U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #6, 00-01-27
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1320
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, January 27, 2000
Briefer: James P. Rubin
PAKISTAN
1,7 General Musharraf's Order that Sitting Judges Sign Loyalty Oaths
1-7 Recent Travel by Assistant Secretary Inderfurth and Ambassador Sheehan
2 Prospects for a Presidential Visit to Pakistan
3,4,5,7 Recent Hijacking/Hijackers Affiliation with Harakat-ul-Mujahadin
3-4,5,7 Links Between Elements of Pakistani Government and Afghanistan's
Taliban/Bin Laden
RUSSIA
8 Radio Liberty Journalist Disappearance in Chechnya
8-9 Secretary's Upcoming Trip to Russia/Meetings with Acting President
Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov/Co-Chairing Multilateral
Steering Group Meeting
9 Secretary's Views re Acting President Putin
10 Rep Burton's Hearing on Reported Russian Placement of Nuclear
"Suitcases" in US/Request for State Department Officials to Appear
at Hearing
18-19 Arms Control Discussions in Geneva/START III
CUBA
10-12 Update on Elian Gonzales Case/State Department's Role on Behalf of
US Citizens in International Child Custody Disputes
12-14 Grandmothers' Meeting/Conditions of Meeting/Cuban Government Protest
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
14,15 Status of Israeli-Syrian Track/Status of Experts' Meeting
14 Prospects for the Secretary to Travel to the Middle East
14-15 Status of Israeli-Palestinian Track/Permanent Status Issues
15 Ambassador Ross to Travel to the Region
15 Secretary Albright's Conversation with Chairman Arafat
17-18 Republicans' Debate/Criticism of Administration's Policy
TERRORISM
16,17 Reported Detention of Usama bin Laden Associate in Senegal with
Ties to Algerian Bomb Plot in US
SOUTH AFRICA
16-17 Secretary Albright's Meeting with South African Foreign Minister
AUSTRIA
17 Possibility of Austrian Freedom Party in Next Coalition
NORTH KOREA
17 US-DPRK Talks in Berlin
BURMA/THAILAND
Refugee Situation/Impact of Hospital Incident
ARMS CONTROL
19 Prospects for Establishing a CTBT Task Force
IRAQ
20-21 Candidate for Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #6
THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 2000, 12:50 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing, today being
Thursday. There will not be a briefing tomorrow, I believe. I have one
statement to read and then I will be happy to take your questions.
The United States deplores General Musharaff of Pakistan's order that
sitting judges sign loyalty oaths to the regime. In a midnight order on the
25th of January, General Musharaff decreed that all higher court judges,
including those on the Pakistan supreme court, must swear an oath the next
morning committing themselves to upholding the provisional constitutional
order - the order issued by General Musharaff himself. The chief justice
and five other supreme court justices who refused to swear to the oath have
been forced to quit the bench. Other appeals court judges have also refused
to take the oath.
This move by General Musharaff undermines the integrity and independence of
the judiciary in Pakistan by forcing judges to uphold the order that would
place Pakistan's constitution in abeyance. General Musharaff has removed
his actions from judicial review. The military-backed government, in their
view, now can act without facing such review. This is contrary to the path
of restoration of civilian rule the General pledged to follow when he took
power in October, and his promise at that time to respect the constitutional
order and human rights in Pakistan.
This development only reinforces the view we share with much of the
international community that General Musharaff needs to make clear in a
comprehensive fashion how he intends to return Pakistan to an elected
government with a functioning legislature and an independent judiciary
under a democratic constitution.
QUESTION: I've got a question. Between October and today, there was at
least one high profile visit by senior American officials, Mr. Inderfurth,
Mike Sheehan, and we know part of their agenda - terrorism, of course, and
such. But was his approach to rule, democratic or otherwise, on the agenda?
In other words, has the US privately been urging him to be a little bit
more consistently democratic?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Assistant Secretary Inderfurth did lead a delegation,
including Ambassador Mike Sheehan and the senior director from the National
Security Council, to Pakistan and they addressed all of the major issues of
concern with the leadership in Pakistan, including the question of
returning Pakistan to democratic civilian rule, including the regional
stability questions of concern to us, including our very strong concerns
and disturbing reports we've received about terrorism and particularly its
nexus with Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and they also discussed our non-
proliferation agenda.
So all of the issues were raised very directly with the government in
Pakistan.
QUESTION: Do you remember when that was?
MR. RUBIN: That was last week.
QUESTION: Last week. All right. And one other thing, once in a while, we
hear before there is a final decision what the Secretary is recommending.
Is this a point against a Presidential visit to Pakistan? Does the State
Department think that it's wise for the President to visit Pakistan while
he's visiting India and Bangladesh?
MR. RUBIN: The President has said that he intends to visit India and
Bangladesh but no decision has been taken as to whether he will go to
Pakistan as well. Let me be clear, we are not conducting business as usual
with Pakistan in light of the October coup there and our policy recognizes
however that we do have national interests of concern to us - I just
mentioned some of those to you - including non-proliferation, terrorism,
regional stability, the potential conflict with India. These are national
interests of the United States that we thought it was appropriate to raise
directly with Pakistani officials.
The question of whether the President will or won't go is up to the
President to make. Obviously, the Secretary will make a recommendation and
obviously there will need to be a calculation as to what is the best way to
advance our national interests, by trying to see that the kinds of steps we
want taken get taken or by avoiding Pakistan. That is the question that the
Secretary will wrestle with in the coming days and weeks as that decision
comes to the fore.
On this subject?
QUESTION: Yes. Two things. One, when you say in diplomatic parlance, is
"deplore" harsher than "condemn"?
MR. RUBIN: It's right up there.
