U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #53, 99-04-27
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
937
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, April 27, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
RUSSIA
1 Deputy Secretary Talbott had meetings with Special Envoy
Chernomyrdin, Foreign Minister Ivanov, in Moscow.
1 Secretary Albright spoke with Foreign Minister Ivanov by telephone
this morning.
1 US continues to search with Russia for diplomatic ways, means to
solve Kosovo crisis.
3,4 Oil issue did not figure prominently in Deputy Secretary Talbott's
discussions.
FRY (KOSOVO)
1,2,5-6,9 NATO objectives: Serb forces out, refugees return, security
force in with NATO core.
1 Deputy Secretary Talbott has flown to Berlin to meet German Foreign
Minister Fischer today, UN's Kofi Annan tomorrow, then to Brussels
to meet NATO's Javier Solana.
2,7 Systematic destruction of Serb military machine by air continues.
2 US, NATO would like to see situation resolved diplomatically.
3,4-5,9 If Serb forces were to withdraw demonstrably, verifiably, a pause
in air campaign could be discussed.
5 NATO wants all Serb forces - army, police, paramilitary - removed
from Kosovo.
6 Milosevic can end this conflict whenever he chooses.
7-8 US working on comprehensive economic sanctions on FRY, including
petroleum.
10 Ways to implement NATO required conditions can be worked out.
6,10 All means of getting oil to Serb military machine are fair game for
NATO.
10-11 NATO planning will take Montenegro's position into account.
11 Reverend Jesse Jackson's mission is humanitarian in nature.
11,12 ICRC people met with the three detained US servicemen, had them
examined by a physician.
12-13 A US delegation is en route to Macedonia to assess refugee
processing possibilities.
13 Need to use all 20,000 slots for refugees is an open question.
NORTH KOREA
13 Four-party talks in Geneva were useful, productive. Next session
will be held in August, again in Geneva.
ISRAEL
14 Secretary Albright will meet today with Defense Minister Arens.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
14 President Clinton has made clear US support for Palestinian
aspirations.
15 US opposition to unilateral actions, statements by either side is
matter of principle.
15 President Clinton's letter to Chairman Arafat does not contain
policy changes. With proper environment, seriousness on both
sides, permanent status issues could well conclude in one year.
15-16 Regarding closure of Palestinian offices in East Jerusalem, US
urges both sides to avoid steps which could further complicate an
already volatile situation.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #53
TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1999, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing on this
Tuesday.
Let me begin just with a brief word on Deputy Secretary Talbott and the
trip to Russia that he made. He reported early this morning to Secretary
Albright on his visit with key Russian officials. He indicated that he had
two two-hour meetings each with former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and
Foreign Minister Ivanov. He believed that these were very constructive
sessions.
On behalf of the United States, he laid out very clearly the objectives
NATO has set forth in its communiques, and the importance we attach to
achieving those objectives. The Russian side indicated its analysis of the
situation, based on its discussions with officials in Belgrade and others
connected to Belgrade, and laid out its analysis of what the thinking was
in Belgrade. The two sides discussed the issues extensively, and worked on
the basis of building on the common objectives Secretary Albright and
Foreign Minister Ivanov worked on in Oslo. That is - from our perspective -
is making sure that the refugees get back; making sure the Serb forces
leave; and making sure that an international security force is deployed,
and obviously a security force with NATO at its core so that the refugees
can return, and that it can be robust enough to do its work.
The Russians did not indicate any major changes in their position. It was
very much an analytical discussion - a detailed discussion about the
nuances, about the importance of our explanation of our objectives, and the
simple fact that our position laid out by NATO leaders is irreducible.
From Russia, the Deputy Secretary has now flown to Berlin, where he is
expected to meet with Foreign Minister Fischer and expected to meet with
Kofi Annan tomorrow. Secretary Albright followed up the Deputy Secretary's
trip with a conversation with Ivanov this morning to sort of sum up where
we are. Deputy Secretary Talbott is expected to go on from Berlin to
Brussels to meet with Secretary General Solana sometime tomorrow. I don't
have the details of all of his schedule.
In short, we continue to work with Russia in search of diplomatic ways and
means to implement NATO's objectives and to have this situation resolved
peacefully. That effort continues and will continue with a number of
officials, from other parts of the world, who believe that they can help in
that regard.
