U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #88, 98-07-20
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
548
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, July 20, 1998
Briefer: JAMES P. RUBIN
ANNOUNCEMENT
1 Background Briefing on Secretary's Trip/Briefing Schedule
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
1-2 Secretary's Trip/US Aid and Assessment of Needs for Tidal
Wave Victims
NEW ZEALAND
2 Secretary's Trip
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
2-3,4 Fighting Update/Reports of Serb shelling into Albania
3-5,6 Ambassador Hill's and Ambassador Gelbard's meetings /
Question of Greater Albania / KLA Participation /
Rugova's support declining
5 Senate Resolution on War Crimes Indictment against
Milosevic
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
6-9 US Position on Court's Creation/Possible Effect on US Armed
Forces and Peacekeepers/Flaws in the Treaty/UN Security
Council Role
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
9-10 US Assessment of Israeli-Palestinian Talks/Failed Terrorist
Attack
11-12 Re-writing of Palestinian Charter/Meeting the Requirement
INDIA/PAKISTAN
12-13,14 Sanctions Legislation
13-14 International Support for Sanctions/Deputy Secretary
Talbott's Meetings/Resolving the Rift over Kashmir/Effect
of Sanctions
IRAN/CUBA
14 US Support for Sanctions Continue
CUBA
14-15 Reports of Fidel Castro's Health/Surgeon Defector to Costa
Rica
JORDAN
15 Health of King Hussein
CYPRUS
15 Anniversary of Turkish Invasion and Occupation
MEXICO
15-16 Police Chief as Witness at Houston Trial/Anti-Drug
Cooperation
PANAMA
16 Status of Multilateral Counter Narcotics Center
RUSSIA
16 Update on IMF Financial Bailout/Visit by Mr. Chubays
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #88
MONDAY, JULY 20, 1998 1:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Good afternoon. Sorry for the delay on the starting time.
The schedule as it now looks will involve a briefing tomorrow and on
Thursday. On Wednesday we're going to try to get you a senior administration
official to talk about the Secretary's trip. So that would mean no
briefing on Wednesday, but a briefing tomorrow and Thursday. That's the
current plan, and beyond that we will change gears as necessary.
With those procedural announcements out of the way, let me announce that
today is Monday and so the first question goes to Mr. Barry Schweid.
QUESTION: It's assumed that she will go to Papua New Guinea. Will you
spell that out a little bit and what she would do there and how long she
might be there and how close she might get to the abbot?
MR. RUBIN: The details of that visit are obviously going to be adjusted
pursuant to what's going on there. It is the Secretary's intention to
follow up and still stop in Port Moresby on July 29. Exactly what she will
do will depend on what is happening. I would expect her to try to be of
assistance given the calamity that has occurred there. At the same time,
one has to be careful not to put resources into the visit of the Secretary
of State that might be diverted from the humanitarian needs. So that will
be the balance that has to be struck. The senior official that briefs you
on Wednesday on the visit will be in a position to tell you exactly the
details for her visit at that time. But she is intending to still
go.
QUESTION: The speech - can you tell us about the San Francisco speech?
Is it an evening speech?
MR. RUBIN: As you know, Barry, we haven't announced a speech; and when
we're ready to announce a speech we will. We're trying to work out the
details of that. I think some of you were alerted to the fact of a speech
for your own planning purposes, but that doesn't mean we necessarily are
ready to announce the details.
QUESTION: I was just guessing, because everybody stops in San Francisco
when they can.
MR. RUBIN: That's certainly a possibility, and the weather is a lot
cooler in San Francisco than it is here in Washington.
QUESTION: Will the US be sending any aid to PNG?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, the situation is as follows. The
official death toll as of 2:00 p.m. July 20 local time had reached 620, but
the number could rise as high as 3,000. Many survivors are badly injured.
Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Bill Skate visited the devastated areas.
Government food supplies are being airlifted to the area and provincial
officials are supervising rescue activities and the recovery of remains.
The government of Australia, which has major aid programs in Papua New
Guinea, has sent an emergency hospital and other assistance including food,
shelter and medicines to the effected area. The relief efforts are
obviously complicated by the remoteness of the region and the destruction
of roads. Our Ambassador Karaer has informed the Papua New Guinea
Government that the United States is prepared to provide $25,000 in
immediate assistance and we are also looking for other ways to help.
Our embassy is in the process of assessing needs in consultation with the
government, and we will be in a position to determine how the US can be
helpful following that assessment. We try to do what we can in these
situations, some of our military officials are having meetings to see how
they can be of assistance and we're still in an assessment phase.
