U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #8, 99-01-15
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
887
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, January 15, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 Farewell to AFP Correspondent Carole Landry
IRAQ
1-2,3 Humanitarian Initiative/Iraq's Rejection of New Proposal
2-3,12 Oil For Food Program/Procedures/Approvals
3 Russian Proposal to Send UN Mission to Baghdad
3-4 US Position on Resumption of Inspections Regime
4 Prospects for Use of Force
4-6 US Agreement in Principle to Send Patriot Battery to Turkey
6-7 Iraq Liberation Act/Support for Iraqi Opposition Groups
7 Deputy Asst Secretary Jones Travel to Northern Iraq/Meeting
with Kurdish Leaders
TURKEY
4-6 US Agreement in Principle to Send Patriot Battery to Turkey
INDIA/PAKISTAN
7 Recent Violence
10-11 Nuclear Proliferation Issues In Region
BRAZIL
7-8 Update on Financial Situation
CHINA
8-9,10 US-China Human Rights Dialogue /Secretary's Remarks At
Chinese Embassy Regarding Human Rights and Relations
NORTH KOREA
9-10 Status of Access to Suspect Underground Sites
SERBIA (Kosovo)
12-14 Update on Situation/Shooting of two Verification Monitors
GERMANY
14 US and Germany Agreement on Payment to US Holocaust
Survivors
RUSSIA
14-15 Reported Postponement of EU and US Food Aid to Russia
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #8
FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1999, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to today's briefing, Friday, January 15, here at the
Department of State. We have one statement on the extension of the mandate
of the UN mission of observers in Prevlaka that we will issue after the
briefing. With that, let me go to your questions. And today, rather than
starting with the Associated Press, I think we should go to a serious
journalist, a younger journalist, and so let me turn to the much better
looking journalist, the AFP, first question, Carole Landry, last day.
QUESTION: Thank you. That's swell.
MR. RUBIN: I do understand, by the way, that you've been sent to a
hardship post in Paris.
QUESTION: Yes, it is.
MR. RUBIN: We all want to let you know that we'll be sending you care
packages for -
QUESTION: Peanut butter and corn flakes.
MR. RUBIN: -- and other things. We will miss you here at the State
Department.
QUESTION: Thank you, Jamie.
MR. RUBIN: First question, Carole.
QUESTION: I want to ask about Iraq - you've seen the response, they've
said no to the offer to lift the ceiling on oil sales. I guess it's no
surprise, but what next? Where does that leave you with a proposal?
MR. RUBIN: As we have observed in the past, Iraq's leadership often
attempts to use the sanctions regime as a tool to try to create sympathy
for their people; and they misuse their people in this international game.
We are familiar with Iraq's immediate reaction to proposals to improve the
plight of their people. We, for many years, have tried to improve the
plight of their people. Iraq's response is usually, no, they don't want to
improve the plight of their people. So this is a familiar pattern.
As I indicated yesterday, we cannot force or coerce Iraq into accepting
these new provisions, but we can provide and avail Iraq of this facility.
But it's up to Iraq to decide whether it cares about its people and whether
it, therefore, will take action to use these new programs that we're
setting forth.
So it's not news that Iraq doesn't care about its people. The initial
reaction signaling that they don't care about their people is not a
surprise. But we will continue to press for ways to improve the plight of
the Iraqi people. In that regard, let me say that we have heard a lot from
Iraq about reasons why the program is problematic, whether it's the ceiling,
whether it's lack of funds, et cetera. We are trying to improve the program,
and it's ironic that their response to our effort to improve the program is,
no, we don't want to improve the program
With respect to some of their complaints and some of the concerns that
people have expressed about Iraq's capability to export oil, we do expect
to remove over half of our holds on oil spare parts. We will begin the
prospect by lifting some holds today in New York. We will, of course,
continue to monitor all such contracts with respect to the end use.