Our goals remain the same. We are always looking for diplomatic ways and
means to achieve those goals, but meanwhile the punishing, sustained and
systemic destruction of the Serbian military machine continues from the air,
as laid out very carefully this morning by the Supreme Allied Commander,
General Clark.
QUESTION: Before the meeting, it must have been, the Russian Foreign
Minister was quoted saying in several ways that Russia doesn't intend to
simply, parrot-like, repeat the US "no compromise" position to Belgrade;
nor, as he said, "we're not just a postman." Indeed, when Strobe Talbott
was sent off, it was with the NATO position that there should be no
compromise, no yielding. So I guess I'm asking you to say how that issue -
how Russia's views figure in this. Do you feel that Russia will take on the
assignment of telling Milosevic that the NATO people want X, Y and Z? Or is
the result of this meeting in Moscow some blending in of Russia's
views?
By the way, that's a long question, but I wanted to pick up - I don't think
maybe I misheard you, but you talked about the three things that they had
in common in Oslo. Well, one isn't a peacekeeping force with NATO at the
core.
MR. RUBIN: I wasn't suggesting they had agreed on that. I said what our
objectives were.
QUESTION: Oh, I thought you meant our meaning the two of us.
MR. RUBIN: No, our the United States of America and NATO.
QUESTION: Okay, that's clear now.
MR. RUBIN: With respect to your general question, we would like to see
this issue resolved diplomatically. If diplomatic ways and means can be
found that lead to Serb acceptance of our political objectives - namely,
that their forces leave Kosovo; that the refugees return to Kosovo; that an
international force with NATO at its core is deployed to Kosovo, both to
ensure that the refugees do come back, and to create a secure environment
in which the political future of Kosovo can be determined. Those are our
objectives. They are unshakable; there is no compromise on those objectives.
The Russian role is up to Russia to decide. Russia is our partner in many
parts of the world. They have indicated that they want to join us in
working to achieve a solution. To the extent that they can help us achieve
a solution based on those objectives, that would be good news. We haven't
yet seen that. Russia has its own views, its own analysis of the situation.
In some respects, Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov agreed -
namely, with respect to the forces and the refugees and the importance
of having political arrangements based on the Rambouillet accords.
With respect to the force, they did not agree, and they stated that very
clearly. I would expect that one of the things the United States and Russia
will continue to talk about - talked about today, and will continue to talk
about in the future - is the composition of an international presence,
which we believe has to have NATO at its core for the reasons I've stated
today and yesterday, and which Russia does not yet agree with.
With respect to what their role will be like in going or not going to
Belgrade, that is their decision. It's up to them to decide. What we can do
and what we should do is to go through -- in great detail with analysis,
with explanation, with logic -- our positions and why they're NATO's
positions. Again, there are some nuances that can be explained. For example,
over the weekend we explained that when there is a demonstrable and
verifiable commitment implemented of the Serb withdrawal, that then it
would be possible to talk about pauses. So that's an example of fleshing
out NATO's objectives, NATO's irreducible demands. That's the kind of thing
that could be discussed - the nature of a force. We've said NATO at its
core. We've said we would welcome Russian and other partners' participation.
That can be discussed as well.
It's up to Russia to decide whether those discussions and understanding of
the Western position - in particular, the United States position -
justifies them continuing discussions in that regard.
QUESTION: That was a very clear answer. But another way, maybe, to lock
this in is to ask the question this way: Whatever Russia's views are, does
it remain the US position that the only grounds for a settlement, from the
US and the NATO standpoint, is the US and NATO position?
MR. RUBIN: By definition.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: Two quick questions. One, did Deputy Secretary Talbott discuss
with both Russian officials NATO's plan to visit and search ships in the
Adriatic to prevent oil from entering Yugoslavia by sea? And if they
discussed it, did Mr. Talbott encourage or persuade the Russians not to
ship oil to the Serbs?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding from Deputy Secretary Talbott is that the oil
issue did not figure prominently in their discussions at all. We have
received assurances from the highest levels of the Russian Government over
the weekend, and in regular conversations between Foreign Minister Ivanov
and the Secretary, that they do not want to enter this conflict.
