U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #6, 99-01-13
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1121
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, January 13, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
SERBIA
1 US is actively involved in assisting development of
functioning democratic institutions.
9 US has never taken stock in words of Serbian officials;
focus is, instead, on their deeds.
IRAQ
1-2,4,5,8 UN Security Council resolutions state that Iraq must disarm
by disclosing its WMD programs.
1-2,5 That is the context in which US will evaluate French
proposal, and others.
1-2,3,8 Positive elements of French proposal are clear mention of
need for monitoring program, as well as accounting for
spending of oil revenues..
2 Iraqi regime is making hypocritical complaints about the
plight of its people.
2 US remains very focused on the humanitarian problem.
2-3 US is prepared to look at ways to ensure that Iraq can pump
all the oil allowed under UN program.
4 US is not prepared to 'leapfrog' over UN sanctions
resolutions.
5,7 US is in contact with Saudi government on plight of Iraqi
people.
6 Iraq has not begun to fill in hole it dug for itself with
other Arab governments.
6 No-fly zones are there so Saddam Hussein cannot use air
power to repress his own people.
6 Latest incidents resulted in direct hits to missile sites,
with no damage to coalition aircraft.
18 UNSCOM has performed important work, carrying out UNSC
mandates.
LIBYA
8 There is no newfound optimism over prospects for turning
over Lockerbie bombing suspects.
SIERRA LEONE
8 US is encouraged by dialogue among Sierra Leone,
international community and RUF.
RUSSIA-IRAN
9 Movement in right direction on preventing Iran from
acquiring WMD has stopped; and is deteriorating.
10 Material assistance has been given to Iran's missile
program.
10 This will be part of Secretary Albright's discussions when
in Moscow.
11 Recent violations are different than previous ones:
Previously Russia acted; this time it didn't.
12,14 US is deeply concerned about Iran's pursuit of a missile
program.
12-13 Extension of US program to launch satellites with Russian
missiles depends upon Russian cooperation on export of
missile and WMD technology.
13 Secretary Albright spoke yesterday with FM Ivanov.
HAITI
15 US regrets further gap developed between executive,
legislative branches of government.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S UPCOMING TRIP
15-16,17 Purpose of stops in Saudi Arabia and Egypt is to discuss
Iraq. No plans to stop in Israel.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
18 US strongly believes Wye agreement should be implemented.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #6
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1999, 1:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department Briefing. As you know, today
we had a briefing here this morning and one this afternoon, and so this was
the appropriate time to do our regularly scheduled program.
I do have a statement on democratization in Serbia that addresses the
rather ridiculous and crass and foolhardy attempt by some in Serbia to
staple together some documents and claim they have found the Holy Grail. I
have a statement on that I think that will make clear to all of you the
ridiculousness of the press conference held by some in Serbia in the last
24 hours. I'm happy to address that or go on to your other questions.
QUESTION: I think we have an idea of what it's going to read like, so
let's move on. I'm sure you know France has got a proposal now on Iraq on
more oil, which the US isn't going to get but anyhow, you know the point.
Is the US - I haven't seen a US reaction. There have been some Russian, et
cetera. Is this the place for an American reaction?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that the Security Council resolutions endorsed by
all the permanent members and all members of the Council make clear that
Iraq must disarm, and that it must do so by fully disclosing their weapons
of mass destruction programs. The burden to disclose those weapons of mass
destruction programs is on Iraq, not on the Security Council, not on any
body of the Security Council like UNSCOM or anyone else. The burden is on
Iraq to disclose its weapons of mass destruction if Iraq wants to get out
from under the sanctions regime that the Security Council imposed
at the end of the Gulf War. The regime actually began prior to the
war upon the invasion of Kuwait.
The fact that Iraq must disclose its weapons of mass destruction and that
the Security Council is committed to disarming Iraq through that mechanism
is the context in which we will evaluate any number of proposals, including
the French proposal, as to how we move forward. We are aware of the French
proposal. We have a number of questions and concerns that we are going to
address to France about the proposal.
In addition, let me say that there are some positive elements in the French
proposal that deal with the essential task of ensuring that Iraq does not
rearm and is disarmed -- for example, the important stress on having a
monitoring and inspection regime to fulfill that task; and secondly, a
means of controlling how the Iraqi regime spends its money so that we are
in a position to ensure that money the regime gets is not funneled into
weapons of mass destruction programs or an effort to rearm.
Finally, let me say that what we have seen in recent days is clear evidence
of the hypocrisy of the Iraqi regime in complaining about the fate of its
people. While complaining that the Iraqi people are suffering, Iraq has
failed to order and distribute food and medicine that would alleviate
problems in this area. Iraq has refused, according to certain reports,
humanitarian donations from certain countries.
In the current oil-for-food program that we constructed, Iraq plans to
order less food and medicine for the Iraqi people than in previous phases.
We also understand that enormous amounts of medicines ordered by Iraq after
months of waiting sit undistributed in Ministry of Health warehouses. Iraq
has also refused to propose improvements in the food basket the Iraqi
people get - that is, the metaphorical food basket - and Iraq has promised
for months to order nutritional supplements for vulnerable groups but
has failed to do so.
