U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #140, 98-12-18
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1027
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, December 18, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
US-EUROPEAN UNION SUMMIT
1 White House, not State Department, to hold briefing on
topic today.
IRAQ
1-4 Secretary Albright has spoken with more than 30 foreign
ministers last two days.
4-5 US Medium-term goal is to contain Iraq, as Secretary said
yesterday.
5 US is sensitive to onset of Ramadan.
5 Secretary yesterday referred to long-term goal of regime
change.
6 US is increasing its support for Iraqi opposition.
7,9 US has great confidence in UNSCOM chairman competence,
abilities.
7-8 US sees no reason to replace Ambassador Butler.
8 US has no reason to believe UNSCOM would be allowed to be
effective.
9 Military power can't assure change of Iraqi intentions.
9 US saw no further need for diplomacy before acting.
10 US pleased by Saudi Arabian Government statement today.
10 Need for international support must be weighed against
military need for surprise.
10-11 US has widespread support in Europe, Latin America and
Asia.
11 Defense Department has spoken to dropping of leaflets.
11 US is pleased with supportive reaction of Turkey.
12 NATO support.
12 Syria lack of support.
13 Secretary has spoken to Arafat, half a dozen other Arab
leaders in past day or so.
13 Most US embassies in Africa remain closed today.
RUSSIA
1-5 Secretary had useful phone conversation with FM Ivanov
today.
1 US relationship with Russia much bigger than just Iraq
issue.
1-2 FM Ivanov relayed message from President Yeltsin to
President Clinton.
3 Secretary's planned trip to Russia was discussed with FM
Ivanov.
3 Ambassador to US was expected to leave; successor has
received agrement.
3 Russia has made clear its view that Iraq must comply with
UNSC resolutions.
3-4 Nevertheless US profoundly disagrees with Russia on
military action.
4 US continues to work cooperatively with Russia in many
areas.
6 US is familiar with anti-US extremes in Russia.
15 US sorry that Duma has postponed consideration of START II.
MEXICO
14 US expresses deep condolences to family of Phillip True for
his tragic murder.
14 US consular officials have worked closely with Mexican
officials on case.
14 Cooperation with Mexican officials has been excellent.
KOREAS
14-15 US deplores latest North Korean apparent attempt at
infiltration of the South
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
15-16 OAU Meeting
FRY (KOSOVO)
16 US deplores killing of deputy mayor Zvonko Bojanic of
Polje; KLA's condemnation welcomed.
16 US continues to urge restraint, work toward a negotiated
solution.
16 Monitors observed Serb police moving in Glodanje,
previously announced.
16-17 Serb police announced operation and have right and
responsibility to identify and apprehend murderers.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #140
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1998, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Let me
say, first of all, Secretary Albright is now at the White House participating
in the summit with the European Union. There will be a briefing on that at
the White House at about 2:30 p.m. with several Administration officials.
On Iraq, let me just --
QUESTION: Is Eizenstat still scheduled for here?
MR. RUBIN: No, no, it's going to be at the White House; that's why I'm
announcing it.
QUESTION: That's that, same thing?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
On Iraq, let me say that over the last couple of days, Secretary Albright
has spoken with over 30 foreign ministers and leaders to discuss the Iraq
issue. As she indicated yesterday, generally speaking, she has been
gratified by the fact that the majority of these leaders she's spoken to --
and the general view of the ministers and the leaders she's spoken to --
has been that the responsibility for this crisis falls squarely on Iraq's
shoulders.
She has spoken several times in recent days with Foreign Minister Ivanov;
and most recently, she did speak to him this morning. Let me say that she
was quite pleased by the phone call: that she and Foreign Minister Ivanov
had an extremely useful exchange. The Foreign Minister passed on to her a
message for the President from President Yeltsin. Obviously, the Russians
still believe that they don't agree with this operation; they still oppose
this operation. But the message that she took from her discussion
was that the Russians understand the importance of maintaining a broad-
based relationship with the United States, that they recognize the
importance of having US-Russian relations be a stabilizing factor in
the international community, not a destabilizing factor, and that
they are going to continue working with us on a wide variety of issues.
That is, so far as I know, the only foreign minister she spoke to today.
With that, let me go to your questions.
QUESTION: Jamie, he called her?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know who initiated the call. They've been speaking - I
think she's spoken to him at least four times over the last couple of
days.
QUESTION: Now, the President sent a letter to Mr. Yeltsin last night.
Would this be a response, or might this have been in the works before?