The one case in which Russian oil or deliveries was dealt with was a couple
of weeks ago, when there was some discussion of them sending petroleum
supplies along with the humanitarian convoy through Hungary. That was
worked out between Hungary and Russia. My understanding is that the
Russians did not indicate strongly an intent to push forward with plans to
provide fuel to the Serb military machine during Deputy Secretary Talbott's
discussions.
QUESTION: Have you seen any evidence in the last 24 hours, 48 hours, of
any new Russian ships heading for the port of Bar?
MR. RUBIN: I am not in a position to confirm specific information in that
regard. I will try to get some information for you. I know General Clark
just briefed on what their assessment was in Brussels, as to what is going
into Montenegro. Before we get all the information together and in a usable
form, I would prefer to defer that question.
QUESTION: Can I assume, from what seems to be the conclusion of this
meeting, that you're not ready to have a G-8 foreign ministers meeting
yet?
MR. RUBIN: I think that's a subject that comes up, but there is no plan
to have such a meeting at this time.
QUESTION: How about any travel by the Secretary herself?
MR. RUBIN: None planned at this time.
QUESTION: To your last point just briefly and then another question. You
say the Russians did not indicate their intention to try to make new
deliveries of fuel to Yugoslavia through the Adriatic?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think I said it quite that way. What I said was they
did not push that issue in discussions with Deputy Secretary Talbott.
Obviously, it's getting a lot of attention here and in Brussels; it has
been discussed somewhat publicly in Russia. It wasn't a prominent feature
of the meeting. They certainly did not, to my knowledge, indicate that they
weren't going to send any oil to Serbia. But what I was asked was to
what extent this came up, was Deputy Secretary Talbott able to persuade
them otherwise. What I am suggesting is that it wasn't a prominent feature;
they didn't push this issue hard; and we will continue to make clear to
them, as we formulate our plan of operations in NATO, and we move forward
with a cooperative regime designed to deter the entry into Serbia of fuel
for the Serbian war machine, what our intentions are, and we will continue
to discuss it with the Russians.
QUESTION: In your previous couple of points before that you talked about
when you see a demonstrable and irreversible withdrawal of forces that -
MR. RUBIN: Verifiable.
QUESTION: Oh, I'm sorry, verifiable - that NATO might consider a pause in
bombing to talk about it. That would be short of Yugoslavia meeting all
your demands. But can you explain that a little bit more?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We have said what our political objectives are that would
mean that we would cease - that is, terminate - the bombing effort. They're
very broad and very extensive.
We have said that if the Serbs were to meet our demands, and in one area
were to have a plan for the immediate withdrawal of their forces, and we
were able to have demonstrable and verifiable implementation of that plan,
we might pause for a given period of time, reserving the right to begin
again the air strikes in the event they didn't implement the plan.
So we're looking for Serb action in word and in deed, which would yield the
end of this crisis. That is something that I believe was discussed rather
extensively over the weekend, when there was some misunderstanding that
because we - in some newspapers about what extent we had adjusted our
demands.
Our demands are clear: they have to withdraw their forces; they have to
allow an international security force in; and until that happens, we will
not - and the other three - discontinue the air strikes. That doesn't mean
that if they are withdrawing and they demonstrate that and we can verify
that, that we might not consider a temporary pause, reserving the right to
resume in full the air campaign, if that temporary pause did not lead to
the full withdrawal.
QUESTION: Ivanov said over the weekend that he proposed some Russian
compromise proposals, including that the troops be withdrawn to the October
levels. I know the United States has said you want all Serb troops out, but
I mean, is that kind of a level anything you would accept?
MR. RUBIN: The October levels are simply a non-starter. Where we are is
that we want to see all the forces responsible for the ethnic cleansing and
the repression removed. That's the police forces, the military, the VJ, the
paramilitaries and any other of the forces responsible for this ethnic
cleansing.
If you remember, the levels in October were very high - in the above 10,000
range if you added police and military. In Rambouillet we allowed 2,500
Serb military - 1,500 on the border; 1,000 supporting them - and 2,500
police for one year after which there were no police. We've been very clear
that of that 2,500 number, which is less than 25 percent of the October
number, is way too high.
We want them all out - all of the forces that were responsible for the
ethnic cleansing and the war crimes and the crimes against humanity. So the
October levels are, obviously, a non-starter.