In short, Iraq continues to manipulate with cynical means the plight of its
people, even as we and other members of the international community are
deeply concerned about the Iraqi people. In my final comment on this, since
the French proposal is partially related to the humanitarian issue, let me
say that we are very focused on the humanitarian problem. We have ideas and
are looking at ways to improve the program so that the people of Iraq do
not suffer as a result of the actions of the leadership.
So in short, to summarize, the context in which we need to address this
proposal is that Iraq must disclose its weapons of mass destruction,
pursuant to the unanimous decisions of the Security Council. The French
proposal has some areas where we have some concerns and some questions. In
other areas, we see some positive elements because it gets at the problem
of ensuring there is an inspection and monitoring regime and ensuring that
the regime does not misuse resources in order to rearm or reconstitute its
weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: Two things, please. When you deal with their warehousing
pharmaceuticals and food, and this is well-known -- also, you didn't touch
on the fact that they don't even pump the amount of oil that they're
entitled to. Apologists or a rationale for their behavior say that they
simply don't have the equipment to all of the things. They don't have the
trucks to distribute; the embargo keeps them from the spare parts they need
to keep their oil petroleum industry going. Is there a point to that,
or is it the cynical deprivation of humanitarian needs?
MR. RUBIN: I do not think there's a point to that, and I think it's a
little tiresome to see people making excuses for a regime that is so
clearly manipulating cynically their people. When we know that they're
going to order less food and medicine than in previous phases; when we know
that after months of waiting, enormous amounts of medicine are waiting in
warehouses; when we know that they're not taking steps to improve the food
basket for the average Iraqis or ordering nutritional supplements
for vulnerable groups, I think you don't need to know more than that
to know that this Iraqi regime is not doing all it can to help its
people.
Let's remember -- and please, once I'd like to see you all include this
fact - the embargo does not prohibit the provision of medicine and food to
Iraq. If Iraq were to use its money on food and medicine for its people
rather than weaponry and weapons and palaces for the regime, a lot of this
problem could be handled. The fact that they won't do that is what has
caused us to create an elaborate program to control the revenues, to
control the use of those revenues and to try to encourage the purchase of
food and medicine.
On the supply side, the oil side, all I can say is that we are ready to
work with other countries to ensure that there are no obstacles to allowing
Iraq the means necessary to produce the oil that is permitted by the oil-
for-food program, provided we have confidence and safeguards that those
efforts will not be misused for purposes other than the oil program or
exaggerations or bad analysis will be used to explain why they need to
spend scarce money on equipment rather than spending scarce money
on the food and medicine. In other words, we are not the impediment
to them being able to sell the amount of oil that is permitted. It is Iraq
that is using that as an excuse, just the way it is using the demand and
distribution side to cynically manipulate the international community.
QUESTION: Does that over-extend to distribution of food and medicine?
MR. RUBIN: Which offer?
QUESTION: You seem to be making an offer to make sure they - unless I
misunderstand you, it seems the US is ready to help mechanically to get the
oil out of the ground.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not proposing American oil companies going over
there pumping oil. What I am saying is that we're prepared to look at ways
and explore ideas to ensure that the humanitarian program - that is, both
the demand side of the food and medicine and the supply side, which is the
sale of oil - that there are no impediments to them moving forward as
comprehensively as possible.
QUESTION: Can I get to the other question? You've just seen the French
proposal. You're talking about the objective of wanting Iraq to declare its
weapons, true. But the issue is inspection, and they're blocking inspection.
Do you have a sense yet that the French proposal would permit adequate
search, adequate monitoring of what they may have hidden, or are the French
more inclined to take Iraq's word for it than the US would prefer?
MR. RUBIN: I'd rather not comment on French motivations, other than to
say that certainly I think it's fair to say the United States has always
been fairly skeptical about Iraq's intentions and actions; and perhaps some
are not as skeptical as we are. But they will have to speak for themselves.
With respect to the French proposal, let me say that one of the positive
elements that I identified was the clear need spelled out for a monitoring
and inspection mechanism. Obviously, I'm giving you a preliminary reaction
to some initial ideas. It's going to require further exploration and
discussion. And until we've done so, I wouldn't be able to get into the
level of detail that you've described.
QUESTION: As I understand it, though, the heart of their proposal is to
lift the oil embargo with the monitor - while monitoring it in an
appropriate way. How do you feel about lifting the embargo?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say I am sure that French officials in Paris are
spinning at your description of their proposal as them proposing the
lifting of the oil embargo.
What I can say on the sanctions side is that we do agree and find positive
the aspects of the French proposal that make clear there must be a means of
controlling how the regime spends its money so that we can ensure that Iraq
doesn't use that money to rearm or reconstitute or for other nefarious
purposes.
Exactly how we will get from here to there are one of the things that we
are going to discuss. But we have certainly made clear that we do not
support leap-frogging Security Council resolutions to lift the sanctions on
Iraq in the absence of the resolutions' required confirmation that Iraq has
been disarmed and is monitored.
