U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #57, 99-05-03
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
879
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, May 3, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 US Commemorates World Press Freedom Day
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
1-3,8,10 US-Russian Contacts/Consultations Regarding Kosovo
3-4,5-6 Kosovar Liberation Army/Designation/Reported Drug
Trafficking/Tactics
10 US Contacts with with KLA
4,6-7 Rev Jesse Jackson's Efforts re Release of US Servicemen
/Response to Milosevic's Gesture/Role in Administration
4-5 NATO Air Campaign/Effectiveness/Conditions to End Campaign
5 Readout of G-8 Meeting
7-8 Situation Inside Kosovo
8,9 Prospects for Release of Captured Yugoslav Soldiers
8-9 Reported Desertions within the Serb Army
9 Planning for Arrival of Kosovar Albanian Refugees in US
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
11,13-14 Status of Peace Process
PANAMA
11 Election Results
COLOMBIA
12 Government's Talks with the FARC
CUBA
12-13 Baltimore Orioles and Cuban Team Baseball Game/Visa Status
JAPAN
14 Visit of Prime Minister Obuchi
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #57
MONDAY, MAY 3, 1999, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing on this
Monday. Let me say that today does mark World Press Freedom Day, and the
United States applauds the work of journalists around the world and
recognizes those who daily risk their freedom and often their lives to
report the news.
Throughout the world, journalists risk harassment, arrest, imprisonment and
even death to get the story told. This is particularly relevant at a time
like this, where we note the continued dangerous environment the government
of Serbia has created in its attempts to silence objective and independent
voices within its borders. The murder a little over two weeks ago of a
prominent, courageous, independent voice, Mr. Curuvija, is only the most
recent example of this campaign.
Dozens of Kosovar Albanian journalists have had to free their homes or go
into hiding. The Belgrade regime clearly intends to silence all independent
voices, deny its citizens access to objective information and violate
international standards of press freedom. That's particularly brought home
by the inability of any of you or your organizations to work freely in
Kosovo to tell the world what's going on there.
With those opening comments, let me turn to your questions.
QUESTION: Jamie, some day maybe we'll have a briefing that doesn't begin
with Kosovo, but today isn't the day. Mr. Chernomyrdin is in town. In
considering the close contacts in, while there's a disagreement, what seems
to be a good working relationship with Moscow and its efforts in Belgrade,
what might he have to say that you folks don't know already? And if you
know what that is, what do you make of it?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this -- President Clinton spoke to President
Yeltsin yesterday. Former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin spoke to the Vice
President yesterday, and Secretary Albright spoke to Foreign Minister
Ivanov yesterday. This is part of the close and continuing consultation we
have with the government of Russia, because we believe that Russia can play
a constructive role in bringing this crisis to a solution. Russia was part
of the Contact Group; Russia was part and parcel in putting together
peace agreements that we worked for many, many months on when we were
giving diplomacy the primary role.
As we have moved from force supporting diplomacy to diplomacy supporting
force, our objectives have changed. Primarily among our diplomatic
objectives are maintaining maximum unity amongst the NATO allies in all
major countries in the world in our objectives. Secondly and related to
that is to explain to the Russians the rationale for our position, the
reasons why we have been so clear and uncompromising on the five objectives.
They're all basically related to one thing: they're related to the million
people who have been kicked out of their homes and either deported to
foreign countries or otherwise fleeing for their lives.
That means getting a secure environment for them to return, which requires
the Serb forces to leave; it requires an international security force with
NATO at its core to deploy; and it requires steps towards developing a
political arrangement.
During these conversations, we got the impression that the Russian
Government continues to share our basic objectives -- that is, to end
attacks against Kosovar civilians; withdrawing Serb forces from Kosovo; and
allowing for refugees to return and unimpeded access by humanitarian
organizations. Now we have to find an implementation mechanism to achieve
those objectives.