QUESTION: Just one more on the oil embargo. General Naumann said the
other day, yesterday, that there was no authority to use force to intercept
Russian or other ships as part of this embargo. Are you satisfied with
that? Do you feel that weakens your position, NATO's position?
MR. RUBIN: Well, General Clark gave a briefing this morning in which he
described in general terms what the concept of operations -- the operational
plans being worked out by NATO military authorities -- would involve. There
are a range of options, and he indicated that the threat of force was part
of that consideration.
But many of the necessary provisions are voluntary; that is, screening
cargo before ships arrive, pre-notification. In previous examples, such as
Operation Sharp Guard, there were very few exceptions -- I gather two in
over a number of years - where anybody sought to not act in voluntary
conformity with such arrangements. So to the extent it's not a hypothetical
question, it's something that would need to be spelled out following the
operational plan being spelled out in Brussels.
QUESTION: Previously, you and other US officials have had four or five
points that you've gone through. Now you're only saying that there are
three non-negotiable points. What happened to the autonomy for Kosovar
Albanians. Is that still non-negotiable?
MR. RUBIN: I was saving you some time. If you would like, in the future,
for every time I say our demands, I'll hold up the 17-sentence piece of
paper so that you'll know what I'm referring to. That hasn't changed.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - NATO at its core.
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: With NATO at its core.
QUESTION: Not NATO-led, but NATO at its core.
MR. RUBIN: And I'll be happy to read through each one of those sentences
in the future whenever I'm asked a question about our objectives.
The objectives were laid out in NATO's communique over the weekend. I'd be
happy to read it for you, but in the interest of time and the patience of
your colleagues, I won't. But nothing has changed in that regard.
QUESTION: Okay, would you characterize what is happening right now with
the Russians as that there is a real momentum that is developing here on
the path to bringing about a negotiated diplomatic solution to the war in
Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: President Milosevic has had the opportunity to end this
conflict at any time of his choosing. Even as his military machine is
destroyed, his political apparatus is destroyed; even as his own minister's
now telling the Serb people and the world that Yugoslavia is getting weaker
every day, that NATO is getting stronger every day - that he should accept
an international force with NATO participation; even as this is going on,
President Milosevic has refused to move.
His own ministers are now beginning to speak the truth. They are telling
the world about the ethnic cleansing. They are offering to have investigations
of that ethnic cleansing. They are signaling that the Serbian people are
isolated in the world. They are talking about how NATO came out of this
summit unified and strengthened to intensify the air campaign. That is
going on, and yet President Milosevic has not moved.
I am not going to speculate as to when President Milosevic is going to
move. I can tell you that NATO is determined to continue its intensified,
sustained and systemic destruction of the Serbian military machine. That is
going on; General Clark has discussed it. To what extent these discussions
with the Russians will yield a change in President Milosevic's position is
something that one doesn't want to speculate on. It's too big a question.
What I can tell you is that the price, every day, gets higher and higher
for President Milosevic, and every day more and more people in Serbia and
around the world are starting to understand that. The costs are higher.
Whether this discussion with the Russians will translate into a change in
the Serb position is obviously the $64,000 question. It's too important to
speculate on.
QUESTION: At the beginning of the briefing, you said that the Russian
side had indicated its analysis of the situation in Belgrade. Yesterday an
official said that Talbott would be meeting with Chernomyrdin to find out
what really happened in last week's meetings with Milosevic. Can you
clarify at all what the Russian side indicated its analysis was of the
thinking in Belgrade?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think it would be appropriate for us to reveal the
nature of a meeting between their envoy and our discussions in public.
Obviously, they went into great detail about what happened in their
meetings and what the Russian assessment is. But it wouldn't be appropriate
to comment on it publicly.
QUESTION: There's a report in a London newspaper, which was played up
rather highly, and it's about the EU foreign ministers banning oil sales.
Then it goes on to say - and this is a quote - "but in a development that
will be regarded as scandalous in European capitals, America confirmed that
it had no plans to follow suit." It cites a State Department official
confirming there are no plans to introduce this kind of legislation.
Can you offer any assurances to the Europeans that the US isn't calling
for this oil embargo as a way for US oil companies to sneak in behind and
start selling oil to Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: The only thing scandalous about this is that report from that
newspaper. We put in a whole series of sanctions last year in which we
limited the ability of President Milosevic's family and ministers to
travel; in which we put a freeze on funds held abroad by Serb and FRY
government officials; in which we prohibited export financing; in which we
extended an investment ban that was already in place; in which we made sure
that the arms embargo was applied not only to arms, but anything that
could be used for internal repression; and a number of other measures.