QUESTION: And the second thing is, one of the clerics who was released as
a result of the hijacking gave a speech either yesterday or today in
Islamabad calling for a holy war against India. Is this the kind of thing
that General Musharaff and the government should be seeking to stop?
MR. RUBIN: Well, when it gets to free speech questions, it is kind of
tricky for me to tell other governments what they should and shouldn't
allow their people in their country to say. I would expect that everyone in
this room would have strong concerns about the right to publish information
and the right to speak. But certainly we do not want to see an escalation
of tensions between India and Pakistan.
We did have reason to believe that the hijackers may be affiliated with the
Harakat ul-Mujahedin which has been designated a foreign terrorist
organization. So the organization that we have evidence the hijackers may
have been affiliated with has been taking steps that have received the
highest possible condemnation from this government.
As far as a holy war is concerned, obviously that kind of incendiary
rhetoric only harms the chances for all the people in the region to achieve
their legitimate needs.
QUESTION: A couple of points. Apart from making this public statement,
has there been any diplomatic communication with Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: I think we've been in touch with them about the judges issue.
I can't tell you at what level.
QUESTION: And also on the - we understand that the delegation went to
Islamabad, asked for steps to be taken against the Harakat ul-Mujahedin.
Could you in public describe the response you've had from Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't received the kind of concrete assurances of
the steps they're going to take that we would like, but that's not the same
thing as saying that we believe that that's not possible. I think that the
officials involved believe they got a full hearing, that some of the
difficulties of Pakistan's dealing with organizations like this were
described. The leadership there took on board our very clear indications of
what we needed to see happen. We haven't received a formal yes or no but,
obviously, as I indicated in the beginning of my remarks, they haven't
yet done what we've been seeking.
QUESTION: Can I amend that just quickly, very quickly? The twin request
evidently was a lean on Taliban to get Usama bin Laden exiled for
prosecution. Could you verify that, and was the response similarly taking
it on board but not really responding?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this: We have been concerned for some time
about the ability of Usama bin Laden to operate in Afghanistan and the
links between elements of the Pakistani Government and the Taliban, which
control the parts of Afghanistan where Usama bin Laden has received safe
refuge, and we've been deeply concerned about this.
I think it's clear to us that Usama bin Laden, and thus his hosts, pose a
real and clear danger to the United States national interest and to the
American people. And I can assure you and tell you that Ambassador Sheehan
made very clear to the Pakistani Government the depth of concern that this
government feels about this issue where it's involved, as you know, one of
the largest counter-terrorism operations in modern history in the closing
days of the year 1999.
And we obviously believe that when it comes to threats to American lives,
there is no higher priority to this government, and I think Ambassador
Sheehan made that quite clear. Again, Usama bin Laden is still in
Afghanistan. He has not been brought to a country where we would want to
see him brought to justice, and we do not believe that all ties between
elements of Pakistan and the Taliban, who provide him the safe haven, have
been cut. But we will obviously be waiting to see whether Pakistan takes
the necessary steps that we've been seeking.
Does the US believe that Pakistan's security service, the ISI, have some
sort of - has a relationship with this Harakat ul-Mujahedin, and you all
believe that the ISI uses or works with some members of this terror
group?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we do believe that agencies of the Pakistani Government
have provided general support to a number of groups active in Kashmir,
including the Harakat ul-Mujahedin. That is a matter of extreme concern to
us. That is an organization that we have declared a terrorist organization
and there have been some links providing general support to a number of
groups operating in Kashmir, including this one. That is one of the issues
that we raised with them in these discussions.
QUESTION: This "general support" doesn't mean go hijack an airplane, does
it? I mean, general support could cover a lot of - maybe even - oh, what
should I say - inconsequential forms of assistance. Or is there more
concern there than "general" would suggest?
MR. RUBIN: If the Secretary of State determines that a government has
repeatedly provided support of international terrorism directly, then she
would be prepared to designate that country as a state sponsor of
terrorism. I hope that's responsive to your question.
QUESTION: You haven't reached that level, then?
MR. RUBIN: We have not so designated.
QUESTION: Or so designated.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)
MR. RUBIN: No, that's a comment about the realities, and I was asked a
specific question about the different ways in which support can yield a
view about what the original organization's role is, and I answered the
question. But, certainly, any country in the world should know that if we
determine that they have provided support to international terrorism on a
repeated basis, that they are subject to this designation.
QUESTION: The Pakistanis presumably - the Pakistani authorities
presumably say that it's difficult for them to take action against these
groups because of the level of popular support inside Pakistan for the
Kashmiri cause. What do you think of these arguments? Do you give them any
consideration at all?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me make an analogy that some of you may hate and
some of you might like, but at the risk of making an analogy that I can
then disavow later, let me try the following. There are organizations that
have operated in the Palestinian Authority that have been trying to pursue
terrorist acts, and we have worked closely with the government of Israel in
trying to see that the Palestinian Authority security apparatus cracks
down on those carrying out terrorism in a situation where they don't even
have full government authority because they're obviously not a state.
So we do believe it is possible to crack down on terrorist organizations
and we have so required that kind of action from the government of Pakistan,
to make sure that the links do not allow a terrorist organization like, for
example, Usama bin Laden's organization, to operate with impunity and to
not provide the kind of support that allows other terrorist organizations
to thrive.
QUESTION: Jamie, does the US Government believe that General Musharaff is,
in fact, in charge and that he has control over the military, or is his
position not quite as secure?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think we have any doubt about, or reason to doubt, his
ability to lead the government there.
QUESTION: So if he wanted to, the US Government believes that Musharaff
could tell the ISI to stop providing support to the HUM?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, but remember the issue here. The issue is effectiveness,
and in another context we've often talked about 100 percent effort and 100
percent results are not always the same thing; that when it comes to the
ability of terrorist organizations, given their very nature of being covert
and shady and operating in the shadows, that even the best of efforts
doesn't always mean that you have total effectiveness.