MR. RUBIN: Well, he did indicate that he had a message from President
Yeltsin that he wished to pass on through her to President Clinton. Beyond
that, it would be up to the Russians to tell you whether they intend to
respond in some other way. But certainly, Secretary Albright will pass this
on to the President.
QUESTION: You know what I'm saying: Is that a reply?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly in a form it is. It wasn't a letter that he
was passing back. He was passing a message.
QUESTION: I see, all right.
QUESTION: Ivanov was quoted in the last hour as saying that if the
strikes continue, this may damage ties between Russia with the United
States. Was this reflected in the conversation that the Secretary had with
Ivanov?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not in a position to repeat everything that was said
in the conversation, but let me simply say that it's no secret that the
United States and Russia have a profound disagreement on the wisdom of
using force against Iraq. This has been long-standing, and Secretary
Albright has pointed out to the Russians, as she has to other governments
who have expressed concern about this, that they don't seem to have any
other solution, and that we didn't come to this decision easily, that we
gave diplomacy every chance, that we went the extra mile and the extra
ten yards of the last mile and did all we could to try to avoid using force,
which we regard as a last resort. But Saddam Hussein broke a new record in
terms of promises made and promises broken since November, when he said
that he would comply with this Security Council resolution; so we felt we'd
given him every last chance.
The fact that Russia and the United States disagree on the use of force,
which clearly came through in the phone call, we have said that we think
that our relationship is bigger than just Iraq, and that we have a lot of
business to do across the board, in Europe and around the world. We want to
be able to manage differences like we have on Iraq, work together
cooperatively in other areas. So what I'm suggesting to you is that there
is no question the Russians oppose this operation; but the phone call
Secretary Albright regarded as an extremely useful one, in which she
believed it was apparent that we both recognize the importance of
maintaining an effective and stable relationship -- both for ourselves
and for the security of others.
QUESTION: Did Mr. Ivanov come up with any ideas at this stage? Are there
any proposals coming from the Russian-Chinese-French side for ending this
crisis, ending these strikes and getting some kind of new inspection
regime?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't care to comment on Foreign Minister Ivanov's
specific words. Let me simply say: I think we have made clear that we're
going to continue this mission until it's completed.
QUESTION: Jamie, your statement that they don't seem to have any solution
- did she make this point?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think he's quite familiar with that view. I don't know
whether - I think she's said that to him in the past; I don't know whether
she said it to him today.
QUESTION: All right, and two quick things: She's been entertaining the
idea of taking a trip to Moscow in January, perhaps. Has that been --
MR. RUBIN: That did come up in the conversation today. Foreign Minister
Ivanov confirmed his invitation to the Secretary. She expressed her
intention to come. They talked about the possibility of a trip in late
January.
QUESTION: Isn't that - don't you see that as constructive?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly it's part of the general tone of this call, which is
that we do want to keep our channels of communication open despite the
unfortunate decision of Russia to recall its ambassador yesterday.
Let me point out, in that regard, that we have pointed out to others that
Ambassador Vorontsov has been expected to leave, that we have provided
agrement to a new ambassador that we expect and hope to receive in
January.
QUESTION: Can I ask you one last thing? It's a little broader. You and
she seem to cast this disagreement as almost intellectual -- they're more
diplomacy minded. I mean, this has been going on for a long time. I'm not
inviting you to take a slam at them - or maybe I am - but aren't the
Russians enormously protective of regimes like Iraq's? Certainly Mr.
Primakov's whole past has been very solicitous of the radical or the
militant regimes. Doesn't this go beyond diplomacy? Isn't this some sort of
- as the United States might be protective of a friendly country in Europe,
like Denmark or Norway - isn't this their field of - what should I
say - they're the little brothers, aren't they, in a way?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't agree with your characterizations, and let me say,
especially in light of the phone call that Secretary Albright had with
Foreign Minister Ivanov today. I would remind you that the Russians, like
us, have both made clear that Iraq must comply fully with all Security
Council resolutions. We do have a profound difference on what to do in the
event that Iraq did not comply - and frankly, interfered - with UNSCOM's
ability to operate. We do have a difference there. It's not a new
difference; it goes back a long time. I could give you historical
references going back to 1991 about the Soviet Union's position and
Russia's position; but it's not really relevant.
What's relevant right now to us is that we made this decision because we
thought that we had given diplomacy every chance. We did what we needed to
do to protect our national security. We acted pursuant and in furtherance
of an international principle enshrined in the Security Council resolutions
- that is that Iraq must be disarmed from its weapons of mass destruction.