It now appears that the European Union, in a very welcome development, has
put in place a number of those similar measures.
With respect to the oil issue, the European Union indicated that by Friday,
April 30 - which is still three days from now - this ban on delivery of
petroleum would enter into force. So before people get scandalized, let me
explain what we're doing.
Any suggestion that we are allowing our companies to ship oil while
insisting European companies not would be scandalous if it were true. It's
simply not true. We and our NATO allies committed ourselves during the
summit to put in place additional measures to tighten the constraints on
Belgrade. These include intensified implementation of economic sanctions
and an embargo on petroleum products.
We are now working through the amendment to the export administration
regulations that is pending that would establish a comprehensive embargo on
exports and re-exports to Serbia of all goods. This includes exports and re-
exports of oil, gasoline and other petroleum products. Under this provision,
an export license issued by the Commerce Department will be required for
all exports for Serbia. There will be a presumption of denial for all
exports to Serbia, including oil exports or re-exports other than those for
humanitarian items. This is working its way through the system right now;
I would expect an announcement shortly by the Commerce Department.
QUESTION: This is an administrative action, not -
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Okay, so there is no plan for legislative action?
MR. RUBIN: Well it's not necessary.
QUESTION: Okay, I just wanted to make sure.
MR. RUBIN: I think every American company knows what a mistake it would
be making to try to sell oil through any means to Serbia right now; and I
think there was a little bit of false outrage demonstrated by that
report.
QUESTION: You mentioned Milosevic's ministers beginning to speak out. As
far as I know there's only one - his former opponent. And I seem to recall
that you spoke somewhat slightingly of his ability to impose any political
will on this situation. Do you know of another minister? You used
plural.
MR. RUBIN: No, I think I didn't use the plural in the way you're
suggesting. On the contrary, I said, "even his minister's" - that is an
"apostrophe s" -- and then I mentioned Mr. Draskovic. I think we all know
he is the minister I was referring to, but I will make sure that the
transcript includes the apostrophe.
With respect to what I said yesterday, the point today was about whether
President Milosevic would move. I was being asked whether we think he is
more likely to move because of what's going on in Moscow. I pointed out
that the fact that Mr. Draskovic is saying these things has still not lead
President Milosevic to move, to reverse course. Yesterday I indicated that
we had no way of knowing to what extent Mr. Draskovic had any influence on
Mr. Milosevic.
So I think the two are entirely consistent, and there was nothing in my
remarks to suggest that there was more than one minister.
QUESTION: Going back, seriously, to the 3-5 list of suggestions, what you
seem to be saying is that there is going to be a two-phase wind-down if it
ever comes. The first three would create a pause, but then only after the
pause would it be necessary for the Yugoslav Government to agree to a form
of self-government for Kosovo. Is that right?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think that if you look carefully at NATO's communique,
and at the foreign ministers' document that preceded that - and I'm sure
you've done so - and let me read it for you: "The objectives are to ensure
a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of
violence and repression in Kosovo; withdraw from Kosovo his military
police and paramilitary forces; agree to the stationing in Kosovo
of an international military presence; agree to the unconditional
and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access
to them by humanitarian aid organizations; provide credible assurance of
his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework
agreement based on the Rambouillet accords."
If you go back and look, from the day this conflict began we used the
phrase "the framework of Rambouillet." We never said - and any implication
that we did would be incorrect - that one had to get the political
arrangements of Rambouillet in place before the bombing would be suspended.
So there is nothing new here. What we are talking about is if he were to
agree to these points, how would that be implemented? There are ways in
which that can be implemented, and to the extent that we get to a place
where we think that he is really going to implement them, we will be
prepared to spell them out in greater detail. I gave an example; I wouldn't
draw any large conclusions from that example. It was an example of -- for
example -- if there's a plan for him to remove his forces and we had
verifiable and demonstrable proof that he was removing his forces, we might
pause to allow the complete removal of his forces.
As you may have seen today on television, General Clark made the same
point; that if they had trouble getting their tanks out, they could just
leave their tanks and move. So one can work on the details of how this
would be implemented without in any way adjusting the substance of the
requirements.
