Special issue: We review a number of articles about Greece that
have appeared recently in a variety of publications.
For each of the articles, I report the author's views. The authors
are not responsible for the summary I made of their argument, and
I'm not responsible for the accuracy of their arguments, but I've
tried to pick interesting and credible articles, and to make an
honest summary of their views.
In this issue: |
The authors, on staff at King's College, University of Western
Ontario, and at the Council on Foreign Relations, respectively,
offer a summery review of the Cyprus impasse and suggestions on how
to unlock it. The article written after the murders on the Green
line, but before the missile crisis of January 1997, points to the
tangled history of the conflict.
They draw attention to the role played not by external forces
(Athens and Ankara) but internal ones over the years, arguing that
outside intervention has often been provoked or at least justified
by the inability of Cypriots to resolve their differences. They
point to Makarios' call for enosis with Greece in the 50s, the
inability of local leaders to work out constitutional differences
in the early 60s, the pressure from extreme nationalists that kept
the enosis idea alive in the late 60s down to the actions of a few
hot-heads in the present crisis as examples. Of course, external
factors, most notably the Turkish invasion of 1974, certainly have
created problems, but the authors want to deny that such events are
the totality of the underlying problem.
They suggest that external forces affecting the island are not
likely to produce movement. The end of the cold war takes
superpower attention away from the island, and introduced new areas
of fragmentation in the region of Cyprus. The long standing world
opposition to division of communities is declining, and there is
more willingness to allow ethnic groups to set up separate
political entities, suggesting that more outside observers might
be content with a 'two-Cyprus' solution. Strains on the UN
peacekeeping budget reduce the interest in keeping a more or less
permanent presence on Cyprus.
And while various Greeks hope that bringing external pressure to
bear on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community will produce
movement, the authors fear this hope is misguided. While Turkey
faces problems with its budget, balance of payments, inflation,
growing friction with Syria and Russia, the Kurish rebellion and
world focus on its human rights record, these problems have
produced less anxiety in Ankara than Greeks might hope. No Turkish
government could afford to be seen as 'abandoning' its brethren on
the island. Indeed, elements of the Turkish government may regard
the crises as effectively solved already, and see no reason to work
for any change.
Thus the authors say that a solution is up to the respective ethnic
communities on the island. And here while Denktash is seen as the
obstacle by Greeks, and Clerides as the middle-of-the-road
moderate, the authors point to a paradox: Denktash has the stature
with the Turkish community to be above local politics and thus may
be able to sell a compromise to his people. On the other hand,
Clerides has never enjoyed the kind of universal popularity and
status of Denktash, and might have trouble selling a compromise
from his weaker political position.
More paradox: the economic embargo on the Turkish northern region
contributes to the inequality of the economies of the two
communities and this growing inequality feeds the concern of
average Turkish Cypriots that a re-unified country would mean their
absorption as second class citizens into an effectively Greek-run
economy.
As with many conflicts is issue boils down, say the authors, to the
willingness of leaders to run short-term risks for long-term
benefits. Can the Greek Cypriots and the Greek government
guarantee enough of the economic pie to the Turkish Cypriots, that
the Turkish Cypriots will be able to accept a unified overall
government for the island? Can the Turkish Cypriots accept freedom
of movement for all the island residents so that the Greeks can
offer a looser sort of federation for a governing structure?
The authors suggest that the rank and file population of both
communities is growing in its frustration with the impasse and
willing to make compromises for peace and relative unity. The
question is if the leaders are equally willing.
The author, a Sociology professor at the University of Crete,
examines the historical reasons for the delayed and imperfect
development of state-run social welfare polices in Greece as
contrasted with Western Europe.
Various health systems, pension systems, etc. are not uniform or
universal in Greece and vary dramatically by sector of the economy.
Witness the recent row over farmer's pensions, which apparently can
be adjusted without reference to anyone else's pensions.
She points to the association of such welfare programs (state
organized health care, pensions, unemployment insurance, etc.) with
industrialization, and the mass action arising from industrialized
workers. In Greece, the economy never developed the extensive
industrial base, and instead is transitioning, to some extent,
directly from an agriculturally based economy to a post-industrial
service economy. The percentage of workers in industry peaked at
28% in 1981 and has actually been declining since then. By
contrast 47% of workers are self-employed, the highest percentage
in Europe. This fragmentation does not lend itself to mass
agitation for collective social welfare institutions.
Another factor, according to Prof. Petmesidou, lies in the
clientist nature of the political process where government benefits
are often extended to favored clients on a quasi-political basis
involving such things as tolerating the illegal use of public land,
or ignoring widespread tax-evasion. This clientist orientation
impedes the development of uniform and public policies.
European integration will produce even more strains on this system,
she predicts, since the immediate pressure that integration
produces is a focus on fiscal policy and a reduction of government
welfare programs.
This econometric paper attempts to quantify the effect of terrorism
on the amount of foreign investment flowing into these two
countries. Terrorist incidents have a number of effects, such as
on tourism, for example, but here they are testing for this one
effect on foreign investment.