This effort began when Foreign Minister Ivanov and Secretary Albright met
in Oslo. They discussed the major objectives; they disagreed on what kind
of implementation mechanism would be necessary. We still believe strongly
that there must be the deployment of an international security force with
NATO at its core.
We do look forward to hearing the results of former Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin's visit to Belgrade and his discussions with the Yugoslav
leadership. To my knowledge, the details of all of that have not yet been
transmitted to the United States.
So on the first instance, we will want to get a sense from the Russians of
where they think Belgrade is coming from. Has Belgrade finally gotten the
message? Have they understood how isolated they are? Do they understand
that with every passing day they get weaker and weaker and NATO retains and
gets stronger every day? Do they understand that the air campaign is only
going to intensify; and if they do, what positions are they prepared
to take?
The public versions of the positions we've heard about from Belgrade remain
not serious because they refuse to accept two of the key points, which are
that the Serb forces must withdraw and that an international security force
with real military capabilities - an armed security force - must deploy if
we are going to provide the security that will be a magnate for the
refugees to return.
We believe Russia can play an important role in resolving this conflict and
implementing a political settlement, and this is a process. This meeting
today is not an event; it's part of a process in which we believe the
Russians can play a constructive role. We will be very much looking for
what they have to say and at that time we may have more to say.
QUESTION: But Milosevic won't acknowledge the role that Serb forces are
playing. He spoke, I think, in an (inaudible) interview as some sort of
loony, erratic paramilitary people responsible for a minimal amount of
havoc among civilians. How could the US expect to get from Milosevic a
serious settlement proposal? Doesn't he have to accept - take on, at least
the onus for what Serbia has been doing?
MR. RUBIN: We will judge serious proposals based on the criteria we've
laid out - are they going to involve the withdrawal of the paramilitary
police and military forces? Are they going to involve an international
security force with NATO at its core? Will they come up with a clear and
rapid time table for withdrawal of those forces; and can we verify that and
can it be demonstrated? Then - and only then - will we consider a
suspension of the bombing. That's how we will judge it - by the substance.
Whether President Milosevic ever admits the horrors perpetrated by his
forces, I don't know. But we're going to judge by deeds and not words.
QUESTION: Would you agree with Secretary General Solana that the Russians
could in fact have averted most of this tragedy if they'd taken a more
robust attitude during the Ramboulliet process?
MR. RUBIN: History will be able to judge the different roles everybody
played, what they did and didn't do. We do believe that Russia was part of
the effort to find a diplomatic solution. They participated in the
Ramboulliet process; they worked with us on documents; they supported the
efforts of Ambassador Hill and Ambassador Petritch. That doesn't mean we
agreed on everything. We didn't. But they were very supportive in creating
the maximum pressure for diplomacy to succeed.
At the end of the day, President Milosevic didn't want a diplomatic
solution. He didn't want a solution that would have brought enormous
protections to the Serbs; that would have disarmed their Kosovar Liberation
Army; that would have ensured the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Kosovo within Yugoslavia for three years. He didn't want a diplomatic
solution. Whether that's because he would never, ever have agreed to it, or
whether some extra measure of Russian pressure might have made the
difference is for the historians to decide.
QUESTION: I wonder if you could clear something up that's got me,
personally, confused, which is about the KLA. There was a story this
morning in The Washington Times about KLA that included in it - and I've
heard it repeated on TV quite a lot. It seems to me that the Secretary has
actually denied it. The question is: Has the US ever officially designated
the KLA as a terrorist group?
MR. RUBIN: I don't believe so. I believe that it was part of a comment
that was explained by me shortly thereafter -- that we believe there were
incidents that occurred that fit the classic definition of a terrorist
incident. But I do not believe they were ever formally designated in that
respect. We made clear that we could not support the use of force against
innocent civilians, and we made that very clear to the Kosovar Liberation
Army. At the same time, we also made very clear that the insurgency
that they were a part of was an understandable reaction to a decade
of human rights violations, a decade in which President Milosevic and the
Serb forces denied the legitimate rights of the people of Kosovo, and went
further in brutalizing them and taking them into prison and beating them
and using brutal force to guarantee that rule. But I do not believe we ever
designated them - under the judicial process by which we make such
designations.