So we're going to go the extra mile in trying to ensure that we do all we
can to improve the plight of the Iraqi people. It would be helpful if the
Iraqi response wasn't to simply just say no.
QUESTION: Jamie, you remember yesterday you were asked about holds - how
often. Of course, it was in the context of humanitarian - and holds, you
said, were frequent, and that's our understanding. So what is the dimension
of what you're waving on now?
MR. RUBIN: Okay, there's two kinds of holds. One is with respect to
whether a proposed import from Iraq is a humanitarian import - food,
medicine and other humanitarian supplies - and whether we have concerns
about whether that particular company or the provisions are not spelled out
in such a way that we have concerns that it's not been explained adequately
to justify allowing the purchase and then provision of that good.
There's a second type of issue, which is on the spare parts for oil
equipment. Funds were set aside in the last phase of Oil-for-Food to buy
spare parts to increase Iraq's oil exports. This would mean more revenue
for Oil-for-Food. Many of the items requested had tenuous links or no links
to oil exports - e.g., parts for gas stations in Iraq, for example.
In the current phase of the Oil-for-Food program this set-aside for
equipment is continued. So rather than a one-time funding for this
equipment, it is now a more regular part of the program. Since more money
should be available, we can be more lenient about what is charged to this
account. So essentially, in response to many of the questions you asked me
yesterday, the program is getting more and more effective. We are learning
to use our controls more and more effectively. So that allows for
adjustments over time. In this area, we do believe, on the oil spare parts
piece, because there's now going to be more revenue available, the set-
aside is not so damaging to the purchases of food and medicine that
more oil parts can then go forward.
Now that we've examined and been examining some for many days and weeks now,
we believe many of these holds can be removed today. We're looking to try
to remove some half of the holds in the near future.
QUESTION: Do you know how many holds?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have a specific number on that.
QUESTION: Have you heard about a Russian proposal to send a UN mission to
Baghdad to discuss - I believe it's a humanitarian --
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'm familiar with certain Russian ideas in this area. The
French have obviously put their proposal down, to which we indicated there
were some serious concerns we had and also some positive elements. I
suspect the Russians will also be entering the game, but I wouldn't want to
preview any ideas they might have.
QUESTION: So there's a US proposal? And the stand-in ambassador has been
commenting on what is wrong with other proposals, but I don't see anything
telling the world what's good or what's in the American proposal. This is
to get the inspectors back.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: I know you want them to disarm and all, but your back's up
against a wall because not a lot of your friends want to help you. What is
the US proposing as a mechanism to get inspectors back to Iraq?
MR. RUBIN: We have put forward yesterday a humanitarian initiative, I
described to you in some detail. We have not put forward a proposal on
inspection and monitoring issue. Our preference, of course, is for Iraq to
allow the UN inspection teams that were there to return and do their work.
We are willing to discuss other's ideas, and we've begun that discussion.
At this point, we are talking to others and trying to get the lay of the
land in the Security Council. That's how we think we ought to do business.
But in discussing these new suggestions, we have to remember that this is
taking place in a new context. Prior to December, the context did not
include disarmament by military force. Having degraded Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction through the use of force in December and having made clear
that we are prepared to act with military force again if they reconstitute,
we have a new and very effective overlay to deal with the disarmament
problem. In that context and in the context of Iraq refusing to let
UNSCOM back in, we are prepared to discuss with others various ideas.
We have not put forward a US proposal to my knowledge.
QUESTION: What does reconstitute mean? Aren't they constituted enough to
cause enough problems? Do they have to build up or they just say strongest -
-
MR. RUBIN: There are two problems. One is, what weaponry and capability
they may have hidden from the inspectors.
QUESTION: Exactly.
MR. RUBIN: There's another problem, which is a much worse problem, which
is to take all the dual-use factories, that are either producing, say,
missiles that were permitted below 150 kilometers or various pharmaceutical
and other factories that could, if converted and changed, quickly produce
very large quantities of chemical and biological weapons.