QUESTION: Has the government asked for any particular kind of aid from
the international community?
MR. RUBIN: The specific details of what they have asked for I am not
aware of. I know that the US is trying to make an assessment of what the
needs are so that we can then see which particular ones of those needs we
can try to fulfill.
QUESTION: One more on the Secretary's trip to the region, to New Zealand
- do you expect that her visit will, of course, will improve relations even
further between the US and New Zealand?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly, we would hope so. Again, we're going to
have a briefing on Wednesday on the subject of the Secretary's trip. The
briefer will go through, in great detail, what the purposes of the trip to
New Zealand, Australia, as well as the ASEAN meeting are, and some of your
more detailed questions could be best addressed at that time.
QUESTION: On another subject, the situation in Kosovo appears to be
heating up again. Do you have a current reading on what it's doing?
MR. RUBIN: The fighting does continue in two regions - the Decani region
and the Pec region -- as well as other parts of Kosovo. Specifically,
there are reports of heavy fighting in the town of Orahovac in Central
Kosovo. We are checking into these reports. At this time, the status of
the town is a little unclear. Serb forces claim to have retaken the town;
but these reports have not been confirmed.
There were also clashes at the border between Kosovo and Albania over the
weekend. The exact number of casualties is unknown. There are reports of
Serb shelling over the border and into Albania. If true, this represents
an unacceptable violation of Albanian territory. Belgrade must understand
that such shelling runs the risk of escalating further the current
conflict.
As far as our negotiating activity is concerned, Ambassador Hill is in
Belgrade today. He has met with President Milosevic. He's accompanied by
a delegation including Jim O'Brien from the Secretary's staff. They will
be traveling to Pristina tomorrow for discussions with ethnic Albanian
leaders. Special Representative Bob Gelbard attended a meeting at The
Hague this morning, also related to the Kosovo conflict, organized by some
Serbian opposition figures.
So the negotiating effort continues through the work of Ambassador Hill.
Its intensive phase continues. This is a difficult problem that we are
trying to address by finding a solution between the needs of the claims of
the Kosovar Albanians for independence and the stripping of the autonomy of
the Kosovar Albanians by Serbia. So we are working intensively on some
ideas that we've put down to try to create enhanced autonomy for the people
of Kosovo and give them what they want without seeing this conflict spin
out of control and spill over into the countries in the region, which we've
indicated would be a danger to us.
QUESTION: The spill-over - when Hill and others talk to the Albanians,
do they speak in larger terms of wishing some sort of union with Albania or
maybe take little piece of Macedonia, a little piece of Serbia and having
kind of a larger - I mean, I know the US position, but do they express
modest goals or do they let it all hang out and tell you what they're
really after? You talk to all kinds of Albanians, but I wonder.
MR. RUBIN: Obviously, what people say to you in those meetings depends
on who they are and exactly what they choose to say about their intentions.
As far as the question of a greater Albania is concerned and who's for it
and who's against it, let me start by saying we're against it; that this
would be a very dangerous development that could effect the stability of
the region.
To the extent that I have been briefed on what is said in Albania, I am not
aware that government leaders are pushing this particularly hard at all.
On the contrary, they are very supportive of what we're trying to do to
provide enhanced autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians. Does that mean that
every Albanian in Albania supports the government position? Probably not.
There are some extremists in the north who take rather radical positions
and I suspect they have indicated in various ways -- either subtly or by
implication - their greater goals. But as far as the government is
concerned, it's my understanding they've behaved quite responsibly, wanting
to see the improvement of the lives of the people of Kosovo, but recognizing
the borders can't be changed in this way.
QUESTION: Well, when you visit think-tanks around town, for instance,
and you hear Albanians, they include in their ambitions a more - a
different regime in Tirana; not the kind of moderate government - or at
least taking the moderate tone that you hear - but as part of this grand
plan would be some more --
MR. RUBIN: I don't which Albanians you've heard from. All I can say is
that there is a wide spectrum of opinion amongst Albanian-Americans,
Albanians around the world, about what the goals of the Albanian people
should be. I can tell you what our views are; I can certainly tell you
what my understanding of the position of the Albanian Government. It's
certainly true, as in many cases, that people outside the country have
rather grandiose goals for what the people who are living there suffering
under the daily life would want to see happen. That's pretty common in
many conflicts around the world.
QUESTION: When you say that there was fighting on the Kosovar Albanian
border, do we know who instigated the fighting?
MR. RUBIN: Those kind of details are almost impossible to determine at
this level from this distance, to know who took the first shot. We have
seen press reports that ethnic Albanians may have staged actions from
Albania. We cannot confirm those reports at this time, but have reason to
believe aspects of the stories are true.