What we are looking for, however, is an effort to be made to deal with the
kinds of problems that are at the center of our national security. When it
comes to Usama bin Laden and his organization's potential threat to
Americans, there is no higher priority, and one of the messages that
Ambassador Sheehan delivered very clearly was that we want to see Pakistan
do everything it can do to prevent organizations like Usama bin Laden and
his operation from being able to operate in Afghanistan.
QUESTION: If I could just follow, during last week's trip, US officials
seemed to be somewhat optimistic on the signals General Musharaff was
sending with regards to return to civilian rule. It was something that he
had essentially said that he was going to consider and look at.
What do you think happened between last week and this week? And do you
think that that, in itself, was a signal that Musharaff was sending to the
United States that, in fact, you can forget about it?
MR. RUBIN: Forget about it?
QUESTION: Forget about it, with regards to -
MR. RUBIN: That would only be in a New York accent he would have to do
that.
QUESTION: -- with regards to the judiciary.
MR. RUBIN: The answer to your question is I don't think we see this
action as an irreversible step that prevents him from taking the necessary
steps - the action on the judges, that makes it inevitable that he will not
take the steps necessary to restore Pakistan to civilian democratic
rule.
You know, you may have heard some optimism. You know, in this business,
it's always important to try to retain a certain sense of optimism when
trying to pursue extraordinarily difficult tasks. And I welcome the
optimism that you heard. But from this podium and from the Secretary of
State's standpoint, what we are going to be looking for is concrete
progress, milestones achieved on the path to a return to civilian
democratic rule.
Obviously, this step with the judiciary is not a step forward; it's a step
backward. But because it's a step backward does not mean that General
Musharaff will not proceed down the path toward civilian democratic
rule.
QUESTION: There were four important US national interests that were
brought up by the visit of Mr. Inderfurth and Mr. Sheehan: nuclear,
terrorism, democracy and regional stability. I wonder, were they satisfied
with any of the responses on any of those four issues? You already said we
haven't received the kinds of concrete assurances that you were looking for
in terrorism.
MR. RUBIN: I think it's fair to say we have a long way to go in reaching
our - and having Pakistan address our concerns in those four areas.
QUESTION: Did the delegation come away with any sense of optimism? You
were asked two questions back. The premise of the question was that he had
disappointed the US, had given indications in those talks last week that
maybe he would act democratically.
MR. RUBIN: Right. I think maybe the best answer I can offer you is this
was the highest level visit, the first real direct visit from senior
Washington officials with General Musharaff. For those of you who have
watched diplomacy over the years, we would not have expected and I think we
would have been naïve to have expected that in one meeting it would be
a sea change in Pakistani policies towards these areas.
This is a dialogue that laid out very clearly by senior American officials
our concerns, and we are looking for Pakistan to address those concerns and
we did not expect that they would be resolved in one meeting.
QUESTION: Could I try something else? It's on the same thing.
No parallels are perfect and the Palestinian Authority, which was the PLO,
was never a country. However --
MR. RUBIN: I knew some would like it and some wouldn't.
QUESTION: No, it's a good parallel. But what that reminds me of is that
the State Department never accused the PLO, per se, of terrorism but
accused various parts of the PLO of terrorism. Is your - is Musharaff's
control so airtight that the State Department would not single out a
particular agency of the government as terrorism supporting - do you follow
me? - as you have - as there is a precedent for?
MR. RUBIN: Let me do the best I can on an extraordinarily difficult
question to answer.
QUESTION: I don't know how strong his control is but -
MR. RUBIN: There is a difference between providing general support to a
cause that many groups operating in Kashmir, including the HUM share, and
providing support, having foreknowledge, directing or helping carry out a
terrorist action.
We do not believe that Pakistan or any agency of its government had
foreknowledge of, supported or helped carry out the terrible hijacking; we
have no evidence to that effect. And what we do have evidence is that, in
general, there is support and ties between agencies of the government of
Pakistan and this and other groups operating in Kashmir and that difference
is an extraordinarily important one in the business that we're discussing.
QUESTION: Going back to the loyalty oath on the part of the judiciary,
did this specific issue come up last week in the talks between Inderfurth
and the Pakistani government?
MR. RUBIN: I will have to check that. It wouldn't have been something
that we would have come in with. I described the issues of concern to us on
the movement towards democracy, on terrorism, on regional stability and on
non-proliferation. Those are the issues that we raised from our standpoint
with the government of Pakistan.
Whether this was in the offing or was rumored at the time, I do not know. I
don't recall receiving a briefing about the trip, that this was a
significant part of their discussions.
QUESTION: But, in general, the United States Government, when talking
about return or approaching democracy, it includes an independent
judiciary; is that not correct?
MR. RUBIN: Obviously, it does. But the issue here that we were focused on
and have been focused on is getting a civilian government under democratic
rule. One of the pillars of a free society, of course, is an independent
judiciary. This step took place after that meeting.
And so I would expect that Assistant Secretary Inderfurth would have been
focused on the restoration of civilian rule and the importance of that and
whether or not he raised an issue of backpedaling with respect to the
judiciary, I said I just don't know. But I don't think it was a significant
component of the discussion on democracy.
QUESTION: I'll do my best to try and plant a quote here. Is the US
concerned that Pakistan is on the slippery slope to becoming a rogue state -
and a nuclear one?
MR. RUBIN: Those are double metaphors. Look, we have had a relationship
with Pakistan for many years. We do not have a relationship of business as
usual right now with Pakistan because of our concerns about the coup that
took place there and our concerns about these other issues.
We have a number of issues of serious concern to us that we have been
talking to the Pakistani government about. We do have diplomatic relations
with Pakistan. I hope that is responsive.
QUESTION: Is the US taking any action or seeking any clarification with
Russia as regards the disappearance of RFE correspondent Andrei Babitsky in
Chechnya?
