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Voice of America, 5 January 1996 (#2)

From: "Ioannis V. Bousnakis" <ivb19@nfi.com>

Voice of America Directory

CONTENTS

  • [01] THE NATO MISSION IN BOSNIA

  • [02] U-S-BOSNIA (S ONLY) BY RON PEMSTEIN (STATE DEPARTMENT)


  • [01] THE NATO MISSION IN BOSNIA

    DATE=JANUARY 6, 1996
    TYPE=ON THE LINE
    NUMBER=1-00389
    EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
    CONTENT=

    THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

    ANNCR: ON THE LINE -- A DISCUSSION OF UNITED STATES POLICIES AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES.

    THIS WEEK, "THE NATO MISSION IN BOSNIA." HERE IS YOUR HOST, ROBERT REILLY.

    HOST: HELLO AND WELCOME TO ON THE LINE.

    THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA HAS TAKEN OVER TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND LIVES AND PRODUCED THE WORST ATROCITIES IN EUROPE SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. LAST NOVEMBER IN DAYTON, OHIO, A PEACE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AMONG THE WARRING MUSLIM, SERB AND CROAT FACTIONS. THE ACCORD CALLS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF SIXTY-THOUSAND NATO TROOPS, INCLUDING TWENTY-THOUSAND AMERICAN SOLDIERS, TO ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT

    JOINING ME TODAY TO DISCUSS U.S. POLICY AND THE NATO MISSION TO BOSNIA ARE THREE EXPERTS. WILLIAM ODOM IS DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES AT THE HUDSON INSTITUTE. JONATHAN CLARKE IS A FORMER BRITISH DIPLOMAT WHO IS NOW A GUEST SCHOLAR AT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER HERE IN WASHINGTON. AND PETER RODMAN IS THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES AT THE NIXON CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM. GENTLEMEN, WELCOME TO THE PROGRAM.

    MR. ODOM, LET ME BEGIN WITH YOU, IF I MAY. WHAT DO YOU THINK IS AT STAKE FOR NATO IN THIS MAJOR DEPLOYMENT IN THE BALKANS?

    ODOM: WELL, IT HAS AT LAST RECOGNIZED ITS POST-COLD WAR MISSION, AND THAT IS TO EXTEND STABILITY, A ROOF OVER PARTS OF EASTERN EUROPE, TO ALLOW PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS IN THE ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN THOSE COUNTRIES TO TAKE PLACE. AND UNLESS IT CAN PROVE ITS VIABILITY IN CREATING STABILITY IN THE BALKANS, THEN I THINK THERE'S A REAL QUESTION ABOUT ITS ABILITY TO DO THIS ELSEWHERE, AND THEREFORE I THINK IT IS DEFINING ITS FUTURE IN THE WAY IT CONDUCTS THIS OPERATION IN BOSNIA.

    HOST: JONATHAN CLARKE, IS THIS THE RIGHT LOCALE FOR NATO TO PUT EVERYTHING AT STAKE IN DEFINING ITS FUTURE IN THIS WAY?

    CLARKE: I DON'T REALLY THINK WE SHOULD BE TYING THE FUTURE OF NATO TO WHAT'S GOING ON IN THE BALKANS, NO. I THINK NATO'S BEEN AN EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION AT KEEPING THE PEACE IN WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST A MAJOR ADVERSARY. THIS ADVERSARY HAS NOW GONE FROM THE SCENE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AND I DON'T THINK THAT WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO RECONSTRUCT A ROLE AROUND THESE SORTS OF INTERNECINE CIVIL WARS IN EUROPE. I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE RIGHT WAY TO GO AT ALL, NO.

    HOST: PETER RODMAN, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE STAKES?