So we were acting on behalf of the international community. We believe
that very clearly the Security Council resolutions provide us the
authority to act, because by blocking UNSCOM, Saddam Hussein's Iraq is
in violation of the cease-fire resolution. Thus, the underlying authority
in Resolution 678 applies.
That is our view. Obviously, the Russians have a different view. But what's
important is that we continue to work together cooperatively where we
can.
QUESTION: So would you say that they are as interested as the US is in
inspections, and that their position isn't influenced by some kinship to
the Hussein government?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to speculate on what motivates Russia and make
the speculations that you're suggesting. I will simply say that they have
said that they want to see -- and have voted in the Security Council time
after time -- for resolutions demanding full compliance by Iraq with
Security Council resolutions. That's not just words; those include votes in
the Security Council.
QUESTION: Jamie, without asking you to tell us what Foreign Minister
Ivanov said specifically, did he indicate to the Secretary that the
Russians might be sending an envoy to Baghdad, or did he indicate that they
would not?
MR. RUBIN: I didn't get the sense that that was imminent.
QUESTION: Did sanctions come up, and is there any concern in the
Administration that the sanctions regime could start to weaken, or that
there would be a new effort within the Security Council to ease them?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the Russians, like all countries in the Security Council
have voted quite clearly and made clear their position that in the absence
of full cooperation with UNSCOM, and a clean bill of health from UNSCOM and
the Security Council on the disarmament side, that that is the only path to
sanctions relief. We've had no indication that any of the countries
that have voted on that time after time have changed their position.
Secretary Albright did point out yesterday, that one has a medium and long-
term strategy here. The medium-term strategy is to contain Saddam Hussein
through the sanctions regime. We would welcome the return of an effective
UNSCOM; if we had reason to believe that UNSCOM could be effective, we'd
welcome its return. But in the absence of that, certainly there will be no
sanctions relief; there will be no comprehensive review. We have -- other
than extremists within various countries who had been for sanctions relief
prior to the use of force, we haven't heard anything new on that.
QUESTION: Did Ivanov talk about sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: That didn't come up to my knowledge.
QUESTION: Tomorrow morning, the Islamic month of Ramadan comes up. First,
did that come up in the Ivanov conversation? And second, does that fact --
Ramadan starting -- change anything as far as this government is concerned?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say on Foreign Minister Ivanov, I think the
public position of the Russians is that they didn't want this abhorration
to take place, and they want it to stop. So, I don't think that Ramadan is
a factor in their considerations.
As far as our considerations are concerned, let me simply say that we are
very sensitive to the onset of Ramadan. We are also determined to complete
the mission. I don't have any operational details to fill those two points
out.
QUESTION: The mission is not going to be complete by tomorrow morning, so
can I translate that to mean that, yes, the campaign will continue?
MR. RUBIN: You can't draw any conclusion about the operational length of
time of this mission from anything I've said. All I have said is that we
are sensitive to the onset of Ramadan and that we intend to complete the
mission.
QUESTION: Can I ask you if NATO-Russian relations --
QUESTION: Yesterday, the Secretary in response to a question by Steve
Erlanger, I think, about the goals of the Administration --policy goals of
the Administration -- when she talked about the long-term goals, she talked
about shoring up the Iraqi opposition or working with the opposition. Is
there any other long-term goal that this Administration has, besides
working with
the opposition?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the long-term goal, I think, that she referred to was
regime change, and that we believe that the Iraqi people would be far
better off -- and the world would be far better off -- if there was a
regime change in Iraq. It's very difficult to imagine any leader that could
be worse for the people of Iraq or for the world than Saddam Hussein.
In the meantime, we will continue to pursue Security Council resolutions,
and if we have reason to believe an effective UNSCOM can be operating in
Iraq, we would be supportive of that. We have no reason to believe that at
this time.
With respect to working with the opposition, Secretary Albright, like
others, has pointed out that we are increasing our funding for the
opposition, increasing support for efforts to publicize and provide
documentation of Saddam Hussein's war crimes. We are hoping that a viable
alternative can be found. It's a step-by-step, long-term process. We're
quite realistic about how difficult an enterprise this is, but we think
there is great benefit in at least starting down this long road.
QUESTION: Jamie, when you all announced, I guess about a month ago, that
you were going to begin talking more with the opposition figures, you said
that by the middle of December that you all should have some idea of
exactly which groups might begin to get some of this money. Has this
assessment been completed?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think we've made specific decisions yet as to exactly
how the money will be parceled out. I will have to check for you when that
is likely to happen.