MR. RUBIN: On this subject, several people were working on this this
morning. Let me say what I can about that. We are aware that Radio Liberty
journalist Andrei Babitsky, a Russian citizen, has not been heard from
since January 15. We understand that Radio Liberty officials are going to
Russia to work on establishing his welfare and whereabouts. We have been
concerned about the safety of journalists who have chosen to report from
the combat zone and, if we have not yet, I am sure we will be raising
this issue with Russian officials.
We support very strongly the freedom of the press and urge the government
of Russia to ensure that journalists are able to do their work without
unnecessary constraints in Chechnya. At the same time, our embassies in
Moscow and in Tblisi have issued notices and reissued notices recently to
journalists considering travel to Chechnya which cautions, as we feel
obligated to do, that travel to that region remains extremely dangerous
because of the conflict and the continued risk of kidnapping. This has been
issued to all American citizens as well.
So I think we've tried to inform journalists of the danger. We are
extremely concerned about any infringements on freedom of the press. We
know some Radio Liberty officials are going there and we will want to give
them the fullest possible support.
QUESTION: Can I try on another subject?
MR. RUBIN: More on Russia, yes.
QUESTION: What can you tell us in general about what the Secretary
intends to do in Moscow and can you give us your latest assessment of the
acting president? The Secretary has said some positive things about him. I
wondered if you could expand on those and say what direction you feel he is
going in and whether it is a good direction?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright will be meeting, as I understand it, with
Acting President Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov in her bilateral
discussions with Russian officials. This will be obviously the first and
highest level American trip to Russia to engage in a full set of issues
between the United States and Russia since Acting President Putin took
over. There will also be a meeting there of the Multilateral Steering Group
of the Middle East Peace Process that Foreign Minister Ivanov and
Secretary Albright will be hosting.
The Secretary is looking forward to her first meeting with Mr. Putin since
he became Acting President and I think they will be discussing our
fundamental objectives in our relations with Russia in the coming year,
including the importance of improving and enhancing our cooperation in
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including
developments that we would like to see on the arms control front and
improving the security of the United States and Russia vis-a-vis the
nuclear danger, as well as discussing very prominently our profound concern
and the disturbing developments that have taken place in Chechnya.
We will also, obviously, have an opportunity to talk about Russia's
transition, its democratic transition and its transition to a market
economy and the prospects for its full integration into the global economic
community.
With respect to Acting President Putin, let me summarize what I understand
to be the Secretary's views on this subject. She has met him in his
previous capacity. She has been aware of different strains of his
background, including his role as a KGB officer and including his
association with a number of the leading reformers in St. Petersburg and
elsewhere. And is it her view that she wants to get a firsthand assessment
of how he intends to operate now that he is the acting president, which
brings additional responsibilities and can bring out the intentions of a
person more clearly than subordinate roles that may have required people to
hide their true views.
So there is really no way to judge surely the views of someone until they
have the power to make decisions, and she'll be looking for a firsthand
view. And we will be judging Acting President Putin based on his actions
and the decisions he makes, and obviously one decision is one that we have
had major concerns about that we found profoundly disturbing, and that is
the continued use of military force in Chechnya to an increasingly clear
dead end; that it's becoming increasingly clear that the points that
we've made to Russian officials about the difficulties and the counter-
productive nature of their operation is proving correct.
That doesn't mean we don't understand the risks of terrorism. We just
talked in this room for quite some time about the issue of Usama bin Laden,
and it is certainly true that there are number of loosely knit extremist
organizations, including Usama bin Laden and those who support him, who
also support those who have been operating in Chechnya. So that we share
some common ground in our joint desire to prevent extremist views from
pursuing terrorist actions, but we think the approach that Russia has taken
to Chechnya has been so out of bounds in terms of meeting its objectives,
and we've had specific concerns about specific actions that I've described
to you in the past.
So that is a long answer, but I hope meets your two questions. And I don't
know whether that was what you wanted as well.
QUESTION: It was, but I have another one. I hope this isn't too much from
left field, but earlier this week, you may be aware of the fact there was a
hearing in LA based on testimony from an ex-KGB Colonel, who is in a
witness protection program. According to Congressman Burton and Weldon,
they had asked someone from the State Department, I think a few officials,
to come and testify. And the way that they characterize it is the State
Department has ignored their requests. This has to do with allegations
that the Russian spies placed suitcases with small bombs in various
places around the US with nuclear devices.
What is the State Department's reaction to the fact that they were asked to
come and testify at this hearing? Do you know anything about suitcases with
nuclear devices that may or may not have been placed around the US? Thank
you.
MR. RUBIN: With respect to what may or may not have been placed around
the United States and what risks that might or might not pose to American
citizens, that would be beyond the purview of the State Department. That
would be for other agencies to determine, and I would have every reason to
believe that this issue, which is not new, that Representative Burton has
sought to - how shall I say - dramatize is not news to us at the Department
and we, therefore, expect that it's not news to other agencies who
might actually have responsibility for trying to get to the bottom
of it.
With respect to Representative Burton's views about what the State
Department should or shouldn't have done in a hearing, I will have to check
with Legislative Affairs. Beyond saying that, I fear I was going to make a
very dumb joke, so I will not.
QUESTION: A new subject but also related to Congress.
MR. RUBIN: You would have loved it, but it might not have been good for
me.
QUESTION: Does the State Department share the Attorney General's feelings
that pending legislation in Congress to make Elian Gonzalez a citizen would
have a bad effect on US - Americans in similar situations - American
parents in similar situations?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we did attach a brief, or a statement, to the INS's brief
that was a declaration by Assistant Secretary Mary Ryan, and what we have
concerns about is the following: that a failure to implement the decision
by the INS could seriously prejudice the ability of the United States to
help parents outside the United States recover children who have been taken
to foreign countries; in other words, we have been at the forefront of
pushing the parental rights to deal with child custody cases in our
discussions with other governments around the world, and our credibility
and effectiveness in putting parents' rights at the forefront of these
issues that often can get quite complex could be seriously undermined and
jeopardized by a decision that would challenge that basic precept of our
work.