Data sets of foreign investment and number of terrorist incidents
were used. For Greece, terrorism came from the November 17
organization, and from a split off group, the Revolutionary Popular
Struggle (ELA). Together they caused between 0 and 20 incidents
per year from the 1970s through the early 1990s. While there was
no simple trend, incidents peaked in the years of 1977, 1980-82,
1986, 1990-91.
A very careful analysis using sophisticated time series analysis
techniques was carried out to determine that terrorism likely
caused an 11.9% reduction in foreign direct investment. The
reaction to terrorism lagged the incidents by 1 to 2 years they
found. They project the amount of foreign investment if there had
been no terrorism, and speculate that while there still would have
been a leveling off in the early 1980s (due to government policy
climate in PASOK's early years?) it would have leveled off at a
higher level and resumed an upward trend earlier than it did.
This article presents a history of the involvement of the American
Red Cross (ARC) in bringing humanitarian aid to Greece in the time
period.
The author points out that the post-WWI situation differs from the
post-WW II situation in that troops were recalled to the United
States quicker, and the United States government quickly resumed
an isolationist position rather than the aggressive expansion of
influence that occurred after WWII. As a consequence the work of
volunteer organizations like the ARC assumed a larger presence in
shaping attitudes of Greeks to America.
Work in Greece and the Balkans was essentially the first overseas
commitment for the ARC. Initial involvement in Greece came in
response to the Soliniaka fire of August 18, 1917, and expanded
into work with refugees from WW I in the period 1918-1920. Most
of the ARC work was in Eastern Macedonia and involved standard
humanitarian work including restocking hospitals depleted by the
war and responding to the typhus epidemic of 1919. Notable was a
significant involvement of Greek personal in the work.
By 1920 the ARC was winding up this work and preparing to withdraw.
However the first indications of a different refugee problem -
those from Turkey - was already apparent and involved some work on
Aegean islands.
In 1922, in response to an appeal by the Greek government, the ARC
came back in force to work with the flood of refugees caused by the
war with Turkey. Starvation and epidemics were threatened by the
massive influx of refugees, as for example, there being 35,000
refugees on Chios compared to 30,000 residents in January of 1923.
The author reports that while relations at the local level appear
to have gone smoothly, as far as the evidence indicates, there were
significant struggles between the Greek government and the ARC as
to the organization of the overall effort. In 1923, in an early
example of "donor fatigue", fund raising in America for the work
in the Aegean fell short, and the ARC decided to wind up their
work, over the protest of the Greek government.
The ARC distributed 24,000 tons of food, clothing and medicines,
at a cost of $2,600,000 (1923 dollars). At times the ARC was
feeding as many as 500,000 refugees on a daily basis.
Despite certain frictions, the scope and urgency of the ARC work
created good feelings between Americans and Greeks and left a
signficant positive impression of America in Greece.
The author conducted a survey of libraries at Greek institutions
of higher learning. These 20 academic institutions had 182
thousand students and their libraries had a total collection of 2.7
million volumes and 17 thousand serials (including duplicates).
The bulk of the article is a institution by institution survey.
He does provide some overall comments. He indicates that the lack
of trained library personal, while easing, is still a problem. The
only school of librarianship in Greece opened just in 1980. Of the
256 employees of the various libraries, 3 had Ph. Ds., 6 had
Masters of Library Science, 102 a library science degree. This
percentage of library science holders had increased since a 1990
survey. Further, there is a history that specialty libraries had
a head with training in the specialty, not in library management
(ie. a medical library being run by a Doctor).
He indicates, rather briefly, that historically, libraries were not
a priority of academic institutions, even to there being no
specific place planned for a central library when the institutions
were built. While he regards Greek libraries as inadequate to
their contemporary tasks, he sees there being growth and expansion
in the 90's in contrast to the "static" period of the 80s.
Cyprus
Tozun Bahcheli & Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "The Cyprus Impasse: What
Next?", World Policy Journal, Winter 1996/97, pp. 27-39Greek Social Welfare Institutions
Maria, Petmesidou, "Social Protection in Greece: A Brief Glimpse
of a Welfare State", Social Policy & Administration, vol 30:4,
December 1996, pp. 324-347Does Terrorism Affect Foreign Investment?
Walter Enders & Todd Sandlen, "Terrorism and Foreign Direct
Investment in Spain and Greece," Kyklos, Vol 49:3 p. 331+, 1996The American Red Cross in Greece after WW I
Dimitra Giannuli, "American Philanthropy in Action: The American
Red Cross in Greece, 1918-1923," East European Politics and
Societies, Vol. 10:1, Winter 1996, p. 108+.Academic Libraries
Pashalis Raptis & Anestis Sitas, "Academic Libraries in Greece: A
new perspective," Libri, vol. 46:2, June 1996, p. 100+Coming Up Next Time
Look for the next issue to appear about April 1st. See you then.
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