U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #24, 99-03-02
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1030
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, March 2, 1999
Briefer: James B. Foley
UGANDA
1,3 US regrets death of two Americans, six others murdered by
Rwandan Hutus.
3,17 Public identification pends notification of next of kin.
1 Ugandan authorities are working to apprehend the
perpetrators.
1-2 US Embassy worked with other embassies to take care of
survivors and victims.
2 All eight hostages killed were murdered by the
hostage-takers, not caught in a crossfire
3 US issued public announcement about the attack yesterday.
IRAN
3-4 US disappointed, concerned about the investment by Italian,
French companies.
4 An investigation under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)
will take place.
4,5,6 US will consult with European allies on their efforts on
non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.
5,6 US wants to encourage Iranian desire to re-integrate into
international community.
GREECE
7 US Ambassador Burns in country for consultations, speaking
engagements.
7 US has excellent relations with PM Simitis' government.
CHINA
9 Chinese students visiting the US voluntarily missed their
return flight to China.
9-10 US in contact with local authorities in Los Angeles.
IRAQ
10 Latest allegations detract from UN aim of dismantling
Iraq's WMD program.
11 Iraq must comply with its obligations under Security
Council resolutions.
11 Pentagon is proper source of information on bombing
attacks.
CUBA
11 US condemns trial of dissidents, who should be immediately
released.
SERBIA (Kosovo)
12 Secretary Albright asked former Sen. Dole to travel to
region, to meet with Kosovar Albanian leaders. He is
expected to do so in coming days.
12 KLA visit to Washington still being worked on.
12,14 Ambassador Chris Hill reports very encouraging signs that
Kosovar Albanians are moving toward accepting Rambouillet
accords
13,14,15 No meaningful progress to report on Serb side.
NORTH KOREA
16 Talks in New York continued today.
LIBYA
17 If, when Qadhafy turns over two suspects for trial, US
would welcome it.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF-CAMERA DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #24
TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 1999, 1:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
Briefer: James B. Foley
MR. FOLEY: May I ask what the journalists are doing?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Don't answer that.
MR. FOLEY: Let the record show the journalists are doing that which they
will not acknowledge on the record.
QUESTION: No statements?
MR. FOLEY: No statements.
QUESTION: No questions.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Jim, Uganda.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, we very much regret the fact that two American citizens
lost their lives in this horrible hostage-taking incident in Uganda. We are
in the process of notifying the families of the two Americans who were
killed yesterday. In deference to the families, we are not releasing the
names of the victims until notification is complete.
The two Americans had been among 14 hostages seized yesterday at a game
park in southwestern Uganda by an armed band of 100 to 150 men identifying
themselves as Rwandan Hutus. Our consular officer in Kampala and the office
of Overseas Citizens Services here in Washington are providing all
appropriate assistance.
Eight of the 14 hostages - all of them foreigners - were killed during the
course of the ordeal. Six, including one American, are safe. And our
embassy in Kampala is providing assistance to the survivors of the attack
and is working with Ugandan authorities who are endeavoring to identify and
apprehend the perpetrators of this heinous crime.
What I can tell you is that yesterday, upon notification of the hostage-
taking, that our embassy officials flew to the scene of the kidnapping to
assist with the evacuation of the survivors and the victims of the hostage-
takers. As I said, our embassy went to the scene, contacted those who had
evaded capture and ensured they were taken out of harms way.
The staff took the group to a safe location in Kampala. The embassy
coordinated its actions closely with the embassies of other nationals taken
hostage to avoid duplication of effort. The embassy contacted high level
Ugandan officials to stress the importance of protecting the lives of the
hostages.
In that regard, I can tell you that according to the accounts provided by
the hostages themselves, the victims were killed by their captors as the
group marched through the forest. It's our understanding that all eight of
the dead were murdered by the hostage-takers. We do not know how they were
killed -- or, excuse me, why they were killed at this point. There was no
cross-fire. I think there was some press reporting that there may have
been an exchange of fire between the pursuing Ugandan authorities
and the hostage-takers. That is not our information.
Our information is that, again, the hostages were murdered while in the
captivity of the hostage-takers, and that those who were not murdered were
able to remove themselves from the hostage-takers and then were found by
the Ugandan forces. As I understand it, those Ugandan forces are now in
pursuit of the hostage-takers. That's all the information I have at this
point, though.
QUESTION: From what you know from the survivors, was there any commonality
as far as the victims? I mean, race, nationality, religion.