QUESTION: One final point on the self-government credible commitment by
the Yugoslav Government. Given the scathing comments, particularly by the
Secretary over the weekend when she called Milosevic flatly a liar, why
would anybody take his word as credible?
MR. RUBIN: Look, if he stopped, verifiably, all the military action and
ended the violence, and he withdrew from Kosovo in a demonstrable and
verifiable way his military, police and paramilitary forces, and if he
agreed to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
with NATO at its core - NATO is controlling the real estate - and agreed to
the unconditional and safe return of all these refugees - all of those
previous commitments, there would be a very different world in Kosovo, a
very different situation in Kosovo. It would be quite easy to imagine how
to develop negotiations towards the ends that were described, because all
of those other things would have been accomplished.
QUESTION: I'd like to ask for a little more detail on petroleum products,
crude oil, refined products, whatever. I understand that - and tell me if
I'm correct - that the refining capacity of Serbia has been eliminated in
the two refineries that have been hit. Do they have any further refining
capability, or can they use only refined products? The second question is,
from the Montenegro port - Rad, I think is the name - do they have --
MR. RUBIN: Bar is the port in Montenegro.
QUESTION: Oh, Bar, I got it backwards. Anyway, what I want to know is, do
they have a pipeline that goes to Serbia, serving Serbia from that
port?
MR. RUBIN: I think General Clark made very clear that the effort to stop
the flow of oil and petroleum products to the Serb military machine is not
simply a matter of deterring shipping from coming through filled with oil,
but it also involves making sure that all the ways and means that the oil
or petroleum products can get to the military are cut off. He talked about
bridges; he talked about railroads; he talked about other types of targets,
which I would prefer not to get into.
That is a way in which you can stop oil from the outside from becoming
useful to the Serb military machine. All of that is fair game now, and is
what the NATO leaders decided to stop.
With respect to what is getting in through Bar and what the specific
shipments are, in response to Carol's question earlier, I indicated I would
try to get as accurate information as I could about what is and isn't going
in as soon as possible.
QUESTION: But what I'm asking is, rather than interdict by embargo or
quarantine tankers that are bringing the product to Bar, it could possibly
be that the trans-shipment of that product could be where the interdiction
could take place, short of --
MR. RUBIN: That's what I just said that General Clark indicated.
QUESTION: Has there been any more thought given, or any decisions made,
on how Montenegro is going to be protected or not covered by this
embargo?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any new information to offer you. That is one of
our objectives, yes.
QUESTION: And how great a concern is there that the Serbs will just kind
of requisition Montenegrin petroleum products?
MR. RUBIN: We will do our best to take into account this concern
regarding Montenegro, recognizing the brutality of Belgrade's forces,
recognizing the needs of the people of Montenegro and recognizing the
imperative of stopping the oil from getting to the Serb military machine.
QUESTION: Jesse Jackson apparently has been trying to go to Belgrade to
seek the release of the three soldiers. There are reports that the
Administration wasn't very keen on this. I just wondered how you felt.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't know the status of Reverend Jackson's plans at
this time. As you know, it's been our view that the three servicemen were
detained illegally and should be released immediately without conditions.
In the discussions that various officials have had with Reverend Jackson
and his team, we have received very good impression of their intentions.
Their mission is humanitarian; their intentions are obviously good. We did
point out certain concerns that we have about their safety, about the
possibility of them being subject to manipulation in Belgrade, but also are
supportive of the goal of getting these servicemen released. We did explain
the problems - security problems and the political problems of them being
manipulated or sought to be manipulated by President Milosevic.
QUESTION: On the three American POWs, what can you tell us about the Red
Cross team's meeting with them today? And has the ICRC issued a report to
the State Department on that meeting with the three men?
MR. RUBIN: I do not know the status of that report. My understanding is
that the ICRC representatives met privately for 40 minutes today with each
of the three servicemen. They were seen by an ICRC - that is Red Cross -
selected physician. The Red Cross will not make public details of their
condition until the families have been informed. They were able to deliver
mail and receive mail is my understanding, but beyond that it is the
Red Cross' policy not to provide additional information pending their
discussion with their families.
QUESTION: Just to follow up, can you tell us if they sent letters? Were
there letters that were given to the ICRC that are going to their
families?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding - it went both ways; that letters were
provided from both directions, from the families to the prisoners and from
the prisoners to the families.
