
throwing away the key to the lifting of sanctions. They have the key to
lifting of sanctions - all they have to do is comply. Instead of complaining
and whining about how long it's taken the UN to do its job, they should
look in the mirror and realize that it's their failure to comply and to
cooperate with the United Nations that has caused us to be in this
situation.
It wasn't so long ago that a defector from Iran provided a whole ream of
information about what they were and weren't doing that went far beyond
what even the UN inspectors suspected. So if they've got a problem as to --
QUESTION: You said Iran.
MR. RUBIN: Did I say Iran? Please forgive me; I meant Iraq.
It's up to the senior officials in Iraq to decide whether they want these
sanctions lifted. Instead of complaining that it's the United States' fault,
that it's the world's fault, that the dog ate my homework. They should
simply comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and we
wouldn't be in this situation.
Time and time again, Secretary Albright has talked about stories in which
she has heard directly from UN inspectors that they will go in a room and
be told that a piece of paper is the total amount of information that's
available on a particular weapons program. Then the UN inspector will pull
out of his briefcase a document they've received from the Iraqis that shows
that that's one-tenth of the program. And they will hand it over to the
Iraqis, and the Iraqis will leave the room, and come back and say, oops,
we forgot about that, and rewrite their alleged full disclosure.
So the key to lifting sanctions is in Baghdad's hands. If they keep
throwing the key away and burying the key, they can't complain that it's
the United States or the United Nations or anyone else's fault that
sanctions are still in place.
QUESTION: Jamie, may I ask another question about the Tariq Aziz visa.
The President this morning suggested that the United States normally grants
such visas, but not for the purposes of stonewalling. Is this - and
presumably he is going to do something like that - is this another example
of the United States going an extra mile to satisfy --
MR. RUBIN: I really don't see it that way. Let's bear in mind what we're
talking about here. We're giving the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, a
member of the United Nations, a visa to go to the United Nations to talk to
his colleagues and UN officials. That talk can go on, as I said earlier,
without slowing down the American-led effort to try to develop firm action
in the Security Council to compel Iraqi compliance.
He can do all the talking he wants with UN officials, have all the
discussions, complain about why it's everybody's fault but Iraq's that
sanctions are still on the people of Iraq. But meanwhile, we'll be working
to try to develop a firm action in the Council.
QUESTION: Jamie.
MR. RUBIN: Still on Iraq?
QUESTION: Yes, one more for me. This may sound like parsing, forgive me.
You said today that the US will be seeking firm action on Monday from the
Security Council, and you also said the US did not need Security Council
approval for military action. Can I infer from those two remarks juxtaposed
that in the short run, the US is not using military action?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to rule out any option at this point, and that
is our position.
QUESTION: Just one more question. There's been some talk that Saddam
Hussein has sort of timed all of this, coincidentally, with the Doha
Conference. Would the US postpone --
MR. RUBIN: That's the first time I've heard that, that this is - the Doha
Conference.
QUESTION: As a means - one of the benefits would be to upset that whole
balance. Would the US consider delaying action until after that conference?
MR. RUBIN: I can assure you the security interests we have at stake here
in preventing a dictator like Saddam Hussein, who is trying to develop
weapons of mass destruction -- namely, about as serious a threat as the
world could face -- is far greater than our legitimate interest in trying
to promote economic development in the Middle East.
QUESTION: Speaking of the Doha Conference, Israeli Foreign Minister David
Levy said yesterday that he's not going to go.
QUESTION: Can I stay on Iraq for a second?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We'll move in a second. Sure.
QUESTION: Mr. Brahimi, in his news conference this morning, said that he
and his team had gone to Iraq and "listened with respect and with patience
and interest to everything that they wanted to tell us, and we are taking
that back to the Secretary General." I thought Mr. Brahimi and his team
were supposed to go and deliver a message, that there wasn't supposed to
be any negotiation or listening, but simply a message.
MR. RUBIN: I don't see how any diplomat could go to a foreign country and
not listen.
QUESTION: And then take a message back to the Secretary General from the
Iraqis?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we have no problem with Iraq continuing to complain, so
long as the United Nations and the rest of the world rally around the
principle that we need to compel compliance. And if these diplomats
listened, that's what diplomats do. If additional diplomats will be
listening in New York when Tariq Aziz comes, that's fine, too. Discussion
is a good thing. We're an open country, interested in open discussions, and
we have no problem with that.