QUESTION: Is what you're saying in any way different from or in addition
to what Under Secretary Pickering had announced before Christmas about
there being more oil that could be pumped in the oil-for-food program? Is
this an addendum to that?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that question. All I can tell you
is that I've given the importance we attach to exploring ideas on the
humanitarian side. One way in which one could do that is by increasing the
limit on the oil that could be sold. On the inspection and monitoring
aspects of the French proposal, I've said what I can about that.
QUESTION: Jamie, would you outline or at least give us some kind of sense
as to what aspects of the French proposal the United States does not agree
with?
MR. RUBIN: I know that disagreement is your stock and trade, but it's not
ours. We think it's preferable at this time to make clear that there are
issues of concern that we want to ask for the questions about, and there
are some positive elements that I have identified.
QUESTION: You've often made clear that the conditions for lifting
sanctions against Iraq are laid down in Security Council resolutions and,
as you say, you just can't leap-frog those resolutions. What about a brand
new resolution that in a sense superseded existing resolution that, perhaps,
reformulated those conditions and laid down, perhaps, even some new ones?
Would you then be at a point where you would reappraise this whole
issue?
MR. RUBIN: Well, that is why I gave you the main point, and that is the
context in which we continue to approach the problem and would evaluate the
French proposal -- namely, that under Security Council resolutions, which
we continue to support, Iraq must disclose its weapons of mass destruction;
and that burden has to be on Iraq. That is our view today, as it was at the
time that the resolutions were passed. What other's views maybe they can
speak to but, again, it is my impression that in none of the discussions
that we've had - and Secretary Albright has talked to the Russian
Foreign Minister in the last couple of days and we have been in contact
with the Russian delegation and other delegations -- and that no delegation
is saying that they want to step away from the requirement, which is in the
national security of Russia, of France, of the countries in the Middle East
and all the countries in the world, that Iraq must be disarmed to protect
us from the threat that he poses from his behavior.
As far as what a new system would look like if we moved and talked to the
French and others and find out how to move forward, I can't speculate for
you. That's too many steps down the road. What I can say is we've looked at
the French proposal. There's some things we have concerns about and
questions about and there's some things that we find positive, and I've
identified those.
QUESTION: Theoretically, that requirement could be, if not stepped away
from, perhaps, rewritten?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I would think that every time a Security Council
resolution passes of a substantive content, since 687, there have been new
elements on the disarmament side added - 715 added certain requirements on
Iraq to accept the various programs of UNSCOM and the IAEA. So, yes, a
resolution was passed that created an exception for the oil-for-food
program, and that's what you do as you continue to work on the objectives.
I'm simply pointing out that the objective of disarming Iraq and making
clear the burden of proof is on Iraq to disclose its weapons of mass
destruction is and objective we continue to support strongly and is the
context in which we will discuss any new proposals.
QUESTION: Is there any likelihood that the Secretary will go to Paris
either to or from Moscow?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that. For those of you who have
been with us for a couple of years, I'm sure you've gotten use to the fact
that stops can be added and removed as per the needs of our diplomacy and
the Secretary's decisions. When those stops are removed or added, I try to
provide that information to you as quickly as I can.
QUESTION: Have you seen details of the Saudi initiative yet? If not, are
you coming to the conclusion, perhaps, that it's not very substantial?
Secondly, what do you make of Iraq's apparent attempt to mend its fences
with Arab countries after the outburst last week?
MR. RUBIN: On the first question, we are in contact with the Saudi
Government. Secretary Albright will be there shortly. We want to work with
the Saudi Government on ideas to deal with the humanitarian plight of the
Iraqi people that Saddam Hussein is uninterested in dealing with. We will
do that. As I just indicated, we have some ideas and are looking at ways to
improve that program, and we are doing that in consultation with the Saudi
Government.
But as far as the specifics and our specific reaction to any specific idea,
I don't have one at this time.
QUESTION: And the --
MR. RUBIN: Oh, and the Iraqi attempt to get out of the deep hole they've
dug for themselves in the Arab world, I don't think they've even come close
to filling up that hole. They can say a lot of nice words about how they
want to work with other countries, but I don't think anyone will soon
forget the intemperate, irrational diatribe of Saddam Hussein against
fellow leaders in that region. I don't have any reason to believe that they
all suddenly think he's terrific because they finally say something
that's not irrational and not intemperate.
QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, today, I believe, was the seventh attempted attack
of SAM reaction to patrol planes of the United States over no-fly zones in
Iraq. My question is, what does the Administration see as the objective of
Saddam's administration in trying to do what is technologically not likely
to succeed? To shoot down a US plane, is that what they're trying to do,
to get a pilot or something else? And then what is the remedy for
this current situation that's going on in the no-fly zones?
MR. RUBIN: As far as Saddam's attempt, again, I think we've said this
before, it's by lashing out in this way and the remarks he's made about
other Arab leaders and trying to deal with the no-fly zones, we need to
start from the premise of what the no-fly zones are for. That is to ensure
that Iraq cannot use the skies over the North and the skies over the South
to repress his people so brutally in the way he has in the past.