QUESTION: Do you have an update on the refugees that should be arriving
in the United States from Albania and Macedonia?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Are you all - other than the fact that there was a great delay
in the Red Cross being able to see these men, which was a violation of the
Geneva Convention, are you satisfied that other than that they are being
treated consistently with the Geneva Convention?
MR. RUBIN: Well that's like saying that, "Other than the assassination of
your husband, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?" This was several
weeks in which they violated the Geneva Convention. They broke every rule
in the book. In so doing they paraded them in the first few days publicly,
used their images in ways that are directly contradictory to the Geneva
Convention. Yesterday they did not let the ICRC meet with them alone.
This was a whole month before they were in a position to meet with
them alone.
I am not in a position to give you the details of the ICRC's report, which
would tell us more about what happened to them over the last month; to what
extent that further violations of the Geneva Convention were committed by
the Serbs.
The question you had was about refugees.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: A delegation of representatives from the Department of State,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the International Organization
of Migration and NGOs are traveling in Macedonia and Albania now to develop
plans for where and how processing of these refugees will occur. They will
return to Washington at the end of this week.
Our preference is to do processing in the region, not in the United States.
If we can complete the process in the region there will be no need for a
processing site in the US. Then refugees will travel directly to their
sponsoring families in the US.
If complete processing in the region is not possible, we will consider the
use of a facility like Fort Dix. No decision has been made about any site
yet. Once the processing plan is finalized, we will begin the effort
immediately and expect to move the first refugees about three weeks
later.
QUESTION: So that would be roughly three weeks from Friday?
MR. RUBIN: The end of this week, yes.
QUESTION: I don't know how much additional information you have, but
bearing in mind that unification with the relatives who emigrated here
earlier is the first priority, presumably all 20,000 or whatever don't have
relatives. Would they be - but there's a lot of interest in this - I'm not
trying to overdo this, but --
MR. RUBIN: "Sponsoring families" is the term of art; it's not necessarily
the family. But I don't want to get cross-wise with the experts in this
field. Let me try to get a question to the record posed on the exact
arrangements for planning for how the 20,000 will be resettled.
QUESTION: Yes, and the question - because the Dix thing was overdone over
the weekend. From out there eerybody thought it was a done deal; and we
were told right away it wasn't a done deal, and it isn't a done deal. But
the question is if people don't have sponsors and they're still refugees,
will they be sent through processing or will they be - if they would wish
to be - placed in a major American city - Detroit, Chicago, New York
- and be on their own?
MR. RUBIN: Right, we'll have to check that. But again, remember what's
going on here - we're trying to remove bottlenecks in Macedonia where
there's a problem. Sometimes that problem escalates and then it goes away.
We're trying to encourage more countries in the region to take more
refugees because we want to keep them in the region to the extent
possible.
So to what extent we would really need to use 20,000 slots is an open
question, and will be reviewed weekly and daily to ensure we're meeting all
our natural concerns about the rights and the needs of these people weighed
against the policy concern, which I think everyone shares involved, of not
seeing them go too far from where they're going to get back to.
QUESTION: Do you have any idea how many people, sponsoring families, have
signed up?
MR. RUBIN: No, I would have to get that information for you. I'm not sure
it is yet available. That's -- maybe -- why the first group wouldn't come
for three weeks.
QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the Four-Party Talks in Geneva?
Is it still scheduled to end today?
MR. RUBIN: The fifth plenary session of the Four-Party Talks, chaired by
the United States, was held from the 24th to the 27th. They were useful and
productive discussions, which were conducted in a businesslike and cordial
manner. The two subcommittees that were established held meetings over two
days, on the 25th and 26th. The two subcommittees were conducted in
accordance with the procedures agreed to during the fourth session. There
were extensive details; I have a statement on this.
The sixth plenary session of the Four-Party Talks will be held in Geneva in
August 1999. A deputy head of delegation preparatory meeting will be
convened to discuss arrangements for organizing the work, a day before the
plenary meets. We express our strong appreciation to the Swiss Government
for its support.
I think they'll be giving more information out in Geneva about what
transpired in the talks.