QUESTION: This question is: When did the United States notify the Russian
Government that we were intending to launch attacks against Saddam
Hussein?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be in a position to speak to that.
QUESTION: Did the Secretary notify -- was any notification made prior to
it? Because Boris Yeltsin is saying that he received no phone call from
President Clinton.
MR. RUBIN: Well, that's certainly true, but I'm not in a position to
describe every -- if I begin down the road of telling you who received
advanced notification and who didn't, then you would have every right to go
down the list of every country and I would be hard-pressed to give you a
reason why I couldn't answer it with respect to every country. That would
not be wise, diplomatically.
QUESTION: Okay, and is the US Government at all concerned or alarmed by
what some describe as a growing anti-American sentiment in that country?
MR. RUBIN: Well, for a long time in Russia, there have been anti-American
sentiments expressed by both extremes. We're familiar with that, and we've
come to expect that. In the meantime, we've developed a very effective
working relationship with President Yeltsin, with Foreign Minister Ivanov,
with Prime Minister Primakov. We continue to value that relationship very
highly; that's the reason Secretary Albright will going to Russia in
January. We will continue to work with the Russians.
We're familiar with radical views from both extremes that have expressed
themselves in the past, and that we expect to continue to express
themselves. Russia is going through a very traumatic change in its
political and economic system. There's much dislocation and much resentment,
and that tends to cause some in the extremes to try to blame Russia's
problems on outsiders.
QUESTION: Do you think it's fair? Because there are some in Russia who
are very angry, obviously, about the US decision to launch attacks, and
there are those that say that this strong symbolic reaction by withdrawing
their ambassador, et cetera, has to do with the feeling that Russians feel
that their interests are being ignored.
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have most certainly not ignored Russia's interest. We
and Russia have a common interest; and the common interest is in the
disarmament of Iraq. This is a regime that has used weapons of mass
destruction and seems determined to keep them, and keep their ability to
make them and deploy them. That is a common interest of the United States
and Russia, and it's something we've been working on very closely with
Russia for a long time. We did come to a point, in pursuing that common
interest, where we had a very different conclusion as to what the
right course of action was.
Russia's opposition to this was no secret to us, it was no surprise to us;
we expected it. But we decided that for our national interest and for the
world's common interest in disarming Iraq, that we needed to act.
QUESTION: In their conversation, was there any reference to Russia's
relationship with NATO? There are stories coming out of Moscow about troop
movements, but also that Russia's reconsidering --
MR. RUBIN: Right, I've gone quite far in describing the conversation, and
I've reached the end of my ability to be specific.
QUESTION: Then let's forget the conversation. Is there any sense in this
building that Russia is re-evaluating the relationship that indeed the
United States set up for Russia with NATO to try to allay their concerns or
irritations?
MR. RUBIN: I've seen press reports about Russian non-participation in a
defense ministers' meeting, et cetera. In the meantime, Secretary Albright
and Foreign Minister Ivanov had a very constructive phone call. So we'll
just have to see how things unfold.
QUESTION: You keep saying that you'd welcome the return of an effective
UNSCOM. Is there any consideration being given, is the United States
amenable to any proposed changes in the structure or leadership of UNSCOM?
There's a lot of talk about, for example, Tariq Aziz said that UNSCOM could
come back but Butler must go. How do you feel about --
MR. RUBIN: We have great confidence in Chairman Butler's abilities, in
his independence, in his judgment. We don't see any reason why the
leadership in Iraq or the leadership in other countries, frankly, should be
shooting the messenger.
Chairman Butler was delivering the message to the world that Saddam Hussein
had violated its commitments, and acted in a series of ways that we have
detailed for you: including cleaning out rooms before UNSCOM arrived;
including interfering with helicopters; including issuing instructions to
their people to destroy documentation; including creating new safe havens;
including trying to declare Fridays off limits. These were facts, these
were realities - decisions made by Iraq.
What Chairman Butler did was communicate those facts. We do not see any
reason whatsoever why the messenger should resign, or do anything other
than continue the fine work that he's doing. If Iraq were to decide to
allow UNSCOM to be effective, and we had reason to believe that was going
to happen, then we would want UNSCOM to go back in. But we're certainly not
supportive of anyone's suggestion that Butler is to blame, and we have
the highest possible regard for him.
QUESTION: What about the composition, though, and the mandates of
UNSCOM?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the composition and mandate is - the mandate has been
determined by the Security Council. The composition has always been
determined by Chairman Butler and the chairman before him, based on his
determination of what professional expertise would be necessary.