We have made clear that Saddam Hussein and his regime suffered damage
during the last set of air strikes. I described two days ago some detail
about certain assassinations in Iraq. Clearly, in the past, Iraq has tried
to demonstrate that its regime is still there through actions such as this.
I wouldn't rule out that as one of the motivations.
But the bottom line is that we are determined to enforce the no-fly zone;
that our air crews have been acting in self-defense, firing precision
guided missiles and HARMS, and there were direct hits of the Iraqi surface-
to-missile sites and additional damage is being assessed. There was no
damage to Coalition aircraft. Since Desert Fox, the Iraqi military has
obviously increased both the pace and severity of no-fly zone violations.
Despite repeated warnings, Iraqi forces have posed threats to our air
crews. The actions like the ones taken today are appropriate military
responses to that threat.
We have served notice, since the beginning of the no-fly zones, that we
would take action to protect our forces; and on a number of occasions, we
have had to resort to the use of force for this purpose. My understanding
is that since the end of Desert Storm, the US has flown in excess of 140,
000 missions in support of the no-fly zone. Most have been conducted
without incident. However, since the no-fly zones were declared invalid on
December 23, there have been some 40 separate and distinct violations.
Our military actions are prudent responses to these violations and Iraqi
actions that endanger Coalition aircraft and crews, and we have made clear
that our pilots will take the necessary actions to defend themselves while
carrying out the mission of enforcing the no-fly zone.
Let me simply say that with respect to the rules of engagement in dealing
with this problem, I would have to refer you to the Department of
Defense.
QUESTION: Do you think that in view of the superior technology and the
general superiority of American air forces in this theater that Iraq,
Saddam is in fact acting in a suicidal way; he's sacrificing his people by
one SAM battery after another, and this just shows the insanity of the
regime?
MR. RUBIN: Well, if I were an Iraqi pilot, which is something I certainly
wouldn't want to be, that might be a conclusion that I drew.
QUESTION: I just want to follow up on Jonathan's earlier question about
the Saudi proposal. Did I understand you correctly to say that we've
recognized or acknowledged that there is the need to improve, did you say,
the program?
MR. RUBIN: No, what I said was the same as I said in response to your
earlier question - that we are looking at ways and exploring ideas to
improve the plight of the Iraqi people through these humanitarian programs,
like the oil-for-food program. The Saudis have put forward some suggestions
in this area, and we are going to work with the Saudi Government because,
like the Saudi Government, we share a deep concern about the plight of the
Iraqi people - a concern that Saddam Hussein does not share.
QUESTION: Are those the only such ideas that the US is willing to
entertain?
MR. RUBIN: No, we're exploring many different ideas, including the Saudi
ideas as to how to improve the program.
QUESTION: I meant only within the oil-for-food, humanitarian aspect of
the --
MR. RUBIN: Well, that's the mechanism by which they - there's only three
ways to get food and medicine to Iraq: either people donate it or the
Iraqis spend some of their money and but it as permitted by the sanctions.
They can use their money to feed their people; they don't, but they can. Or
we create a mechanism by which we induce them to sell oil for that purpose.
It's hard for me to imagine any other way in which food and medicine could
get to Iraq. So in those three areas - either donations or Iraq's
using its own money for this purpose or using oil revenue for this purpose -
that's the comprehensive set of possibilities from which one can work. That
is what we'll be working from.
QUESTION: Have they been part of that discussion?
MR. RUBIN: They have traditionally been part of that discussion. We've
tended to consult with many of the governments in the region about
that.
QUESTION: A question and a follow-up, please. Is it the American position
that a complete Iraqi disarmament and full disclosure of its past weapons
of mass destruction program must occur before there can be a lifting of the
oil embargo?
MR. RUBIN: I think that is pretty clear from what I have said. We cannot
leap-frog the requirements of Security Council resolutions. Any lifting of
sanctions pursuant to those resolutions need to be in accordance with the
resolutions' requirement that Iraq's disarmament is confirmed. The
resolutions lay out a decision tree based on confirming Iraq's disarmament.
We believe in those resolutions.
QUESTION: To the extent that the French proposals for inspection and
monitoring would replace the practices of UNSCOM, is that okay with the
United States?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that question. What I know how to
tell you is what I've told you about the French proposal; which is that we
find a positive element to be their focus on an inspection and monitoring
system. We have always said we are prepared to look at ways to improve the
effectiveness of the inspection and monitoring that UNSCOM does.
QUESTION: Have you had any reports back from the envoys who went to Libya
on Lockerbie - Prince Bandar and the South African?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have anything new to share with you that would lead to
any new found optimism, and I haven't seen a lot of scurrying in the
relevant bureau and people concerned that this is about to break.
QUESTION: Elsewhere in Africa, Sierra Leone - the imprisoned rebel leader
has made an offer - (inaudible) - to the president that if he frees him,
there would be a cease-fire, some sort of a quid pro quo. Does the US have
a position on that by any chance?
MR. RUBIN: The leader, who was convicted last year on eight counts of
treason, was flown to Guinea yesterday, where he met with UN Special
Representative Okelo and the Foreign Minister of Cote d' Ivoire, Togo and
Sierra Leone.