MR. FOLEY: Well, I've seen the press reports or the televised statements
of at least one of the victims. I have seen a report that the hostage-
takers seemed to be singling out some Westerners. I believe the hostage
victims were Americans and Brits and I think Australians. I may be missing
a nationality there. We don't have a full report, and I certainly don't
have that information. That's really about all I have at this point.
QUESTION: Would you all consider this a terrorist incident?
MR. FOLEY: Well, in terms of a legal definition, I don't know. It's about
as abominable a crime as one can imagine. Hostage-taking, cold-blooded
murder of hostages. I don't know the legal definition of terrorism; I know
the practical definition of an act of barbarity when I see it, though.
QUESTION: I ask because of the possible FBI involvement in investigating
this. Is that --
MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm certain that we will assist the Ugandan authorities
in any way possible in terms of identifying those who committed these acts.
Of course, this is under the province of the Ugandan authorities now to
pursue these hostage-takers and hopefully capture them and bring them to
justice. If we can assist in any way, I'm sure we would be willing to do
so.
QUESTION: Were the victims all part of any one tourist group, and was
that group based in --
MR. FOLEY: I don't know if they were in the same tourist group. I believe,
just watching the one witness or victim on TV talking about people being
rounded up from different parts of the camp and brought together, but I
don't have that information.
QUESTION: Do we know how they were killed?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that information. I should add, though, that we
believe that the perpetrators, who identified themselves as Rwandan Hutus,
do stem from that wider group which committed acts of genocide in
Rwanda.
QUESTION: Does the Rwandan Government bear responsibility for the
apprehension of these outlaws?
MR. FOLEY: Well, the Rwandan Government itself is struggling with the
remnants of the genocidal groups that perpetrated genocide in Rwanda in
1994. They are struggling with this very same problem. I think in terms of
who can apprehend them, that would depend on where they go. We will seek to
cooperate with any of the governments in the region that can possibly track
them down and bring them to justice.
QUESTION: Does the US feel, perhaps, that some kind of international
posse might be applied to these people who work out of sanctuaries in
Rwanda?
MR. FOLEY: Well, it's a big problem, especially for the Rwandan
Government -- the fact that these groups that committed such unspeakable
crimes continue to be at large and pose a problem for the region as a
whole. It's not something that can be solved easily because it does involve
large numbers of people in areas that are not subject to control by the
central government.
What we have done for our part yesterday was to issue a public announcement
I'm sure you've seen, in which we strongly urge American citizens who may
be planning to visit western Uganda, including the gorilla parks, to
postpone their travel until further information becomes available.
QUESTION: Do you think today you will be releasing the identity of the
two Americans killed?
MR. FOLEY: That's possible, but our first responsibility is to notify the
next of kin.
QUESTION: The latest oil deal with Iran -- are these companies going to
be subject to the US sanctions law?
MR. FOLEY: We've seen the press reports -- that was yesterday, I should
say, because apparently the announcement was made yesterday. It's our
understanding that the deal has been signed. We are both disappointed and
concerned about this development. The US remains strongly opposed to
investment in Iran's petroleum's sector. We've repeatedly urged the
governments of France and Italy at the most senior levels to discourage
this investment. As in all such cases, we will look closely at the facts of
what has happened, and we will be assessing the implications under
ILSA.
If sanctionable activity is found to have occurred, we will decide upon and
take appropriate action. We stand by Secretary Albright's statement at the
US-EU summit last May concerning an expectation with respect to EU firms.
However, we have made clear to our European partners that an expectation is
not a guarantee.
Because we've dealt with this before, you're probably familiar with the
procedure we have to go through. This is something that will have to be
examined under ILSA. We would follow the same procedure as in the last
case: first, evaluate the facts, as I indicated; second, determine whether
sanctionable activity has taken place; and if it has, decide, in light of
our national interest, what action under the law to take. You'll recall
from the last experience there are several choices - whether to impose
sanctions, to waive sanctions or, lastly, to delay action in order to
enter consultations with governments. These are the basic options
provided for in the law.
QUESTION: That raises the issue that having waived the law last year -
and this deal, apparently, is about half as much as what the deal was last
time. It seems like you really are - I mean, I know you'll say you do have
choices - but it seems, practically speaking, that you really don't.
MR. FOLEY: That we don't what?
QUESTION: Really have a choice.
MR. FOLEY: In terms of what we ultimately decide?