But I think the direction you're going is the opposite of the direction
we're going. We would need reason to believe -- new reason to believe --
that UNSCOM was going to be effective before we would support going through
a charade where you would have a non-functioning UNSCOM back in there
again.
So on the contrary, we think that we need reason to believe it was going to
be effective; and we don't have that at this time.
QUESTION: Is it wrong for Russia and China to lead the charge to remove
Butler?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly disagree with them wholeheartedly. Secretary
Albright said yesterday that the Russians and the Chinese have no
alternative solution. I'm not sure about the Chinese with respect to Butler,
but certainly we're open.
QUESTION: She said it.
MR. RUBIN: I said I'm not sure --
QUESTION: No, she did say they're leading the charge.
MR. RUBIN: I'm just not sure on the details of that. But with respect to
the Russians, I think that's publicly known. All I can tell you is that we
disagree with them that Butler should be taking responsibility for Iraq's
failure to comply. It's Iraq that caused this problem; it's Iraq's non-
compliance that Butler was reporting, and we don't think it's appropriate
to attack the messenger.
QUESTION: Should Saddam Hussein try to climb down and look for a way to
bring the inspectors back, would the United States be willing to sacrifice
Butler as a way of resuming inspections?
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, what I just indicated in response to a series
of questions that just came up -
QUESTION: It's a pragmatic world.
MR. RUBIN: We have the highest regard for Butler, and we would need
reason to believe that an effective UNSCOM was going to be possible. It
wouldn't start by challenging the independence and integrity of Butler. It
would start by us having the kind of reason to believe that Iraq was going
to change its tune and allow UNSCOM full access, full cooperation and allow
UNSCOM to do its job; which are points we certainly don't have assurances
on now.
QUESTION: Two questions, Jamie - first, why hasn't the United States
stated, as a goal of this current round of military strikes, that UNSCOM be
allowed to come back into Iraq and allowed to operate effectively and
without any restraint?
MR. RUBIN: Well, because military power can't assure that. We have stated
what the goals are as: degrading their capability on weapons of mass
destruction and their capability to threaten its neighbors. That's what
military power can do. But causing a change of heart by Saddam Hussein is
not necessarily something that military power can do. We would welcome it
if it was an effective UNSCOM and we had reason to believe it was
effective. But we don't consider that a military objective.
QUESTION: And on the diplomatic contact, was there a decision by the
Administration to limit or circumscribe the diplomatic contacts prior to
the launching of air strikes, just to prevent the sort of footwork that
occurred at the UN in mid-November?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say it a different way - I understand the intent of the
question. We said that we were prepared to act without warning and without
delay and that we saw no need for further diplomacy. So that is the rubric
under which we were acting.
On the military side, I believe the Pentagon has stated, and others have
stated, that we didn't want to gather a large coalition - the kind of group
that we had gathered earlier this year in February-March - because of the
risk that might make it more difficult to catch the Iraqis by surprise. So
there were military down-sides to gathering a large group together. I think
it applies on the diplomatic side as well.
QUESTION: Do you think that some of the opposition that has stirred up
since then is pique among countries that were not given any kind of advance
notice?
MR. RUBIN: No, I don't believe so. I think that what we've seen is very
limited opposition. What I would hope that those of you who read diplomacy
as well as I know you do would understand (is) that any suggestion that our
allies are not supportive of us is nonsense.
If you go throughout Europe, Japan, other countries, the Canadians, the
Australians, the New Zealanders -- across the board, our allies have been
very supportive. In other parts of the world and with other relationships,
there are nuanced differences, which are totally understandable if one
understands the neighborhood they live in and some of the ways in which
they need to speak publicly.
Certainly with respect to the Arab countries - and we're quite pleased
today the Saudi Government put out a statement that made very clear the
responsibility for this crisis and this use of force and the consequences
belong to Saddam Hussein and no one else. So we've seen a different type of
support, different type of reaction and different terminology used in
different parts of the world. But overall, we've been quite pleased that
our allies, our friends and many others are all squarely blaming Iraq
for this crisis. Many of those are overtly supportive; many are supportive
privately and expressing regret publicly.
So based on acting so quickly in order to maintain operational security, we
think that the response is much the same as it would have been in November,
had we not given Saddam Hussein one last chance.
QUESTION: Why was the element of surprise more important now than it was
back in February?
