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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #90, 98-07-23

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


895

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Thursday, July 23, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

STATEMENTS
1		Execution of Baha'i in Iran
1		Secretary's Meeting with Bosnian Croat Member of Joint
		  Presidency

IRAN 2-3,5 Missile Test: Test Launch of Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (Shahab-3) / Fully Operational Range Capabilities & Targets / Development Phase / Secretary's Speech re US Concerns About Weapons Programs & Policies 3 Recent Positive Steps by Iran 4 Effect of Test on Peace Process / Israeli Reaction 2,4-6 Technology Contributions by North Korea & Russia / Vice Pres Gore's Agenda Item 10 DAS Welsh Mtg with Kurdish Group

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 6-10,14-15 US Involvement & Contacts/ Importance of Direct Contacts / Request for Amb Ross Travel / Secretary's Mtg Today with Palestinian Authority Officials / Secretary's Comments on Future of Talks / US Judgment on Proceeding / Netanyahu-Arafat Mtg

TERRORISM 10 Iraqi Support for PKK

CAMBODIA 10-11 July 26 Elections / Status of US Sanctions

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 11-12 US Position on Treaty / Correcting Flaws in Treaty

CHINA 12 Military Withdrawal from Commercial Activities

URUGUAY 12-13 Visit of President Sanguinetti / Women in Democracy Conference

BELARUS 13 Visa Ban for Violation of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

TERRORISM / LIBYA 13-14 US Explores Possible Third Country Venue for Trial of PanAm #103 Suspects /Communication from Libyan Govt

JAPAN 14 Rating of Financial Situation

CROATIA 14 Refugee Returns and Resettlement


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #90

THURSDAY, JULY 23, 1998, 1:00 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing; today being Thursday. Let me start with a statement that we have with regard to the summary execution of Baha'i in Iran.

On July 21, Iranian authorities executed by hanging an Iranian Ba'hai, Mr. Rowhani, who had been charged with converting a Muslim to the Baha'i faith. There is no evidence that Mr. Rowhani was accorded due process of law.

The United States strongly condemns the execution of Mr. Rowhani for the exercise of his freedom of conscience. We call on the government of Iran to protect the lives of the 15 other imprisoned Baha'is, seven of whom are sentenced to death on charges of apostasy and so-called Zionist Baha'i activities. We understand that three of the condemned Baha'is are threatened with imminent execution and urge the Iranian authorities not to carry out the death sentence.

Since the Islamic republic came to power, more than 200 Baha'is have been executed because of their religious beliefs. Mr. Rowhani is the first Baha'i to be executed in Iran since 1992. We have repeatedly urged the government of Iran to ease restrictions on the practice of religion, and to recognize and uphold the fundamental human right to freedom of conscience and belief. We have also called for the release of all those serving sentences for the peaceful expression of their religious or political beliefs; we do so again today.

The President and Secretary Albright have made it clear that the issue of freedom of conscience and belief is a central component of our human rights policy in Iran and around the world. Our concerns about restrictions on the practice of religion will play an important role in any future dialogue with the government of Iran.

One more statement, on the subject of Bosnia. Secretary Albright will meet with President Zubak, the Bosnian Croat member of the joint presidency, this afternoon at 2:15 p.m. They will discuss a range of issues, including the upcoming elections and progress in implementing the Dayton accords in Bosnia.

We are encouraged by the increasing political pluralism in Bosnia- Herzegovina, and welcome the pro-Dayton orientation of President Zubak's new party. There will be some press arrangements that we can provide after the briefing.

With those two statements, let me turn to George Getta of the Associated Press.

QUESTION: A two-part question - what is your assessment of the significance of the missile test by the Iranians, in light of the Secretary's speech last month or so? The second part of that, we understand that the missile was detonated somewhere between 70 to 100 seconds after launch, but there's some uncertainty as to whether it was deliberate or accidental. a) have you heard that; and b) do you have an assessment of it?

MR. RUBIN: Let me tell you what I can say on this subject. Obviously, there are intelligence issues that make it difficult to be as specific as I know some of you may like. But I can say that the United States did detect yesterday the test launch of a No Dong type medium-range ballistic missile. The North Korean No Dong medium-range ballistic missile has a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers. The Iranian name for this missile is the Shahab- 3.