QUESTION: In terms of --
MR. FOLEY: Well, of course, I can't preview for you what we will
ultimately decide. We actively tried to discourage this investment. We
reminded our European friends that ILSA is the law and that we will apply
it.
There was an expectation that Secretary Albright spoke to last May. That
had to do with policies on the part of the European governments. She
indicated in her statement in May that so long as the heightened level of
EU cooperation on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism is maintained, we
would expect that a review of our national interest in future ILSA cases
similar to the South Pars deal of last year would result in like decisions
with regard to waivers for EU companies. However, this does not mean
that waivers will automatically be granted; and it would truly be
putting the cart before the horse to preview what our ultimate decision
will be. We are going to start the process now that the deal has been
signed.
QUESTION: Can you say anything at this moment about how their cooperation
has been on non-cooperation?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not aware that it has slackened in any way, but I'm
sure we'll be prepared to answer that question in more detail as we proceed
with the review. But first things first. We're going to examine the facts,
determine whether it does fall under the law and whether it's sanctionable.
QUESTION: I'm sorry; I just have a follow-up to that. I mean, the fact
that there seems to be an increasing rush of deals with Iran would seem to
suggest that your policy is no longer holding; that US attempts to try to
prevent huge amounts of capital going into Iran's energy sector is just not
working. I would be interested in a counter-argument here.
MR. FOLEY: Of course, our policy towards Iran, which includes sanctions,
was developed in response to specific Iranian policies and activities which
we believe threatened US interests. While there have been some positive
developments in Iran since the election of President Khatemi, we've not
seen changes in those policies that threaten the interests of the US and
the international community -- especially in regard to Iran's support for
terrorism, its continued efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and
things of this nature.
Iran, at the same time, is seeking integration into the international
community. We welcome this desire. We would like to encourage it. But we
believe that real integration and real cooperation with the international
community can only occur when Iran is prepared to bring its practices into
conformity with international norms. Therefore, we regard foreign
investment, in the absence of change in Iran's support for terrorist groups
or its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery
technology, as potentially strengthening those who argue that Iran can get
what it wants from the West without changing its policies.
So we have a very strong view on this. We talk very candidly with our
European partners and other potential investors in regard to this. They are
aware of our views. They have different views, both on the nature of our
sanctions law and also on the methods of best dealing with Iran to promote
what are common objectives - namely, the change in certain practices and
our hope that Iran can be integrated into the international community.
I believe that the ILSA law has had an effect. It may not be able to
prevent every investment in Iran; but at least in terms of the way
international investors look at that market, it has to have had a sobering,
if not chilling, effect.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on that, if, in fact, you were to waive
sanctions this time, don't you think that would be an acknowledgment that
even though the law remains on the books, you really don't want to see
investment in Iran but the cost of actually invoking sanctions is too great
and, consequentially, the law has no teeth?
MR. FOLEY: What we are going to do is examine this case in light of the
law, and we're first in the process of establishing the facts and the legal
applications involved. But as this proceeds, you can be certain that we'll
be discussing with our European friends not only this case, but equally the
question of their cooperation on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.
These are two essential ingredients that will go into the equation
that also address our major concerns regarding Iran in this respect.
QUESTION: Doesn't this deal suggest to you that the European allies, at
least, consider ILSA to be a paper tiger?
MR. FOLEY: I think I answered that question; Carole just asked it. I can
go through it again if you'd like. The fact is that we have policy concerns
regarding Iran. We're trying to work with our European friends on counter-
terrorism and stemming the flow of weapons of mass destruction technology
to Iran and we're going to continue to do so. And we've also stressed to
our European partners that an expectation is not a guarantee.
QUESTION: But those are the reasons; not internal behavior, right? Iran's
sins are external, except for trying to develop weapons of mass destruction?
Their human rights record does not --
MR. FOLEY: We do not challenge the nature of the Iranian regime.
QUESTION: Repressive as it may be.
MR. FOLEY: We have been welcoming the trends towards a more liberal
society, towards an opening of the political system, which we've seen
evidenced just these last few days in the local elections in Iran. We
welcome President Khatemi's pledge to build a society based on the rule of
law and his desire to reintegrate Iran in the international community. We
welcome that; we want to support that. But we remain seriously concerned
about several important aspects of Iran's foreign policy, and we believe
that Iran's desire to reintegrate - let me put it this way. The positive
changes we've seen internally need to be reflected in external Iranian
policies.