The international delegation reportedly told the press that Sankoh had
expressed his willingness for peace and for a political, not a military,
solution. However, Sankoh demanded his freedom and official recognition for
the RUF before ordering a cease-fire.
We are encouraged by the dialogue that has begun among the international
community, the governments of Sierra Leone and the RUF. The goal is to
establish an enduring cease-fire and a lasting peace.
QUESTION: The Serbia thing you mentioned in the beginning, given that
this so-called top secret CIA document was waved around by two deputy prime
ministers, the justice minister and it was clearly a forgery, do you intend
to protest that, ask for any explanation; or are you just going to sort of
brush it off and ignore it?
MR. RUBIN: Well, these kind of hysterical, paranoid ravings are not
unfamiliar in that part of the world, as I'm sure you know. We have never
taken great stock in the words of leaders of Serbia; we have focused on
deeds. I think the absurdity of this is clear on its face, and I suspect
that it will quickly redound and rebound against them all by itself.
QUESTION: So there won't be a demarche or anything like that?
MR. RUBIN: I mean, I'm not aware - I think most people's reaction was
that this was so ridiculous, but the kind of antic that some of these
people are known for, that we didn't see the need to do anything other than
make clear the falseness of the paper.
QUESTION: I have a Moscow question. Yesterday Sandy Berger said that
three more Russian entities were involved in, I believe, transferring
technology to Iran. I don't know whether he was that specific. The Russians
have now denied that these entities have been engaged in this activity. How
sure are we of our information; how seriously do we take this?
MR. RUBIN: Let me give you a fairly comprehensive answer to that. Over
the last several years, we have been working very closely with Russia to
try to deal with real concerns we have in the missile and nuclear area.
This was done first through the services of Frank Wisner and his counterpart
Mr. Koptyev on the Russian side, and now has been taken over by Bob
Gallucci.
The objective is to not only provide information to Russia about the
concerns we have and the disturbing reports we have about cooperation in
the missile and nuclear area, but to convince them to take it more
seriously, to investigate those reports, to stop this activity and to pass
laws that create a better deterrent for that activity in the future.
During the initial phases, we saw a significant amount of success. Laws
were passed - or rather, export control regulations were set forth, in
particular a catch-all export control, and the Russian Government took
active steps to stop problems and fix problems that we had identified. That
movement in the right direction has stopped, and there has been a steady
deterioration in this area.
We have brought to Russia's attention for many months now the fact that two
entities on the nuclear side - and they are the Nikyet Scientific Research
and Design Institute of Power and Technology and the Mendeleyev University
of Chemical Technology. We have made clear to the Russians that on the
nuclear side, we believe material contributions to Iran's nuclear weapons
program have been made. We are very confident in the information we have.
We have provided it to the Russians and given them several months
in which to deal with this by stopping it. They are quite familiar with the
level of detail our information consists of.
We made very clear to the Russians that if they failed to act, that we
would be taking this kind of step well before we took it. And prior to the
decision to announce the sanctions, we alerted the Russians to the fact
that we would do so. So any suggestion on their part of surprise or
diplomatic precedent being somehow affected is simply untrue.
Secondly, on the missile side, we believe that the Moscow Aviation
Institute has provided material contributions to Iran's missile program. In
both cases, we believe that militarily significant activities are taking
place. We have very good confidence in the information that we've made
available to the Russians to justify them stopping it. We do not believe
that these are groundless charges; we believe that Russia's government must
do more to deal with the problems.
QUESTION: The follow-up to that, I imagine the Secretary is planning to
take this up on her trip to Moscow, and what concerns on the part of the US
of how these sanctions could impact the success of her trip to Moscow.
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary, from the beginning, has made clear that we and
the Russians have a lot of work to do together. We and Russia need to work
very closely together on the security of Europe and the security of other
parts of the world. In her many, many conversations over many meals and
many discussions with then-Foreign Minister Primakov, she made very clear
to him the seriousness with which we approach the problem of non-proliferation
and the determination we have to use whatever means are at our disposal to
respond and deter action in this area. This is no surprise to the
Russians.
Clearly, the US-Russian relationship has many areas of agreement and some
areas of disagreement. What we consider our goal to be, in the broadest
sense to advance America's interest, is to work together where we can and
cooperate together where we can and manage the differences where they
exist. Clearly, this is a difference.
Now, rhetorically, there isn't a difference. The Russian Government has
made clear to us that they do not support activities to promote the
development of weapons of mass destruction in Iran or assistance to their
missile program. But we believe that these entities that I've described to
you have done just that; and this will be a part of the discussion. It
won't be the most pleasant part of the discussion, but the business of
diplomacy requires one to deal with the hard issues more often than the
easy ones.
QUESTION: Jamie, why do you think there has been this backsliding?
MR. RUBIN: That is not something I would care to speculate from on the
podium. I am prepared to describe to you the assessment we have about the
situation and the deterioration. I'm sure there are many different views in
the expert community about this, but we are going to try to reverse the
trend and I think the seriousness with which we approach this issue has
been made clear by these actions.