    RODMAN: WELL, I HOPE THIS IS NOT A PRECEDENT. I HATE TO SEE NATO DRAWN INTO THESE THINGS, BECAUSE IT'S SUCH A MESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, I THINK THE FACT THAT EVERY OTHER INSTITUTION THAT TRIED TO SOLVE THIS THING FAILED -- I MEAN, THE EUROPEAN UNION TRIED TO MEDIATE WITHOUT SUCCESS, THE UNITED NATIONS GOT INVOLVED, THE O-S-C-E WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS -- I THINK IT TURNED OUT, MAYBE TO SOME PEOPLE'S SURPRISE, THAT NATO WAS THE ONLY KIND OF GROWN-UP INSTITUTION WHEN IT COMES TO SECURITY MATTERS. SO EVERYBODY LOOKED TO THE WESTERN POWERS TO TRY TO SOLVE THIS. AND I'M GLAD TO SAY THAT WE SHOWED, YOU KNOW, FINALLY THAT WE HAVE AT LEAST SOME ABILITY TO PRODUCE A RESULT.

    HOST: WELL, WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS NOW?

    CLARKE: WELL, I THINK THAT IF YOU DEFINE THINGS REALISTICALLY -- AND I THINK THE DAYTON AGREEMENT IS REALISTIC -- IT'S A FINITE COMMITMENT FOR A SHORT PERIOD WITH RELATIVELY WELL-DEFINED TASKS. I THINK IF YOU LOOK AT IT IN THAT CONTEXT -- I THINK THAT, ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE SEPARATION OF THE POWERS, THE CESSATION OF WARFARE -- I THINK THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS GOING TO WORK. THE REAL PROBLEMS LIE AHEAD ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE: THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, THE TAKING BACK OF PROPERTY AND SO FORTH. THAT'S GOING TO BE MUCH MORE COMPLEX.

    HOST: LET'S TALK ABOUT THE MILITARY SIDE BECAUSE THE NATO DEPLOYMENT IS TAKING PLACE NOW, AND BY, I BELIEVE, JANUARY 19TH, THE CONTENDING PARTIES ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN BEHIND THESE PREDESIGNATED LINES WHICH THE NATO FORCES WILL THEN POLICE. ARE THEY ON SCHEDULE?

    ODOM: WELL, I THINK THEY MAY BE A LITTLE BEHIND THE SCHEDULE THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE ON, BUT I THINK THAT THAT'S NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THE POINT THAT JONATHAN JUST RAISED, AND THAT'S HIS ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE MILITARY MISSION AS SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE POLITICAL MISSION. IF THE MILITARY MISSION DOESN'T SUPPORT THE POLITICAL MISSION, THEN THE WHOLE THING IN THE LONG RUN WILL BE A FAILURE. NOW, THE DAYTON ACCORD ENVISIONS A VIABLE BOSNIAN STATE. THE DEPLOYMENTS ARE TO DIVIDE THESE FORCES AND ESSENTIALLY TO FRAGMENT BOSNIA AND TO PAY LITTLE OR NO ATTENTION TO THE ROLE OF SERBIA AND CROATIA IN WHAT GOES ON IN BOSNIA. THEREFORE I THINK THE PRESENT MILITARY POLICY, THE PRESENT MILITARY STRATEGY, IS DESIGNED TO HAVE THE OBJECTIVE CONSEQUENCE IN THE LONGER RUN OF PARTITIONING BOSNIA. AND IF THEY COME OUT WITHIN A YEAR, THAT'S ALMOST A CERTAINTY.

    HOST: A DE FACTO PARTITION OF BOSNIA.

    ODOM: THAT'S EXACTLY RIGHT. WE'RE LINING IT UP. THIS IS A MISSION THAT WILL REQUIRE A GENERATION AND MAYBE LONGER. AND I THINK IT'S VERY GOOD THAT WE'VE GOTTEN IN THERE. AND I HOPE THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE YEAR, AS THESE MANY MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEMS BEGIN TO BECOME MORE OBVIOUS AND CONSPICUOUS, THAT WE'LL MODIFY THE POLICY AND BRING THE MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND THE MILITARY TASKS MORE INTO LINE WITH WHAT WAS AGREED AT DAYTON AND THE VIABLE BOSNIAN STATE.