What we had a problem with was any of these envoys purporting to put
restrictions on what the UN Special Commission would or wouldn't do, and
what the Security Council's policies would or wouldn't be under different
circumstances. We have no reason to believe they purported to suggest any
changes in that regard.
If the envoys wanted to indicate that they listened patiently and intended
to communicate back to the Secretary General what a member state of the
United Nations said to them, we don't have a problem with that because we
have no reason to believe they purported to change the mandate of the
Special Commission, the policies of the Security Council in any way.
QUESTION: Can I just ask, how much longer, how many more days is there
going to be listening and talking; and when is there going to be the firm
action that you --
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated several times, Monday we will receive a report
from the United Nations envoys. The Security Council will digest that
report, and we will be seeking firm action in the Security Council at that
time.
QUESTION: Monday?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I worked in New York, and Secretary Albright was the UN
Ambassador there. The Security Council doesn't - especially in a matter of
this seriousness - normally act in a matter of minutes or a matter of
hours. But we will be seeking, starting Monday, firm action in the Security
Council.
QUESTION: Has the United States decided what that firm action will be? Or
is that a decision that will be taken over the weekend?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to get into our internal planning on this. As
you've seen and as you indicated at the beginning of this discussion some
25 minutes ago, Secretary Cohen reported on different options. All I can
say is we're not ruling options out at this point.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: You're on Iraq. I didn't realize that. I thought you wanted to
talk about the Doha Conference.
QUESTION: Jamie, you keep refuting the Iraqi claim that this crisis is
between America and Iraq; and you insist it is between the United Nations
and --
MR. RUBIN: It's not us who insists that. It's the Security Council that's
made that very clear in its statements and resolutions; not the United
States.
QUESTION: Exactly, you, too, are United Nations --
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: How long are you prepared to go? We know there is opposition
from the Russians and the French to any military action. They stated this -
their official --
MR. RUBIN: I would have to disagree with so many things you just said, I
don't think I could be constructive in answering.
QUESTION: The Russian Foreign Minister, in Cairo, he said --
MR. RUBIN: The Russian Government, the French Foreign Minister have all
demanded Iraqi compliance. I have not seen any statements ruling out for
all time the kind of action that you suggested by the French and the
Russian Government.
QUESTION: We are all - all the allies agree about that Saddam has to
comply. But the difference is about the punishment if he doesn't.
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, I'm just - I think you're starting from a premise
which I don't think is demonstrated by the public record or the private
record.
QUESTION: But the Russian Foreign Minister, Primakov, in Cairo, stated
last Friday, when I asked you the question, and you answered me, it's
always tricky to quote Russian Government officials - he stated clearly
they will not support military actions in Iraq.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I haven't seen that quote, but that doesn't sound like
the position of the Russian Government that we're familiar with. I think
everybody prefers the diplomatic course, and my understanding is what the
Russian Government and the French Government have been saying in the last
week is that they are demanding Iraqi compliance, and that they would
prefer to see this solved without the use of force. The President of the
United States said the same thing.
QUESTION: On Doha -- Foreign Minister Levy's statement yesterday that he
will not be attending; do you have a reaction to that?
MR. RUBIN: I have not seen that statement. I can tell you that we
understand that 70 - 150 business people, including 150 American business
people have registered for the conference. This represents a solid response
from the business community. We are expecting broad, high-level representation
from the region.
I don't believe there are final decisions by everyone. If the Israeli
Government believes that it would be wiser to send officials directly
involved in economic matters, that's really up to them to decide. Secretary
Albright will be going to that event to try to give a boost to development
of economic ties and economic growth in the region.
Each government is going to have to make its own decision as to how to
participate, and we will have to see what the final Israeli participation
is before we make a judgment whether participation on their part was a
problem or not a problem.
QUESTION: He made that statement to Israeli reporters before he left
yesterday.
MR. RUBIN: Right. I just hadn't seen that.
QUESTION: It looks as - do you think that the Secretary will be the only
foreign minister at Doha?
MR. RUBIN: I doubt that, but I don't have a list of foreign ministers for
you. As soon as I do, I will give it to you.