This test is significant because it shows that Iran's aggressive effort to develop missiles more capable than its existing shorter-range Scud missiles is making progress. Additional time and flight tests normally are required to bring a missile into series production or so-called "operational status." Therefore, it would be premature to say this test suggests that Iran has an operational medium-range missile capability. However - and fairly obviously, once the Shahab-3 is made operational, Iran will have the ability to strike more distant targets, including Israel, portions of Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

This missile, I'm advised, is a No Dong type medium-range missile, indicating that it was largely derived from North Korean technology. This is also consistent with the fact that just as North Korea itself developed the No Dong, based on Scud technology, Iran for many years has been working with North Korea to put in place an indigenous Scud production capability.

That is what I can say about the significance of this and the status of the program as far as I can. With respect to whether it exploded and what the significance of that is, I am not in a position to comment.

QUESTION: Is it the first such test?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that. But clearly, this system is in a development phase, and during the development phase the missile is often tested. That is not a surprise; and therefore, one couldn't rule out additional tests. But it is not in the operational phase.

QUESTION: Given the test yesterday and --

MR. RUBIN: Oh, I didn't answer George's first question, and then I'll come over to you.

With respect to the Secretary's speech and the significance of this test, let me remind you that the Secretary made very clear in her speech that one of the key issues that we have profound concerns about is Iran's pursuit of programs in this area, including ballistic missile capabilities and weapons of mass destruction capabilities. That is one of our prime concerns with respect to Iran. It is one of the reasons why we think we need to do all we can to retard and deter other countries from providing assistance to this program. It is one of the basis for many aspects of our policy.

But it doesn't mean that we don't want to have an opportunity to express these concerns directly; and it doesn't mean that we don't see the election of President Khatemi and the steps that he's taken as significant enough to say what the Secretary said about what the future might hold.

The question is, will Iran pursue policies that don't threaten the interests of its neighbors and the world. We think one of the ways in which we can try to achieve that objective, in addition to retarding and deterring the assistance to Iran from other countries is to talk to the Iranians and express our concerns directly to them, at which time they would be in a position to express their concerns as well.

So Secretary Albright went into the speech on Iran with her eyes wide open about the problems in our relationship with Iran. It is precisely because of those problems that she identified what is the phenomenon in Iran politically, and what our road map might look like in the future if they are prepared to deal with the concerns that we have - especially with respect to ballistic missiles.

QUESTION: Does the test yesterday and the execution as well tell the Administration anything about what's going on between President Khatemi and the religious leaders who rule the country?

MR. RUBIN: It's not our practice to try to divine exactly what goes on between different groupings of interest groups and views that are obviously in existence in Iran. What we can do is identify phenomenon that we consider real, and that was the democratic basis of the election of President Khatemi. We can identify things that he said that have significance. We can identify things that Iran has done in the area of drugs, refugees, Afghanistan, statements about terrorism. And now we can identify, as we have always been, things that they've done that are bad news; and clearly, this kind of a test is bad news.

So what we are focused on is the policies and practices of the government as well as the significant trend that was demonstrated by his election and things he's said and done since then.

QUESTION: One just follow-up on that. Does the Administration have any reason to think that there may be additional missile tests?

MR. RUBIN: I think in response to George's question I indicated - or in response to your question - that given that this is a missile in the development stage, that it would be imprudent to rule out the possibility of additional tests.

QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about whether or not you see this test at this moment in the Middle East peace process when things seem to be stalemated to say the least, whether this would --

MR. RUBIN: Although that depends on which newspaper you read, obviously.

QUESTION: You can comment on that, too.

QUESTION: Hopefully you'll talk about that as well. But since you're talking about Iran, I mean, do you see this as contributing to the jitters in the region? And in short term and long term, what affect does this have on the balance of power in the region? Maybe it has no affect at the moment, but in the long term, how significant is this?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I indicated, once the missile, the Shahab-3, is made operational, Iran will have the ability to strike more distant targets, including Israel, portions of Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia; and at that point, would therefore have an impact and a significance strategically. But at this point, this is a missile test in a development stage. There are many such tests that occur around the world. Our job and our effort and our objective is to try to work with the various countries around the world to try to retard and deter the acquisition of additional technology or capability that can add to what is obviously an indigenous capability that they now have.

