U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #66, 98-05-29
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
763
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, May 29, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENT
1 U.S. Pickering to lead senior-level trip to Nigeria
PAKISTAN
1 US attempts to create a coordinated international response
1 US to arrange initial international meeting to discuss
Asian sub-continent
2 Meeting next week will be at ministerial-level of UN
Security Council permreps
2-3 China's role in current crisis discussed
3-4 Tentative Secretarial decision not to recall US ambassador
4 Strongly-worded message sent to Pakistan and India last
night
4-5 Goal of meeting is to discuss ways to defuse tensions,
promote dialogue with India
6 US view of how, why Pakistan decided to test nuclear
weapons
INDIA
5 Secretary has decided to send US Ambassador Celeste back
soon
JAPAN
6-7 Belief that North Korea supplied ballistic missiles to
Pakistan
CHINA
7 Report that China shipped special-quality steel to Iran
FRY-KOSOVO
7-8 Kosovar Albanian leader Rugova's meetings in Washington
8 Situation a matter of deep concern to US
8 NATO steps taken to respond to worsening situation
8-9 Firm pressure on Milosevic is a prime lesson from Bosnia
9 Update on fighting
9 US watching Montenegrin elections closely
OAS
9 Secretary plans to attend meeting in Caracas next week
COLOMBIA
9-10 US expects free and fair elections this weekend
RUSSIA
10 US encouraged by announcements yesterday to improve
financial situation
10-11 US view of Duma and START II passage
NIGERIA
11-12 US deeply concerned about current situation
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #66
FRIDAY, MAY 29, 1998, 1:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing on this
Friday. Let me start by announcing that at the direction of President
Clinton, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering
plans to lead a senior-level delegation to Nigeria within the next two
weeks. The purpose of the visit is to share our concerns about the
transition program that's not happening there, and to discuss steps we
think could lead to democratic civilian government in Nigeria.
The trip underscores the importance we attach to our relationship with
Nigeria and to democracy and reform in Africa. Accompanying Under Secretary
Pickering will be Assistant Secretary Susan Rice, NSC Senior Director for
African Affairs Joe Wilson and Deputy Commander-in-Chief, European Command,
General James Jamerson.
If there are any questions on that or any other subjects, let me turn the
questioning over to George Gedda from The Associated Press.
QUESTION: I wanted to turn to Pakistan. Do you have any evaluation of the
international response - the NATO allies, with one or two exceptions, don't
seem too enthusiastic about the idea of sanctions. How do you see
it?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, sanctions are not an end in themselves;
sanctions are a tool. Obviously in this case, the sanctions did not deter
the Indians or the Pakistanis from engaging in testing. So the task of the
international community is not sanctions for sanctions' sake.
Let me say, on the other hand, I think the international community's
response has been very much in line with the President's response and the
Secretary's response; in particular, the North Atlantic Council, the
Permanent Joint Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council - that means
over 44 nations at meetings yesterday in Luxembourg -- all made clear their
opposition to this test. So the international community is very united on
its views.
What Secretary Albright has been doing in the last two days is trying to
develop a more coordinated international response along the following
lines: She had a series of small meetings with Foreign Minister Primakov,
with Foreign Minister Cook, with Foreign Minister Vedrine, and she has been
on the phone twice with the Chinese Foreign Minister, as a result of which
the statement just passed the Security Council strongly deploring the
Pakistani test. They also have been discussing, and she hopes to make it
possible for the Permanent Five members of the Security Council to meet
in the coming week at the ministerial level to address this problem.
Clearly the situation in South Asia - the security situation has deteriorated,
and so Secretary Albright has launched a process, beginning with a
ministerial-level meeting that we hope to arrange as early as next week for
discussions on the key issues that make the risk of conflict greater now in
South Asia - that is, conflict both by miscalculation or intentional. So
the purposes of this meeting and any subsequent meetings - and we would
expect there to be a larger group that would begin to discuss this after
that initial session - the purposes of this initial session would
be to develop a coordinated, common approach to this grave situation.
In particular, to see that there are no more nuclear tests or escalations
in the region; to reaffirm the world's commitment to the maintenance of the
global non-proliferation regime; to find ways to engage India and Pakistan
in a process that will lead to their signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban;
support for the fissile material cut-off; ensuring that they don't take
further escalatory steps in the ballistic missile area; and finally,
to find ways to de-escalate the underlying tensions, including promoting
dialogue between India and Pakistan both on the current security situation
and on the underlying conflict in Kashmir so that the underlying dispute
that has made it so worrying and so troublesome that they have both tested
nuclear weapons and have gone to war with each other several times in
recent decades can be addressed.