We believe the rights of parents are recognized internationally and have
long been a central premise of our consular work on behalf of Americans. It
is a basic precept of our work that the parents of American citizen
children, not the Department of State or the United States Government,
should decide what is best for their children. And, increasingly, one of
the roles that the Consular Affairs Bureau has taken on is the provision of
services in connection with children, including the prevention and
resolution of cases of international parental child abduction.
We believe that our work in this area, which is, we believe, the most
concentrated work done by any government in the world, is jeopardized by a
challenge to that basic precept. Our work on behalf of children in such
cases is almost always initiated by a parent's request for assistance and
often occurs in the context of an international child custody dispute
involving an American child.
We have been at the forefront of providing consular services to our
citizens and in advocating on behalf of parents seeking the return of their
children. The reality is that other countries will scrutinize our practices,
our credibility; and our effectiveness therefore depends on our ability to
adhere at home to the principles that we espouse. These are considerations
we believe are critical to the ability of the United States to obtain the
return of children to the United States.
So we are concerned that challenging this basic precept of our work could
make it harder for us to effectively serve the American people and, in
specific cases, desire to get children back from other countries.
QUESTION: The last time that I remember the same argument being made that
this would hurt the credibility of the US, it was a complete failure, the
one on the CTBT, which the Senate rejected.
MR. RUBIN: There is an analogy that barely gets in the right part of
right field.
QUESTION: No, the point was that that argument that you've just made
hasn't seemed to --
MR. RUBIN: No, there's no linkage between those two. I'm having trouble
processing the linkage that could be in your mind. So let me repeat myself
so I can explain it to you, which is that we are trying to operate
internationally. And we are telling, very clearly in this case, what the
potential damage is. That is our job to describe very honestly, very
candidly, what our concerns are. This is not a question of the comprehensive
test ban, which has been a treaty which has been opposed by a large
group of senators for as long as I've been in Washington. This is a case of
first impression that relates to the child Elian Gonzalez. And I fail to
see any linkage between our concern about the credibility of our serving
American citizens in foreign countries based on the argument of parents'
rights and the comprehensive test ban.
QUESTION: The point was, which you chose to ignore, was that arguments
such as this, about damaging the US credibility abroad, on whatever issue,
haven't seemed to work in the past.
MR. RUBIN: Right. I think that is demonstrably untrue and that your
assessment of it is based on one issue, the CTB. If we go down the issues
of concern that we have expressed to Congress, on funding for overseas
programs, on the United Nations debt relief, on all the other hundreds of
treaties that have been passed by the Congress, if you go to a number of
initiatives that the Senate and the House have improved on every part of
our foreign policy, I think you will find the score is closer to 99 to 1
than 1 for 2.
QUESTION: Jamie, has the State Department expressed this concern directly
to members of the Senate and the House?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know. I think the members of the Senate and the House
aren't really fully back yet. I know that this was first put forward in the
attachment to the INS's brief this morning.
QUESTION: Jamie, does the State Department believe that this case is an
example of international child abduction, which you --
MR. RUBIN: I was not even suggesting that. What I was suggesting was that
the issue of parents' rights comes up in a number of different cases, child
custody as well as child abduction. I was not suggesting that this is a
case of child abduction. It was the INS that, as I understand it, allowed
the boy to go to his relatives in Miami. That wasn't by kidnapping. I
didn't mean to imply that, other than to talk about the different work that
Consular Affairs does.
QUESTION: Do you have any sense of how successful the US has been in
making this argument to other governments and, therefore, how serious?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We do believe that one of the reasons why we are
successful in many, many cases of getting children returned home is that we
have made the parents' rights the principal argument in pursuing these
cases. And so I think it's fair to say in many if not most of the cases
where we've had success, and there have certainly been many of those, that
this was an important factor. That is why we're so concerned about having
that view challenged.
QUESTION: Elian's grandmothers say that during their meeting they had
given a cell phone to Elian so that he could speak with his father in Cuba
and that the US State Department took the phone away, some US officials
took the phone away.
MR. RUBIN: The State Department?
QUESTION: Well, US officials representing the State Department took the
phone away. Is there any truth to that?
MR. RUBIN: I can't imagine why the State Department would have been
monitoring the rooms where this took place. I will check that and will
check what officials were involved. But I think our role has tended to be
not inside the United States; it has tended to be focused on the contact
between Cuban officials and the American government about things like, as
you know, last week, getting visas for the grandmothers.
Our role also, as I indicated, in another part of the State Department, is
to try to help American citizens trying to secure access to their children
in custody battles. I don't think it was State Department officials who
were involved in the question of what equipment may or may not have been in
some meeting with someone else. But I'll certainly check that for
you.
QUESTION: Do you have any idea how many cases there are in which the
Consular Affairs Bureau is going to bat for parents who are trying to --
MR. RUBIN: We can try to get that data for you.
QUESTION: It doesn't have to be exact, but a dozen, scores --
MR. RUBIN: Just rough numbers. Right. We will get that data for
you.
Same subject?
QUESTION: Has the US received any - what's the right word?
MR. RUBIN: Concerns expressed by other governments about this?
QUESTION: No - yes. Has the Cuban Government - did the Cuban Government --
MR. RUBIN: I'm just seeing the story get written. And, you know, line
three - I'm not aware of that but I can check with Consular Affairs about
it.
QUESTION: Whether they have protested what happened in the meeting, on
the phone -
MR. RUBIN: Oh, on the phone? Have we received a protest from the Cuban
Government?
