USIA - Transcript: Secretary Of State Albright On-Board Briefing, 97-02-15
From: The United States Information Agency (USIA) Gopher at <gopher://gopher.usia.gov>
TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT ON-BOARD BRIEFING
(Albright hopes to advance Charter talks in Moscow) (2350)
Washington -- Secretary of State Albright hopes to advance discussions on
the proposed Russia-NATO Charter during her visit to Moscow February 19-
21.
Speaking with reporters on-board the aircraft during her first overseas
trip as Secretary of State, Albright said the United States sees the
Charter as "a political document primarily and a way to make sure the
Russians understand that we are looking forward in terms of a more
cooperative relationship. For instance, the best example now of that
relationship is what is going on in Bosnia where U.S., Russian and NATO
forces are operating together through a consultative mechanism."
"The charter itself, as it evolves, is a way to institutionalize the new
relationship between NATO and Russia; one in which there would be a joint
council in which consultations could take place where Russia would have a
voice in some of the issues that are discussed at NATO -- not a veto, but a
voice," Albright said.
Albright acknowledged limited goals for her upcoming stop in Moscow.
"I consider that what I am doing in Moscow is filling out some of the
discussions that took place during the Gore-Chernomyrdin meetings and
putting in more of the details. The purpose of my stop in Moscow is to give
them further substance on this. I am not going to be asking for decisions.
I am going to be presenting further details. It is basically a trip where I
will have the opportunity to explain more about what we are doing. It is
not a negotiation."
Following is the transcript provided by the State Department:
(begin transcript)
U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman
February 15, 1997
PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
Enroute from Andrews Air Force Base to Rome February 15, 1997
ALBRIGHT: Here we are, off on our first trip. My plan is to get down to
work on a common agenda. That is what I am going to be doing in Europe and
then later in Asia. We will talk much more about Asia as we get closer. Let
me explain why I wanted to go to both areas on the same trip. I want it to
be very clear that we have vital strategic and economic interests in both
areas and it is important to pay equal attention to them. Despite the fact
that this is going to be a very long and arduous trip, I think it is very
important to make sure that both areas are covered.
As far as Europe is concerned, the common agenda has been visible, frankly,
in terms of the work we have been doing on the Trans-Atlantic relationship.
Generally, I am going to be speaking to that and, more specifically, to the
importance all of us attach to having a united, democratic Europe. I am
going to be talking about NATO enlargement and, at the same time, working
to assuage whatever Russian concerns there are about it, and talking about
the NATO-Russian charter; discussing that also when I am in Brussels with
the other Partnership for Peace members, so that there is generally a sense
about the importance of an undivided Europe.
I am going to be also talking with Europeans about common activities that
we have undertaken, such as in Bosnia, and about our common concerns about
what is happening in the Aegean and Cyprus. I also want to talk with
Europeans about out-of-area issues, specifically in Africa, and generally
discussing with them what I consider the hallmark of our time which is a
partnership with Europe in dealing with this common agenda, the kind of web
of relationships that will allow us to deal with the opportunities at the
end of the century.
We can now go to questions.
QUESTION: Here is an easy beginner: Yeltsin's opposition says his days are
numbered. They mean politically and medically. Are you not a bit uneasy
about Yeltsin's staying capacity?
ALBRIGHT: I think the issue here is that we have an excellent relationship
with President Yeltsin. The relationship between President Clinton and
President Yeltsin has worked very well for the last four years. President
Yeltsin's health seems to be improving. He is more visible at public
events. I am going to be meeting with him. President Clinton is looking
forward to meeting with him in Helsinki.
There are two parts to this. Obviously he himself and the role he has
played in democratizing Russia and reform is important, but there are other
elements within the government, increasingly so, that are also dedicated to
democracy and economic reform. We do not have concerns about the future
direction of Russia and want very much to work with other leaders, but also
with President Yeltsin because of the good relationship.
Q: I am sorry. My question was a little sloppy. They are speaking also of
the economy.
A: I think that clearly the Russians have had serious problems in their
economy. I think there are huge pockets of improvement and the necessity
for economic reform. We have a new initiative that we are putting forward
that I asked funding for, on behalf of the President, in my testimony which
will allow us to move to a new phase with Russia and the other New
Independent States in terms of locking in some of the reforms in a way that
goes beyond technical assistance.
Q: Madam Secretary, could you talk to us a little about this charter? What
is it going to be? Is it in any way going to be a legally binding document
that would have to be approved by parliaments? Will the Russians have to
take the best deal they can get? Will NATO expansion go on even if the
Russians do not agree to a charter?
A: First of all, I think it is very important for the Europeans and the
Russians to understand that we are into a new era. We do not need old-think
in terms of how NATO is viewed. It is not an adversarial relationship with
Russia. The charter itself, as it evolves, is a way to institutionalize the
new relationship between NATO and Russia; one in which there would be a
joint council in which consultations could take place where Russia would
have a voice in some of the issues that are discussed at NATO -- not a veto,
but a voice. There would be extensive consultations. We see it as a
political document primarily and a way to make sure the Russians understand
that we are looking forward in terms of a more cooperative relationship.