QUESTION: Could it not be that the European policy of critical dialogue
is at least partly responsible for the moderation in Iran?
MR. FOLEY: We have a difference of view with the Europeans on that; I can
make no bones about that.
QUESTION: According to last reports from Athens, Simitis Government is
almost to collapse today due to the humiliation of Greece over the Ocalan
case. Since your Ambassador to Greece, Nicholas Burns, is in town, I'm
wondering if you have anything on that.
MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure I caught the question. I heard about Ambassador
Burns being in town - and I did have the pleasure of seeing him today - but
I didn't quite get your full question.
QUESTION: The question is that there are reports from Athens that the
Simitis Government is about to collapse due to the humiliation of Greece
over the Ocalan case. I am wondering if you have anything on that, since
your Ambassador to Greece is in town today.
MR. FOLEY: I do have something on his visit and, as I said, I had a very
pleasant meeting with him this morning. He's in the US to participate in
the semi-annual US-Greek Economic and Commercial Commission meeting, being
held on March 5. In addition to official consultations, he's also
participating in a meeting of the US-Greek Business Council in New York and
is addressing the American Foundation for Greek Language and Culture in
Tampa and speaking at New York University. He has a very full public
schedule.
QUESTION: What is he speaking (inaudible)?
MR. FOLEY: I don't know -
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: I will pass these unsolicited comments from his colleagues.
But in terms of internal Greek political matters which you were raising,
that's not something that we will comment on.
QUESTION: No, I was wondering if he said anything to this effect - the
ambassador.
MR. FOLEY: To what effect?
QUESTION: To the effect that the Simitis Government is collapsing - is in
a type of crisis.
MR. FOLEY: Mr. Lambros, I would never talk to you about what Mr. Burns
may have said privately to me; but that was not a subject of our discussion.
QUESTION: Well, you're looking for stability in governments. I guess my
friend's root question is, does the government in Athens appear stable at
this point with all the resignations last week - the battering it's taking
on the Ocalan case?
MR. FOLEY: Ocalan.
QUESTION: Sorry, my Turkish is terrible.
(Laughter.)
MR. FOLEY: We have excellent relations with the current government of
Greece; we expect those to continue. We have confidence in Prime Minister
Simitis, and we see no signs of what you're talking about.
QUESTION: I was told by Department of State officials today that during
the Ocalan crisis, Nicholas Burns had an extensive line of communication
with Theodore Pangalos on a consultation and advice basis. May we know the
context of this type of consultation and advice?
MR. FOLEY: Of course not, Mr. Lambros.
QUESTION: Why?
MR. FOLEY: We don't talk about our private diplomatic conversations.
QUESTION: Just the -- (inaudible) - annual events. Was he here last year
for the same things, or is it just a convenient - understandably convenient
way to come home and consult about the situation in Athens? Is he here to
speak to businessmen or to consult? Because Greece has got a tough
situation.
MR. FOLEY: Barry, first of all, you're asking questions I couldn't
possibly know the answer to as you ask them. I will try to get the
information, but my supposition is that when an official goes to speak to
audiences that these are not spur of the moment decisions. I can tell you
from working in the Bureau of Public Affairs, invitations come in many,
many months in advance; and if you're an overseas ambassador, you try to
schedule several appearances if you have some public requests.
QUESTION: Since Nicholas Burns stated that the Greece of Simitis and
Pangalos made a very serious mistake by sheltering Abdullah Ocalan in the
Greek Ambassador's residence in Nairobi, may I assume then that the context
of this consultation and advice was the delivery of Ocalan to the Turkish
side? In other words, did he convince Simitis and Pangalos to do so?
MR. FOLEY: Did he convince Mr. Pangalos to do what?
QUESTION: Yes, that is correct. When he's talking about they both made a
very serious mistake by sheltering Ocalan in the Greek Ambassador's
residence in Nairobi, may we assume that the context of his consultation
and advice in Athens was the delivery of Ocalan to the Turkish side?
MR. FOLEY: The context of what consultation, Mr. Lambros?
QUESTION: The consultations between the Simitis Government and Nicholas
Burns. They told me from the above that it was consultations.
MR. FOLEY: From the above -- how high above?
QUESTION: Excuse me?
MR. FOLEY: I'm joking.
QUESTION: I'm not going to disclose -- not supposed to do so --
MR. FOLEY: Mr. Lambros, I really do not understand your question. I can
tell you that Ambassador Burns is an excellent ambassador. Let me finish my
answer. He is in regular consultation with the Greek Government, and we are
not in the habit of talking to you about what he's saying privately to the
Greek Government.