    RODMAN: WELL, I AGREE IN PART. I THINK THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THIS AGREEMENT IS THE POLITICAL PART OF IT. I THINK THE MILITARY PROVISIONS ARE ENFORCEABLE. I THINK THE MAP IS ENFORCEABLE, THE CEASE-FIRE IS ENFORCEABLE, ESPECIALLY WITH SIXTY-THOUSAND TROOPS THERE. BUT THE POLITICAL PROVISIONS ARE VERY AMBITIOUS AND EVEN NAIVE, I THINK. THE UNITY OF THE BOSNIAN STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEES, DEMOCRATIC ELECTION PROCEDURES. AND THE UNITED STATES HAS TRIED HARD TO SEPARATE, AS BILL SAYS, THE MISSION OF THE TROOPS FROM THIS MORE AMBITIOUS POLITICAL STUFF. THEY SAY THE MISSION OF THE TROOPS IS LIMITED TO THE MILITARY PROVISIONS AND THAT THEY WILL NOT GET DRAWN IN TO TRY TO IMPOSE A UNITARY STATE OVER THE LONG RUN. AND, OF COURSE, IF WE'RE OUT IN A YEAR, WE ARE WASHING OUR HANDS OF ALL THAT. AND I ALSO AGREE WITH BILL THAT THE EVOLUTION, THE NATURAL POLITICAL EVOLUTION HERE IS TOWARD PARTITION, JUST BECAUSE OF THE NATURAL LINKS THAT WILL DEVELOP BETWEEN THE CROATS IN CROATIA AND THE SERBS IN SERBIA. AND THE AMERICAN POSITION AS TO WHAT WE DO ABOUT ALL THIS IS TOTALLY AMBIGUOUS.

    HOST: GENERAL MCKENZIE, A CANADIAN GENERAL WHO SERVED AS THE FIRST U-N COMMANDER IN SARAJEVO MADE THE PREDICTION THAT: "IF YOU AMERICANS GO INTO BOSNIA, YOU'D BETTER START TRAINING YOUR GRANDCHILDREN NOW TO BE PEACEKEEPERS THERE." DO YOU THINK, MR. CLARKE, THAT THIS MISSION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE YEAR THAT YOU MENTIONED?

    CLARKE: WELL, CLEARLY THE MISSION IS INFINITELY EXPANDABLE, IF THAT'S WHAT PEOPLE WANT TO DO. AS BILL SAYS, YOU CAN STAY THERE FOR A GENERATION. I MEAN, TO ACHIEVE FULL FRATERNAL UNITY THERE, I'M SURE IT IS THE TASK OF A GENERATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT'S NOTHING TO DO WITH THE DAYTON ACCORD. THE DAYTON ACCORD'S ALL TO DO WITH SETTING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE PARTIES THEMSELVES -- IN OTHER WORDS, THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THE REGION -- THEY HAVE THE CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY OF FORMING THE NEW STATE. THE AGREEMENT IS VERY AMBIGUOUS ABOUT WHETHER IT IS GOING TO BE AN INTEGRAL UNITARY STATE. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS LEAVE A LOT OPEN TO QUESTION, SO I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD PREDETERMINE HOW THIS IS GOING TO END UP.

    HOST: WELL, MR. HOLBROOKE, WHO HELPED NEGOTIATE THIS ACCORD, AND OTHERS HAVE MADE THE STATEMENT THAT ALL NATO CAN DO IS HELP THESE PARTIES REACH AN AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES. I'M REMINDED OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT THAT WAS REACHED IN FEBRUARY OF 1992 IN WHICH THE THREE CONTENDING PARTIES AGREED TO A PARTITION UNDER A LOOSE UNITARY STATE, WHICH LATER FELL APART WHEN THE MUSLIMS WITHDREW. DO YOU SEE ANY PARALLELS WITH WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN DAYTON, WHY ONE HAS FAILED AND WHY NOW, IT SEEMS, WE'RE AT LEAST ON THE CUSP OF SUCCESS?