I know that's sort of an opaque formulation there; but the point is to who
fired the first shot, it's almost impossible to know in these cases.
QUESTION: Did it have to do with trying to keep, for instance, Kosovar
Albanian refugees from going into Albania? Did it have to do with
arms?
MR. RUBIN: Which action?
QUESTION: Just the fighting that took place on the border.
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I understood the press reports, the press reports
indicated that the Serbian side was trying to interdict the Kosovar
Albanians who were on the other side of the border coming in. It wasn't so
much about refugees as it was about fighters trying to re-enter Kosovo.
QUESTION: You say you're talking with people in Kosovo. Who are you
talking to from the KLA?
MR. RUBIN: I've been saying for ten days from this podium that I am not
going to get into the habit of detailing every contact the United States
Government has with the KLA.
As far as our discussions by Ambassador Hill, the focus of those discussions
is on Dr. Rugova and the group of political leaders that operate within
Pristina that reflect a wide variety of opinion in Kosovo. We have long
said that if it's appropriate, and Dr. Rugova and the others believe it's
appropriate, we certainly wouldn't stand in the way for the views of the
KLA to be reflected in that discussion. But we are not shuttling back and
forth between the KLA and President Milosevic; we're shuttling back and
forth between President Milosevic and the civilian leadership in Kosovo,
led by Dr. Rugova.
QUESTION: Despite the fact that many people in Kosovo have lost faith in
Rugova?
MR. RUBIN: Is that an assertion or a question?
QUESTION: It's a little bit of both. I mean, I've heard you say and
I've heard others say that so many in Kosovo no longer support, for the
last ten years, watching Rugova essentially lose the moderates in his
country.
MR. RUBIN: I think what I have said is that the radicalization of the
population of Kosovo has occurred precisely because of the actions and
statements emanating from Belgrade. That is something we've referred to
many times.
We believe that the leadership in Pristina, led by Dr. Rugova is central
and indispensable to a peaceful resolution of this conflict. That is our
view; that continues to be our view. But that doesn't mean we don't want
to reflect in these discussions the full spectrum of opinion. To the
extent that you talk about the KLA, I think we've made very clear that it
is a much more disparate organizations than having three initials would
make it seem. So what we are trying to do is reflect the wide variety of
opinion in Kosovo - political opinion, political views about the future of
the country, those who are respected in their various communities; so that
if an agreement can be achieved that yields greater rights for the Kosovar
Albanians, that everyone's view will have been taken into account.
QUESTION: Jamie, are you aware of the Senate resolution on Milosevic,
suggesting that the War Crimes Tribunal should indict him based on the tens
of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people the Senate says he's
responsible for?
MR. RUBIN: I'm unaware of the resolution. Our view on this is that it's
not up to the Senate or the US Government to decide who's indicted; it's up
to the Tribunal. That's why one has a tribunal, so that when indictments
are brought down, that they have the independence and respect that is
necessary for that kind of an important judicial act to be widely
accepted.
There's no question that we believe that President Milosevic has done great
damage to the world and to his country by the steps that have occurred
since the early '90s in Belgrade. With respect to whatever private views
some of us may have on his culpability, we think it's best to leave it to
the Tribunal to make a decision as to who should be indicted or not,
because they're the ones that have the evidence based on legal documentation
rather than simply opinion.
QUESTION: Speaking of war crimes tribunals --
MR. RUBIN: If we want to stay on Kosovo and then I'll come back for what
I expect to be the larger subject.
QUESTION: I just want to ask you again about your statement that we
expect Dr. Rugova and our talks with him to reflect wider views. Does the
US rule out KLA representatives as part of Dr. Rugova's team?
MR. RUBIN: We've done this a lot of times here, and I'm just stunned I
have to keep doing it. We are not going to decide for the Albanian side
who's at the table. We want the views of the KLA, that is, the more
extreme views, reflected at the table. But it is up to the Albanians to
decide who's going to be at the table. We have not ruled it out, and I
think if you look back at the numerous times I've addressed this issue, you
will see that.
QUESTION: I wonder if you'd talk a little bit about the strategy now for
dealing with the issue of the War Crimes Tribunal and the agreement that
was reached in Rome on Friday. And specifically, do you anticipate an
effort by the United States Government to dissuade other countries from
ratifying that agreement?
MR. RUBIN: Let me make a few general points and then I'll get directly
to your question. The negotiating team obviously worked very, very hard
there. Ambassador Scheffer did his best to try to reflect American
interests and try to get the kind of court created that we think would've
been effective.