QUESTION: That is not my question. Since Nicholas Burns stated that
Simitis and Pangalos made a serious mistake by sheltering Abdullah Ocalan
in Nairobi, why, then, the State Department does not -- (inaudible) --
publicly?
MR. FOLEY: Why does the State Department not --
QUESTION: Does not criticize them publicly - both - Simitis and
Pangalos?
MR. FOLEY: Mr. Lambros, you have been absent from this briefing room for
some time and, therefore, you missed the fact that I have commented
publicly on that subject on several occasions.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: Mr. Lambros, thank you.
QUESTION: Today the government of Greece officially announced that they
withdraw from the confidence-building measure which the United States --
MR. FOLEY: Withdraw from the what?
QUESTION: Confidence-building measure between Greece and Turkey on the
Aegean issues, which the United States has played the mediator role to
acceptance. What's your comment?
MR. FOLEY: I've not heard that.
QUESTION: Do you have any informationon the group of Chinese students
that apparently disappeared in Los Angeles?
MR. FOLEY: Some limited information, yes. We've, of course, seen those
reports. We've been in contact with local authorities in Los Angeles. We
understand that local authorities are continuing to investigate the
incident.
There are no indications thus far, other than that the students chose
voluntarily to miss their scheduled flight to China. I'd have to refer you
to the Los Angeles Police Department, though, for any further information.
QUESTION: Do you have anything to say about the story this morning about
US spying through UNSCOM?
QUESTION: Wait, wait, wait, can we stay with the Chinese students for a
moment? You said you're in touch with authorities. Are you talking about
the local police in California?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, local police, yes.
QUESTION: What about with the Chinese Government?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of any such contacts.
QUESTION: On the allegations of spying --
MR. FOLEY: I don't have any comment on the story.
QUESTION: You don't even care to --
MR. FOLEY: We never comment on allegations involving intelligence
matters.
QUESTION: You issued a prepared statement - not you, the State Department
issued a statement on the story.
MR. FOLEY: I read that in the story, that there was a statement; and I've
not been able to track that down. I stand by what Mr. Rubin said,
though.
QUESTION: Suleyman Demirel --
MR. FOLEY: Mr. Lambros --
QUESTION: It's not on Ocalan, though.
MR. FOLEY: Mr. Lambros, I'll come back to you towards the end of the
briefing.
QUESTION: The article quotes you from a briefing that you gave here some
time ago, but not too long ago, saying that you all assist UNSCOM for
UNSCOM's mission. The article alleges that whatever activities were
undertaken were done not for UNSCOM, but for, really, purposes that could
only benefit the US. How do you think the allegations in the article will
affect - I mean, there's a panel right now in the UN that's looking at the
sanctions regime and the inspection regime. How do you think these
allegations will affect what your goals are in forums like that?
MR. FOLEY: Well, the allegations do tend to detract attention from the
major problem here, which is Saddam Hussein's refusal to cooperate with the
international community, whose job it is to uncover and dismantle his
programs of weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: Yes, but don't the allegations undermine the American position
in negotiations or in discussions like that because the allegations are
that the United States -
MR. FOLEY: I know what the allegations are. I think that what needs to
happen is the Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq need to be fully
implemented by Iraq. I don't think anything's going to deter the United
States from remaining committed to that principle. I've not seen any
evidence that other nations in the Security Council believe anything other
than that Iraq must comply with its obligations.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the trial of the four dissidents in
Cuba, plus the harassment of independent journalists in general?
MR. FOLEY: After imprisoning the four leaders of the dissident working
group for 19 months, the Cuban Government, yesterday, finally conducted a
trial. The four - Martha Beatriz Roque, Vladimiro Roca, Feliz Bonne and
Rene Gomez Manzano -- have been held in cells with common criminals, denied
adequate medical care and denied their fundamental rights.
It is an affront to the most elemental concept of due process that the
Cuban Government went to extraordinary lengths to avoid public scrutiny of
its justice system. It barred the foreign media and diplomatic representatives
from the trial, and it detained dozens of dissidents to prevent a public
show of support for the four outside the courthouse. We strongly condemn
the Cuban Government's treatment of these four individuals, and we call for
their immediate release.