QUESTION: As you know, Reverend Jackson has indicated that NATO's
response to Milosevic's gesture to release the POWs is "arrogance of
power." He's saying that the US and NATO are losing an opportunity here to
try to end the fighting, bring about peace. As you know, other Republicans
were sort of saying the same thing - that the US should sort of seize the
moment here, the momentum, and respond to Milosevic's gesture. How do you
respond to those comments?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that more attention should be focused on the
million people who are the real subject of this conflict, not the three
Americans who were detained by the Serbs, denied their legitimate
protections under the Geneva Convention for a month; but the million people
who have been kicked out of their homes and deported to other countries in
forcible deportations like nothing we've ever seen in Europe since World
War II.
We think more attention should be focused on the brutal war crimes that we
have tried to bring some information about and that your colleagues are
uncovering with increasing frequency every day. That's what this conflict
is about; it's about President Milosevic's forces brutalizing a million
people. That is what we are working to combat. That is why we are
undertaking this air campaign. Until we believe that President Milosevic is
going to reverse course and allow these people to return to their homes
with the protection and security they need, we are not going to consider a
suspension of bombing.
We don't think that this represents our arrogance; this represents our
response to Milosevic's evil.
QUESTION: To follow up there, what does the US believe is behind
Milosevic's gesture? I mean, does the US believe he's starting to
potentially feel the heat of an intensified campaign or he's trying to
build cracks in NATO's alliance or change public opinion in the West?
MR. RUBIN: I think President Milosevic seriously miscalculated the
determination of the West to carry out a determined and intensifying
military campaign through the air. He seriously miscalculated.
I think with each passing day, he must be understanding the depth of that
miscalculation. Whether this particular gesture or any particular public
relations effort he makes is related to him cracking, it's impossible for
us to know. We do know that the bombing campaign is having a very
determined effect on his military infrastructure. With every passing day,
we come closer and closer to breaking this military machine that is
responsible for this unprecedented barbarism in Kosovo. We continue to
intensify that campaign - NATO military spokesmen detailed that intensification
this morning.
In short form, it involves 45 targets being struck, including 21 in Kosovo;
that is, Serb forces in the field - tanks, artillery, ammunition storage,
headquarters sites, also electrical transformers in five locations.
Increasingly, we're going at the nervous system, the brains and the heart
of this military machine. This is a determined air campaign. President
Milosevic presumably is intelligent enough to realize the intensification
that is going on. What course he chooses and what efforts he makes in
response to that, it's impossible to know for sure.
QUESTION: Jamie, did I hear you issue three conditions for a suspension
of the bombing, rather than five?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: I think there was a briefing that you weren't at last week, in
which I asked your indulgence that you can assume until further notice that
when I mention a few to try to summarize the main points, that they include
all five. It's the five that were in the NATO communique. Those remain our
requirements. They involve the withdrawal of military police and paramilitary
forces; the deployment of an international security force with NATO at its
core; the unconditional return of refugees; the unimpeded access for
humanitarian organizations; and movement toward a peaceful multiethnic and
democratic Kosovo in which all people live with security and self-
government.
QUESTION: Do you have a readout on today's G-8?
MR. RUBIN: I did speak to Ambassador Dobbins, who is there for us. He
said that the discussions continue. This is the second meeting at that
level. The first was in Dresden last month. They continue to work based on
these conditions. The Russian delegation has not fully moved in accordance
with all these conditions, consistent with what they've been saying
publicly. We continue to work on an effort to fill out the details and
clarify what's necessary for Milosevic to meet our conditions, and thus
bring an end to this conflict.
QUESTION: Will there be a meeting at the Foreign Minister's level on
Thursday?