    RODMAN: I DON'T REMEMBER THE DETAILS OF LISBON, BUT I DO THINK THAT A YEAR FROM NOW, WE ARE GOING TO BE FACED WITH A VERY DIFFICULT CHOICE: WHETHER TO LEAVE AND WASH OUR HANDS OF THIS AMBITIOUS POLITICAL PROJECT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, WHETHER TO STAY AND TO TAKE ON THIS VERY VISIONARY TASK OF INSURING THE LONG-RUN UNITY OF THE STATE. AND I DON'T THINK WE'RE INTELLECTUALLY PREPARED OR POLITICALLY PREPARED OR MILITARILY PREPARED FOR THE SECOND CHOICE, IF THAT'S WHAT WE END UP DOING. AND IT'S GOING TO BE A VERY PAINFUL CHOICE TO WALK AWAY FROM IT A YEAR FROM NOW, HAVING DECLARED OUR STAKE IN THIS MILITARY STAY.

    ODOM: THE WAY THE PRESIDENT DEFINED OUR INTEREST HERE INCLUDED SEEING THIS CASE -- BOSNIA, THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA -- AS A THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF EUROPE. NOW, IF IT GOES BACK INTO THE STATE OF CONFLICT AND DIVISION THAT IT WAS IN BEFORE THE DAYTON ACCORD, THEN SURELY OUR INTERESTS WILL ONCE MORE BE AT STAKE. AND, IT SEEMS TO ME, AS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE COMMITMENT AS IT'S NOW STATED BY THE DAYTON ACCORD, AND THIS LARGER DEFINITION OF OUR STRATEGIC INTEREST WITH THE PRESIDENT, [AS] THAT CONTRADICTION COMES MORE TO THE FORE, THEN WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO REALIZE THAT WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE A LONGER-TERM COMMITMENT THERE. AND I'M REMINDED OF 1948-49, WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING THE FORMATION OF NATO. IT HAD LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SOVIET THREAT; IT HAD TO DO WITH THE GERMAN PROBLEM. IN FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION WASN'T EVEN MENTIONED IN THE DEBATE ABOUT NATO. HARDLY WAS IT MENTIONED IN LONDON, A LITTLE MORE SO IN THE U.S. WE EVEN PROMISED SENATOR VANDENBERG THAT WE WOULDN'T PUT ANY TROOPS IN EUROPE. WELL, WE REALIZED THAT TO KEEP A POLITICAL CLIMATE IN EUROPE, EVEN AMONG OUR WESTERN ALLIES, THAT WAS GOING TO ALLOW THE KIND OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED TO HAPPEN, WE'D HAVE TO STAY LONGER. AND I THINK THE PARALLEL IN YUGOSLAVIA IS QUITE REAL.

    HOST: LET'S TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT MAY BE FACED WITHIN THIS ONE YEAR. AFTER ALL, NATO WAS ENGAGED BEFORE THE DAYTON ACCORDS IN SOME BOMBING ACTIONS AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS. ARE THEY VIEWED AS A POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT IN THIS SITUATION? CAN NATO BEHAVE AS A NEUTRAL ENFORCER OF THESE LINES BEHIND WHICH THE RESPECTIVE FORCES ARE WITHDRAWING?

    ODOM: I BELIEVE THE DAYTON ACCORDS GIVE THE U.S. FORCES, OR THE NATO FORCES, OCCUPATION STATUS. AND THAT MEANS THEY HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT WITH ANYBODY WHO BREAKS THE TRUCE.

    RODMAN: ONE NEAR-TERM PROBLEM THAT WILL ARISE, OF COURSE, WILL ARISE WHEN WE START ARMING AND TRAINING THE BOSNIANS AS WE ARE COMMITTED TO DO. THE PEOPLE WHO ADVOCATE THIS ARE SAYING THAT WE NEED TO GIVE THE BOSNIANS THE ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF LEAVING. THE ARGUMENT HAS BEEN MADE THAT THIS WILL COMPROMISE OUR NEUTRALITY. I'M NOT SO SURE THAT NECESSARILY IS THE CASE, BUT I CAN SEE AT LEAST, YOU KNOW, A POSSIBILITY ARISING THAT, AS WE GET MORE ENGAGED ON THE BOSNIAN SIDE, THAT THIS COULD AFFECT HOW WE'RE PERCEIVED.