This is the beginning of a long and complicated process. It's evident, I
think, as a result of the meetings that Secretary Albright has had and the
decisions that Pakistan has made that the outside world's ability to have
decisive influence in the area of nuclear testing was very limited, and
that the key driving factors were the regional dynamic that was created by
India's test and many of the events that preceded that, as well as the
enormous political pressure that Prime Minister Sharif was under.
So despite the limited leverage the outside world has, the concerns are so
deep and the danger is sufficient so that we hope to arrange this initial
meeting next week.
QUESTION: Where will it be and who will be invited?
MR. RUBIN: The meeting would be the permanent members of the Security
Council at the ministerial level. We have not settled on a venue yet, but
this is -- in real-time, it would be the five foreign ministers from the
permanent members of the Security Council.
QUESTION: Have they agreed to come?
MR. RUBIN: As I said, we're hoping to arrange it. We've received, in a
series of discussions, general support for this idea. Now we're nailing
down the venue and timing and agenda. But the agenda that we would be
looking toward would be the kind of objectives that I just set forth.
QUESTION: China has been criticized in the past for aiding Pakistan's
nuclear program. Without getting into great detail about that, how do you
assess the role of China in the future in curbing a potential arms race on
the sub-continent?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think the fact the Chinese Foreign Minister agreed to
attend this meeting is a signal that they want to be as supportive as they
can to ensure that the troubling events in recent weeks in South Asia do
not spin out of control. They were very much in sync with the United States
in terms of trying to convince Pakistan not to test; in terms of their very
strong response to India's initial test, in terms of their decision,
despite their obvious close relationship with Pakistan, to allow this
statement to go through just a few hours ago in New York, as a result of
this conversation Secretary Albright had with the Chinese Foreign
Minister.
That is not to say there are not serious concerns that we've had in the
past about China's cooperation with Pakistan. But I think we all have to
bear in mind the evolution that has occurred in China's policies, including
a commitment that we believe they are honoring not to assist unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities, especially those in Pakistan and other countries of
concern.
So there's no question there were problems in the past. I think we've
spoken to those very clearly. But one can either live in the past, or one
can focus on what's happened in recent years in terms of their non-
proliferation policy and what is evidently a desire on their part to work
with the United States and the other leading countries. Let me say in that
regard that President Yeltsin and President Clinton had a very important
discussion about the need for cooperation along the lines of this kind
of permanent member meeting in South Asia to deter the sides from
taking further dangerous steps, and to try to see what the major powers can
do collectively through their various diplomatic means and the different
leverage they have on the different parties to prevent this situation from
spinning out of control.
QUESTION: Jamie, Mike McCurry has talked about a strongly-worded
diplomatic cable having been sent to both Islamabad and to New Delhi. Can
you, without obviously going into the exact wording, characterize some of
the concerns expressed in such a cable? And can you bring us up to date on
whether or not Ambassador Simons is going to be recalled or not and
Ambassador Celeste?
MR. RUBIN: Tentatively, it's my understanding the Secretary has decided
not to recall Ambassador Simons, and Ambassador Celeste will be sent back
to the region, to India, very shortly. We obviously have a lot of
discussions that have to take place now in this situation. We think it's
appropriate to have ambassadors in country to try to work with the
governments involved so that the decisions they take in the coming days and
weeks will turn around the troublesome, dangerous trend that we've seen in
recent weeks.
With regard to our specific concerns, again, it would be difficult to say
too much in public; other than to say we are concerned about the danger of
additional action that would escalate the situation. A very strongly worded
message was sent to Pakistan last night, urging them not to take any
additional action that could further unravel the peace and stability that
is currently in existence there. We are trying to turn around the trend,
and it is a very difficult thing to do from outside when you have
such an emotional national issue as the underlying dispute over Kashmir,
and you have the cycle of action in tests of missiles and tests of nuclear
weapons and counter-tests that are occurring, and the outside world's views
are not as important as the feelings that exist in those countries.
Nevertheless, we're going to continue to stay in contact with them, and we
hope that as a result of the kind of meeting we're trying to arrange, that
the various permanent members of the Council can bring to bear some
leverage and turn this process around before it's too late.
QUESTION: A follow up - you mentioned a strongly worded cable to Pakistan
- was one not sent to New Delhi?