QUESTION: Right.
MR. RUBIN: Okay. I will check that. I am not aware of that. It has not
been provided to me and I have been getting pretty good stuff on this. But
maybe. That doesn't address the phone.
Oh, pardon me. The Cubans did protest both through the Department of State
in Washington and to the US Interests Section in Havana regarding the
conditions of the meeting. The government of Cuba was concerned about
arrangements for the meeting between Elian and his grandmothers. In
particular, you know, one of the concerns you raised.
But it would be hard for me to get more specific about that. But they did
protest.
QUESTION: On another subject?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Has the Department of State made any kinds of inquiries into
this and is there some sort of --
MR. RUBIN: Right. We don't always respond to every protest from the Cuban
Government.
QUESTION: Forget about it, right?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: The Syrians did not arrive in Washington this week.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Do you have any prospect for them ever coming?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I think we do expect there to be the kinds of discussions
that I've described to you. We have been in diplomatic channels both the
substance and the procedure of the Syria track with both Damascus and
Washington and we do expect experts from both sides to come in the near
future.
Given the upcoming travel schedule, obviously, that is going to be slowed
down. Ambassador Ross is going to be accompanying Secretary Albright to her
meetings in Davos, including with Chairman Arafat and then accompanying her
to Moscow where the multilateral track of the peace process will take
place. So that certainly makes it -slows down the process a little bit. And
we recognize that the parties have differing views on the negotiation and
we continue to work intensely with them through diplomatic channels. But
this scheduling issue makes it unlikely they will be meeting in the
next several days.
QUESTION: Is there still a possibility that the Secretary will go to the
Middle East after Moscow?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't rule anything out in this business, but I would say
whatever possibility there was has reduced significantly.
QUESTION: Jamie, on the Palestinian track, do you guys share the
assessment of some Israeli and now Palestinian officials saying that the
February 13 deadline is just no longer possible; it's no longer possible
for it to be met? And, also, these reports about this Palestinian proposal,
the final status proposal, can you say anything about those reports?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we've seen reports on that proposal. Obviously, the
parties are negotiating and I'm not going to get into the substance of
their negotiations.
With respect to the February issue, let me just say Secretary Albright and
the President in different fora have discussed this issue with Chairman
Arafat. The Secretary intends to ask Ambassador Ross to go from Moscow to
the region to work on the Palestinian-Israeli peace track.
With respect to the mid-February question, let me say negotiating a
framework agreement is a very formidable task and obviously there is a
formidable challenge posed by the realities of the calendar. We have to
make sure that whatever happens with the calendar, that there is an
effective process that can allow an agreement to be produced on all the
permanent status issues. So the key point for us is whether we can get an
agreement and not so much when the agreement is struck in terms of the
framework agreement.
QUESTION: Does that mean that you agree that it's basically not - it's
not possible --
MR. RUBIN: Well, we recognize that, you know, the clock is ticking and
it's the end of January and it's hard to see how that date could be met.
But, on the other hand, we want to be sure. And what counts is that there
is an effective process so that it can be met at some - I mean, the point
is to be able to achieve the substantive agreement, not when that agreement
is reached. And we have - will continue to work on that.
QUESTION: Can you just fill us in on the various discussions about the
possibility of holding marathon talks between Palestinians and Israelis in
the United States before the date? Was this ever proposed and what did the
United States feel about it?
MR. RUBIN: Right. I don't intend to describe to you what every different
procedural or substantive proposal was made by various parties, except to
say that Chairman Arafat and the Secretary spoke yesterday, that Ambassador
Ross is expected to go to the region from Moscow, which would mean late
next week he would be there, which would be the end of the first week of
February.
That is the next real opportunity for us to see where we can be helpful in
the peace track between Israel and the Palestinians and, beyond that, I am
not going to speculate on next steps.
QUESTION: Can you tell us what it was that prevented the Syrian and
Israeli experts from coming to Washington at the time which was initially
proposed?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there clearly wasn't a willingness to come at the
initial suggestions. There were some mixed signals there. And let me simply
say the pace of this process is going to be determined by the parties. We
can't push them any faster than the two sides are willing to go.
QUESTION: The Turkish President is coming to Washington at the end of the
next month. Do you know anything about that trip?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check that for you.
QUESTION: Have you seen the story about the possible link between Usama
bin Laden and the Algerian terrorists, and do you have anything?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have anything worthy of use to you. I mean, obviously,
we're always concerned about that, but it's really more of an FBI matter at
this stage.
QUESTION: Can you tell me about the talks this morning between Secretary
Albright and South Africa's Foreign Minister? In particular, I'm wondering,
well, obviously, what was discussed and if there were any areas of
agreement or disagreement on the situation in the DRC and setting a
timetable for getting peacekeepers in?
MR. RUBIN: I can give you sort of a general readout of the meeting
between Secretary Albright and the South African Foreign Minister and
perhaps we can get you together with some of the regional experts for more
details. But, in general, they did discuss the important work that's being
done in New York on trying to get a sustainable peace achieved in the Congo
and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and next steps that need to be
taken toward that end, including how to get a national dialogue started
and how to ensure that the demobilization of forces occurs.
They also discussed the important subject of Angola and what environment we
need to create as an alternative to the civil war that's plagued that
country for so long. And we certainly will be urging that political and
economic reforms take place in Angola, the kinds of reforms that create
real alternatives to the kind of devastating war that has occurred
there.
They talked about they are both attending the Community of Democracies
meeting in Warsaw later this year and they talked about the many ways in
which the South African-American relationship has been very strong and will
continue to be so.
QUESTION: Has the State Department taken any view? I know DRC President
Lawrence Kabila has in New York been attacking Pretoria for not being
objective. Does the US have any view that Pretoria could play a role in the
DRC conflict?