So there's two problems: one, the existing missing weapons of mass
destruction; and a much larger - much larger, in our view - problem, which
is the prospect of them taking existing facilities and converting them
quickly and reconstituting a large militarily significant operational
weapons of mass destruction program.
What we're talking about in the missing category is unexplained absences of
materials that we think could well be chemical and biological weapons
programs. What I'm suggesting to you, that is one thing; and it is a
problem.
There is another thing which is a bigger problem, which is a wholesale
effort to build a militarily significant operational program using long-
range missiles and weaponizing them with warheads that can carry biological
weaponry or chemical weaponry. That is the reconstitution problem. But that
doesn't mean there isn't a problem of what may be hidden and never revealed
by the Iraqis.
QUESTION: If force isn't an option in both categories, then the United
States has veered toward the French position, which basically seems to be,
let's watch what they do and let's not worry so much about what they may
have done and hidden. Now, is force an option in both categories?
MR. RUBIN: I think you think you've found a secret flaw here.
QUESTION: No, you're stressing the second thing as more worrisome. I'm
asking about the first thing, which was a reason for the United States to
hit them at least twice.
MR. RUBIN: Right. Since the President acted, he said in the aftermath of
that that if they were to reconstitute their weapons of mass destruction,
we would be prepared to act. He didn't say what we would be prepared to do
on issues that weren't defined. We have said we're not ruling out action in
a number of cases. There's a difference between not ruling something out
and specifying in advance what you will do.
When the President used the word "reconstitute," I am merely defining a
word for you. I am not ruling in or out other actions on other issues.
QUESTION: Has there been some decisions made on the Patriot missiles
overnight to Turkey?
MR. RUBIN: I'm glad you asked that question.
QUESTION: It's a righteous question.
MR. RUBIN: It's a righteous question and you're a righteous reporter. Let
it be said that today is today and yesterday was yesterday.
On the subject of Patriot missiles, let me say that we have agreed in
principle to send a Patriot battery to Turkey in response to a formal
Turkish Government request. We have agreed in principle to provide them
with Patriots for the duration of the current crisis with Iraq. The actual
operational details of this military-to-military program would have to be
spelled out from the Pentagon. I would urge you to contact officials at the
Pentagon.
QUESTION: You said for the duration of the crisis. Do you mean, then,
you're just sort of lending them these Patriots?
MR. RUBIN: As I just indicated, the operational details of how this
military-to-military program will work will have to be spelled out from the
Pentagon.
We see no immediate threat to Turkey right now; but obviously, there are a
lot of hostile statements from Baghdad, and we think it's prudent to
consider these kind of precautionary measures.
QUESTION: Do you think, though, that - I mean, the new leadership in
Turkey has criticized the US policy on Iraq. Do you feel that - I mean, by
giving them these missiles you'll somehow diffuse that criticism as
well?
MR. RUBIN: I think you need to not put the cart before the horse. A
program like transferring Patriot missiles to Turkey is not something one
does overnight. As you know, the government's Prime Minister has just
arrived on the scene. So I think what this indicates is the extent to which
we and Turkey are in sync on our Iraq policy and remain in sync on our Iraq
policy. Turkey is a vital NATO ally that has provided critical support for
international efforts to ensure that Iraq complies with UN resolutions.
We are very appreciative of being able to use Incerlik for the purposes of
Operation Northern Watch. We understand that there has been no change in
Turkish resolve in this regard. Obviously, we always take into consideration
Turkish sensitivities about how events in Iraq may affect Turkey. But I
think the fact that we are continuing with a close ally a military-to-
military program directly related to the Iraq crisis is a pretty sure sign
that we are in sync on the main elements.