We've always supported the creation of a fair and properly constituted
international criminal court to bring to justice those accused of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. And several aspects - and I
can provide you some more detail later of the final document - included
things that we wanted. But in the end the treaty, as currently envisaged,
is deeply flawed and will produce a flawed court. We are sorry to see that
the court that people were in a rush to create is simply not the kind of
court the United States can support. There was an unfortunate rush to
judgment by the people in Rome who seem more anxious in creating a - making
a point than making a difference.
I think everyone knows that an international criminal court without the
leading force for the rule of law and the leading force for in the fight
against war crimes and crimes against humanity - that is the United States -
is a weakened court and I think everyone knows that.
There were three basic reasons why we were unable to agree to this court
and why we think it creates an unfair double standard for states that
choose not to sign the treaty. First, once the treaty comes into force, it
would extend the court's jurisdiction over the nationals of countries that
are not party to the treaty. Never before has a treaty in international
law - from the work that I did this morning - put itself over those who
have not been included in it. The nation state is the fundamental unit in
the international system, and international law does not has not before
seen a treaty try to impose itself on those who have not signed it.
Even in the case of the United Nations, everyone signed the UN treaty in
which the Security Council was created, and the Security Council often acts
in opposition to the views of particular member states; but they signed the
underlying document. This is, as international lawyers have explained it
to me, something that's never happened before.
The US armed forces operating overseas, as a result of this flawed
provision, could face prosecution by the court even if the United States
does not sign it. Not only would this violate, as I said, the most
fundamental principal of treaty law, it could inhibit the ability of the
United States to meet alliance obligations and participate in multinational
peace keeping operations. In short, it could let US forces be subject to
politically motivated or ill-considered or unjustified prosecutions.
Second, we are concerned about the treaty's failure to give states the
chance to test the court's experience before becoming subject to its
jurisdiction. We sought a treaty that would have allowed states to opt out
for ten years for war crimes and crimes against humanity so that we could
accept the automatic jurisdiction with respect to genocide. That would've
allowed many, many more states to sign on to the court immediately,
creating a broad base of support for it's work on genocide while allowing
those with international peace keeping responsibilities and security
obligations the opportunity to see the court in action.
Ironically, this provision, combined with the treaty-drafters' insistence
that non-state parties be subject to the court's jurisdiction creates a
double standard: countries that now can sign the treaty and avoid
prosecution of its nationals for war crimes for the first seven years,
while nations that do not sign the treaty could face such prosecution. The
starkest example would be that the Pol Pots of the world can avoid
prosecution, can be protected, while the peace-keepers are prosecuted.
This is an inherent flaw in the treaty. It's a system that shows how a
rush to judgment created a flawed instrument.
In short, a known human rights violator could sign the treaty, opt out of
war crimes and yet seek to prosecute the United States when its peace-
keeping forces seek to enforce peace and security in that particular
country.
Third, the treaty includes a provision allowing the court's prosecutor to
initiate investigations even when no state party seeks such an investigation.
This means that despite our best efforts, the court will be deluged with
complaints from well-meaning individuals in organizations that will want
the court to address every wrong in the world. This will turn the court
into a human rights ombudsman and limit its ability to investigate the most
serious crimes. It will also leave the court open to frivolous and
politically motivated complaints.
There is more to this story that I don't care to share with you right now;
I'm happy to do so after the briefing. But let me, in direct answer to
your question, say that we, as a result of the court that has been created,
it is hard to see how the United States can support either politically or
financially such a court. As far as what we will do in the future, we will
be reviewing our options and examining what the likely next steps are. We
will obviously be having bilateral contacts with other countries. There
will be a prep com for certain elements of it. We need to determine the
best course of action so that the treaty text can be approved and
facilitate possible US participation if corrective steps are taken.
But we will reserve the right to actively oppose the treaty if such changes
are not made and we determine such action to be necessary to protect our
national security interests. In short, we are going to try to convince the
people who were so determined to create this in a rushed way to think hard,
think again, try to correct the mistakes and put us in a position to try to
join the regime. If not, and we believe that our national interests could
be affected, we intend to reserve the right to actively oppose it.
Was that the longest answer in the history of the State Department
briefing? It's a very important issue; and I thought it was important to
get our views out there.
QUESTION: On that subject, Jamie, if your analysis is right, as it now
stands, if an American peace-keeper, let's say, in Bosnia were to be
accused of a war crime, he could be arrested by the local authorities
without the United States authorities in the United States being able to do
anything about it; is that right?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, I doubt that would happen with the American
forces operating in Bosnia. But as far as your hypothetical question is
concerned, this court is a long, long way from being created and I wouldn't
even assume that any of the current deployments in places like that would
still be in effect by the time this flawed instrument could ever become
accepted internationally.