MR. RUBIN: That has not been determined. The idea of a meeting has not
been agreed to yet.
QUESTION: Back on the KLA, there's a report today that the KLA has been
growing opium and then turning it into heroin, financing its armaments. Do
you believe that to be true?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to that report, let me say that the evidence that
we have is not consistent with the way in which that report was written. We
cannot confirm reports that the Kosovar Liberation Army is or has been
involved in drug trafficking. Clearly drug trafficking to the West European
market through the Balkan route has been recognized for many years. The
involvement of the KLA - the Kosovar Liberation Army - remains speculative
at this time.
QUESTION: Also on the KLA, the Serbs increasingly are using these hit-and-
run attacks by the KLA as a public pretext for what they're doing. Has it
occurred to NATO and to the United States - if only to remove that pretext -
to ask the KLA not to provoke these hit-and-run attacks?
MR. RUBIN: There were a million people pushed out of their homes, either
to the hills or deported to other countries in the last several weeks.
There are thousands of people who are reported to have been slaughtered;
women raped; families separated; 100,000 men whereabouts unknown based on
who should've been coming into Macedonia and Albania. Whatever pretext -
one hit and run or another hit and run or a localized insurgency -- may
provide, I don't think in any rational calculation it provides a pretext
for this kind of barbarism.
The KLA is obviously trying to support the people in Kosovo and continue
its effort to confront the Serb forces that are conducting this barbaric
policy. I think it would be wrong for us to try to tell them what they can
and can't do at a time when these efforts of the Serbs to kick people out
of their homes and to separate men and women and kill men and rape women
continue.
QUESTION: Follow up on Jesse Jackson. As you know, he is Special Advisor
on African Policy for the Administration and most people linked to the
Administration are expected to follow the Administration's policy. Clearly
Jesse Jackson hasn't. Does the President and the Secretary still have faith
in Jesse Jackson as an African policy advisor, or does he have more running
room to stake out independent positions on such issues than others
in the Administration?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly, he has more running room. The issue is whether he, in
the areas where he has a formal relationship with the Administration --
that is, in Africa as a special envoy - whether he acts consistent with
American policy. As far as I know, there have not been any substantial
problems in that regard. When he has gone as a special envoy to Liberia and
other parts of Africa, he has been accompanied by State Department
officials and pursued efforts that we thought were very constructive.
He's clearly not the President and Secretary's special envoy on Kosovo.
Both the Secretary and Mr. Berger at the White House made clear to him that
while we had some understanding of the value of getting the three Americans
out, that we were deeply concerned about Milosevic manipulating the
delegation and we were concerned about the safety of the delegation. We did
not oppose the mission formally because we recognized the possibility that
he might succeed in getting the prisoners released. But we had concerns,
and we did not support this as a formal mission for that reason. That's
different from not opposing it. Those of you sitting in this room know the
difference between not support and oppose.
He got them out. He is to be congratulated for that. The families of those
Americans who now are going to be rejoined with the servicemen who were
held in captivity speak for all of us when they express their happiness at
the release of the three prisoners.
The fact that he released the prisoners, however, does not mean that we
agree - and, in fact, we don't agree - with the policy prescriptions and
suggestions that have been advocated by Reverend Jackson. We think that our
effort is focused on the million people who were kicked out of their homes
and expelled and deported to Albanian and Macedonia. Jesse Jackson was not
able to go to Kosovo. Your journalistic colleagues are not able to go to
Kosovo, except in highly restricted conditions where they are able to
report on something the Serbs want them to report on.
I think the more the world understand what's going on in Kosovo, the more
they will understand why we are focused on continuing to intensify this air
campaign with the objectives I've set forth.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you think in retrospect, Milosevic used Reverend
Jackson's trip to his own advantage in a propaganda way? And the safety
concerns you had, was it concerns from air strikes or concerns from the
Serbians?
