MORE DISTANT COUNTRIES Turning to more distant countries, Russia has recently warmed up its relations with the Government of Cyprus. Symptoms include increased investment and the sale of perhaps eight to twelve S-300 surface to air missile systems to Cyprus. How do the rapprochement and the arms sales affect the balance of power on Cyprus?

Russia's closer ties to Cyprus may help give Cyprus a friend on the U.N. Security Council, and arms purchases may add some increment to deterrence. Beyond this Cyprus should expect little other concrete help from Russia. As Chechnya and numerous stories of desertion and other problems show, Russia's armed forces have declined considerably. Russia's power projection capabilities were never its strong suit and they are even weaker now. While Russia and Turkey have been at odds for centuries, and Greece has often been the stage for this drama (for example, the Greek rebellion in the 1820s), it would be unwise for Russia to draw too close to Cyprus and risk direct involvement in an intra-NATO war or in a war with Turkey. Russia has more immediate and proximate problems to deal with and, like Turkey, would be unwise to alienate itself from the West.¹¹

The S-300 missiles, like any surface to air missiles (SAMs), are mostly defensive in nature¹² and the Government of Cyprus clearly has a legal right to buy them. They will impede Turkish air operations over Cyprus and thus they may also help deter Turkey from attacking in the first place (at present though, these missiles have incited a Turkish threat to attack them if they are deployed). However, even these sophisticated SAMs cannot be expected to work or be operated perfectly, most Turkish planes carry ways to spoof SAMs (chaff and flares), and the Turkish Air Force has high-speed anti-radiation missiles (AGM-88 HARMs) as well as AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles.¹³ The HARMs are purpose-built to destroy SAMs and, if the Turkish forces can locate the S-300s, they would become vulnerable to a variety of other attacks. Thus, the S-300s, while very capable, cannot be expected to clear the skies of Turkish aircraft.

The S-300s impose costs as well as benefits. Turkey has two interests on Cyprus: preventing Cyprus from becoming a Greek base (thus completing Turkey's encirclement by Greek islands) and protecting the Turkish Cypriots (and now the Turkish settlers). The S-300s and the construction of the airbase at Paphos and the naval base at Larnaca¹⁴ are beginning to turn Cyprus into just the Greek outpost the Turks fear. While the Greeks and Greek Cypriots have ample and just reason to fear the Turks, the Turks increasingly have a strategic justification for maintaining forces on Cyprus. This is a classic security spiral.

Even more acutely, Turkey has threatened to attack the S-300s if they are deployed. This threat may just be a bluff made in the hope of scaring the S-300s away. However, Turkey's credibility is now on the line. And if there is an attack, Greece's credibility (regarding the defense dogma) will also be on the line. Hence, if everyone can be taken at their word, the likelihood of conflict or war on Cyprus and between Greece and Turkey will be quite high when the missiles are deployed in the early summer of 1998.

In the end, the delivery of the missiles may not take place, or Turkey may not attack them. But the S-300 purchase has already raised tensions and raised tensions have several costs. First, any Europeans scared of importing a Cyprus problem into the E.U. will be more likely to postpone accession.¹⁵ The more tension there is, the more distant Cyprus' accession becomes. Second, tourism -- upon which Cyprus depends heavily -- is likely to drop. Third, if outside powers do muster enough leverage to propel Cyprus toward a solution, that solution is more likely to resemble partition than federation. The more tension there is, the less appealing a federal solution becomes and the more necessary partition appears. The S-300s may have helped focus the world's attention on Cyprus, but Cyprus may not like the result.

The S-300s are a gamble. The Greek Cypriots are hoping that the benefits of a marginal increase in deterrence and defensive capability, as well as increased world attention, are worth the costs of helping justify Turkey's presence on the island, a higher risk of a war they would lose, a reduced chance of E.U. membership, fewer tourists, and a less favorable solution -- if a solution is possible at all.

With respect to the U.S., America is unlikely to be of timely help in case of conflict on Cyprus. Even though the U.S. has a strong interest in preventing a war on Cyprus, and especially a war between Greece and Turkey, there are several reasons why the U.S. is likely to be slow to act. First, despite its overall interest in peace, many of the rest of the U.S.' interests in the region are conflicted and this is likely to lead to a degree of inaction. This will be especially true if it's not clear how and why the war started. Even if Turkey started the war, the U.S. may not be too willing to take actions it believes would isolate Turkey and move it more towards fundamentalism. Turkey is also closer to oil than Greece or Cyprus.

Second, the U.S. is becoming less activist in foreign affairs, especially when it comes to spending blood and treasure. This problem is compounded by the number of items already on the U.S.'s foreign policy agenda: China, Russia, and Middle East among them. The odds of a time and resource-intensive push on Cyprus seem low when other issues are more pressing. A counter to this argument is that the U.S. already has considerable latent influence on Turkey and Greece because of military and other assistance. Thus, the resources are already in place if the U.S. decides to use them in an attempt to coerce either of these countries in the event of a crisis (or perhaps as part of the Cyprus negotiations).

Third, history offers lessons about possible U.S. (and other states' and organizations') action. In the 1967 crisis, it was heavy weather, not Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that initially prevented Turkey from invading Cyprus. Vance's efforts then successfully defused the standoff that followed.¹⁶ In 1974, following the Cypriot coup and impending enosis,¹⁷ much of the world initially was equivocal about or even somewhat supportive of the initial Turkish invasion. The internationally community more decisively singled out Turkey for condemnation only after it became apparent that the invasion would not restore the 1960 constitution, that the scope of the damage and loss of lives caused by the invasion was disproportionate to the potential threat, and that the percentage of land conquered (37%) was disproportionate compared to the percentage of Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus (18%).

Europe is also unlikely to intervene meaningfully in a timely way. Many people died in the former Yugoslavia and Albania before useful actions were taken. The parties involved and distances to Cyprus make U.S. leadership even more necessary in dealing with a crisis on Cyprus than it was with the Yugoslavia and Albanian crises nearer the heart of Europe. Finally, some in Europe may see benefits in a continued Cyprus problem. Those who don't want Turkey in the E.U. cite the Cyprus problem as one reason for keeping Turkey out.