MR. RUBIN: I think, obviously, South Africa is a leading country in
Africa and the role that the South Africans play should never be minimized
in international conflicts as significant as the one that is taking place
in Congo. I think the south African countries, as a region, is certainly
playing a role. President Mugabe has been playing a role. And we certainly
did discuss with the South African Foreign Minister the importance of
support for this difficult process. And beyond that I would have to
defer comment.
QUESTION: The question about South Africa's neutrality which Kabila is
talking about?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as far as we're concerned, there are a number of
countries that have been involved in one way or another, a number of
countries in Africa that have been involved in one way or another in either
being supportive of countries who are involved, and that is why the
Secretary has talked about the conflict as a virtual world war in Africa.
But I don't think the issue of neutrality came up in this meeting.
QUESTION: Another subject. Jamie, there has been quite an uproar in the
European - a number of European governments over the possible inclusion of
the Austrian Freedom Party in the next coalition. What is the American
position on that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say the following on that: We have excellent
relations with Austria. The choice of a government, obviously, is one for
the Austrians to decide. We have had a close relationship based on
Austria's commitment to pluralism, tolerance and democratic principles. If
the Freedom Party were to enter the government, we would expect that party
to live up to the commitment that I described of those principles.
This is something we will follow very, very closely. In all our meetings
with Haider, we have emphasized our strong opposition to any statements or
any actions that might be interpreted or as expressing sympathy for the
former Nazi regime or as explaining away in any way, shape or form the
terrible tragedy of the Holocaust.
QUESTION: Does it make a difference for the American evaluation whether
Mr. Haider himself joins the government or just members of his party?
MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously, we'd have to take a look at that. What
matters less are the personalities than the extent to which the party and
he live up to the commitment that I just described of pluralism, tolerance
and democratic principles. That's what counts.
QUESTION: Jamie, I know you said you didn't have much on Usama bin Laden
and the Algerian terrorist link, but can you say anything about the arrest
in Senegal and whether the US is doing anything to try and keep the suspect
arrested there, or if there has been any security upgrades in Senegal or
Mauritania because of the arrest?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any information about security upgrades. We're
obviously always focused very clearly on securities of embassies. To show
you how little I have on the UBL question, I will read you the proposed
answer: "I would refer you to the FBI."
QUESTION: Where are we on North Korea and the newest talks in Berlin?
MR. RUBIN: The round of talks between the United States and North Korea
began on Saturday, January 22nd in Berlin. Additional meetings were held on
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and they met again today. They have been taking
place in a businesslike atmosphere. It's not appropriate for me to comment
on the substance of the discussions at this point, but at the end we try to
give some description of that.
QUESTION: Jamie, I realize that usually you don't like to talk about
politics, especially the presidential campaign, but last night the
Administration came in for some pretty heavy hits in the Republican
debates. One candidate said the Administration was clueless as to India and
Pakistan, that they made a total hash of the WTO question, coddling China -
and just a couple things - and then sacrificing Israel, turning a blind eye
to Syrian terrorism.
And I'm wondering if you have any comments about what these candidates have
to say?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I've generally been reluctant to engage in this kind of
a process. But let me say on one of those, certainly the suggestion that we
have harmed the security of Israel by coddling the Syrians, is absurd on
its face. The Prime Minister of Israel has come to us seeking our
assistance in trying to develop a peace process with the Syrian Government
that will advance the security of Israel and advance the security of the
Middle East.
We have said that a peace between Israel and Syria is one that could
benefit greatly the security of the United States and the security of the
world. And so to suggest that we are acting outside the interests of Israel
really means these people have an argument with the government of Israel,
not the government of the United States. We have seen our role to try to
help the government of Israel achieve its goals, so long as the needs and
concerns of both sides can be met. We have moved the process forward in
a dramatic way. For the first time, Israel has met at a political
level with the Syrian Foreign Minister, which was a dramatic step forward
for Israel and the region.
And so any suggestion that we have somehow harmed Israel and coddled Syria
is nonsense and we have done what we think is best for the United States.
And what we have done on the Syria track we have done step by step, working
with Prime Minister Barak who would like to see a peace between Israel and
Syria.
QUESTION: This may be a question for the INS but there is a report the
United States is planning to allow a fairly sizable group of Burmese exiles
into the US that are currently along the Thai border in a refugee camp. I
was wondering if the State Department knew anything about that.
MR. RUBIN: I have seen the report and we are trying to check on that and
we will try to get you something as soon as we can.
QUESTION: When you check on that, can you also find out if the decision
to accept these people has any relation to the hostage incident?
MR. RUBIN: We'll check on that.
QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the talks in Geneva last week on
START III? There have been various accounts of proposals which were put
forth.
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Let me say that we and the Russians have been discussing
for several months the issue of how to further reduce the strategic
offensive arms of the United States and Russia. Russia has expressed a
preference for lower reductions, down to a level of some 1,500 strategic
nuclear warheads on each side. Our position has been quite clear and that
is that the presidents in Helsinki, President Yeltsin at the time and
President Clinton, had agreed that these discussions would be based on the
number of 2,000 to 2,500. That is the position that we have expressed
in these talks.
Obviously, there are a number of components for these talks, including the
National Missile Defense and how to convince Russia that we face a joint
threat from the development of long-range missiles around the world and
that we need to make modest adjustments to the ABM treaty that will not
interfere with our ability to have strategic stability between the United
States and Russia and, meanwhile, enable us to move lower and lower, down
to, as we have proposed, a level of some 2,000 to 2,500 warheads.
I would expect this to also be an issue that comes up prominently in
Secretary Albright's discussions in Moscow.