MR. RUBIN: It's my understanding there was one to both.
QUESTION: At this meeting of the Permanent Five, can you give us any
insight into what possible items might be on the agenda - the way in which,
at least the United States is thinking - is there any thought given to a
mediation effort between Pakistan and India?
MR. RUBIN: We've had a longstanding position that we would be prepared to
be helpful if the parties saw that as wise and wanted us to do that, and
that is our view.
I think the important point is that it's a meeting that hasn't yet taken
place. It's a meeting that is in the process of being arranged, and
although I do like to be able to give you real-time information as much as
I can, I'd hope you wouldn't expect us to be in a position a week in
advance of a meeting to tell you exactly what we're going to do at that
meeting before we've even had it and discussed it with the countries.
Nevertheless, the basic goal is, as I've said, to try to see how we can
encourage the parties to take steps to reduce the possibility of escalation;
to reduce the possibility of conflict in Kashmir; and to deal with the
underlying dispute in Kashmir; and to promote a bilateral dialogue between
them. Hopefully, with the major powers in the world having taken on this
issue in this way, we will be in a position to urge them successfully to do
more to see that their underlying dispute does not cause the kind of
horrifying conflict that is now imaginable.
QUESTION: Jamie, yesterday Deputy Secretary Talbott said there were a
series of meetings to figure out what exactly to do. Apart from the
proposed P-5 meeting and the decision on the ambassadors and the strong
telegram, is any other concrete action --
MR. RUBIN: Yes, there are concrete actions that we are considering.
QUESTION: What are they?
MR. RUBIN: Those are concrete actions that, when we're prepared to
discuss publicly, we will. I just told you three things that were
happening. I know your appetite is large, but I'm doing the best I can,
Jim.
QUESTION: For example, let me ask a specific thing that has been proposed
by some experts around town. Has the United States followed through to set
up a hotline between India and Pakistan, for example?
MR. RUBIN: We're well aware of the value of better communication to avoid
the risk of unintended conflict. But at this point, we're a day into this
process, and we are pursuing what we think are the best initial steps and
talking publicly about what we think are the best initial steps. They are
to get the permanent members of the Security Council together to try to
bring to bear their leverage for the agenda that I laid out.
Obviously, the concern about unintended escalation, as the countries
increase their military capabilities, is one of the problems. If we have
anything further to say on tools to do that, we will do so.
QUESTION: Beyond the cable you mentioned, are there any other direct
discussions between the US Government and either India or Pakistan going on
now or planned for the weekend to discuss in any way the terms of a stand-
down from the current situation -- any other contacts?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any particular steps that are being
considered at this point, other than returning Ambassador Celeste, which I
think is an important step, and making clear through our embassy our views.
The President had, as you know, five separate phone calls with Prime
Minister Sharif over the recent weeks. If there are additional telephone
contacts that we have and choose to report, I'll be happy to do that for
you.
We are aware that a delegation from Pakistan is expected here today. We
expect them to have meetings in the coming weeks with senior American
officials as well as members of Congress. That delegation, however, is led
by the chairman of their foreign relations committee, but it would be a
channel for some discussion. Any additional communication that we have, we
will report as appropriate.
QUESTION: Are they coming here today or New York today?
MR. RUBIN: I believe they're arriving in the United States today. I don't
think there are any meetings scheduled here in the Department today. I
think the meetings would begin next week.
QUESTION: You said, just in answer to Jim's question a few minutes ago,
that we're a day into this process. But India tested over two-and-a-half
weeks ago. Was any thought given to convening the Permanent Five after the
Indian test, to possibly head off Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: You mean you're asking me, did we consider an idea that we
didn't implement?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: We consider a lot of ideas.
QUESTION: No, I'm asking, why did you wait - (inaudible) --
MR. RUBIN: Right. The implication in your question is that the outside
world was capable of stopping Pakistan from testing; and I think we've
spoken to this quite clearly. We believe that the immense political
pressure that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was under and the regional
dynamic that was created by India's test and events that preceded that made
it excruciatingly difficult for the Pakistani Prime Minister to do anything
but what he did.
The President of the United States spoke to him five times in a series of
lengthy phone calls; and we believe that we did what we can. And we hope
that as the American people and those who comment on American foreign
policy examine this issue, they bear in mind the fact that the United
States is not in a position to control every event that occurs in the
world. There will be bad things that happen in this world that we have not
been able to stop, regardless of what we do. We have considered a lot of
steps. As you know, Deputy Secretary Talbott went to see the Pakistanis.