MR. RUBIN: Well, its always important, but one has to weigh it against
other needs. It's also important to have international support. We gathered
international support in November, we gathered it in February-March,
because it was very important where we were reaching a new threshold where
we were talking about a substantial use of force, and that we wanted to
gather as much support as possible.
But having gathered it in November, we made a decision that we thought, for
military reasons, preventing the disbursal of Iraqi forces was an important
benefit; and weighed against additional diplomatic contacts and the
possible benefits thereto, we decided this was more important.
QUESTION: Now, how do you view the fact that three out of five of the
permanent five members of the Security Council have already voiced - at
least two of the five have voiced extremely strong disapproval and
condemnation of US action? The third, France, has voiced - it has said it's
not in favor of military strikes.
MR. RUBIN: That's fine.
QUESTION: But I mean, how is that international support?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I went through - I don't think international support
means doing a tally of how many countries there are in the world and how
many countries there are in the permanent members of the Security Council.
International support means those countries that, in any case, would be
likely to support the use of force.
China and Russia have made very clear that they wouldn't. So their lack of
support is to be expected and not particularly relevant to the question of
whether there's international support. The question is across Europe, with
our allies, across Latin America, in Asia, around the world, what are the
leading countries in the world saying? Well, across Latin America there is
widespread support. In the Gulf states, with different levels of public
comment - and certainly we have said we have the necessary military
support - we are receiving support. In Asia, Japan has been quite
strong on this. Even countries like Singapore and Indonesia and others
are expressing merely regret about the consequences, but not criticizing
the United States.
So if one wants to pick those countries that would be expected to criticize
the United States and make those the barometer of international opinion, I
don't think that would be an accurate reflection of the widespread support
we've seen.
QUESTION: Jamie, we hear the US military is dropping leaflets in Southern
Iraq --
MR. RUBIN: I think Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shelton just
addressed that in the last hour, and made clear that there was a -
repeating his words - that these leaflets were designed to tell certain
units not to move against their neighbors, and that if they stayed put they
wouldn't be hit. That was what the leaflets were. I believe those leaflets
are going to be made available in the Pentagon.
QUESTION: So this is not - okay, can I - has there been any intensification
of contacts with Iraqi opposition? I mean, have you, kind of, brought
forward the term of your strategy of encouraging --
MR. RUBIN: I think we're continuing to work on the same pace, which is
talking to them, gathering them together, trying to get them to develop a
coordinated position. But I wouldn't make the link that you're making.
QUESTION: What box would you put Turkey in, or if you don't want to be
particular -
MR. RUBIN: Supportive.
QUESTION: Supportive? Because their statements haven't all been that
supportive. You say there are no -
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright spoke to the President of Turkey and, I
think, supportive. Each country has its own way of expressing its views,
and we are pleased with the reaction of Turkey. That's what supportive
means. We're not expecting people to be cheering about this. We're not
cheering about this. I don't think any American Administration official has
reacted with pleasure to the decision to use force. It's something we don't
do easily; it's something we do as a last resort.
So the fact that people aren't cheering about this should not be seen as an
indication of anything other (than) that force is a last resort; that in
different parts of the world, different countries have different ways of
expressing their support publicly and privately.
QUESTION: What I was driving at is, we sometimes refer to Norway, Denmark
as being supportive. Is France the only - are all NATO allies except for
France supportive of the United States?
MR. RUBIN: I would have to check the records. I mean, the French Foreign
Minister Vedrine and the Secretary had several calls about this that were
quite constructive. The Foreign Minister made clear that the responsibility
belongs on Saddam Hussein.
QUESTION: No, no, I understand - whatever category you put France in, is
everybody else --
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - if you want to be critical and you want to
find something critical to write a report --
QUESTION: No, I want to find where the support is.
MR. RUBIN: Can I finish my answer, please? Then you can look for a "rah-
rah" level of support and say anything short of that is non-support. What
we consider a reasonable level of support is to place the blame for the
consequences on Saddam Hussein. Any country that is in that category, we
believe, is supportive.
QUESTION: That takes care of the Arabs as making them all supportive,
because they feel the consequences are Saddam Hussein's. But I'm thinking
of the Europeans and the allies and NATO. I just want to know if one can
safely describe all the countries in NATO except France as being supportive.
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check each of the countries' positions.
QUESTION: Over all, there were a number of countries that were, kind of,
lined up in support of the United States in mid-November, and in the month
since - like Syria, for example - some of that support has fallen away. It
seems unmistakable.