QUESTION: Are you concerned that Israel might take a preemptive strike on this system? And have you talked with the Israelis about --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're in regular touch with the Israelis. I do believe we've talked to them about the significance of this test, and we've had such discussions. But I'd rather keep those discussions private.

QUESTION: Follow-up, Jamie - you mentioned that this missile was based on North Korean technology. Do you all believe also that any of the transfers of technology from Russia could have aided in the test of this particular missile; or do you think that's more in helping in different areas?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say in general, we have been extremely concerned for some time about Iran's aggressive efforts to obtain missile technology from Russian firms. Some of those acquisition efforts have been successful; and therefore, one can't rule out that some technology contributed to this. But it is our understanding that this was largely derived from North Korean technology, and that is a key point.

We have been pursuing an intensive, high-level effort to impede Iranian efforts to obtain missile technology from Russian firms. We have produced real progress in this effort. Over the past year, the government in Russia has enacted sweeping new export controls, which is the basis by which you can change policies and practices and have a substantive impact on a subject like non-proliferation. They have shut down some activities, made arrests and announced last week that they are investigating nine Russian entities for cooperating with Iran.

So we have concerns in this area; we've been working very hard on those concerns. I can't rule out what you suggested, but the basic view is we regard this missile as based on and largely derived from North Korean technology.

QUESTION: I'd like to follow up Carol's question. Some months ago the Iranian resistance here in Washington developed some information based on their sources in Iran that the Iranian Government had one Shahab already operational. Could it not be very possibly that Iran now has the capability of reaching Israel with a medium-range rocket that's too fast for missile defenses that are not yet developed for this kind of medium-range rocket? Is it not possible that Israel is under that threat?

MR. RUBIN: I think I've made very clear what our view is, and that our view is there is not now an operational capability; that this program is in a development stage. You are quoting a particular source; you're welcome to continue to quote that source. If you're asking for our view - the government's view - I told you the government's view is that this is a missile in research and development, and it has not reached its operational phase. If it did, I've also told you our view that it would be possible for it to reach Israel.

QUESTION: But could it not have just a small number or even one missile ready to use against Israel; isn't that possible?

MR. RUBIN: I think I'm doing the best I can with your question. Your question is, what do we think of this missile. I've given you our judgment that I've been provided as to our judgment on a highly technical, very difficult judgment that we make with thousands and thousands of people working on this problem.

QUESTION: Not operational, that's the judgment?

MR. RUBIN: That's the word that I used, yes.

QUESTION: I know you're not the Vice President's spokesman, but would you expect this issue to come up during his meetings in Russia in the coming days?

MR. RUBIN: I would be surprised if, in one form or another, the Vice President - as the President has and the Secretary has - didn't have discussions about the issue of preventing and deterring and retarding assistance by certain Russian entities to Iran.

QUESTION: Natan Sharansky was here on Monday, did he raise any of these same concerns - possible presage the preparations for the test?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be able to get into details of Mr. Sharansky's discussions with us in any detail. I can say that we weren't surprised by this test, given the program that we know is in existence. Mr. Sharansky and US officials obviously did talk about our joint effort to try to deter and retard assistance to Iran's program, precisely because we share a view about the dangers inherent of such a program.

QUESTION: Can we move to the Middle East peace process?

QUESTION: Speaking of North Korea's missile technology, what is your understanding of the cooperation? Do you think Iranians used North Korean technology - (inaudible) - missile program; or Iranians used North Korea's missile body like No Dong missile body?

MR. RUBIN: Iran for many years has been working with North Korea to put in place an indigenous Scud production capability. That is something I indicated earlier, and that is the kind of cooperation between Iran and North Korea that we're so concerned about and we are working to deter and retard.

QUESTION: As you noted, there are different reports coming --

MR. RUBIN: There sure are.

QUESTION: -- from the region. What is your reading? Are they close to a breakthrough or a breakdown or something in between?

MR. RUBIN: In terms of the state of play, let me say this. The Administration continues to work with both parties and be in intensive consultation with both parties. We have made clear that we are urging them to continue working together. We're obviously trying to help them, in our discussions, to find creative and constructive approaches that can resolve these problems.

Let me say this clearly - we have not closed the gaps; and that is the state of play. But we believe that they need to continue to engage with each other.

QUESTION: Well, the Defense Minister of Israel specifically asked that the US Government send Dennis Ross back. Two questions - one, are you going to respond to that; and two, is he in extensive contacts with them, telephonically?