A number of ideas were put forward between the United States and Pakistan
through the President's phone calls with the Prime Minister. But at the end
of the day, it was the political pressures and the regional dynamic that
were too overwhelming.
Now, that event having occurred, it seems appropriate for us to try a
different way to bring to bear pressure on both parties, not just on one --
which is obviously what the time now is ripe for. That is why we've decided
to pursue this particular meeting as a first step in the process.
QUESTION: Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: Everyone finished with India-Pakistan?
QUESTION: No. The Japanese Government is afraid - they believe that the
North Koreans have supplied Pakistan with up to 12 of the Rodong II
missiles. And they are afraid that this, perhaps, is going to lead to
Pakistan sharing some nuclear technology or weapons technology with the
North Koreans. What is the United States' concern on that?
MR. RUBIN: Like Japan, we are concerned about the possibility that
nuclear technology could be shared with any country in the world. We have
sanctioned companies with regard to sales between North Korea and Pakistan;
we're well aware of that. But we are not aware of any plan on the part of
Pakistan to share their nuclear technology with North Korea.
Moreover, North Korea is under a very elaborate agreement, pursuant to the
1994 Nuclear Framework Agreement, that froze their nuclear weapons program
and that we believe is being honored by North Korea. Is there always an
inherent risk that nuclear weapons capabilities can be sold? Absolutely;
that's one of the reasons we thought it was so important to stop North
Korea's program. It's one of the reasons we're trying to prevent Pakistan's
and India's program from growing. It's one of the reasons we've spent
enormous sums of money and political and diplomatic leverage on trying to
prevent material that may have existed in the former Soviet Union to
become available for sale. But do we have any specific information
about a specific sale? No.
QUESTION: Jamie, you mentioned the Chinese improved behavior. There's a
new report out today that a large shipment of special quality steel,
stainless steel, went from China to Iran, similar to the shipment of 22
tons that was stopped from Russia recently. Do you know if that's
true?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen any such report.
QUESTION: Can you check into it?
MR. RUBIN: Right, I will certainly check into a report; but I would bear
in mind that we don't always comment on every report. But we'll check into
it.
QUESTION: Are we ready now?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Mr. Surroi, a member of the negotiating team of President -
what's his name --
MR. RUBIN: Rugova.
QUESTION: -- Rugova's team said today --
MR. RUBIN: You took all that time to prepare?
QUESTION: Well, sometimes it slips.
MR. RUBIN: Now you know what it's like up here.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: He said today over at the National Press Club that the level of
violence in Kosovo risks all-out war. In fact, he said that it was
extremely dangerous now, they were at the first stage of war; and that
situation made it so that further negotiation with the Serbs may not be
possible. He said that first they had to stop the violence to keep these
avenues of negotiation open. He also said that NATO was welcome to come
into Kosovo, but he didn't think it would be much use on the borders with
Albania or Macedonia. What, can you tell us, is the State Department's
impression of the Rugova visit insofar as the substance is concerned?
MR. RUBIN: I spoke to Ambassador Gelbard an hour or so ago, and he said
the meeting with the President went extremely well. Dr. Rugova met with the
Deputy Secretary; he met with Ambassador Gelbard; he is expected to meet
with the Secretary tomorrow morning. It's clear to us that this visit has
gone extremely well.
Does that mean that the situation in Kosovo is going well? On the contrary.
The situation in Kosovo is a matter of deep concern to the United States,
and there's been recent increases in the violence there. The United States
and its NATO partners have made significant investment in the stability of
Southeastern Europe. We believe that both Albania and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia are vulnerable to spillover of this conflict.
That is why the NATO ministers took a series of measures designed
to shore up the stability of the states on the periphery of the former
Republic of Yugoslavia, including a ship visit to Albania in July; a
decision to conduct an early Partnership for Peace exercise with Albania; a
decision to upgrade a planned exercise in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia; the study of the possible future use of a training center there
for training of the Partnership for Peace; and announcement of an enhanced
set of activities with the Partnership for Peace - both with the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania.
NATO is considering other measures designed to contribute to the stability
of neighboring states, including study of possible preventive deployments
in FYROM and Albania, as well as study of possible NATO support to the OSCE
mission in Albania. NATO will continue to monitor the situation in Kosovo
closely, and be prepared to take additional measures if that becomes
necessary.