With respect to your hypothetical point, if we believe that the prospect of
a court would interfere with our ability to operate internationally, we
will respond. But we don't intend to accept the jurisdiction of a court
like this if it's created in such a flawed and mistaken way. We will
continue to pursue what we think we need to do around the world to protect
our national interests, including deploying forces as appropriate.
QUESTION: Jamie, the way that the treaty deals with one nation occupying
another, do you have any comment on that? I believe it characterizes
Israel's occupation as a war crime.
MR. RUBIN: I gather that was one of the - another last minute bone
thrown in there to try to - it was sort of a festival, I think, towards the
end for people who didn't really understand the consequences of words.
That is one of the issues that I'm familiar with concerns about. There are
others, including the inclusion of the crime of aggression, despite the
drafters' failure to define that crime; the drafters' unwillingness to
permit reservations to the treaty; the possibility that nuclear weapons may
someday be included in such a way - and this is another example of the
perversity - it might make their use acceptable if you've signed the treaty,
but criminalize it for non-state parties. So this is a flawed instrument
all the way around, and it needs some repair work desperately.
QUESTION: Jamie, there was a suggestion that adoption of the ICC would
force the United States to re-evaluate its commitment of troops to Europe.
What would kick in that re-evaluation - the actual creation of the court or
did the vote last week?
MR. RUBIN: I think this question came up last week with respect to some
talking points that were allegedly used by Defense Secretary Cohen, at
which time his spokesman denied that those talking points were ever used,
that that position was ever taken. So I can't, again, respond to a
hypothetical question about a view that was never the view of the United
States.
QUESTION: And one follow up - if a country is close to ratifying or
considering ratifying this particular treaty, what kind of penalty could
they expect from the United States?
MR. RUBIN: As is normal, these thoughtful questions are about ten
squares down the road. First, as I said in response to Tom's question, we
need to try to convince the drafters to make the corrections necessary to
make us be part of it. A treaty on the international subject of war crimes
- a subject where the United States has been the leading force in creating
the Yugoslav tribunal and the Rwanda tribunal - is simply not going to be a
serious instrument without the United States participating. One would
certainly hope - although it's hard to expect it - one would certainly hope
that the people who care about this court would rethink the rush to
judgment that occurred in Rome, and realize that if they want a court that
they can be proud of, that the world will be proud of, that will be
effective, that will work, they need to make the kind of adjustments
necessary so that the United States can support it.
As I said in response to Tom's question, if that doesn't happen, we will
retain the option of strongly opposing this court and all that goes with
that.
QUESTION: Jamie, another subject --
QUESTION: One more - so this issue of the court, in the end, will come
up before the Security Council, and they'll decide whether it actually gets
set up or not; is that correct?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that -- the Security Council role is more about
being in a position to stop a prosecution during the course of its
prosecution.
I believe this is not a creature of the Security Council. If it were, we
would obviously be able to stop it. It is an international body, as I
understand it, that would be funded through a variety of means. The
Security Council's role, as I understand the provisions of this flawed
court, would enable the Security Council to make an affirmative decision to
suspend prosecutions while matters were being considered under the Security
Council.
QUESTION: So you can oppose it, but you can't block it - the United
States, I mean.
MR. RUBIN: Well, right, the Security Council could take action to
suspend for 12 months at a time the prosecution in a particular country if
it affected the work the Security Council was trying to do, or was
otherwise deemed unwise. The Security Council could take affirmative
action to stop it.
QUESTION: Contrary assessments from Israel and the Palestinians. Does
the US have one of its own? I think Arafat's assessment was a one-word
assessment; it was nothing. So that sounds negative. Netanyahu speaking
of - maybe in a few days, there will be a happy conclusion. Does the US
have an insight into these?
MR. RUBIN: We have said for some time that it was important for the two
sides to meet directly. They have done that; that is important. Such
meetings are essential to re-establish trust and confidence so that the
differences between the two parties can be resolved.
They have agreed, as I understand it, to an intensive schedule of follow-up
meetings to try to conclude, make progress on the key elements needed for
an agreement.
We didn't participate in these meetings, so we're not going to provide
details about the content or our views about the content of meetings we
weren't participating in; other than to say we do feel an enormous sense of
urgency here that the two sides need to be in a position to resolve
problems together. We're not going to prejudge the outcome of these
meetings other than to say that we've wanted them to work together and now
they need to work intensively in resolving the differences.