MR. RUBIN: We have advised all Americans, pursuant to our policy of
informing Americans about the dangers of Serbia, that this is not a safe
place to go. That applies whether you're an official or whether you're a
citizen. We do not think that this effort involves a public relations
success for President Milosevic. All it involves is that these three people
have been released and their families have been made happy and the American
people have been made happy. It doesn't change the fact that President
Milosevic's policies of brutal ethnic cleansing continue.
The release of the soldiers is a positive development, but the negative
developments that are the reason for this crisis - the killing of innocent
men and women, the raping of women, a million people pushed out of their
homes. That's what this crisis is about, and that has not stopped.
QUESTION: Speaking of continued repression, Jamie Shea this morning said
that there were reports that the Serbs were shelling up into the mountains
where the IDP people - the internally displaced -- had gone for refuge.
They were shelling them in their camps in the mountains. I would ask if you
have any confirmation of that report. And secondly, is Milosevic using his
military to decimate, to kill off the Kosovars?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that President Milosevic is using his military and
his police and his paramilitary forces in a brutal campaign of ethnic
cleansing, the scope of which I've just described to you that involves a
million people being pushed out of their homes, 600,000-plus of them
deported to other countries in a mass deportation unlike anything we've
seen since World War II in Europe. That effort is the result of policies
pursued by his military, his police and his paramilitary. That kind of
organized campaign of expulsion and killing could not be done without an
organized system.
With respect to the shelling of civilians, there's a lot of shelling that
goes on in Kosovo. There's no doubt the President Milosevic's forces in
Kosovo use their advantages in artillery and heavy weaponry to organize the
campaign that I've described to you. I don't know what specific shelling
Mr. Shea was referring to, but he is the spokesman of NATO and I presume
that his information is therefore accurate.
QUESTION: Well, let me just follow up briefly. Do you have any up-to-date
reports on the condition of the IDP's that are in the mountains?
MR. RUBIN: As I've told you for many days now, it's very hard to know
what's going on inside of Kosovo. We do not have an enormous amount of
information. We know that there are hundreds of thousands of people
displaced. We know that the reports of food problems continue. We know that
there are signs of hunger and malnutrition among those who have been
trapped in Kosovo. That is not those in the care of the aid agencies, but
those trapped in Kosovo. Until President Milosevic allows the international
community the necessary access, they remain his hostages in the area of
food just as they are in the area of military force.
QUESTION: Would the United States be amenable to releasing the two
Yugoslav prisoners of war if a neutral Serb envoy appeared on the scene and
asked for their release, given that there doesn't seem to be much military
advantage in holding such a small number of people in such a conflict,
which is the usual reason for not releasing prisoners of war?
MR. RUBIN: It is premature to discuss any release of the captured
Yugoslav soldiers. They are combatants in the conflict, in contrast to our
soldiers who should never have been taken and should never have been held.
The Yugoslav soldiers will continue to be handled consistent with the
Geneva Convention, as they have been since the moment they were in our
custody.
QUESTION: New subject -- you said that the full details of the results of
Chernomyrdin's efforts have not been transmitted to the United States. Was
Strobe Talbott not given a complete picture of the Russian position --
MR. RUBIN: The meeting that Chernomyrdin had in Belgrade was after Strobe
was in Moscow.
QUESTION: A few weeks back, NATO and the allies spoke of a significant
number of desertions within the Serb army. Where are these people; do you
track them? Is there any evidence that they might have gone to neighboring
countries?
MR. RUBIN: I've heard about reports in this regard which we have not been
able to -well, there was a specific report of some people going to a West
European country which we have not been able to nail down that some have
asked me about. The desertions tended to occur from those serving in Kosovo
who returned to Serbia after deserting. We do have clear evidence that the
limits on fuel, that the casualties being taken by Serb forces in
Kosovo and the inability to move around without the risk of NATO action
is taking a toll on the morale of Serb forces in Kosovo, as well as
throughout Serbia.
QUESTION: So you've not seen indications that deserters are leaving
Serbia? You're saying they're staying in Serbia?