What I can say to you is that our view is that the best way that the
problems of Kosovo can be resolved is through a process of open and
unconditional dialogue. This is a problem that is best solved at the
negotiating table. The more the battlefield grows, the harder it will be
for the progress at the negotiating table to proceed.
We have made that point very clear to President Milosevic that the
unjustified extreme use of violence against Kosovar Albanians only makes it
harder to negotiate a solution to this because it radicalizes the Kosovar
Albanian population and undercuts the interlocutor we are trying - who may
be in a position to avoid this conflict from spinning out of control.
With regard to the view that -- it's often a view that unless the outside
world intervenes directly, militarily, that nothing can happen. We haven't
found that to be the case around the world; but we have made clear we're
not ruling options out.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - not ruling the option of direct intervention?
MR. RUBIN: We are not ruling any options out. We have made that quite
clear; that is something I've said before. At the same time, one hopes that
the parties involved understand the seriousness of the measures that we've
now taken to consider deployments along the border to deal with potential
spillover. That is a first and important step.
QUESTION: Just to follow, briefly, the President was reported to have
said today that the United States would not permit this to become another
Bosnia. Is that correct?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I wouldn't be in a position to quote the President from
a private meeting. Maybe Mr. McCurry can offer you more information on
that. But certainly, Secretary Albright has made clear that we've learned
lessons about dealing with the situation in Bosnia - namely, the lesson of
firm pressure on President Milosevic is the one lesson that is clear from
the Bosnia episode that we will try to convince our allies and friends not
to forget.
QUESTION: Jamie, have you heard any reports of fighting today in or
around Kosovo or the border? And as a corollary to that, do you have any
comment on how concerned the Department is about elections in Montenegro
this weekend?
MR. RUBIN: Well, with respect to Kosovo, yes, the fighting continues. We
are very concerned about the tactics being pursued by the Serbian
authorities there. The situation is increasing in danger. That is why we
believe that President Milosevic has to understand that the more violent
the tactics that his security forces use, the less likely it will be that a
peaceful solution can be found.
Often leaders imagine that what they can do on the battlefield will
increase their leverage at the negotiating table. That's often considered
one of the primary rules of international diplomacy. In this case, the
opposite is true. The more extreme the measures taken on the battlefield,
the weaker Dr. Rugova will be in trying to negotiate; the stronger the
extremists will be - the UCK in Kosovo. Unfortunately President Milosevic
seems to be acting like the membership chairman of the UCK. With every step
he takes, he increases support for the extremist forces he's trying to
combat. If that isn't shooting oneself in the foot, I don't know what
is.
With respect to the question of Montenegro, we do have deep concerns that
we have expressed to the Serbian authorities that the United States is
going to watch very closely what happens in Montenegro with the elections
scheduled for Sunday. We are very concerned by the recent steps to dismiss
Prime Minister Kontic, and there are OSCE observers on the ground. The
elections must be free, fair and in keeping with democratic standards, and
any attempt to intimidate the Montenegrin parties will be remembered.
We are hopeful that this election will be free and fair. And the more that
President Milosevic uses the tactics of intimidation both in Montenegro and
elsewhere, the less likely it is that the international community will ever
come to a point where it seeks to reintegrate Serbia into the community of
nations.
QUESTION: Is the Secretary still planning to attend the OAS meeting in
Caracas on Monday?
MR. RUBIN: As far as I know, yes.
QUESTION: Same general area -- Colombia has an election on Sunday. I
would imagine that is an issue of more than passing interest to this
government. Do you have anything on that?
MR. RUBIN: Other than that we hope the election is free and fair, and
that the electoral process yield a result that is deemed free and fair,
we're not going to make any comment other than, obviously, our desire to
continue to work with Colombia to fight drug trafficking.
QUESTION: Mr. Chubays is here today --
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: -- apparently seeing Mr. Eizenstat and others. I wonder if you
could talk about it at all and just say whether the United States believes
that Russia needs another financial and economic support package, and if it
asks for it, what would the response be?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that in his meeting with the Administration,
Mr. Chubays did not ask for such an additional package. I believe the IMF
officials did release a statement welcoming the Russian Government's
announcement yesterday of new measures to bring the fiscal situation under
control -- that is, to have strong economic decisions that were made there,
and that they will recommend the disbursing of the additional $670 million
of quarterly tranche of Russia's existing loan.
We were encouraged by the developments we saw yesterday. We're going to
closely monitor the situation. Obviously, the United States, since the
beginning of the Clinton Administration and before, has been, overall,
extremely supportive of reform in Russia - economic reform, in particular.