MR. RUBIN: The Administration as a whole, including Ambassador Ross and the Secretary and others, have been in contact with different officials either by phone or in person. Secretary Albright will have a meeting, this afternoon, as you know, with Abu Ala-a, the head of the Palestinian Parliamentary Committee. So there is contact.

What I'm telling you is that there is a focus on having the two parties talk to each other. We believe that this phase of the discussions at this juncture the negotiating process is such that the best way for each party to hear out each other's concerns is to talk to each other. But, yes, we are in touch with them.

With respect to travel plans, we have no current plan for the Secretary to ask Ambassador Ross to go to the region at this time - precisely because we want to see them engage with each other. I wouldn't rule it out, as I have not ruled out such visits in the past.

QUESTION: Do you know what time the Palestinians are due in here?

MR. RUBIN: In the Department?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. RUBIN: Mid-afternoon.

QUESTION: Can you comment on the suggestion in one report today that - I don't know how to put it - that Secretary Albright is --

MR. RUBIN: I'll probably respond, no matter how you put it.

QUESTION: Well, fill in the blank - dropped her pressure on Israel, stepped back, whatever that story was attempting to say.

MR. RUBIN: It is always an interesting phenomenon to read in the newspapers what appear to be fictional accounts to those who are participants. This was a classic hype job. The basic lead of the story was incorrect. I've spoken to Secretary Albright, and she does not believe that - she doesn't believe nor has she said to anybody that she has "no hope" that the Israelis will agree to the ideas we've put down. Secondly, she has not said to anyone in recent months or weeks that on a date certain that we intended to make public our proposals.

Having said that, the third point that is stated in the story, where clearly there was a quote from one Palestinian official, does not represent the views of the Palestinians. I've spoken to Secretary Albright about this, and she has made clear that it is our understanding and has been our understanding for many, many days now that the Palestinians regard our efforts as constructive, and they do not believe we have backed away from the ideas we put forward. It is my understanding that the Palestinian Authority has put out a statement to that effect - namely, that they believe the United States has adhered to its initiative, and they want us to continue our efforts.

So taking one quote and creating a journalistic hype job has created an unfortunate impression that is simply not true.

QUESTION: What story are you referring to?

MR. RUBIN: The story in The Washington Post.

QUESTION: Jamie, has the Secretary - you talked about contacts by the US side - has the Secretary spoken with Prime Minister Netanyahu or Chairman Arafat in the last week?

MR. RUBIN: In the last what?

QUESTION: Week - since that famous -- conversation --

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of - I think that since that flurry of calls, it has been our hope that they would engage with each other, and that she has not spoken to Prime Minister Netanyahu.

QUESTION: What exactly is the purpose of her meeting with the Palestinian today?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think it's appropriate for the Secretary to meet with a delegation of Palestinian officials. She's been heavily involved in this peace process for a long time and they're here, as I understand it, at the invitation of Speaker Gingrich. They are reflecting the importance of greater contact between the parliament of the Palestinian Authority and the US Congress. It's in the nature of a courtesy call, not a negotiating session.

QUESTION: I know you don't want to give out any details, but could you say whether she's feeling optimistic about the way the talks are going? Is it a generally positive direction, same direction?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - the issues that they are now engaged in and the reason why we urged them to engage with each other are issues particularly suited for direct negotiation between the parties, direct contact between the parties precisely because the issues are of a nature that require the concerns of each side to be better understood by the others.

We have heard the concerns repeatedly, and we understand them quite well. We thought if there is going to be a chance to narrow the gaps further -- and we have narrowed the gaps considerably in recent weeks, we have made substantial progress since May. At that time we took certain steps that were designed to change the dynamic; and we believe that it did change the dynamic. In the subsequent weeks, there was considerable progress towards the objective, which is that the Palestinians have accepted our ideas in principle, and we have been working with the Israelis in an effort to get them to say yes as well. We are moving -- or had been moving very steadily in that direction, and that is what's been going on. But considering there are concerns in certain areas, we have urged them to share those concerns with the other party.