    CLARKE: I THINK PETER RAISES EXACTLY THE SORT OF DILEMMA WHICH IS GOING TO FACE THE ADMINISTRATION, OF BEING SUCKED IN ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. I PERSONALLY THINK THAT ARMING THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS IS EXACTLY THE WRONG WAY TO GO. THIS PREJUDGES THE OUTCOME OF A VERY, VERY COMPLEX SITUATION. AND FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SAY THAT, AT THE END OF THE DAY, WHATEVER HAPPENS, WHATEVER THE POPULAR MOOD IS, THAT THEY'RE GOING TO COME DOWN ON ONE SIDE. I THINK IT'S GOING TO DISTORT THE DEBATE INSIDE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA RATHER BADLY. THIS IS EXACTLY THE SORT OF MISSION-CREEP WHICH I THINK, WHICH I HOPE THE ADMINISTRATION IS GOING TO AVOID.

    ODOM: BUT JONATHAN, ISN'T THAT A VERY GOOD ARGUMENT FOR EXTENDING THE STAY OF THE U-N FORCE THERE INDEFINITELY. BECAUSE IF YOU DON'T ARM THE BOSNIANS, THEN CLEARLY THEY'LL BE SLAUGHTERED WHEN WE COME OUT.

    CLARKE: OF COURSE, THE DAYTON AGREEMENT DOESN'T HAVE A ONE-YEAR TERM IN IT. THIS IS A UNILATERAL UNITED STATES CONDITION AS I UNDERSTAND IT.

    ODOM: I MEAN, I QUITE AGREE WITH YOU ON ARMING THE BOSNIANS. AND I ALSO THINK, IF YOU'RE GOING TO TAKE THAT POSITION, YOU HAVE TO BE WILLING TO COMMIT TO A MUCH LONGER PERIOD FOR THE NATO FORCE TO BE IN PLACE. SO, THAT'S WHY I THINK IT DOES MAKE SENSE TO BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT EXTENDING THIS FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE.

    CLARKE: I'M CONVINCED THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL HAVE TROOPS THERE FOR A MUCH LONGER PERIOD THAN ONE YEAR.

    HOST: WELL, IN EFFECT, WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON THE OTHER PARTICIPATING NATIONS OF THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL AFTER A YEAR'S PERIOD OF TIME? WILL THEY THEN SAY WE'RE LEAVING TOO, OR WE'RE GOING TO STICK TO THE MISSION?

    RODMAN: WELL, IF THINGS ARE QUIET, I DON'T SEE WHY OTHER POWERS WON'T STAY. IF THINGS ARE GOING TO HELL, I THINK WE ALL MAY WANT TO LEAVE.

    HOST: BUT IF THEY'RE QUIET, THAT, IN A WAY, MEANS THEY'RE [NATO TROOPS] UNNECESSARY AND THAT THIS POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT IS WORKING.

    RODMAN: WELL, THAT MAY BE, THAT MAY BE.

    ODOM: I THINK THEY WILL BE QUIET, BUT I ALSO THINK THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL THINK ABOUT WITHDRAWING, BECAUSE THE U.S. BRINGS A LOT TO THIS NATO FORCE. IT BRINGS A BIG COMMAND-AND-CONTROL STRUCTURE. IT BRINGS THE BIGGEST COMPONENT OF FORCES. IT BRINGS TREMENDOUS LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES TO THE SCENE. AND THAT WAS MISSING IN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH REINFORCEMENT WHEN THEY WENT IN THERE. SO, THIS AMERICAN COMPONENT IS REALLY THE GLUE THAT HOLDS IT TOGETHER. AND IT ENGAGES THE ENTIRE NATO STRUCTURE WITH AN AMERICAN SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER IN EUROPE. FOR THE U.S. TO MOVE OUT AND TO LEAVE THE OTHER NATO COMPONENTS THERE STRIKES ME AS CREATING A SITUATION THAT WOULD NOT BE VERY VIABLE FOR VERY LONG.