MR. RUBIN: Well first of all, we wouldn't necessarily know, to be able to
track every single human being who goes inside and outside of Serbia.
People who are deserters tend to, by design, try to hide themselves from
the world. So it wouldn't be surprising that those who were deserting would
not make themselves known to authorities, and thus we would never know. So
it's not something one can easily know about.
We do have reporting, however, that units are having desertions - not the
number of deserters and where they ended up and whether they've officially
presented themselves outside of Serbia -- but we do believe there are
desertions.
QUESTION: Just to get back to the Yugoslav soldiers who may be detained
by the allied forces, do you know how many Yugoslav soldiers or other
forces are in the hands of the US or NATO?
MR. RUBIN: Two.
QUESTION: Just two?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Very briefly - the plan for the refugees is still they will
arrive Wednesday?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is the first plane load should arrive at Fort
Dix on Wednesday afternoon. That is some 300-400 refugees. Another plane
load is scheduled for Friday. Thus, by the end of the week there should be
somewhere between 500 and 1,000 Kosovars at Fort Dix. We would then be
trying to move into a position where we could handle and receive some 2,000
refugees a week, beginning next week. That would involve processing
people both in Fort Dix and in Macedonia for direct sending to their
final destinations.
QUESTION: There was some talk last week about a third plane coming on May
8, I believe, which are people who have been processed already. Do you know
anything about that?
MR. RUBIN: What I know is that these two planes are planned for Wednesday
and Friday and when I get additional information - Wednesday and Friday and
then the week after that we'd start to go 2,000 a week, so it might
incorporate that third plane load.
QUESTION: These people are going to be flying not to Fort Dix but to JFK,
I think.
MR. RUBIN: Right. I will try to get you additional information on
that.
QUESTION: One more on Russia. Last week you were saying the US and Russia
still hadn't agreed on the --
MR. RUBIN: It's like this in the White House briefing, so Joe tells
me.
QUESTION: -- composition or the make-up of that international security
force. But you said their discussions were intensified or more serious. Has
there been - have those differences narrowed since that point? I mean, are
the US and Russia --
MR. RUBIN: We continue to discuss, as Ambassador Dobbins is doing in Bonn,
with the Russians and also with our allies internally about the make-up and
composition of what an international force would be. Those discussions
continue. We have not reached a meeting of the minds with Russia on the
nature of this force, and it's unclear to what extent that is a reflection
of their desire not to move farther than where Belgrade will be or whether
it's for other reasons. So we will continue to discuss this with them.
I think we certainly have moved to a greater understanding on Russia's part
of the rationale for an international security force with NATO at its core
because of the need to attract the refugees back, and in the absence of a
NATO force with American participation it won't have the capabilities and
the presence and the symbolism, frankly, that is necessary.
In that regard, let me say that on television yesterday, I perhaps
infelicitiously explained this issue by saying that if there is non-NATO
countries only with armaments, such as Ukraine or Belarus or some other
country, that will not be enough for the Kosovar Albanians to come back.
Certainly, we strongly value Ukraine's participation in the Bosnia exercise,
and would welcome Ukraine's participation in a Kosovo international
security force. But alone, any non-NATO country, such as Ukraine, is not
going to be enough to attract the return of the refugees.
QUESTION: A quick one - the KLA has a new military commander who appears
to (inaudible) shift towards a more disciplined and regular army. I wonder
whether the United States and its allies had any advance knowledge of this
and had any role in the --
MR. RUBIN: I don't know which commander's name you're referring to and to
what extent there has been a shifting in their command system.
QUESTION: He's an ethnic Albanian-Croatian origin.
MR. RUBIN: I just don't know anything about it; I can check that for
you.
QUESTION: Jamie, we haven't asked in a while - or at least I don't recall
asking in a while, the status of your conversations with any members of the
KLA or the negotiating team. I just wondered if you'd give us an update on
how frequently and to what extent we're still --
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard from Mr. Thaci in many, many days now.