QUESTION: I take it that's your response to what Ecevit told The
Washington Post, right?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We didn't find anything particularly new in his comments,
and he's had views like that for some time. We are aware of Turkish
sensitivities about the subject of Iraq. But the basic situation is that we
are in sync with Turkey. They came out, as you may recall, immediately
after the commencement of Desert Fox, with a statement calling on Iraq to
comply fully with Security Council resolutions, which we regarded as a
supportive action. We're now moving forward on the Patriot issue. But
to the extent that any concern has been expressed in Turkey about
our views, let me reiterate our long-standing view is that we believe
strongly in the territorial integrity of Iraq.
QUESTION: Does Saddam have the ability to threaten Turkey in some way,
with a missile or -
MR. RUBIN: Certainly, any neighbor of Saddam Hussein is under some level
of threat because he has invaded his neighbors. Yesterday, as you know,
there was some intemperate remarks about Kuwait from the Deputy Prime
Minister. So I think as long as that regime is in violation of Security
Council resolutions and remains operating in the way that it's been
operating, there is some existential threat to the region and the world. We
believe it's prudent, as a precautionary measure, to assist Turkey in this
regard.
QUESTION: Just a detail - are these Patriot missiles will be owned and
operated by the United States?
MR. RUBIN: That again would be an operational detail. I've told you that
we have agreed in principle to provide Patriot missiles to Turkey, as a
precautionary measure and a prudent precautionary measure. But the
operation of that program and that transfer is something that the Pentagon
would have to address in detail.
QUESTION: Still on Iraq - I understand that the US may soon name a
coordinator for the Iraqi opposition groups and start identifying which
groups should get money. Can you tell us about that in time line? Also, to
follow up to that, does the US believe these groups truly can destabilize
Saddam Hussein?
MR. RUBIN: On the subject you raised, let me say that we are in the
process of transmitting the proposed notification of Iraqi democratic
opposition groups to the Congress. These criteria are spelled out in the
Iraq Liberation Act, which involved not only a commitment to democracy and
a commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq, but also a sense that
the groups are willing to work cooperatively with others in this effort.
There are other specific criteria commitment to protect human rights.
We are in the process of notifying the Hill of our intentions. The way the
process will work is that we will then consult with Capitol Hill about our
decisions as to who fits the criteria. Then a final report will be
presented by January 30. We are committed to fulfilling the specifications
of this act in a serious and expeditious manner, but we are not prepared to
announce which groups have been designated until we have notified it and
discussed it with Capitol Hill.
On the coordinator question, I do know that Secretary Albright has been
discussing this subject intensively. No final decisions have been made and
when they are, we will alert you to them. But I would expect it to be very,
very soon.
QUESTION: Was there a senior US official in Turkey trying to talk to the
Iraqi-Kurdish leaders?
MR. RUBIN: Northern Iraq, yes. Beth Jones, our principle Deputy Assistant
Secretary, for the region is traveling to Northern Iraq this week at the
invitation of the two Kurdish leaders, Talibani and Barzani. It's part of
our ongoing consultations with the Kurdish leaders there. As you know,
David Welch, her predecessor, visited the region in December; and the very
important action that took place when the two Kurdish leaders were here in
Washington to sign the joint statement on reconciliation.
The purpose of this kind of a visit is to work with the parties in Northern
Iraq to further advance reconciliation. She will be discussing issues like
governance and regional elections with the two Kurdish leaders. As you know,
they took some very important steps forward in recent days in the area of
sharing revenues so that they can be better coordinated and have less
issues of concern between them. Hopefully, we can keep them on that
path.
QUESTION: Regional elections by a certain date?
MR. RUBIN: I will have to check the specifics, but I think this would be
something that they would be proposing. We would obviously want to make
sure that the process was done in a way that maximized the chance that the
cooperation that we've seen would continue.
QUESTION: Jamie, any comments on the continuing religious violence in
India and Pakistan, especially against Christians? Who's behind it? And
also if you have protested to the governments of India and Pakistan or if
you have called any ambassadors here in the State Department to --
MR. RUBIN: I do have some information on that that I can provide to you
after the briefing.