MR. RUBIN: I don't accept the premise. In November, with the exception of
Syria, there were statements by the GCC, by other Arab countries, by
European countries, by others around the world about the use of force. We
never expected, if we had used force, for Syria to stay with the statement
that they had managed to be associated with.
So we believe the level of support now is roughly the same as it was with
November, with a minor exception or two.
QUESTION: Notwithstanding the official support from various governments
around the world, in some parts of the Middle East there have been street
protests against US military action. First of all, can you tell us whether
or not Secretary Albright spoke with Chairman Arafat or with President
Mubarak or Foreign Minister Moussa? And has she asked anyone in governments
there to take any action to try and dampen street protests?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly respect, in all parts of the world, the
right of citizens to express their views; that's something very fundamental
to the United States. And we, therefore, wouldn't be asking other
governments to interfere with freedom of speech.
However, we have spoken to Chairman Arafat, I believe she spoke to
President Mubarak, and she spoke to Foreign Minister Moussa. She spoke to a
half a dozen Arab leaders in the last day or so, and has made clear the
reasons for our action. Certainly in the case of Chairman Arafat, you did
not see him associating himself with some of the comments of his people
purporting to speak for him.
We've seen rather limited and sporadic public demonstrations on this
subject. It certainly wouldn't be appropriate for us to ask other
governments to suppress freedom of speech.
QUESTION: So she did not ask Chairman Arafat to --
MR. RUBIN: No. I think there's certainly an effort to calm the public
waters and explain things, but suppressing freedom of speech is not
something we would ask other governments to do.
QUESTION: Have there been any additional embassy closings, warnings, any
plans to take additional security measures?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know what "additional" means, but I don't think since
yesterday anything's really changed.
QUESTION: So then will the African embassies open up --
MR. RUBIN: They're being closed today. A decision hasn't been made on
their re-opening.
QUESTION: Secretary Cohen repeatedly said that it's not an aim of the
current military action to destabilize Saddam's regime. Isn't that going to
be disheartening to the opposition that you say you're trying to encourage?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: Why not?
MR. RUBIN: Because I think if they are watching TV, they're seeing that
Saddam Hussein is paying a heavy price for his non-compliance, and that
he's going to be worse off as a result of this. I think that's their
calculation.
It's one thing to say what a military objective is; it's another to just
look at the results. Clearly, he's going to be worse off, and that
certainly would be their goal if they were in opposition.
QUESTION: On another subject, is the US Government taking any part in the
investigation into the apparent murder of the American reporter in Mexico,
Philip True?
MR. RUBIN: On that subject, I do have some information. We certainly have
been active in working with the Mexican authorities on it.
We wish to express our deepest condolences to the family of Philip True, a
well-respected foreign correspondent who made Mexico his specialty, and
whose reports in The San Antonio Express-News were widely read.
The Department of State is following the investigation into Mr. True's
death very closely. We have seen the news accounts indicating that Mr. True
was murdered, and have been informed by the coroner in Guadalajara that the
cause of death was strangulation. While we will reserve making a judgment
until the final report of the Mexican authorities is made, we are very
disturbed by what appears to be the violent demise of a journalist who had
undertaken an effort to report on little-covered regions of Mexico.
Mr. True's tragic death has saddened all his friends in Mexico City,
including those in the embassy who knew him well. He was a prominent member
of the foreign press corps in Mexico.
Since being informed on December 12 that Mr. True was missing, our consular
officers at the embassy in Mexico and at the consulate general in
Guadalajara have worked closely with Mexican officials. A consular officer
traveled to the area where Mr. True had last been seen. Cooperation with
the federal, state and military authorities has been excellent. We wish to
express our great appreciation for the assistance provided, including the
contribution of more than 250 officers and men, five helicopters, four
search dogs, in the effort to find Mr. True. We anticipate further
excellent cooperation as the Mexican authorities continue their investigation.
Therefore, it's going quite well. I have no information about an American
component to that.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you have anything on the North Korea sub -- or seems
to be a sub -- that the South Koreans discovered?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, various details have been provided by the South Korean
defense ministry, which I won't repeat to you here. But let me say that we
understand that President Kim's spokesmen have expressed his satisfaction
at the military's handling of this issue.
On our part, the United States deplores this latest North Korea action,
which appears to be another attempt at infiltration of the Republic of
Korea by elements of the North Korean military. We are consulting closely
with South Korea. This incident highlights the need for tension reduction
and confidence-building measures on the Korean Peninsula, as the President
of South Korea and President Clinton have called for.