QUESTION: You've got to wonder, don't you, though, if two sides are
supposed to agree on ambiguous matters how they could have a meeting and
come out with totally contrary appraisals or they could be just playing to
their audiences.
MR. RUBIN: As an experienced diplomatic observer as you are, Barry, I'm
sure you're familiar with times when people publicly presented certain
things about meetings and then lo and behold there was agreement. I'm not
saying there's going to be that in this case. What I'm saying is, of all
people, I doubt you'll be dissuaded from taking on face value the initial
reaction of two sides who have had such a long-standing difficulty in
talking to each other about what happens in a meeting.
QUESTION: Has the US been in touch with the two sides about this
apparent failed terror attack?
MR. RUBIN: I don't really have much to say about that. We've certainly
been talking to the Israelis and the Palestinians about the issue of
terrorism. As far as what our contact with the Israeli Government is, as I
understand it, this is a matter that's under investigation and it should be
under investigation. As I've said before, the Palestinian Authority has an
obligation to do all it can to fight terror. As I understand it as well,
the Palestinians have condemned this act - the Palestinian Authority.
QUESTION: Yes - just the act itself -- do you have reason to think it
was not as it was presented by the Israelis?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I think I indicated that we're waiting for them to do
the investigation; and I gather they're doing that right now and saying
very little about it. They're on the ground and in position to make an
assessment of what the fact situation was or even potentially the
motivation. So I'd rather wait for them to make formal assessments.
QUESTION: This is still on the Mid-East - okay, I'm sorry, excuse me.
Prime Minister Netanyahu called on the Palestinians - at least it was
reported in the paper - to convene the entire Palestinian National Congress,
I think it is, on the rewriting of the charter. I'm sure you know the
background that the Palestinian Executive Council, I think it was, made
some verbal commitments to do so a couple of years ago. Is the United
States satisfied with the state of play on renouncing the old Palestinian
Charter, or do we support the convening of this new - of what Netanyahu
said?
MR. RUBIN: We have made our position quite clear on a number of
occasions in recent days, in fact, on this subject; and the position
remains the same a week later. That is that in 1996, we indicated that
some of the requirements of Oslo had been met through the decision of the
Palestinians at the time; that in January of this year, Chairman Arafat
presented a letter detailing the specific provisions of the Palestinian
Charter that had been rescinded. Combined, we said that they have gone a
long way to meeting the concerns of the Israelis. To the extent the
Israelis have additional concerns, they should address those directly with
the Palestinians. I wouldn't be surprised if that were happening in these
meetings.
QUESTION: You may have said it a little differently this time.
MR. RUBIN: If I did --
QUESTION: I know you weren't intending to --
MR. RUBIN: If I did - if I did, I wasn't intending to.
QUESTION: Well, I think it was the phrase "some requirements." First of
all, let's break this down - if the US says --
MR. RUBIN: Do we really want to do this?
QUESTION: Yes we do. If the US - because it is a major hurdle for one
thing --
MR. RUBIN: Look - you're driving them out.
QUESTION: That's all right; they get the transcript. It's all right -
some of them don't even come. Some requirements - that's the US standpoint
- when you say some requirements were met in January '96 - I mean, that
means not all the requirements were met. So as you push forward to today,
is it still the US position that only some requirements have been
met?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure - it's over to me, Barry, and what I'll do is give
you a transcript from last week and we can go over that after the
briefing.
QUESTION: No, I'm serious about this because --
MR. RUBIN: I don't have anything to add.
QUESTION: We don't have to prolong it. This is not harassment, this is
simply --
MR. RUBIN: I don't have anything to add.
QUESTION: No, to switch - let me explain what you've just done - you've
gone from requirements, which means things the US, in its good nature,
would like to see happen, to concerns - you know, this worrisome Israeli
Government has concerns.
MR. RUBIN: That's what I said last week.
QUESTION: I understand that. But the US - you're being asked if the US -
-
MR. RUBIN: And I said this last week.
QUESTION: -- has a position on whether the Palestinians have met their
requirements. And you're telling the Israelis to take it up with the
Palestinians, but you're also saying some requirements were met.
MR. RUBIN: Barry, my intention -- and I hope this helps you, but it
probably won't -- is to restate today what I restated last week and what we
restated in 1998 in January when the letter was provided. Our position
remains the same. Whatever concerns some may have about that position,
they should have the same concerns today as they did last week and the
beginning of January, and I'll be happy to provide you the words that I
apparently --
QUESTION: I remember the words - I'm okay.
MR. RUBIN: So when I - so great, let's move on.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - some requirements.