QUESTION: Apparently the Democratic Republic of Congo is trying to set up
some sort of national political debate, and they don't have the funds to
follow through. I'm sorry; I know it's a little regional, but if you could
give me -
MR. RUBIN: Good word. You could be a spokesperson.
QUESTION: If you could get an answer of some sort.
MR. RUBIN: I will get that for you.
QUESTION: The Secretary is going to be seeing the Israeli Defense
Minister today.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Can you preview that at all?
MR. RUBIN: It's a meeting with the defense minister that's supposed to
take place, I believe, in the late afternoon. They will obviously talk
about the situation in southern Lebanon; about our security cooperation and
the normal bilateral and regional issues that we talk about with the
Israelis.
QUESTION: Do you expect to get some - it's hard for you to say - but do
you think there will be some discussion of the President's letter to Arafat
yesterday, and his reiterating his somewhat controversial position on
Palestinian rights - what exactly that means?
MR. RUBIN: In our view, the President made clear on previous occasions,
including on the trip to Gaza, our support for the Palestinian aspirations.
The United States has said since Madrid that we have supported the
legitimate rights of the Palestinians.
The point is that the only realistic way to fulfill Palestinian aspirations
is through the peace process. That is the view that we've stated in this
letter; that is the view that we've stated in numerous meetings; and that
is not a view that we would think ought to create enormous controversy,
because it's premised on the idea that the concerns and the aspirations
will be dealt with through negotiations and not unilaterally.
QUESTION: Is that an open-ended request the US is making of Arafat's
declarations of statehood? In other words - I mean - if that's not clear I
could elaborate. You've asked him not to make - and the Israelis as well -
not to do or say things that prejudge the outcome. In his case, the big
thing is to declare a state -- and you're not going to have an outcome May
4, that's clear. But either in the President's letter or as a matter
of policy, would you expect him to hold his tongue until those negotiations
are concluded? Or there's been a theory - lay off for a few months or lay
off until we get everybody here for a summit or lay off until after the
elections. Is it an open-ended request?
MR. RUBIN: Our position on unilateralism is a position of principle. It
applies to the Israelis and it applies to the Palestinians. We don't think
either side should pursue unilateral actions or statements as a matter of
principle. It's not something that we have a view for the weekend and it
ends on Monday morning. That applies both to the Israeli side and to the
Palestinian side.
QUESTION: The Palestinians apparently are making quite a bit of the
President's letter, and they're indicating that there's some more forward-
leaning language about self-determination and what not. A, can that letter
be released; and b, is there any change in position, as far as you know, in
the wording?
MR. RUBIN: I will check on the ability of such a letter to be released.
That would be unusual for us -- to release such a letter. I suspect an
intrepid journalist in the field might be able to get their hands on such a
letter, because things are different often here in Washington than they are
in the field. But with respect to our views, we have not changed our
policy positions in this letter. We believe that the peace process
is the only realistic way to fulfill Palestinian aspirations. All
of the issues related to permanent status must be resolved through
negotiations.
QUESTION: Do you believe that there should be a specific date that the
extension ends -- not a target period, but a specific date that it
ends?
MR. RUBIN: Yesterday I was asked this question several times and I
repeatedly refused to say that, so I wouldn't agree with the premise of
your question.
We've said that if there is the right kind of environment created by both
sides, and if there is seriousness on both sides, that we believe a year is
a reasonable time frame to resolve the permanent status issues. We believe
that if that environment and that seriousness are there, that can be
achieved. If there isn't that seriousness or there isn't that kind of
environment, we don't think these issues could be solved in 20 or 30
years.
In the meanwhile, our objective would be after the Israeli elections, to
encourage the beginning of accelerated permanent status talks with the
objective of completing them within a year and with the United States being
prepared to play the kind of role we've been prepared to play in the past
depending, obviously, on the circumstances -- whether that environment is
being created, whether that seriousness is being demonstrated.
QUESTION: Would you expect the Secretary to go to the region pretty
quickly after the elections to test the waters?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any information on her plans after the elections.
After the elections, I'll try to get you such information.
QUESTION: On the issue of unilateral -- would the Israeli closure of
three Palestinian offices in East Jerusalem be described by you as a
unilateral act?
MR. RUBIN: That is a very sensitive issue -- the question involved - and
we think that it should be resolved bearing in mind the sensitivity of it.
We urge both sides to avoid steps that further complicate an already
volatile situation.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)
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