QUESTION: They're reports out of Iraq that the US, in their bombing, hit
a communications center used to, I guess, monitor crude oil. Also, there
were reports that the US hit another similar pumping station earlier near
Mosul earlier in the week. Does this mean, possibly, that the US believes
that these communications centers are being used for other things than
pumping oil or (inaudible) oil?
MR. FOLEY: I spoke to Mr. Bacon at the Pentagon a short while ago. I
would refer you to him and the Pentagon for any details about this. What he
told me is that the United States did not target any pipeline related
facilities, that we do not believe that we hit any pipeline related
facilities, but we are continuing to assess those strikes that occurred
yesterday.
QUESTION: Yes, but she's asking about camouflaged - I mean, things that
were not what they were purported to be. Do we know that they're deceptively
-
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that information. I'd have to refer you to the
Pentagon.
QUESTION: Is there anything further since yesterday on either the Dole
mission or those Albanian leaders having accepted but no dates set for them
to come here? We're in that two week period, I believe.
MR. FOLEY: Yes. Secretary Albright has asked Senator Dole to travel to
Kosovo to advance the search for a political settlement to the crisis in
the region. Senator Dole is expected to travel to the region in the coming
days. His trip will support the negotiating efforts of Ambassador Hill and
his Contact Group colleagues, Ambassadors Mayorskiy and Petritsch.
Senator Dole is expected to meet with a broad range of the Kosovo political
leadership, including leaders of the KLA. Senator Dole will encourage them
to endorse the decision of the Kosovar Albanian delegation to sign the
Rambouillet accords on an interim political settlement.
QUESTION: Will he go on to Belgrade?
MR. FOLEY: I don't believe so. I believe his mission is directed at
Kosovo.
In terms of the visit that we're expecting here, as I said yesterday, an
invitation has been extended in principle to KLA representatives to visit
the US in the coming weeks. The purpose of that visit would be to urge KLA
representatives to support the interim settlement plan and to discuss the
transformation of the KLA consistent with the agreement. The precise timing
of this visit and a list of those coming are still being worked on.
I would note also something I said yesterday. As you know. Ambassador Hill
was in Pristina. Secretary Albright asked him to go to Pristina yesterday
and to Belgrade today. He reported very encouraging signs in the last few
days that the Kosovar Albanians as a whole - and KLA representatives in
particular - appear to be moving toward full agreement of the Rambouillet
accords.
I know many of you were at Rambouillet and covered the talks. I think some
of the coverage or the commentary after those talks was a little unclear in
terms of perhaps missing the fundamental point of what happened there,
which is that the Kosovar Albanians agreed to the interim settlement. What
they said was that they wanted to go back to Kosovo to consult widely in
Kosovo; and that then they hoped they would be in a position to sign on
formally by March 15.
Ambassador Hill reports that that is going very well, and that they are
moving towards a formal and definitive yes. So when Ambassador Hill was in
Belgrade today, seeing President Milutinovic, and he also saw the Deputy
Prime Minister, Draskovic, he was able to apprise them of the fact that,
indeed, the Kosovar Albanians are on the road to "yes," to agreeing fully
to the interim accord.
We will have to await March 15, I think, to have a formal signature, and
Ambassador Hill is still working with the Kosovar Albanians, and Senator
Dole will be going to talk to them because this is not - as those of you
who were at Rambouillet know - this is not an easy decision for them. They
are deciding their future and whether they can believe that autonomy under
an interim accord will change their lives for the better, and dramatically
so, as we in the Contact Group have been suggesting.
We believe that they are coming to that view, as they indicated they would
at Rambouillet. So Ambassador Hill made that clear to President Milutinovic,
that the Serbs are facing the likelihood of a Kosovar Albanian delegation
in France at the next round saying "yes" to the agreement. I spoke to
Ambassador Hill. He did not report to me any meaningful progress with the
Serb side, even any meaningful willingness to engage on the fundamental
stumbling block with the Serb side, which is their thus far unwillingness
to consider a peace implementation force led by NATO to guarantee the
agreement.
Ambassador Hill also met with opposition figures in Serbia. They, too, had
serious concerns about a NATO peace implementation force. But Ambassador
Hill told me that he stressed to them the fact that this force would be,
ideally -- and would have to be -- invited by the Serb side, it would have
to be agreed; and that, indeed, this force would be there to protect all
the people of Kosovo, including the Serb minority in Kosovo and that a NATO
peace implementation force would be in a position to ensure that that
minority remains safe and secure and can remain in Kosovo.