QUESTION: Jamie, there were a series of entities that had previously been
cited in this way.
MR. RUBIN: Seven, yes.
QUESTION: Do we consider these current breaches to be more serious then
those?
MR. RUBIN: There's a big difference. In the last case, the Russian
Government had identified those seven entities for investigation. We told
the Russians, in light of their investigation into the activities of these
seven entities, that we were going to use our executive power to prevent
any trade or import or export with those entities, along with their
investigation into those entities' activities.
In this case, we have been urging the Russians to act in these three areas
and they have not acted to our satisfaction. That is why we took the action
we took.
QUESTION: Did the activities not stop after you told them?
MR. RUBIN: Apparently not.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: No, no, that wouldn't be covered necessarily by your remarks.
They may not have taken action against the companies, but did the companies
keep doing what you didn't like?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that these entities are engaging in activities of
concern to us. I cannot say that every one of the activities that has gone
on is still going on, but there are activities of concern to us that
continue.
QUESTION: Is there any question that the Russian Government was aware,
even before you let them know? You sometimes say that the Chinese
Government doesn't know what their companies are doing, so I wondered about
the Russians.
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say that - I named the institutes which are --
QUESTION: You did - some kind of formal and government-like.
MR. RUBIN: Right, so I'd rather simply say that in our conversations with
the Russian Government at the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister level,
both then-Foreign Minister Primakov and current Foreign Minister Ivanov
have said to us that they do not support these activities; that they face
risks from Iran that they want to stop. So that is where I'd like to leave
that speculation.
QUESTION: This is somewhat of a follow-up on Betsy's question, but does
the US recognize and appreciate the difficulties that the Russian
Government is experiencing and, in addition to that, that these institutions
would be experiencing with their economic crisis, and that perhaps some of
the state subsidies that these institutions had come to rely on in years
past just are no longer there? Is that something that the US --
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me give you an example of why I understand the logic
of the question. We're quite aware of the state of Russian missile and
nuclear facilities' finances, and we've been working very hard at that. But
let me give you a concrete example of why this is not in Russia's own
national interest.
We are running out of the quota under which Russia can boost American
satellites. I believe the number is 16 that have been authorized. That is
expected to terminate, reach 16 this year. If we don't get progress on the
missile proliferation problem, we are not going to be able to support
increasing that quota. That is an amount of money that is on the order of
hundreds of millions of dollars per year in revenue for Russia. The
economics are better working with the United States and preventing Iran and
other countries from getting missiles than to work surreptitiously with
Iran or other countries' missile programs.
So it's not a financial question if one looks at it properly and in a macro
sense.
QUESTION: How worried is the United States and how far does the US
Government believe Russia is away from a, having an indigenous nuclear
weapons program; and b, having --
MR. RUBIN: Russia?
QUESTION: Excuse me, Iran - and b, having --
MR. RUBIN: That would have been much easier if you had kept it at
Russia.
QUESTION: And b, sort of being able to mass produce long-range ballistic
missiles.
MR. RUBIN: We don't normally provide in this forum specific intelligence
assessments of the Russian or the Iranian missile or nuclear programs. Let
me say this - we are deeply concerned about Iran's pursuit of a nuclear
weapons program and we are deeply concerned about Iran's missile testing
and development in the medium- and long-range missile area. That is why we
have been working so hard to stop it. Our efforts include not only an
intensive dialogue with Russia, but using the global norms of the non-
proliferation treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, et cetera, using
informal non-proliferation tools like the nuclear suppliers group,
the Missile Technology Control Regime, using export controls of our
own and export control assistance to other countries, using interdiction of
individual shipments of proliferation concern, using sanctions, as we did
in this case, maintaining strong military intelligence and diplomatic
capabilities. We do all this to impede the flow of sensitive technology to
Iran from other countries. That is because of our deep concern about the
prospects in the nuclear and missile areas.
QUESTION: So you're not prepared to increase the quota above 16, or
you're not prepared to extend the program for the satellite launches?
You're going to cut the program whereby Russia --
MR. RUBIN: Well, they're permitted to launch 16 satellites, and that is
existing. Any effort to increase that and to permit future Russian launches
of American-made satellites will require cooperation in this area of
missile development and missile non-proliferation. That is a position that
we have been taking. What I am trying to explain is that that involves the
provision of hundreds of millions of dollars of hard currency to Russia.
QUESTION: I still don't understand. So you're going to stop in total
allowing them - you may stop the program completely, or - I'm just not sure
what you're saying - or they can still launch 16?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't made a final decision and so I'm not telling
you what our final decision is. I'm explaining to you that if we don't
increase the quota at the end of this year, Russia will not be able to
launch any more satellites because they will reach the quota roughly at the
end of the year. So we need to make an affirmative decision about whether
we should increase the quota; and in so doing, we will take into account
very seriously progress, if any, that we have made in getting Russia to
stop its entities from supporting Iran's missile program.
QUESTION: The Secretary spoke to Ivanov late last night or early today,
as Tass claims?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I would have to get the time. I think it was yesterday, I
don't think it was late last night; I think it was yesterday morning our
time.