QUESTION: The Middle East peace process - at least the Oslo process -
ends tomorrow. I wonder if you have any words, if you've gotten any
agreement by the other side to extend the negotiations, or does it in fact
end tomorrow?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we've stated how we intend to proceed; and that is to
create a system of negotiations after the Israeli election. We have
welcomed very strongly Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority's
indications that they do not intend to issue a unilateral declaration of
statehood. We welcomed that and we continue to welcome that.
What we want to see happen now is that after the Israeli election, an
accelerated permanent status negotiations framework is developed, along
with final implementation of the Wye Agreement so that we can achieve the
goals that we've set forth, which is to complete the permanent status
issues in roughly a year time frame.
With respect to the legal situation, I know there are some very carefully
constructed sentences on that. Perhaps we can get you a formal description
of that for tomorrow.
QUESTION: Has either side yet formally agreed or informally to continue
the talks? I mean, is it technically possible, given the --
MR. RUBIN: I think both sides have indicated an intention to pursue the
permanent status issues. I think there's a practical reality, which is
people feel that it would be preferable to wait until after the election.
QUESTION: In Panama, a lady from the opposition has just become president-
elect of the country. Some people who work with her are saying that they're
trying to change some issues on the bilateral relation with the United
States. Have you been in contact with people working with her?
MR. RUBIN: We like the idea of ladies in charge of large organizations
here at the State Department.
(Laughter.)
But I have no specific comment on the election, because the supreme
electoral tribunal has not yet made a formal statement on the outcome of
the election. We certainly congratulate the people of Panama and their
outstanding demonstration of democracy. Some 76 percent of eligible voters
turned out for the elections that were peaceful and orderly, and we look
forward to working closely with the winner of the election in preparation
of the final transfer of the Panama Canal on December 31.
QUESTION: There's a report the United States asked for the extradition of
three Colombian people. One of them is the brother of one of the (inaudible)
- actually the FARC leader.
MR. RUBIN: Extradition is not something I normally comment on, especially
when the names and the question isn't provided in advance.
QUESTION: Okay, another one. Thursday, President Pastrana is going to
start another round of peace talks. He met with the FARC leader on the
weekend - actually yesterday, I think it was. I don't know if you have any
comment on that. What (inaudible) would it be? The extradition subject is a
big issue in Colombia.
MR. RUBIN: We are pleased that the Colombian Government and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC, have engaged in more
serious talks in the last few days. We are pleased by President Pastrana's
personal commitment to get talks moving, and we note his May 2 meeting with
the FARC as an example of this. We remain hopeful the two sides can come to
firmer agreements on an agenda and negotiating procedures. We support the
Colombian peace process, as we believe a negotiated settlement is the
best way to end Colombia's long-running civil conflict.
We believe that with respect to any demilitarization questions, that the
government of Colombia must make any such decision based upon what they
believe will best move the discussions forward while ensuring the security
of the Colombian people. We would respect their decision in that regard.
QUESTION: Jamie, just to follow up on that, does that mean that your
government is now concerned about the indefinite extension of the DMZ in
Colombia?
MR. RUBIN: You ask on the demilitarization. We believe the government of
Colombia must make any such decision, based upon what they believe will
best move the discussions forward while ensuring the security of the
Colombian people. We will respect their decision.
Let me bear in mind that just because it's demilitarized doesn't mean that
there should be no laws. We maintain counter-narcotics operations, will
continue in demilitarized zones.
QUESTION: Jamie, the Os and Cuba - do you have anything on that and who
got visas and who didn't get visas, with specific reference to high
government officials unrelated to sports programs who may or may not
received visas?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say, there is a baseball game occurring tonight.
Regardless of the outcome, the Cuban people will win when they have a
window to the outside world, even if it is only the televised version of
this game.