It's hard to assess whether we will succeed. We have made clear, if we cannot achieve a breakthrough we will have to explain why we couldn't; and we are not at that point yet. We are continuing to make progress. Those who are seeking the thrill of pressure or the thrill of confrontation will not be satisfied, because that is not our policy. Our policy isn't to pursue confrontation and pressure for their own sake; our policy is to try to get an agreement, because it is only an agreement that can enhance the security and the livelihood of the people of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Some would like to see a confrontation, and perhaps skew their views for that reason. That is not our view. If we are unable to make continued progress and these bilateral discussions are not successful in closing the gaps, then we have to decide how to proceed. But at this phase -- there are always different phases when we have to make a judgment as to whether it's better for us to continue to talk to the parties separately; it's better for us to try to work the problem, to be as creative as we can; or is this a moment when the two of them ought to talk to each other, and then maybe they can make progress.

Let's bear in mind that not only won't we reach an agreement if they can't talk to each other and share their concerns with each other, we will not be able to implement it even if we did reach it. So the kind of dialogue that we've been urging and the engagement we've been urging is a necessary prerequisite for the peace process to succeed.

QUESTION: I guess I'm just a little confused, because the focus had been on the meeting last weekend between the two sides - US officials had been focusing on that meeting as an effort - the point at which the two sides might be prepared to take decisions. Yet that's come and gone, and now we're sort of into a continued limbo phase. At what point do you say they seem to be unable to do it and --

MR. RUBIN: Carole, what I'm trying to explain is that it is our job to try to reach closure; it is our job to overturn every stone and seek every creative avenue and go every last mile to try to get an agreement, to get a breakthrough, because that is what is good for the people on the ground. That is what the peace process needs to get back on track - not a confrontation, not a breakdown.

We make our judgments as to whether to continue to work based on whether we continue to make progress. Unless we've concluded that we are not going to be able to close the gaps and get a second yes, then we're going to continue to work at it despite the desire and focus and hype that is associated with different milestones in the process. Every time there's a big meeting or a big session, the hype process increases and everyone thinks this is it: yes or no. But we don't take that position; we take the position that when there are critical moments in the process, they are designed to serve a purpose. In May, the purpose was to change the dynamic; and it succeeded in changing the dynamic and yielding substantial progress on key elements of the American ideas. And we got much closer to agreement.

Last week, we decided that the dynamic that needed to be changed was for the two parties to meet with each other and engage with each other in the hopes of again making progress. That is what we're doing right now. If we conclude that these discussions don't yield progress and can't yield closure, then we will have to act accordingly. But we haven't made that decision. The pursuit of peace requires the patience of Job, and we are trying to do that.

QUESTION: Either separate the apples and oranges, or maybe you mean to lump them together; I'm not sure. Your reference is to those who seek confrontation and your reference is to hype, including specifically journalistic hype. Are you talking about the article today or generally journalists who hype this; or are you talking about the parties themselves or various aspects of the parties who say one thing or another?

MR. RUBIN: All of that.

QUESTION: One more - I guess my question - and I'm trying to put it in a way that makes sense. At what point does all this become like kabuki theater, and at what point do you - I mean, it's in nobody's interest to declare failure. I mean, it's not in the US interest; it's not in the Israeli interest; it's not in the Palestinian interest. But at some point, when it goes on and on and on and this milestone is passed and that milestone is passed and nothing comes of it, I mean, you sort of - it's like the emperor has no clothes - you sort of say, there's no agreement; there's not going to be an agreement.

MR. RUBIN: Right, and what I'm saying to you is that I know that there are those who are impatient for a conclusion for any of the reasons that Charlie suggested - journalistic reasons, some of the people in the countries in Israel or in the Palestinian Authority or some of the people outside of that -- in the Middle East -- there are those who would prefer to see a clear end point at which they can say something, write something or hope that something happens. We may get to that.

As Secretary Albright has made clear, she is determined to ensure that there is no kabuki theater. Secretary Albright does not intend to in any way pursue a policy in which the emperor or the empress has no clothes. But we have to be the judge, because we are the mediators and the facilitators, as to whether we think we've reached a dead end. Then we decide, do we tack in a different direction, change the dynamic by doing so and get more progress, or have we really reached the end of the road?

We certainly understand the impatience; but the pursuit of peace requires enormous patience and determination, and that's the business that we have chosen.

QUESTION: Deputy Assistant Secretary David Welch's meeting with the two Iraq Kurdish groups. Do you have any read-out on this meeting?