    RODMAN: ARE THERE INTERMEDIATE OPTIONS AVAILABLE LIKE WITHDRAWING OUR COMBAT TROOPS AND LEAVING OUR LOGISTICAL TROOPS TO SUPPORT THE OTHERS?

    ODOM: WELL, I THINK ANY PLAN LIKE THAT PUTS THOSE FORCES IN THE WAY OF DANGER IN A MOST IRRESPONSIBLE FASHION. I THINK THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MILITARY ASSETS ANYWHERE WITHOUT AN OPERATIONALLY COMPETENT COMBAT ELEMENT IS UNWISE. WE SAW THAT WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF A SINGLE BATTALION OF MARINES IN LEBANON.

    HOST: WELL, THAT RAISES THE OTHER QUESTION. THERE ARE EXPECTED TO BE CASUALTIES FROM THIS OPERATION. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY HAS MADE THAT CLEAR. SOME PEOPLE HAVE ARGUED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT U.S. VITAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS ARE ENGAGED IN BOSNIA. AND THEY'VE SEEN IN THE PAST, WHETHER IT BE LEBANON OR SOMALIA, THAT IF A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF CASUALTIES OCCUR ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, THE U.S. WILL LEAVE. WHAT DO YOU THINK'S GOING TO HAPPEN IN BOSNIA WHEN CASUALTIES OCCUR?

    RODMAN: I THINK IT'S A FUNCTION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT AND IN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. IF IT'S LAND MINES OR THINGS THAT ARE HARD TO AVOID, I DON'T THINK THIS RAISES A QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE. IF THERE'S A SCREW-UP, IF THERE'S SOME FIASCO, AS HAPPENED IN SOMALIA, THAT RAISES A QUESTION ABOUT THE JUDGMENT OF THE PEOPLE WHO PUT THEM THERE, THEN IT BECOMES A POLITICAL ISSUE. I THINK THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S TOLERANCE FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF RISK SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. I THINK THE PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE DANGERS. IF THE POLITICAL PREMISES UNDER WHICH WE WENT IN THERE SUDDENLY SEEM TO BE MISTAKEN BECAUSE OF SOME REAL FIASCO, THEN I THINK YOU HAVE A POLITICAL CRISIS IN THIS COUNTRY.

    ODOM: LET ME AGREE WITH PETER AND SAY EVEN MORE IN THAT REGARD. I THINK THE PUBLIC'S CAPACITY OR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THESE KINDS OF THINGS IS FAR GREATER THAN OUR MEDIA HAVE TENDED TO INDICATE. I DON'T THINK WE PULLED OUT OF SOMALIA STRICTLY BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF SIXTEEN OR SEVENTEEN RANGERS IN THE EPISODE THAT CREATED THE FUROR. IN FACT, IF YOU GO TALK TO THE RANGER UNIT, THEY CONSIDERED IT A GREAT SUCCESS; THEY KILLED OVER NINE HUNDRED SOMALIS IN THAT LITTLE ENGAGEMENT, AND THEY SAW IT WAS A GREAT TACTICAL VICTORY. I THINK THE HUE AND CRY TO LEAVE WAS A FUNCTION OF TWO THINGS: LARGELY THE MEDIA'S CLAMOR OVER IT, AND THE MEDIA REALLY CREATED THAT, AND THE SECOND POINT WAS, I THINK, MORE RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE REALIZED WE DIDN'T HAVE A STRATEGIC INTEREST IN SOMALIA. AND IT WAS MUCH EASIER TO ABANDON SOMETHING WHERE THERE WAS NO ONE MAKING A STRONG ARGUMENT THAT WE HAD A STRATEGIC INTEREST. NOW, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS SAID WE HAVE A VERY STRONG STRATEGIC INTEREST IN BOSNIA.