With respect to the visas, several Cuban officials were late in applying
for visas for some of the individuals invited by the Orioles to accompany
the team. But we did manage to issue all of the requested visas. We don't
comment on specific visa cases. The US Interests Section did issue visas to
the individuals whose applications were submitted by the Cuban Foreign
Ministry and who were guests of the Orioles. These individuals have been
invited by the Baltimore Orioles organization to represent the Cuban
people in reciprocity for the Orioles' visit to Canada. This group
includes those identified as active and retired players, trainers, staff,
youth and others representing official Cuban organizations.
So it would be up to the Baltimore Orioles to provide the list of who they
asked for. We can't give out specific names.
QUESTION: To the extent that there was a snag on Saturday --
MR. RUBIN: I think there were some additional late visa requests that we
managed to put through, and we issued all of the requested visas.
QUESTION: Everything in the preparations for the games seems like the
United States is not promoting the desertion of the Cuban players. But
there are officials from the INS who are going to be involved in working
close to them, and they are already talking that we are going to support
them if they decided to desert to the national team. What is the real
position of the United States?
MR. RUBIN: Our position is the same as in every case, which is that we
would review cases as they came up and that's our position.
QUESTION: Are you are expecting some desertions?
MR. RUBIN: What will happen will happen - que sera sera.
QUESTION: - you spoke about legal framework, legal documents or
something.
MR. RUBIN: The ones that I was going to get you for tomorrow?
QUESTION: Yes. I wondered - some have speculated that, in fact, the whole
agreement lapses tomorrow. Do you have any guarantee from the parties that
they at least - to be on the safe side - that they respect what has been
agreed so far? Are you seeking such assurances?
MR. RUBIN: When we issued our statement on the subject last week, we
explained to you that that statement, which is very lengthy, was laboriously
discussed with both parties. So we believe that the scheme that we laid out
- the program of action, the plan of action -- to have negotiations begin
after the Israeli election is, if not in agreement with every one of their
positions, it's consistent with them. So both sides understood this as
an acceptable way to move forward pending the elections and the beginning
of those accelerated permanent status talks.
There are some legal questions about the status of Oslo at the end of the
five years, which I'd prefer to get you for the record. But from a
practical standpoint, we believe that this approach of beginning negotiations
after the elections and an accelerated time table is consistent with the
kind of information and positions taken by both parties in our discussions
with them.
QUESTION: I understand - without going into legal fine print, which
you're unable to right now, will it require some sort of legal document
just to make sure? I mean, are you all going to draft something for them to
sign?
MR. RUBIN: I think that will be the kind of thing that they would discuss,
and I don't want to prejudge what they think they would need.
QUESTION: But if you could?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't rule it out.
QUESTION: But they're working on something now?
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. What I said is when the negotiations resume,
I don't want to prejudge what the two parties think they ought to develop
in order to create a base or an underpinning.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I was going to offer you some legal language tomorrow to
precisely answer the various questions about what the status of Oslo is
after tomorrow, in our opinion; although our lawyers may be told that it
isn't a legal question, it's a political question. So we'll have to see
what comes out of that. In either case I will get you something on
it.
QUESTION: In Turkey, acting Prime Minister was assigned today to form the
new government. Do you have any comments on that?
MR. RUBIN: We believe in Turkey's democracy, and we will wait and see how
that proceeds. That's an internal matter for Turkey.
QUESTION: Any comment or statements on Prime Minister Obuchi's visit
today?
MR. RUBIN: That will come from the White House. He's having a press
conference with the President in a few hours.
QUESTION: Are there any plans for the State Department to host any
meetings or anything like that?
MR. RUBIN: There are events here at the State Department. I'll get you
details on that after the briefing.
QUESTION: There is another religious ethnic war going on besides Kosovo,
and it's in Indonesia. And there's been tremendous slaughter of Christians
and quite a slaughter of Muslims over there. What is the State Department's
--
MR. RUBIN: We've been working very closely on the East Timor situation,
and I can get you some material after the briefing.
QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:35 P.M.)
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