MR. RUBIN: We have something in the press office from yesterday that I'd be happy to provide you.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - one of the US officials which is in the party with Welch, he said that Iraqi support of the PKK terrorist organizations is increasing. Do you have any information on this subject?

MR. RUBIN: Again, we'll try to get you that for the record.

QUESTION: With regard to the elections coming up in Cambodia this weekend, we've heard conflicting reports about how free and fair those are likely to be. Does the Administration have any particular views on that topic?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Despite flaws in the election climate, we continue to believe that Cambodia's elections can be held on July 26, and that a delay would not improve the climate. It wouldn't necessarily make it a better election if it was delayed.

The 1993 Cambodian election campaign was beset with violence and intimidation, yet the outcome was certified internationally as free and fair. So it is impossible to predict how this election will be judged. We do believe the election campaign is in full swing with opposition leaders campaigning vigorously. Those opposition leaders no longer are calling for a boycott, and they indicated that they would participate fully in the election.

So there are many parties participating, thousands of Cambodian election observers have pledged not only to stay close to the tallying of votes, but literally to sleep with the ballot boxes overnight during the counting process if that was necessary.

We believe that election observers can play a constructive role, and the US is funding over 200 international observers, as well as over 20,000 Cambodian observers; and we're providing $2.3 million for observation, training of poll workers and other activities. In short, we're not giving the elections a clean bill of health in advance; what we're saying is that we think the climate is about as good as it's likely to be for some time, and that the Cambodian people deserve the opportunity on balance to exercise their ballot rights and their democratic rights.

QUESTION: What is the status of the US sanctions against Cambodia; are there any?

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure there is some set of policy restrictions that are relevant that I will get you after the briefing.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - after elections, lifting several sanctions?

MR. RUBIN: Again, we don't know that the election will be free and fair; so let's wait and see how the election proceeds and then we will know what responses are appropriate - whether it is to view the new government as freely elected or not, and if not, what steps are appropriate.

QUESTION: New subject - do you have any news with respect to what you said the last time as to what form US opposition to the international criminal court will take, or about any possible reprisals against signatory countries?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have that much to add, but I know that Secretary Albright has talked to some of her colleagues about this matter and made clear our strong views on the subject; and that there was a rush to judgment in Rome -- a phony deadline created a rush to judgment and created a treaty with flaws, or a proposal for a treaty with flaws. Therefore, we believe that the right course is to correct the flaws. We are going to try to correct the flaws before we conclude that they will not be corrected, and we need to move into a different mode such as serious opposition.

In other words, we are continuing to be in diplomatic contact with various countries in the hopes that they will see the wisdom of correcting the flaws and avoiding a situation where we would have to seriously oppose the agreement.

QUESTION: Does the treaty as it was approved allow for correcting flaws in the first seven years?

MR. RUBIN: I think that any international body can reconstitute itself to repair flaws. I mean, that's not hard if there's a general view that - I'm sure that amendments made pursuant to the actual treaty text may have to go through a certain process. But if the organizers and the principal participants decided that it was worth trying to correct the flaws, I don't think there would be a procedural hurtle to doing so. Whether they will is obviously an open question.

QUESTION: Another subject - Jiang apparently has told the army to stop its involvement in commercial activities. I was wondering what you thought of that and its significance.

MR. RUBIN: The order by President Jiang to have the military withdrawal from commercial activities is consistent with previous steps taken to professionalize China's military. It is also consistent with China's overall economic reforms, which include efforts to better separate commercial and government functions and to stamp out corruption. It is too early to tell how this latest announcement will be implemented or to assess its long-term impact. But as I indicated, that is consistent with efforts in the economic sphere.

QUESTION: Is this something, though, that you think could help China get a better handle on its transfers of technology and material that trouble you - missile and things?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we think that process has to go on regardless of this - that there is no substitute for the political leadership exercising the strongest possible control over those entities that might be involved in those kind of transfers. Whether this kind of a split of the military from its commercial functions will make it better able to exercise such control, it is impossible to tell at this level of generality.

QUESTION: Was this a surprise to the US or was this signaled to either the Secretary on her separate trip or the President and his party?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know an account of every meeting and everything that was said. It's certainly consistent with previous steps to professionalize the military. But whether at some level or another, this type of step was previewed, I just don't know.