QUESTION: Also, on her stops before Doha, do you have anything to tell
us?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Secretary Albright intends to meet with Prime Minister
Netanyahu in London -- that should come as a surprise to you - and with
Chairman Arafat in Switzerland next weekend. She will meet in London with
Prime Minister Netanyahu on Friday, and is right now scheduled to meet with
Chairman Arafat in Switzerland on Saturday.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: We're still working out the details on where that would
be.
QUESTION: So when does she depart?
MR. RUBIN: We'll be giving you dates on exact departures. I would expect
those of you who would be able to attend and participate in the trip might
be not sleeping in a bed Thursday night.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Anything on North Korea and the assessment team? Do you have an
update on that?
MR. RUBIN: I do not have any update on the North Korean assessment team.
We're going to, again, as I said, try to get you all a read-out from that
team as soon as they are back.
QUESTION: And the Tamil Tigers apparently have filed suit against being
designated on the terrorism list.
MR. RUBIN: As Secretary Albright said last month when announcing these
designations, we are aware that some of the designations made will be
challenged in court. Due process under the law affords this opportunity.
But we're also confident that the designations are fully justified. And I
would note that they have the concurrence of both the Attorney General and
the Secretary of the Treasury.
This is a matter before the courts, but let me emphasize for you that
extraordinary efforts were made, through an extensive Administrative record
created, and an extraordinary number of hours of work on the part of
lawyers from all over the government, to try to ensure that whatever
designations were made stood up in court.
QUESTION: On Algeria, excuse my pronunciation, Omar Belouchet, he worked
for El Watan, I believe he was jailed or there was some sort of --
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we have heard the reports of his arrest and sentencing.
If these reports are true, we are disturbed to learn that freedom of the
press is being further curtailed in Algeria. In his inaugural address in
November 1995, the Algerian President committed his government to liberty
of expression and freedom of the press. We support that policy very
strongly.
The sentencing and imprisonment of this journalist does not appear to be
consistent with such freedom, nor will it help advance the creation of
democratic institutions in Algeria. We have been trying to do our best to
encourage a policy of political and economic reform in Algeria, including
strengthening the rule of law and increased freedom of the press. This is a,
therefore, disturbing development.
QUESTION: What is the status of the US policy with Algeria?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have anything new to report to you on that.
QUESTION: Just to jump back to Doha for two seconds, the Arab leaders
have said that they've linked attendance at Doha with progress in the
talks. Is the US at all optimistic that anything happened this week that
would encourage attendance?
MR. RUBIN: I think both of the parties, the delegations spoke and said
that they thought they had advanced the ball. I do not suspect that we're
going to have any dramatic announcements in time to change substantially
the decision of Arab countries about their participation in Doha.
Let me remind you that we don't think that Doha is a benefit or a gift to
any one country. Doha is about improving the lives of the peoples all over
the Arab world and the Middle East. So there's always an attempt to trade
this for that. Sometimes in the process, one is cutting off one's nose to
spite one's face. It seems to me that the people of the region are
suffering if economic commerce and additional business is not created,
which will help create jobs and improve the lives of the people who live
there.
So we recognize that as the position of some governments. We are not
expecting to be able to demonstrate dramatic breakthroughs before this
conference occurs. But we do hope that the governments will look at the
constructive comments made by the delegations that were here, and talk to
them about what they think was serious movements forward, and adjust their
policies in turn. But we're realistic about what Doha will be and what it
won't be.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you have any comment on the Yugoslav army guy who
confessed to killings in Croatia and some in Bosnia, with a paramilitary
unit? He now apparently has been taken into custody by the Yugoslav
authorities. Do you want him turned over somewhere?
MR. RUBIN: We don't have any independent confirmation of Mr. Misic's
story. But it is a disturbing story, and frankly, from what we know about
the war there, a credible story. The International Criminal Tribunal has
primarily responsibility for investigating and prosecuting war crimes in
the former Yugoslavia.
Belgrade is obligated, therefore, to share any information on the Misic
case with the Tribunal so investigators may determine whether he should be
indicted and tried in The Hague.
QUESTION: Have you made that request to the Yugoslav authorities at
all?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that we will communicate it, and I suspect they just
heard it.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:15 P.M.)
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