QUESTION: The situation in Brazil apparently continues to worsen and
they've allowed the currency to float. Do you have anything to say about
that? Is the State Department playing any role in the development of
policy?
MR. RUBIN: The State Department always plays a role in the development of
policy towards countries around the world. To the extent there are direct
financial issues related to the IMF, that is the responsibility of the
Treasury Department. But we, as a government, are in close touch with the
Brazilian authorities -- the IMF, the G-7 and the financial authorities of
key emerging markets. We will continue to watch developments in world
markets closely.
It is important that Brazil carry forward the implementation of a strong,
credible economic program, and I would expect Secretary Albright to be in
touch with her counterpart in Brazil.
QUESTION: Do you think the President has the ability to do that?
MR. RUBIN: I think that answering questions like that are not helpful.
QUESTION: Jamie, two days conference took place here at the State
Department between US and China on human rights. Madame Secretary Albright
spoke eventually, I believe, at the Chinese Embassy. She again urged the
Chinese to respect human rights and civil liberties. So the Dalai Lama is
calling on the US to do more toward Tibet. Any comments? What has come out
of this two-day human rights conference; what is the future of the human
rights in China?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say that we believe it is very important to
maintain a strong and effective relationship with China for reasons of
national security. Whether it is North Korea, whether it is proliferation
between India and Pakistan, whether it's the Asian financial crisis,
whether it's joint efforts on terrorism, drugs, crime, these are national
security issues for the United States. We think it's extremely important
for us to work with the Chinese in these areas. We've made substantial
progress in many of these areas.
At the same time, we have told the Chinese that we will never have a fully
normal relationship with China so long as they do not allow their people
the basic human rights enshrined in international human rights covenants
and principles. We did engage in a dialogue with China - the human rights
dialogue envisaged by the summit between our two presidents. Assistant
Secretary Harold Koh forcefully presented our deep and profound concerns
about many issues, went into exhaustive detail. I think he briefed many of
you earlier in the week on how that proceeded.
But we do not think that it is appropriate to go into all the details,
other than to say that we will continue to press on the issues of Tibet. He
spoke to the question of him getting access to see the Panchan Lama. He
talked about the fact that we were profoundly disturbed by the unjustified
prison sentences for people merely expressing their legitimate rights and
legitimate views as citizens of China. We will continue to pursue that; but
we have to be capable of pursuing that and knowing that that kind
of abuse is going to make it impossible for the United States and China to
have a fully normal relationship, even while we pursue the very important
issues like North Korea and an arms competition on the Indian Subcontinent
and other matters that affect our security and the security of our
citizens.
So we're going to be able to pursue what's important for national security,
even while we support our principles on human rights.
QUESTION: Jamie, Chinese delegation had a news briefing in their embassy
two days ago. They said Secretary's comments on human rights situation in
China, actually the arrests of the activists, was inappropriate and
unfortunate. Do you have any response on their comments?
MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously, we do not believe that Secretary Albright's
response was either of those things. Let me say that it is the art of
diplomacy to be able to talk frankly to other governments and to be able to
walk the line like the Secretary did in being clear about the need for a
relationship with China, as I described in answer to the last question,
while living up to our principles and acting in a way consistent with our
views. I think Secretary Albright's toast at the Chinese Embassy was
walking that fine line and was a high art of diplomacy to be able to go
into the Chinese Embassy and speak clearly and frankly on a subject that is
very sensitive to the Chinese and be able to also make clear to them our
commitment to improving the relationship and to working together on the
matters where we've worked together. That is why the job of being Secretary
of State is such a difficult one, and I think Secretary Albright walked
that fine line just right.