QUESTION: Strobe Talbott is meeting with the Russian Deputy Prime
Minister today?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: We will check that for you.
QUESTION: Here in Washington.
QUESTION: Can you tell us any more about - you talked about material
contributions for these programs. Does that mean supplying equipment or is
it expertise or what exactly does it --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think with your able research efforts, a little work
on the Internet, you'll be able to determine what it is that these entities
do and probably answer that question for yourself in terms of the basic
activities of these entities in the technical expertise area.
QUESTION: Are there any other possible consequences from their failure to
take action?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we've taken this action and I'm not prepared to describe
--
QUESTION: You said you hadn't taken that action yet. You said you're
considering it.
MR. RUBIN: What are you talking about? We just imposed sanctions on three
entities; that's an action.
QUESTION: No, I'm sorry, I meant are there any other possible economic
consequences to the Russians if these three entities don't stop, or if
there isn't progress in the missile proliferation?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the first and foremost consequence is increasing the
chance that Iran would get a missile, which would be very much against the
interest of Russia. I gave an example of an economic consequence, and I'm
not prepared to speculate on any other areas at this time.
QUESTION: At the Carnegie Conference yesterday, Bob Gallucci was on a
panel concerning the subject of Iran and Russia and the missile and nuclear
proliferation matter. Mr. Gallucci was confronted at the end of his talk
and basically his presentation was that for six months he hadn't received
cooperation from the Russians, especially from Mr. Adamov at -- (inaudible).
At the end of this presentation he was confronted by a Russian gentleman
who said he was a representative of Mr. Adamov. He claimed, played dumb,
said Russia hadn't heard any of these requests that had come from Mr.
Gallucci's travels and could he please repeat them. Mr. Gallucci's response
was, that's preposterous; that's not true that they hadn't been told what
he had been speaking about. Do you have any reaction to this particular
tactic on the part of the Russians?
MR. RUBIN: Thank you for making me feel like I was at the Carnegie
Conference yesterday, which I did miss.
(Laughter.)
Having missed it, let me answer the question as best I can. I indicated in
response to Betsy's question that we have told the Russians for some months
now about the concerns we have with these three entities - the two in the
nuclear area and the one in the missile area. We have told the Russians not
only of our concerns about the problem, but of our intention to impose
sanctions for some time now. Prior to announcing those decisions, we
alerted the Russians to those announcements.
I have no idea who it was that enlivened your day at the Carnegie
Conference and therefore I would have no way to comment on that specific
event.
QUESTION: Just one more matter, Ambassador (inaudible), an Israeli and
very expert man, says that the bottom line is that it's not too late to
prevent the proliferation that will bring about an operational missile and
weapons of mass destruction mating and a threat to Israel. It's not too
late because of the refinement that has to go into the rocketry for
targeting and other purposes. Is this the view of the United States - that
it's not too late for Russia now to shut off the flow of technology?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we are not doing all that we're doing and making all the
effort that we're making because we think it's pointless. We think it will
presumably achieve some purpose.
QUESTION: Several US officials over the last year have been to Haiti to
try to break the deadlock between Parliament and President Preval. On
Monday he announced that he would bypass the Parliament and put into place
his own prime minister, I believe the education minister. What I want to
know is, the US has been supporting Haiti's Preval for a while. Are you at
all embarrassed or concerned or disappointed with his decision to do that;
and what's the next step?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to the shooting, let me say Ambassador Carney has
spoken to President Preval, who confirmed that his sister is coherent and
in stable condition. Her driver was killed. We hope the persons responsible
for this horrible crime are brought to justice.
With respect to the political crisis, let me say that we regret the further
gap that has developed between the executive and legislative branches in
Haiti regarding the formation of a government and the continuity of the
legislative function.
As you know or may know, former National Security Advisor Lake traveled to
Haiti in recent days on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State
to help resolve this political impasse. Some constructive discussions were
held, and we hope, with continuing good faith and effort by the parties
concerned, a resolution will be found. But obviously as yet, there has been
no solution.
We hope the consultations will continue toward a constructive outcome. We
will continue to work with all parties to resolve the impasse. We note that
Parliament opened its new session yesterday and the diplomatic community,
including Ambassador Carney, attended. The police fulfilled their
responsibilities to protect Parliament members and allow access to the
legislative building.
We know, as well, that President Preval has stated he has neither the
authority to extend or dissolve the current Parliament. We and others in
the diplomatic corps are urging all parties to continue their efforts to
resolve this dispute.
QUESTION: Are you pulling your support from Preval, or do you still
support the Preval Government?
MR. RUBIN: Well, my job is to tell you our views; your job is to
interpret them. Our views are that we regret the further gap that has
developed between the executive and legislative branches in Haiti. The
efforts we have been making to try to resolve this problem - let me say
that we want to see that continue. That is our view for now.
QUESTION: Jamie, can I ask you on Secretary Albright's traveling and
another thing with her? It's a logistic thing; I just want to get it
straight - it's getting late. She is going to Saudi Arabia --and you made
the point about Iraq. Is that the main purpose of her stop there?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: All right. She's going to Egypt?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: What is the main purpose of that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Secretary Albright is going to both Saudi Arabia and
Egypt and will be meeting with leaders there who have wanted to talk to her
for some time and have invited her. The main topic on the agenda, as you
can see from the main topic on your agenda when you began the day today, is
Iraq.