QUESTION: What exactly is your objection to the 1,500 level?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I would ask you to look a little bit elsewhere. But we
have made a judgment that, at this time, based on our assessment of what we
think is necessary for deterrence, that we can achieve a lot in terms of
reductions, we can achieve a lot in terms of improving our security, we can
limit the nuclear danger by going down to a level of 2,000 to 2,500 without
jeopardizing our concerns about - or jeopardizing our interests with
respect to nuclear deterrents.
That is where we are right now; that has been the result of a significant
amount of work a couple of years ago, in early '97, in the Pentagon and
that then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shalikashvili oversaw, and we think
that's an appropriate number. And, frankly, the Russians agreed in Helsinki
that that was the appropriate number to seek an agreement about.
QUESTION: Hypothetically if they linked 1,500 with concessions on ABM,
amendments for ABM, would that be an attractive offer?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly, any recognition by Russia that we can amend the ABM
treaty and still protect its fundamental purpose to avoid an arms race and
to ensure that we and the Russians can continue down the strategic arms
control ladder in improving our security, any recognition by Russia that
amendments to the ABM treaty can be accomplished without undermining the
fundamental purpose of the ABM treaty would be a welcome step in the
right direction, because it would mean that they have understood that
there are dangers, that you can meet those dangers with a limited national
missile defense and do so in a way that protects strategic stability of the
ABM treaty and the prospects for even deeper arms cuts.
QUESTION: In November, the Administration announced that a CTBT task
force would eventually be established. Is there any progress on that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I think we are moving quite smartly on that and I may
have something for you in the next 24 hours.
QUESTION: Smartly?
MR. RUBIN: Smartly, meaning - maybe I spent too much time in a foreign
country. But I think that means quickly or aggressively. Smartly. Isn't
that what it means? Help me on that.
QUESTION: Quickly, all right.
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Oh, sorry, we'll go with you in one second.
QUESTION: I just wanted to - your preferred candidate for the Iraqi arms
inspection commission did not get the nod, despite the fact that you said
you were going to keep pushing. I'm wondering though if Blix -- what you
think about him as a good alternate.
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We took the position, and I think some of you may
remember this, that we approached this problem based on objective criteria
and we had four criteria: Did the candidate have expertise in the
disarmament area; were they a proven independent; were they professional,
and; did they have managerial ability?
We support the Secretary General and welcome the proposal for Dr. Blix to
take over the mission of inspections in Iraq. We believe that the Secretary
General and his nominee, Mr. Blix, deserve the support of the entire
Council. Throughout the selection process, we focused on qualifications.
There were a number of candidates including Rolf Ekeus and Hans Blix who
met our qualifications, and we supported whoever we thought met our
qualifications. There were many on the list who did not meet those criteria
who were candidates who didn't have expertise, who hadn't proven independence.
We made it clear that we were prepared to fight for Mr. Ekeus. Anyone who
was in New York last week I think will understand that. But, obviously,
other countries were prepared to put other interests above the interest of
supporting the Secretary General's nomination, despite their longing for
Mr. Ekeus when Richard Butler was the chairman.
So we believe that Dr. Blix meets the criteria. And I have seen some
criticism of him which strikes me as entirely misplaced. People who don't
understand the IAEA inspection system often suggest that somehow he was
responsible for the failure of Iraq to comply with the international
safeguards. At that time, the IAEA did not have the capability to inspect
sites outside of the declared site. So the covert program that Saddam
Hussein was pursuing could not be inspected by the IAEA. And anyone who
thinks that Dr. Blix is not independent and determined vis-a-vis countries
of concern, should try to recall and reflect the very determined
stance he took in trying to nail down North Korean cooperation with the
international community on the subject of its nuclear material.
So he has shown a proven ability in this area. He has shown a proven
ability to stand up to those who are acting not in conformity with the
requirements of the IAEA and, in fact, much of our information and our
determination to deal with the North Korea problem came about as a result
of his determination to bring to world attention the risks that were posed
by North Korea's unsafeguarded programs or absence of some information. So
that is the reason why we support Dr. Blix. We supported Rolf Ekeus as
well. They both meet the criteria and we wanted to make our decision based
on criteria and not some prior bias.
QUESTION: So you don't see this then - you were using some pretty strong -
you and the Secretary were using some pretty strong language last week and
earlier this week about how you didn't think that Baghdad should have a
veto over this. You don't see this as them - as Baghdad -
MR. RUBIN: They've already rejected Blix. So, I mean, Baghdad is not
going to have a veto. What we thought was important to get a person who
meets these criteria was to show the other countries that they couldn't
make their decisions based on political calculations and we believe Blix
clearly shows that that strategy worked.
QUESTION: Given that the Iraqis have rejected Blix and basically reject
the whole resolution, how do you envisage the new arms control organization,
the acronym for which I forget, actually getting down to work and -
MR. RUBIN: UNMOVIC.
QUESTION: That's it, UNMOVIC. Thank you. Actually getting down to work.
How is it going to do this, in your view?
MR. RUBIN: Obviously, without the acquiescence and cooperation of Iraq,
UNMOVIC and the Security Council can never implement its mandate. And so
long as Iraq refuses to cooperate, the sanctions will stay on indefinitely,
the United States will continue its policy of containment, and when Iraq
purports to act in ways that could affect our national interests, we will
respond accordingly.
So Iraq is only shooting itself in the foot by failing to cooperate with
the international community's demand that it allow these inspectors
in.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Rubin. I just wanted to ask at what level
currently is the threat of terrorism to the Department's assets overseas,
say compared to 20, 30 days ago, the 27th of December?
MR. RUBIN: I will have to try to get that information for you. I don't
have it available and I'm not sure it's possible to give it.
QUESTION: Do you know anything about a report in Iran about a former CIA
official going as a tourist to Iran and dispensing large sums of money to
various --
MR. RUBIN: I have no information about that.
(The briefing was concluded at 1:57 p.m.)
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