For instance, the best example now of that relationship is what is going on
in Bosnia where U.S., Russian and NATO forces are operating together
through a consultative mechanism.
Q: But it is not something that any parliament would have to agree
to?
A: It is our desire that this be a political document. The other aspect
that you asked about: we obviously want the work on the NATO-Russian
charter to progress as rapidly as possible. We all will be working on that.
But if it is not ready by the time Madrid takes place, we will go forward
with the Madrid Summit -- that is NATO enlargement -- anyway. Work is going
to go on intensively and extensively between now and then.
Q: Do you have concerns about the reaction in Russia since this seems to be
something that cannot really be negotiated? They really have no options
since Madrid will happen whether Russia agrees to the terms of the charter
or not. Do you have concerns beyond the political reaction? Do you have
concerns about the public reaction or do you think the Russian people are
not that concerned about it?
A: I think the issue here is that we, as well as the Russian leaders, need
to make clearer that there is time for new thinking on this. As I said, the
enlargement of NATO is not a move against Russia. In fact, what it is is an
attempt to do everything we can to stabilize central and eastern Europe --
an area out of which two world wars started and in which the Russians lost
large numbers of people, especially in the Second World War -- to have them
understand that a more stable central and eastern Europe is to their
advantage. I think what is going to be happening now, we hope, is greater
and greater understanding about what the NATO-Russian charter is supposed
to do and what NATO enlargement is not going to do. It is not an institution
that is directed against Russia, that is old-think. That is how we are
going to deal with it.
Q: Madam Secretary, if you could help explain: I gather there is some kind
of NATO meeting taking place on Monday, some kind of NATO ambassadorial
meeting or something, and then you will meet with NATO foreign ministers in
Brussels. I presume, and this is what I am checking with you, so you can
take an agreed package of positions with you to Moscow. Would that be
reasonable to assume, and if so, could you describe how this would be
different from what Mr. Solana has been doing?
A: There are discussions going on all the time about how to solidify
various parts of what the NATO-Russian charter is about. I am going to be
increasingly specific when I get to Moscow, but I do not yet want to
discuss what will be part of that. I will be doing that with you all later.
Steve, we are on a very fast track here, basically. We have a lot of work
to do between now and July. My trip is a part of the work process and
obviously this will be carried on by others and there will be benchmarks
along the way. What is happening, and we are working very closely with
Secretary-General Solana, is that we are constantly adding meat to the
charter -- there is beef in this charter. That is what we will be pursuing
in various places that I am going to be.
Q: Madam Secretary, could you talk a little bit about to what extent you
are going to discuss Turkey with allies in Europe? You have said before
that we have concerns about Turkey remaining a secular state. What do you
see the United States and the allies doing to try to reinforce the fact
that Turkey is a secular state? When you spoke about this to Erbekan, what
did he say to you when you told him how important that was?
A: I will be generally, obviously, talking to the allies about Turkey, and
to the EU ministers also. As I said, we are concerned about increased
tension in the Aegean and we want to make sure it is understood how
important it is for Turkey not only to remain secular but also to have a
tie to the West. We will just be generally talking about the developments
in Turkey. When I spoke with Prime Minister Erbekan, which is now several
months ago, and I made that statement, he took it on board. We did not
argue about it. I made the statement and said it was the basis of American
policy.
Q: Madam Secretary, President Chirac has proposed a five-nation summit to
talk about NATO enlargement. I gather the United States is skeptical about
this idea. Could you explain your position and why you do not think it is
such a great idea.
A: Let me say that we have, as I said earlier, a lot of business to be done
on the issues of NATO enlargement as well as the NATO-Russian charter. We
are now concerned with substance more than process. There will be the
Clinton-Yeltsin Summit and there will be the Madrid Summit. We will
determine various interim aspects of the procedures later. What we are
concerned about most of all now, Michael, is the substance of this. That is
what I am going to be working on on my trip and obviously there will be
others that will be pursuing that. But the process is not where we are
focused right now.
Q: Madam Secretary, what do you hope to achieve in Moscow in the talks with
Primakov? What do you need to take away from there? How far do you need to
get on this leg?
A: I am not setting it up in that particular way. I consider that what I am
doing in Moscow is filling out some of the discussions that took place
during the Gore-Chernomyrdin meetings and putting in more of the details.
The purpose of my stop in Moscow is to give them further substance on this.
I am not going to be asking for decisions. I am going to be presenting
further details. It is basically a trip where I will have the opportunity
to explain more about what we are doing. It is not a negotiation.
Q: I know you want to end this, but this is on a different topic, this is
about Zaire and Rwanda. Maybe it is unfair to ask you, but is there now a
new concern that things are spinning badly and that perhaps it was a
mistake to have short-circuited the idea of some kind of foreign intervention
force when we did?
A: I read what Kofi Annan had to say about it. What I read about Zaire is
troublesome. I will be discussing Zaire with most of my interlocutors,
clearly I will be doing that in Rome and Paris. I would like to reserve on
that question, but obviously we are concerned. The truth is that as we
talked about the international force at the time, it did a lot to release
the refugees. I do not think it was a failure. I think that it accomplished
quite a lot.
Thank you.
(end transcript)
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