QUESTION: You touched on national security. Could you comment on the
latest words that have come out of the China Commentary, their official
news agency, when they say that our demands for access to the site in North
Korea is unjustified? I think they also said it was ridiculous - something
to that effect. On the eve of the North Korean bilateral talks and the four
party talks, how is this seen?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen those particular comments, but let me say we
have not sensed any problem from China when we have explained to them in
our private discussions the importance we attach to the North Korea agreed
framework and the importance we attach to getting access to these sites. It
doesn't mean there wasn't some commentary for some purpose or another. But
in the information that has been available to me, I haven't heard
anyone suggest that the Chinese don't think it's important to find out,
like us, whether the agreed framework is being complied with.
QUESTION: Could I just follow up really quickly? Isn't this the first
time that they've come out and directly stated their opposition?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I haven't seen the particular account. I don't know to
what extent it reflects the views of the leadership publicly. I do know
that in the many discussions we've had with China about North Korea,
there's not been a suggestion that they disagree with us on the importance
of getting access to the site.
QUESTION: Could you take that question and perhaps get back to us later
if you can?
MR. RUBIN: Sure.
QUESTION: Jamie, how concerned is the US Government that if the North
Koreans do not give us access to the underground site and do not give us
the assurance that they won't again test fire a ballistic missile, that
that will impact the talks that will take place next week to bring about a
permanent peace to the Korean Peninsula. Is there a linkage between the
two?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly the agreed framework set forth in 1994 has
been the touchstone for our attempt to improve the security situation on
the Korean Peninsula. It is only as a result of that agreed framework that
we were able to set up greater efforts to try to promote greater stability
on the peninsula. So if we do not get satisfaction in assuring ourselves
that the agreed framework is being carried out and will be carried out, the
whole edifice will be affected that has been created since 1994. So
it would be hard to see how one could have the 1994 agreed framework in
jeopardy and yet be able to make progress in this broader area.
QUESTION: Back to religious persecution in China. Did Madeleine Albright
have an opportunity to confront or to ask about the persecution, the
torture of the Chinese priest, Father Li, that I talked to you about last
week? Was that brought up, or has the State Department made any kind of a
direct protest to let the Chinese know about the 50 million or more
Catholics that would greatly abhor this kind of treatment of priests?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that the State Department did have an opportunity
to discuss in detail our concerns on the religious freedom subject in our
dialogue that was held with the Chinese. Assistant Secretary Koh not only
raised it himself -- the subject of religious freedom -- but also had with
him the new coordinator in this area. He had an opportunity to speak
directly to the Chinese on the subject. I can try to get you some more
information about that.
QUESTION: I appreciate that.
QUESTION: Back to South Asia, you just mentioned twice US national
security interests in South Asian nuclear proliferation. My question is,
how does nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan affect the US national
security interests, other than possible leakage of nuclear weapons
technology from these countries?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as you must know, the stability of the Indian Subcontinent
is a matter of concern to, I think, most people in the world. We know very
well that India and Pakistan have fought several wars in recent years, and
the prospect of a war between India and Pakistan with both sides armed with
long-range missiles and nuclear weapons is a horrifying prospect to anybody
and does, because of the potential of that, affect the national security
of the United States. I think we are harmed by even the prospect of a major
war between India and Pakistan, one that could occur with them having these
dangerous weapons. That's on the immediate tangible side. I think everyone
would agree with that, I would hope.
Secondly, with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
the fact that an arms competition between India and Pakistan would
intensify and lead to increased capabilities in the nuclear and missile
area raises real concerns about that weaponry or capability or technology
spreading to countries who have a much more direct pattern of acting in
opposition to American interests. Those would be the two reasons.
QUESTION: A follow-up - what is the US doing and what can the US do to
reduce tension between India and Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously, you know quite well that Deputy Secretary
Talbott has spent a lot of time on that, and I'm sure that he and Assistant
Secretary Inderfurth would be in a position to get into greater detail on
that.
But we are aware of, and note with concern, several recent reports from the
region in the press predicting possible tests of ballistic missiles by both
India and Pakistan. We have urged both sides to exercise restraint and to
avoid inflammatory actions that would heighten tensions and fuel a missile
arms race. Many other nations have also urged both sides not to take such
actions.