    HOST: NOW ANOTHER THING THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID IS THAT THERE'S NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE. HE REFERRED TO THIS REPEATEDLY IN TERMS OF THE HORRIFIC WAR CRIMES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN BOSNIA. I KNOW THE NATO MISSION IS STRICTLY DEFINED IN A MILITARY WAY, BUT WHAT DO YOU THINK IS GOING TO HAPPEN WHEN, IN THE MOST OBVIOUS CASES, YOU HAVE TWO INDICTED WAR CRIMINALS HEADING THE BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC, MR. RADOVAN KARADZIC AND GENERAL MLADIC.

    CLARKE: WELL, THEY OF COURSE, ARE OBLIGATED TO FADE OUT OF PUBLIC LIFE UNDER THE DAYTON ACCORDS. AND ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY ARE RAPIDLY LOSING SUPPORT INSIDE SERB AREAS OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. SO I THINK THAT, SO LONG AS THIS IS HANDLED DELICATELY -- IF PEOPLE SORT OF BLUDGEON AHEAD AND GO AFTER THESE PEOPLE, I THINK IT'S EXACTLY THE WRONG THING TO DO -- BUT IF IT'S HANDLED GENTLY AND FIRMLY, PURPOSEFULLY, I THINK IT'S GOING TO BE POSSIBLE TO NET THESE SORTS OF PEOPLE, YES.

    HOST: GREAT. WELL, I'M AFRAID THAT'S ALL THE TIME WE HAVE THIS WEEK, AND I'D LIKE TO THANK OUR GUESTS -- WILLIAM ODOM FROM THE HUDSON INSTITUTE; JONATHAN CLARKE FROM THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER; AND PETER RODMAN FROM THE NIXON CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM -- FOR JOINING ME THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS U.S. POLICY AND THE NATO MISSION TO BOSNIA. THIS IS ROBERT REILLY FOR ON THE LINE.

    05-Jan-96 3:04 PM EST (2004 UTC)
    NNNN
    Source: Voice of America
    .


    [02] U-S-BOSNIA (S ONLY) BY RON PEMSTEIN (STATE DEPARTMENT)

    DATE=1/5/96
    TYPE=CORRESPONDENT REPORT
    NUMBER=2-190875
    CONTENT=
    VOICED AT:

    INTRO: THE UNITED STATES IS SENDING OUT SENIOR DIPLOMATS TO THE BALKANS NEXT WEEK TO PREPARE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO BOSNIA AND TO TRY TO ADVANCE CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BOSNIA PEACEAGREEMENT. V-O-A'S RON PEMSTEIN REPORTS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

    TEXT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE RICHARD HOLBROOKE WILL BE VISITING ZAGREB, SARAJEVO AND BELGRADE NEXT WEEK IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S BRIEF TRIP TO THE REGION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO SAYS SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER PLANS TO VISIT ALL THREE CAPITALS IN EARLY FEBRUARY TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH THE BOSNIA PEACE AGREEMENT.

    IN ADDITION TO THE HIGH LEVEL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS,AMBASSADOR ROBERT GALLUCCI WILL BE GOING TO THE BALKANS NEXT WEEK TO TRY TO BRING CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN LINE WITH THE MILITARY EFFORTS.

    SPOKESMAN NICHOLAS BURNS SAYS AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI WILL ASSIST THE EUROPEAN UNION'S REPRESENTATIVE CARL BILDT.

    ///BURNS ACT///

    IN THESE MEETINGS, AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI WILL DISCUSS THE ENTIRE RANGEOF ISSUES RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON ACCORDS. THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT MISSION BECAUSE AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE SECRETARY TO COORDINATE ALL OF THE U-S GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, FINANCIAL AND OTHER, THAT WOULD HELP CARL BILDT AND HIS TEAM IMPLEMENT THE CIVILIAN SIDE OF THE DAYTON ACCORDS.

    ///END ACT///

    ONE OF THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS IS ASSEMBLING A CIVILIAN POLICE FORCE TO ASSURE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN BOSNIA. (SIGNED)

    NEB/PT
    05-Jan-96 4:19 PM EST (2119 UTC)
    NNNN
    Source: Voice of America

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