So he did not report progress in his meeting with the Serb leaders,
unfortunately. But he made clear where things are heading and that it would
be in their interest to reassess their position.
QUESTION: Well, you remember, there were things on the political side,
too, they objected to. There were many of them, and I wondered - I can tick
off a couple and I would if you want -
MR. FOLEY: I have the list in front of me. They did discuss also the --
QUESTION: Any progress on that end?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that there was progress. I think Ambassador Hill
was largely focusing on the NATO and the big stumbling block.
QUESTION: Do you think -- (inaudible) -- strengthens the likelihood that
the Kosovars will sign; does it show greater support for it or lesser
support for the accord? Also, there are reports that the Serbs have mined
some borders that might likely be entrance points for NATO troops. If you
could comment on that.
MR. FOLEY: On the second, I've not heard that. Clearly, we're not going
to send a NATO force to implement a peace agreement unless there is a
permissive environment, unless we have a peace deal signed by the parties
and the force would be welcomed in by all sides.
We're striving to get a Serbian "yes" to that prospect. We don't have that
now. So your question - and I don't know the answer to it because I haven't
heard that report - but it's moot for now. If we got a Serb "yes" in France
on March 15, I can assure you that that type of problem, if it exists,
will be among those types of problems to be addressed and resolved
before we send in a NATO force.
QUESTION: On Demaci?
MR. FOLEY: On Demaci, well, I think it's premature to try to analyze the
potential impact of the resignation. I think, nevertheless, the important
point is the one I made with Barry a few minutes ago -- that Ambassador
Hill has been consulting widely. He believes that there is solid movement
and growing consensus towards signing the peace agreement. He's been
consulting with the Kosovar Albanians in general, but also with the KLA in
particular. So he is optimistic.
QUESTION: But there are those who say that his resignation indicates that
the KLA itself - the Kosovars -- are splintering, contradicting exactly
what you're saying; that the signs are that there's not widespread support
for it; that perhaps among the KLA people who are now in charge, there's
support for it, but that the Contact Group's agreement has further
splintered the Kosovars rather than bringing them together.
MR. FOLEY: I don't believe that we think either that this is easy for the
Kosovar Albanians -- I've indicated that we think it's not easy for them --
or that there won't, at the end of the day, be some hold outs, some who
might not support the deal. But if the Kosovar Albanian leadership and the
KLA leadership are committed to an interim peace agreement, then that
agreement will succeed provided we get a Serb "yes" as well.
QUESTION: Do you think that the US is doing a lot to try to get the
ethnic Albanians to sign on, inviting them here, sending Dole to meet them?
Why no such efforts on the part of the Serbs? Why aren't Serbs being
invited here or Dole being sent to Belgrade to meet with Serbian representatives?
Why no balance there?
MR. FOLEY: Well, it's only March 2 - we still have almost two weeks
before the next round of talks in France. I think that there is time for
sufficient diplomatic activity between now and then for us to be able to
communicate our views to the Serbs. Of course, there are all kinds of
visitors. I believe Foreign Minister Vollebaek was in Belgrade yesterday.
Ambassador Hill was there today. I'm sure there will be further diplomatic
contact between now and March 15.
QUESTION: Jim, first back to what you were talking about, Chris Hill
being in Belgrade; has he finished his visit? Has he gone on from Belgrade
on this particular round without success; is that correct?
MR. FOLEY: I spoke to him - I wouldn't term it a lack of success, in the
sense that he was able to drive home to the Serbs a number of home truths
having to do with the fact that the Kosovar Albanians are coalescing around
support for the agreement and, therefore, the prospect of Serb isolation by
March 15; and also, especially in his meetings with the opposition, to
explain to a wider Serb audience that this agreement will be in the
interests of the people of the FRY as a whole, including the Serb
minority in Kosovo.
He was still in Belgrade when I spoke to him a couple of hours ago. He is
heading, I believe today or tomorrow morning, for Brussels. He's going to
be briefing the North Atlantic Council tomorrow.
QUESTION: Why is the headway today any different than it was in
Rambouillet last week?
MR. FOLEY: I didn't say that it was. I said that the Serbs still fail to
engage on the issue of the peace implementation force.
QUESTION: Right, but you seem to be indicating that it was some progress
to drive home to the Serbs points A and B, that were driven home to them
endlessly -
MR. FOLEY: I didn't say that it was progress. I said it was significant.