We continue to want to help. But the key point is: What is Russia capable
and willing to do? We saw some encouraging signs yesterday.
But with respect to any further facility that I read reports about, all I
can say is that it wasn't raised; and if it were raised, we'd obviously
take a look at it.
QUESTION: Another Russia question - have you had any communications or
any sense that the Duma is going to act any time soon on START II?
MR. RUBIN: There are a lot of conflicting reports from Russia as to what
the Duma's intentions are and what the prospects for passing the START II
ratification instrument. In our view, the key point is for the Russian Duma
to understand that Russia benefits from passage of START II, and Russia
loses from failure to pass START II, because the United States is in a
better position in the absence of START II.
Many of the key Russian officials recognize this. And we certainly hope
that Russian Duma members put their interest in Russia over their interest
in somehow getting back at any political opponent. At the same time, I can
say that President Clinton and Secretary Albright have been assured with a
fair degree of vigor that the government in Moscow wants to see START II
ratified. But when it will be ratified, just the way sometimes other
countries take a look at our legislative body and are puzzled by its timing,
we wish that the Duma would act faster in the interest of Russia and in the
interest of the United States. And in this regard, I think it's important
to understand that the United States and Russia - the governments - have
been engaged in recent years in a dramatic process of reducing the nuclear
arsenals of Russia and the United States.
As part of the disarmament process, we've seen massive reductions in the
numbers of nuclear weapon delivery systems and the number of deployed
nuclear weapons, which is part and parcel of the message we've been sending
to the rest of the world that having nuclear weapons is not the ticket to
great power capabilities. There are great powers in the world, like Germany
and Japan, that do not have nuclear weapons, and the nuclear powers are
reducing their nuclear systems.
So the sooner that the Duma gets START II ratified, the sooner we can get
on with movement to reduce further our systems under START III, the sooner
we can meet the desires of the non-nuclear weapons states that the nuclear
weapons states keep the "disarmament train" moving, and hopefully that will
deter others from going nuclear. In other words, by failing to ratify START
II, the Duma is not doing any favor to the cause of non-proliferation.
QUESTION: Can I ask a question about Nigeria? There was a report today
that this meeting - this visit to - the delegation headed by Ambassador
Pickering is a change in policy - a change in direction of American policy
toward Nigeria. Would you comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: We remain deeply concerned about the situation in Nigeria.
Tensions are rising and the transition process is flawed and failing. We do
not see how the current process will lead to a democratically-elected
civilian government. We think it is important that we do our utmost to
reduce the risk of heightened insecurity in Nigeria, which is the most
populous country in Africa.
The delegation's visit does not signify a shift in our policy, but rather
an intensification of our efforts to share our concern about the situation
in Nigeria, and to urge swift movement toward a credible process leading to
democratic civilian government. It is not a negotiating session or a
bargaining session, but an open discussion of concern between our two
nations. Obviously we don't want to prejudge the outcome of this mission,
other than to say that we hope that we can and should make all efforts
to prevent further deterioration in Nigeria and that's why we're
sending this delegation.
QUESTION: Is this the first high-level contact with the Nigerians in some
time? It seems to me that a couple of years ago, Don McHenry was a special
envoy.
MR. RUBIN: That's correct. We will get you a list of the last contact
with Nigeria after the briefing.
QUESTION: Do you know if we have an ambassador there?
MR. RUBIN: I will get you the current location of our Ambassador in
Nigeria.
QUESTION: On that subject - isn't Reverend Jesse Jackson a special
ambassador or emissary on Africa?
MR. RUBIN: The answer to that question is that I believe that Ambassador -
our former Ambassador in Haiti is being considered for - Swing - is in the
Senate nominating process. I don't know how far along he is. I believe he
either has or will shortly be going there as President Clinton's envoy to
Nigeria.
Was that your question?
QUESTION: Well it was going to be - and why isn't Reverend Jackson part
of the Pickering delegation?
MR. RUBIN: I don't understand the question. He's not the Assistant
Secretary for Africa, and she is part of the delegation.
QUESTION: I understand.
MR. RUBIN: He is a special envoy who pursues missions as we all think
best. But it certainly shouldn't be thought of as strange that he's not on
every trip that the Administration takes to Africa.
QUESTION: I didn't use the word "strange."
MR. RUBIN: But it shouldn't be even noteworthy.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:00 P.M.)
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