QUESTION: Today President Clinton and President Sanguinetti Uruguay meet. Can you comment on any bilateral relations or economic agreements towards which the US and Uruguay are working?

MR. RUBIN: This obviously is a subject more appropriately directed at the White House; but to the extent I can describe the purposes, I will do so.

The visit provides an opportunity for the two presidents to address a broad bilateral and multinational agenda. As a member of the common market of the south - MERCASUR - Uruguay is an important partner in the process of integration and is committed to working with us to implement the Santiago summit declaration.

The presidents will also discuss our shared commitment to free trade, environmental protection and international peace-keeping. In particular, I want to express America's condolences at the loss of a Uruguayan military observer who was killed on Monday while participating in a peace-keeping mission in Tajikistan. The presidents, as I understand it, will also discuss the upcoming Vital Voices of the Americas, the women in democracy conference to be held in Montevideo October 1 through 3, where the United States and the American Development Bank are cosponsoring the conference, which supports the goals of the Summit of the Americas.

QUESTION: The Russian Federation Council last week described the visa ban against Belarusian officials as "inappropriate and destructive action." Can you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen that quote, but I certainly would disagree with your characterization of it and disagree with that view. We think that a fundamental tenet of international diplomacy and international law was violated in the most crude fashion when the inviolability of the ambassador's residence was rejected. So we could not agree with anyone who doesn't understand the seriousness, the significance or the importance of that fundamental tenet and therefore, disagrees with the view that is shared by many European countries and the United States that firm action was required.

QUESTION: Jamie, the newspaper, Al-Hayad, had a story today which says that the two Libyan suspects are prepared to come to The Netherlands for trial.

MR. RUBIN: I've seen differing accounts here. I've seen that account; I've also seen an account from the lawyers in Scotland indicating that they would only do so if there was an international panel of judges.

Let me be very clear on this - we continue to explore the idea with the British Government and others of moving a Scottish court to The Netherlands so that the victims can get justice. That is a tricky legal exercise that we are continuing to work on. But we are not going to negotiate with the Libyan authorities or their lawyers or anyone else on what's involved here. The Security Council resolution is clear; and that is that it should be before a Scottish court. If the Scottish authorities are satisfied that the Scottish court system and procedures can be replicated in a geographically different location, then the quality of justice will remain and the Security Council resolution requirements could, in theory, be implemented.

But anything short of that, such as an idea of international judges, is not what the Security Council resolution said. This is not a negotiation; this is a different way of achieving the same precise objective.

QUESTION: News stories aside, have you heard directly in some fashion from the Libyan Government about this?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any answer; but again, we haven't even put the proposal formally forward. We have acknowledged publicly that we are exploring this possibility in conjunction with the British Government and others so that we're in a position to decide whether this can meet the test of a Scottish court de facto in another country.

QUESTION: I have a question to ask about Japan. The credit rating agency Moody's has just released that it's going to start formal review on Japan, and that there's a possible downgrading of Japan's rating. How would you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: I'd have to see the report; I haven't seen that. We'll try to get you something after the briefing.

QUESTION: This morning the Croatian Foreign Minister, at the National Press Club, said that all refugees returning to Croatia have the same rights, regardless of ethnicity. I wanted to know what your assessment of that is, and how Croatia is proceeding as far as resettling refugees; is he correct?

MR. RUBIN: We certainly have had concerns for some time in that area, and we're obviously pleased about what he said their policy is. But with respect to the details, I will have to get you one of our refugee experts to detail the different problems that we're observed or are aware of. Certainly, in general, I can't say that everything has gone perfectly.

QUESTION: Could we go back to the Middle East for just a second, because you're working the problem, but the two parties are not technically meeting together, are they?

MR. RUBIN: It's our understanding that they will continue to engage, and we continue to urge them to engage.

QUESTION: But at what level?

MR. RUBIN: It's really up to them to make specific statements about how they're meeting with each other. It's our understanding they continue to engage, and we are urging them to do so.

QUESTION: Have you, in the past 16 months, suggested that Arafat and Netanyahu should meet together to bring this thing up to a decision-making level rather than --

MR. RUBIN: Well, they have met during that period. I believe in not --

QUESTION: But not negotiating.

MR. RUBIN: Well, they've met. We are of the view now that the parties need to engage, and if we decide that proposing such a meeting is going to be helpful, we will make such a proposal.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)


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