QUESTION: Jim, a main question on Kosovo is this, and this comes in part
from Mr. Cohen yesterday at the State Department, and what you've talked
about here. If it turns out that Serbia does not sign and then NATO goes
into an enforcement punitive stage with bombing, that will then be
coercion. If that happened -- coercion was used against the Serbs -- then
is it true that a NATO ground force would then not be introduced into
Kosovo because there's coercion on one side or another? Is it possible that
the Serbs could slip the noose on having a NATO force by allowing
bombing or inviting it?
MR. FOLEY: You asked a similar complicated question about it a couple of
weeks ago, along the same lines. I can only repeat emphatically what I said
then, which is that - and President Clinton has made this clear - is that
NATO will participate in a peace implementation force only in the context
of a signed agreement engaging both parties, only in the context of a
permissive environment.
QUESTION: So if there's not a permissive environment from Serbia, they
don't sign and they get bombed and then they can get out of - they can
continue to operate in Kosovo as they are; correct?
MR. FOLEY: I don't accept the premise of your question.
QUESTION: On North Korea, the talks continued today and do you expect
them --
QUESTION: I still haven't heard you say that NATO still plans to bomb
Serbia if you get a yes from the Albanians. Is that still --
MR. FOLEY: I believe I said that yesterday. If I didn't, I say it
today.
QUESTION: Okay, and that would even be if Belgrade accepts the political
side of the agreement, as they did in principle at Rambouillet. If they
accept the political side but not the deployment, you're still going to go
ahead with the --
MR. FOLEY: They hadn't accepted the entire political agreement, as Barry
helpfully pointed out a few minutes ago.
QUESTION: He was talking to the Albanians, not the Serbs.
MR. FOLEY: I thought you were referring to the Serbs.
QUESTION: I'm referring to the Serbs; he was referring to the Albanians.
MR. FOLEY: No, no, he --
QUESTION: Will you go ahead with this very bellicose policy if the Serbs
accept the political side of the agreement? I mean, how can you maintain
unity among NATO to do that?
MR. FOLEY: Secretary Albright, at Rambouillet, made it very clear that
these are not separable parts of the agreement. It is an integrated whole,
to include the political parts, to include the other annexes and, notably,
to include the implementation of the agreement by a NATO-led force. We are
demanding a "yes" to both sides of that equation. NATO has made its
decisions in this regard, and the ACTORD is in effect; Secretary General
Solana has the key. The decisions remain in force. They involve two
different scenarios and I don't need to repeat them for you right
now.
QUESTION: I know you can't comment on the specifics, but did the talks on
North Korea continue today?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, they did continue today.
QUESTION: Do you expect them to carry over until tomorrow?
MR. FOLEY: I wouldn't be surprised if they continued through tomorrow. I
don't have formal knowledge of that, but I think the expectation is that
they may be continuing through tomorrow.
QUESTION: Meanwhile, you have no read-out; is that right?
MR. FOLEY: Well said.
QUESTION: The North Korean delegation has another engagement on Thursday
and Friday, so could they continue on Saturday or next week?
MR. FOLEY: I wouldn't want to speculate as to how long the talks may
last.
QUESTION: I just want to make sure that you don't know the identities of
the two people killed in Uganda or where in the United States they were
from?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not saying that I do or don't know their identity. I'm
saying that we have to notify the next of kin first and foremost.
QUESTION: There are people within this Department saying that they're
from Oregon. I mean, that much specificity. Can you confirm that?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not going to - I've made very clear. Our obligation is not
to you by any means at all; it's to the families. We'll talk to you
afterwards.
QUESTION: Jim, a news wire reported that the State Department has
instructed its embassies to keep a 30-day food supply and rations for Y2K.
Can you confirm or deny that?
MR. FOLEY: I have not heard such story. Lee, have you heard any weird
news of that nature?
QUESTION: Do you have a reaction to Qadhafi's statement today about this -
MR. FOLEY: What did he say? Is he still talking?
QUESTION: Something to the effect that the two - it will be resolved
soon.
QUESTION: He said -- (inaudible) - suspects -- (inaudible) --
MR. FOLEY: Well, if that means that he is prepared to turn over the two
suspects to Scottish authorities in The Netherlands, then we will welcome
that if and when it happens.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - for a sanctions review?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I believe what happened was that the Security Council
met last week. Secretary General Annan stressed in his conclusion that the
time had come for Libya to transfer the suspects. Now the ball is in
Libya's court to respond to the Secretary General, and we hope that that
reply is positive and is forthcoming.
Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:15 P.M.)
|