MR. RUBIN: Let's just move on.
QUESTION: New subject - talking about the US delegation to India and
Pakistan - first, it was quick sanctions against India and Pakistan then.
Now -- a waiver -- in the US Congress and now that the US delegation to the
Indian Subcontinent. Do you think the US has achieved what it wanted, or
there is not enough global support against India and Pakistan to punish
them?
MR. RUBIN: The two subjects - global support and sanctions - let me
address one by one. With respect to sanctions, we, as a result of our
sanctions legislation and a result of implementing that legislation, have
sent a powerful message to the world that to test nuclear weapons is to
cause the isolation of your country. There's no question in our minds that
both India and Pakistan have felt the sting of sanctions.
Last week we did not seek to end sanctions, and some may have breathed a
premature sigh or relief. All we sought was authority from Congress to
have the flexibility to act if India and Pakistan were to change their
positions and to join in one way or another the CTBT and other international
regimes. We have not taken the view that sanctions should be suspended in
whole or in part. On the contrary, these sanctions remain in place; they
are tough sanctions. They have obviously stung in India and Pakistan, and
that is as it should be because the decisions were taken that we opposed.
With respect to international support, I would say this -- the international
community has rallied in an unprecedented way around a very concrete set of
requirements first laid out in the Permanent Five meeting that was held in
Geneva; reiterated in the meeting in London; and reiterated in a number of
Security Council resolutions and acts of condemnation by the organization
of American States, by European organizations like the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council. So there's been a sweeping condemnation by the whole
world of India and Pakistan; and clearly they are uncomfortable, as they
should be. The question now is what can we do to work with them to try to
get them out of the holes that they've blown up for themselves, and to try
to improve the climate by getting them to move in the direction that we're
seeking. That is what Deputy Secretary Talbott is doing. He had meetings
in New Delhi today; he will be in Islamabad tomorrow, as I understand it.
The goals are very clear - how can we and the international community work
with India and Pakistan to bring them back into the international non-
proliferation consensus, to reduce tensions between them and address their
security concerns at the same time.
That is what Deputy Secretary Talbott is doing. That is our view on
international opposition to the tests and the subject of American
sanctions.
QUESTION: Jamie, also, I'm sorry, to follow - the two prime minister
meetings in Sri Lanka next week. India has always said that the Silma
agreement signed between India and Pakistan - then Mr. Bhutto and Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi in 1972 - that India will stand by Silma agreement.
But do you think the US supports the Silma agreement - that the two nations
should resolve the problems of Kashmir and whatever rift is between India
and Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly would like the two countries to resolve their
problems peacefully. I think that's a view it would be hard to imagine
anyone could disagree with. With regard to the specific agreement and our
formal view on it, I'd rather get that for the record.
QUESTION: Could I ask you, the US view is that sanctions - they're
punitive, clearly. But does the US consider them corrective? I ask
because Senator Biden, for instance, who's the senior serious member of the
Senate and you used to work for him, believe.
MR. RUBIN: Very good taste in personnel --
QUESTION: Well, while you were briefing one day, he made a big speech
last week; some of us tore ourselves away from the briefing to hear Senator
Biden. He said it's time to reconsider sanctions so far as changing the
behavior of nations. He said he's sorry to come to this point because he
hasn't got a sure formula to improve things, but he thinks you've got to
look at it a different way. Do you think sanctions will get India and
Pakistan to forego their nuclear programs?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think there's any way of answering that question
today. I think we in the Administration certainly share the view that
you've attributed to Senator Biden that the sanctions pendulum has swung
too far. There's a tendency for people to think if they just impose a
sanction, they can solve a problem; it's not that simple, as we've learned
in many cases.
That doesn't mean, on the other hand, that sanctions are ineffective all
the time. It means that greater care needs to be applied in using the
tool; that we have to bear in mind the one overarching principle that for
sanctions to be effective, they are more effective the more they are
supported around the world. Unilateral sanctions, while sometimes making
people feel good, don't actually do good.
With respect to the US view and the US sanctions on India and Pakistan, we
are not alone. The best example, I would say, would be the London meeting
in which the G-8 made very clear that they were not going to be supportive
or were going to suspend consideration of loans in the international
financial institutions. There's been a wave of change around the world in
terms of assistance and dialogue and support for the government of India
and Pakistan because of what they've done.
So these have been widely - there's wide support for some sanction against
India and Pakistan for what they've done. We obviously have gone farther
than other countries, but many countries have taken very strong measures.