QUESTION: Iraq is big on Israel's agenda, and as you recall, the
President had intended to send her - he said he would. Dennis went instead.
I don't want to belabor the point. It's in the neighborhood, it worries
about Iraq. I asked you about Jordan, but the King has just seen the
President and the Secretary so I guess that's not necessary. Why not Israel
- why not stop in Israel for a few hours?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I explained at the time, the reason the Secretary is
not going to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, pursuant to what the
President said in Gaza, is because that was designed to be at the end of
the 12-week period that would have involved the implementation in full of
the Wye Agreement, which obviously hasn't happened. Her visit there could
have sealed the ending of that agreement and begun intensifying the
permanent status negotiations.
So that purpose of such a trip is no longer operative, given what is going
on in the region. It has not been our practice to go to Israel every time
we've gone to the Gulf to talk about Iraq. I will get you some travel lists
to confirm that fact.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - Mr. Baker didn't always go there because there
was a concerted effort to not put Israeli in the line of fire. This is
insulting.
MR. RUBIN: In the last two years, well after the Baker period, Secretary
Albright has traveled to the region and visited with leaders in the Arab
world to discuss the subject of Iraq without going to discuss the Middle
East peace process in Israel. We don't regard that as anything more than a
simple focus of a trip. Since there isn't a lot to be done now on Wye that
Ambassador Ross can't do, who is there, we are making the decision that
it is appropriate and proper for us to visit Saudi Arabia and Egypt
and we have no plans to go to Israel.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)-because Iraq was also my point, but I won't belabor
it. Now what to Frank Gaffney, I suppose it is, saying she ought to
resign?
MR. RUBIN: You know, I read that about the embassy bombings in which
Secretary Albright took full responsibility. Let me just say on a personal
note, with the end of the Cold War and the end of perhaps even the post-
Cold War period, everybody looks for lodestars and ways in which they can
understand how to think about the new world. What has become a lodestar for
me is that invariably, Frank Gaffney is proposing things that are dangerous
for the United States. So if Gaffney's for it, I'm usually against it; and
that's certainly true in this case.
QUESTION: Michael Jordan -- (inaudible) --
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to touch Michael Jordan.
QUESTION: The political consulting firm that was broken into here in
Washington - do you have any information on either Israeli involvement or
just any further information on just the investigation?
MR. RUBIN: We've seen the reports. It's a law enforcement issue and being
handled by the law enforcement authorities.
QUESTION: Has the Israeli Government or opposition asked for your help or
information or offered any assistance in the investigation?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that; I'll check that for you.
QUESTION: Does the Secretary not see any need to travel to Israel and the
Palestinian Authority until the terms of the Wye Agreement are fulfilled?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't want to make such hard and fast rule. The Secretary
of State will travel to Israel and Gaza when she thinks it's appropriate
and proper and can advance the peace process. That has been her practice in
the past; it will continue to be her practice.
With respect to a specific trip called for in several weeks by the
President in Gaza, I was explaining that the context in which that trip was
to take place has changed dramatically.
QUESTION: I'm not sure I heard Barry's little follow-up and your
rejoinder. Do I take it you don't see any foreign policy implications to
Michael Jordan's resignation now?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I know that you'll have to consult the basketball
experts or lawyers.
QUESTION: I thought you were one.
MR. RUBIN: Well, all I can tell you about Michael Jordan is that it does
make it harder to get the same thrill and excitement from watching
basketball without watching him dunk from the foul line.
QUESTION: Does the United States still believe it's possible that the
terms of the Wye Agreement, and ultimately Oslo, will be able to be
fulfilled before May 4?
MR. RUBIN: We strongly believe that the Wye Agreement should be
implemented. We believe the Palestinians have taken two important steps in
fighting terrorism and in revising the Charter as per the Wye accord. There
are a number of other areas where we think more needs to be done by the
Palestinians, and we think that can be done if there's better communication
between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
On the Israeli side, as far as I am aware, nothing has been done to
implement the second phase of the further re-deployment or other parts of
the Wye Agreement. So we very much want both sides to act in accordance
with the agreement and act to implement the agreement. On the Israeli side,
we note that it was approved by the government and the Knesset, and we
believe that it should be implemented.
QUESTION: Is the United States urging the Israeli Government to do
more?
MR. RUBIN: I think I just did.
QUESTION: Thank you.
QUESTION: Can I just ask about Scott Ritter's latest claim that he
himself installed the listening device in Iraq for the US based on Butler's
orders and that intelligence from that very device was used to select
targets for Desert Fox?
MR. RUBIN: I think we've been very clear on the fact that UNSCOM
performed an important mission in finding out what Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction capabilities are. That was required by the Security Council.
With respect to Mr. Ritter's latest revelation about some secret, I will
leave it to him and his conscience to discuss that subject.
(The briefing concluded at 2:25 P.M.)
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