This section evaluates the strategic environment faced by Cyprus. In so doing, it discusses the Greek and Turkish mainland forces, the U.S., Russia, NATO and Europe. Table 1 sets the stage:
Table 1: Basic Components of Military Strength9
| Total Active Armed Forces | 1995 Defense Expenditures | 1995 GDP | 1995 Population | |
| Cyprus | 10,000+2,300 Greek mainland soldiers and officers (with 30,000 TF and 4,000 TCSF on the North) | $ 354 Million (4.5% GDP) | $7.9 Billion | 748 Thousand (18% Turkish Cypriot)10 |
| Greece | 168,300 | $5.1 Billion (5.2% GDP) | $99 Billion | 10.5 Million |
| Turkey | 639,000 | $6.0 Billion (3.6% GDP) | $167 Billion | 62.3 Million (20% Kurds) |
Turkey is close to Cyprus and has large armed forces. Some of its forces are tied down in suppressing the Kurds and it must deploy its forces on almost every border to confront threats ranging from Syria to Greece to Russia. However, of these possible threats, the Imia/Kardak crisis of early 1996 and rising tension on Cyprus suggest that the most immediate security concerns for Turkey are Greece and Cyprus.
Greece is quite distant from Cyprus and its armed forces are much smaller than those of Turkey (despite spending a larger fraction of GDP).
The geographical and force structure imbalances suggest that Greece will not be able to add much to Cyprus' defense in the event of war with Turkey. The importance of the Greek/Cyprus Joint Defense Doctrine (or dogma, as it is often referred to) of 1993 should not be overestimated. Indeed, many Greek and Cypriot observers indicate that the main purpose of the dogma is to increase deterrence, not to imply that victory is possible. One Greek analyst suggested to me that in the event of conflict on Cyprus, the dogma might lead the Greeks to attack Turkish forces in other areas and not on Cyprus. The dogma offers limited help to Cyprus in the forms of marginally increased deterrence or horizontal escalation if deterrence fails. These effects may be weaker than some Cypriots may be hoping for or counting on. Greece has a strong interest in not being dragged into war with Turkey via Cypriot miscalculation.
Greece might be wise not to send more than token forces to help Cyprus. Forces moving to Cyprus face fairly easy interdiction. If they attempt to take a circuitous route hoping to avoid attack, they will postpone their arrival to the time-urgent war. Moreover, any route to Cyprus ends up close to Turkey (of course). In addition, if Turkey feints or conducts attacks on Thrace or the various Greek islands on its border, it's not unreasonable to believe that Cyprus would begin to look pretty far away to Greece. Imagine that you are a Greek mainland commander and that you have a brigade to work with. If you send it to Cyprus, it will take time and many of these forces could end up manning the lifeboats. If you keep it closer, more of these forces could end up taking on the Turkish army and defending Greece proper. What choice would you make?
Even if Cyprus were demilitarized -- an almost certain provision of any Cyprus solution -- Cyprus would still be at the mercy of the Turkish armed forces. I do not mean to imply that Turkey would want to attack more of Cyprus or that it would be wise to do. On the contrary, such an attack would set it back for decades to come.
10Population figures on Cyprus, especially for northern Cyprus, are often contested. The Greek Cypriots claim that as many as 100,000 Turkish mainland civilians have settled in the north since 1974 (when there were 116,000 Turkish Cypriots out of 641,000 total Cypriots). The Turkish Cypriot authorities claim that only 15,000 Turkish mainlanders have settled on Cyprus. In their first census since 1974, the Turkish Cypriot authorities recently found that the "TRNC"'s population was 198,215. However, the birthplaces for this population have not been disclosed. In a final complication, it is widely recognized that many Turkish Cypriots have left Cyprus, but again nobody knows or will say how many. There are over 600,000 Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus. For information on this census, see Celestine Bohlen, "Fresh Tension for Cyprus: Counting the Newcomers," New York Times, January 23, 1997, p. A10.
This issue is a major hurdle for any peace agreement (over and above those that are the focus of this paper) because it raises the following questions: Who is a Turkish Cypriot? Anybody born on Cyprus? What of those living there long enough to have children? What will happen if Turkish mainlanders come to outnumber Turkish Cypriots? If there is a federal settlement, who will get voting rights? With what population statistics will calculations for proportional representation or federal contracts or federal social aid be based (if these are relevant features of the new constitution)? Will a settlement involve deportation of tens of thousands of Turkish settlers?
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