Missile tests would not be helpful to efforts to reduce tensions and build
confidence through dialogue in South Asia, nor would they help the climate
for our ongoing effort with both countries, through the good efforts of
Deputy Secretary Talbott, to promote a reconciliation. We have raised, in
the last day, with both India and Pakistan directly our concerns on this
matter. Deputy Secretary Talbott will be visiting the region at the end of
the month and will be raising this as well.
QUESTION: Have you gotten any reassurances from either capital?
MR. RUBIN: At this point, all I'm in a position to say is that we've
raised the subject with them.
QUESTION: And just another follow-up - to what extent are you aware of
the nature of the preparations? I mean, is this almost - is this imminent?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to speculate on our information about
such matters with you. I can tell you that we are concerned about, and have
been for some time, about the prospect of missile testing. We take note
with concern of recent reports that there may be tests very soon. So we
take this seriously. I'm not going to describe our expert information on
the subject.
QUESTION: And at what level was this concern communicated in the last --
MR. RUBIN: To our embassies.
QUESTION: To the embassies?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Here, too?
MR. RUBIN: I believe it was through the embassies in Pakistan and
India.
QUESTION: Jamie, could I go back for a moment to the removal of the holds
on oil field equipment? Are those unilateral holds by the United States? In
other words, if the decision is made to move them, then they're gone?
MR. RUBIN: It depends. I mean, some cases we may act in concert with
other countries. In some cases, we may be the only ones. But one would be
enough in the case of the way the system works. I can't give you an answer
to each one of them, other than to say that we're going to act to reduce -
we tend to be the most vigilant on this subject, so I suspect that our
removing holds will make it much more likely that the equipment is
sent.
QUESTION: Geneva, the summit convention starts, I believe, next Monday.
So in this convention do you have any targets towards India and Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you some information about what our specific
efforts would be in that regard.
QUESTION: Moving to Kosovo, could you tell us from what you know about
the two monitors that were shot and wounded, and whether - since I
understand it's the first time it ever happened - whether this is giving
alarm to countries about pulling those monitors out?
MR. RUBIN: It is correct we do have information that two Verification
Mission personnel were shot and wounded today in Kosovo in the town of
Rznic in the Ducani area. Their injuries are not life-threatening and they
are being taken to a hospital in Pristina for treatment. One of the two is
an international member of the KVM; the other is a local member. Neither
individual is American.
Let me say that this kind of attack is unacceptable; that we believe that
all those in Kosovo who want to see peace there should realize that these
people are unarmed, that they are acting to try to diffuse the situation,
to try to help the people of Kosovo and that both parties - the Kosovar
Albanian side and the Serbian Government - are responsible for the security
of these monitors and verifiers. We will hold those responsible who took
this action.
With respect to the future, let me say that any decision on the security of
the monitors and verifiers there would have to be made by William Walker,
and any decisions would be based on his assessment. We have been in touch
with him and we will continue to do so. I have nothing to report to you on
that in general, other than to say that today's events don't change the
importance of the mission the KVM is performing nor change or diminish
in any way the vital contribution they are making to managing and
reducing tensions in Kosovo.
QUESTION: Can you spell the name of the town where they were shot?
MR. RUBIN: R-z-n-i-c.
QUESTION: Do you have the nationality of that international member?
MR. RUBIN: If I had, I would have told you. If I was in a position to
tell you, I would have told you.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I don't think anyone envisaged the NATO extraction force
responding in a situation like this. I think if there's a general breakdown
that puts at risk the KVM and Ambassador Walker makes a request because of
that, that's the circumstance in which the extraction force would be
deployed.
QUESTION: But I thought they'd be there to protect the verifiers.
MR. RUBIN: I think, although it's your last day, I think you probably
know better than that. The force is in Macedonia; the verifiers are in
Kosovo. They're unarmed verifiers. We've always said that the responsibility
for the safety of those people rests first and foremost with the parties.