Will this work? We certainly hope so; we certainly hope that Deputy
Secretary Talbott in his meetings in Islamabad and in New Delhi can help
the governments there realize that the course of wisdom for them, for their
people and for the world will be to come back into the fold, come back into
acceptance of basic norms of the international community.
QUESTION: Speaking of unilateral sanctions, is there still support of
the sanctions that Congress has imposed unilaterally against Iran and
Cuba?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I mean, there's been no change in our view on
that.
QUESTION: Jamie, speaking of Cuba, there are reports in The Miami Herald
and getting around --
MR. RUBIN: Did you guys plan that?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: No. But it's a good transition; we'll take it. That Fidel
Castro has been suffering - or was at least in the fall - suffering from
hypertensive encephalitis. Anyway, this is an illness which paralyzes --
MR. RUBIN: I have the same problem, too, up here, using those long
words.
QUESTION: Paralyzes brain function and in severe cases can cause death
and is a stroke risk. He has been in some bad health back in the summer,
it was said. Of course, the Cubans are completely denying this and the
wires say --
MR. RUBIN: And the question is --
QUESTION: The question is, does the United States have any knowledge or
is willing to speak out on the health of Fidel Castro?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think it's appropriate for us to comment on the
health of Fidel Castro. Clearly, he is in charge there, and that has
caused ill health to the people of Cuba and their system. I can't say that
I wish him well, but I can't tell you that I have any information to impart
on what's going on there.
QUESTION: Same subject --
MR. RUBIN: The same subject? I can't imagine I would have more to
say.
QUESTION: The health of world leaders. Can you just take that question
and apply it to King Hussein?
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to take the question.
QUESTION: Same subject - Cuba again. The information -- The Miami
Herald was quoting a former Cuban surgeon. Has the US talked with this
defector since she went to Costa Rica?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information on that.
QUESTION: Today, July 20, is the 24th anniversary of the Turkish
invasion and occupation of Cyprus with American weapons. I wonder if you
have any comment.
MR. RUBIN: I thought we had a meeting last week.
QUESTION: But it's a very general question, so you can express your
position.
MR. RUBIN: All right, we'll get you an official statement of the State
Department on this subject.
QUESTION: Can I have one more? Probably one I should have asked first -
A man named Adrian Carrera Fuentes -- he used to be the Chief of Police of
the Judicial or the National Police of Mexico - has been loaned by the
state of Mexico to the United States in a trial in Houston as an expert
witness. This seems like extraordinary cooperation. Is the United States
going to help the Mexicans out in some way by providing Mr. Ruis Massieu's
testimony or perhaps he as a witness in Mexico?
MR. RUBIN: I think you should address this matter to those federal
agencies that are responsible for the investigation of such matters.
QUESTION: Doesn't it show good cooperation after Casablanca between
Mexico and the US?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly we want to have greater cooperation between the
United States and Mexico in the fight against drugs.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the current state of negotiations with
Panama on a multilateral counter-narcotics center?
MR. RUBIN: In light of progressive alterations in the Panamanian
position introduced in recent months, these talks have reached an impasse.
Given the importance to the United States and other governments in the
region attached to counter-narcotics operations, we have decided to begin
to pursue alternative arrangements in consultation with other interested
governments for conducting such activities in the future. This doesn't
mean that these negotiations won't ever yield success, but it means the
prospects are not good and therefore we need to be able to be making
alternative arrangements to continue counter-narcotics operations if the
negotiations continue in the direction they've been on.
QUESTION: You don't want to say which countries you're consulting, do
you?
MR. RUBIN: Not at this time.
QUESTION: The IMF is considering Russia's bail-out today - do you have
any words on that?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say as follows. The IMF and Russia are actively
reviewing the actions taken last week by the Russian legislature. The
matter is, as I understand it, going to be before the IMF Board this
afternoon. Mr. Chubays is in Washington on conjunction with this scheduled
meeting at which the new financing will be discussed. He is scheduled to
meet this afternoon with Secretary Albright and other officials at the
Treasury Department.
My understanding is that we are certainly supportive of what work has gone
so far, but these are matters to be resolved by the IMF and the Russian
Government. We have said that we would favor additional conditional
support for Russia from the international financial institutions if that
were necessary. Certain steps were taken in the Duma and others, Prime
Minister Kiriyenko indicated, may be adopted administratively. Essentially
this is a matter before the IMF, and I'd rather not prejudge what the IMF
is going to do this afternoon. It is our expectation that the Russian
Government will fulfill its commitment to give key deficit-cutting measures
the force of law by the time of the IMF board meeting on Monday. But these
are matters best discussed after the board meeting.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:50 P.M.)
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