We will continue our various efforts to resolve our concerns through
bilateral dialogue with North Korea and through the four-party talks.
QUESTION: Is there any reaction to President Jiang Zemin's speech that he
gave today, in which the tone and the tenor of which was a much stronger
indication that the Chinese Government will not adopt what it views as
Western political reform?
MR. RUBIN: We have not studied that speech in detail yet, but as soon as
we have, and we have a reaction, we'll provide it to you.
QUESTION: What is your outlook on START II, and on the prospects of a
follow-on arms control--
MR. RUBIN: We have said quite clearly that in the absence of ratification
of START II by the Russian Duma, we can't proceed with START III negotiations.
It's certainly unfortunate, and we're sorry to see that the Russian Duma
has postponed consideration of START II.
In our view, START II is in our interest, and it is in the Russians'
interest. Increasing numbers of Russian officials and legislators seem to
be understanding that START II is in Russia's interest. And although we
want to see START II ratified, we couldn't hold our concern about START II
above other national security interests, for example, in needing to take
action against Iraq. So we just hope that, eventually, the Russian
legislators will see that it's in their interest to ratify START II as soon
as possible, and then we can move onto START III. We can't make the
judgment that this is in their national interest for them.
QUESTION: Do you understand that the Yeltsin government, or that Ivanov
will be lobbying?
MR. RUBIN: We still believe the Russian government is supportive and
wants to see it ratified. They've been making a more and more effective
case. It's unfortunate that the consideration was postponed. We expect it
to be reconsidered as soon as the time is right. That's really a decision
for the government to make. We don't see any lessening in their support for
it.
QUESTION: In the contacts over the past couple of days -
MR. RUBIN: That hasn't been a prominent feature of those discussions.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on - I saw a wires story that seemed to
indicate that there seemed to be, maybe, a solution to the civil war in the
Congo; that the OAU had done something in -
MR. RUBIN: The OAU meeting that I've been advised about has been a tour
d'horizon and not a meeting with real substantive effect. They went through
various issues and talked about that.
Before closing, let me say that on December 17 the Serbian Deputy Mayor of
Kosovo, Polje, was kidnapped and executed. Although the general staff of
the KLA has disclaimed responsibility, the masked and armed men who carried
out the attack reportedly wore KLA insignia on their uniforms.
The United States deplores this savage act of brutality. We welcome the KLA
political representative's condemnation of this assault. Nevertheless,
tensions in Kosovo are spiraling upwards in response to a number of serious
incidents and armed clashes in recent days. The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer
Mission is doing everything possible to ease tensions in Kosovo, is in
regular contact with the KLA leadership, as well as with local officials.
Harold Koh, the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
is in Kosovo today, together with our Chief of Mission there, Richard Miles,
to press for maximum restraint.
Violence, including in retaliation for violence by another party, is simply
unacceptable. It works against the prospects for a peaceful negotiated
settlement. We remain firmly committed to the view that Serbian threats to
shut down independent Albanian-language media in Kosovo are unacceptable.
We are committed to supporting independent media outlets. If Belgrade
authorities target the independent press in Kosovo with the same sort of
persecution they have unleashed against the Serbian language media, they
will only further deepen the FRY's international isolation.
Neither the Serbs nor the Albanians can win a military victory in Kosovo.
Only a negotiated solution can provide the long-term stability necessary
for the region to grow and prosper.
QUESTION: We heard a report about an alleged Serb police rampage as they
were searching for the killers of the six teenagers. Do you have anything
on that?
MR. RUBIN: There were reports that police arrested three suspects
yesterday in the village of Glodjane, who were allegedly involved in the
Pec killings. We have seen press reports of two casualties, but our
monitors have been unable to confirm this. Our monitors did observe police
conducting a military-style clearing operation near this village. We saw
well-armed police establish a 20-plus man blocking position with a heavy
machine gun on the east road leading into the village. Another group of
dismounted police moved in fire team formation over the hill north of
the village. Small arms and heavy weapon firing was heard from the
direction of Glodjane. No return fire was noted.
Observers concluded that most villagers left before the assault. Police
reportedly questioned those who remained, detained four and subsequently
released one. Serb police had previously announced this operation to
observers and publicized it in the media. I can't go beyond the KDOM
description of the Serb operation, which they continue to investigate; but
let me say, the Serbs do have the right and responsibility to identify and
apprehend those responsible for the appalling murders in Pec. We do expect,
however, that the Serbs will carry out such investigations correctly and
professionally, and we are watching carefully to see whether they do
so.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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