It would be impossible for a force in Macedonia, that is hundreds of miles
away, to protect people in Kosovo. What they're there for is to extract
them in the event it is concluded that there is a general breakdown.
I've never heard anybody suggest, and we've given many briefings from
this podium, that unarmed verifiers in Kosovo could be protected from an
armed force in Macedonia.
QUESTION: I think there was a little bit of ambiguity as to whether or
not these two individuals were caught in crossfire or if they were actually
fired upon. Are you able to --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position - we're investigating this very
carefully, and when we have more compelling evidence one way or the other,
we'll try to get that to you.
QUESTION: A while back you said that events in Kosovo were kind of
spiraling not out of control, but down the path that you would have
preferred not to see. I was just wondering if you could characterize what
these latest events do for the situation in general.
MR. RUBIN: Well, they certainly harm the situation. Let me say it's not
an isolated event. We also have reports from our embassy that indicate a
sizable increase in VJ armor presence along the Pristina to Podujevo road.
At least a dozen tanks have taken up provocative positions very close to
the road and surrounding a major checkpoint on the route. The KVM, the
verifiers, continue to meet with Serb officials and press for the return to
garrison of these forces.
There are also reports of armed clashes in Decani, in which tanks from the
VJ and police mortars are reportedly being deployed, and unconfirmed media
reports of fighting near the Albanian border. We are checking these reports
out. We expect both sides - the Serb side and the Kosovar Albanian side -
to live up to the commitments they have made and to their obligations to
the international community in a number of resolutions in the October
agreements and in numerous cease-fire agreements.
It is very important for the KLA, the Serbian police and the Serbian Army
forces to refrain from provocative actions, movements or deployments which
undercut efforts to maintain the cease-fire. We are continuing to work this
matter very carefully over the weekend. When the issue was the hostages, I
know Secretary Albright had been in touch with her counterparts in Russia
and the United Kingdom on this. So we are watching it very closely and we
urge in the strongest possible terms none of the parties to take provocative
action.
QUESTION: Jamie, is there reason at all for Secretary Albright to have
Ambassador Holbrooke return or is this at all something that's under
consideration?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard that. We make a decision as to when Ambassador
Holbrooke's services can be best used based on the circumstances on the
ground. Right now, obviously, Ambassador Holbrooke and people in the
Department and the Secretary and people in the field talk a lot on the
phone, but there's been no decision for him to return to the region.
QUESTION: Apparently, there's been a settlement between the German
Government and 230 Americans who were held in concentration camps. I
wondered if you had any response.
MR. RUBIN: It is true that the United States and German have agreed on an
amount of money that Germany will pay to the United States under the second
phase of a 1995 agreement on compensation for Americans, who, as US
nationals, were subjected to Nazi persecution. I'm not in a position to
make public the amount of the payment at this time. The agreement covers
the claims of American citizens who were US nationals at the time they were
interned in concentration camps and who have previously received no
compensation from Germany for their suffering.
The individuals eligible for compensation have been identified by the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which conducted an intensive program
to locate individuals and adjudicate their claims. The German Government
has committed to transfer a significant amount of money to the United
States; however, it must seek this funding through a legislative appropriation.
Until this process is underway, we have agreed that the amount of the lump
sum transfer will not be disclosed. We expect that payment to be made in
the first half of this year, but Germany has committed to do it as
early as possible.
QUESTION: How many -- (inaudible) --
MR. RUBIN: That would also be information protected by a statute that
specifies it shall not be publicly disclosed.
QUESTION: Jamie, there's a wire report that says the EU and the United
States Government's food aid to Russia deliveries have been postponed, at
least slightly postponed. I would ask, when do you expect the $885 million -
is that still the correct figure -- of US food aid to start arriving in
Russia?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that I will have to get that information for you
after the briefing, precisely.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)
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