U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #63, 98-05-21
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1067
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, May 21, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 Secretary Signs Dolphin Protection Agreement
1 Sierra Leone
1 Hostilities Between Abkhaz and Georgian Partisans
SERBIA-MONTENEGRO
1-2 PM Kontic's Govt Dismissed / Influence on May 31 Elections
/ Contradiction of Agreement Between Pres Djukanovic and
Bulatovic
INDONESIA
2,4-5 Pres Soeharto's Resignation & Legacy
2-9 Reforms / Transition Process / Elections / US Principles
3,8-9 International Financial Loans & Economic Recovery
4-7 Secretary's Remarks Accelerated Resignation / US Contacts
9 Travel for AmCits / Evacuations
COLOMBIA
9-11 Intelligence Brigade Disbanded / US Visas Revoked for
Military Officers FARC Ltr to US re Kidnapped AmCits &
Drug Trafficking / Plans to Involve UN in Peace Process
MEXICO
11 Rpt on Money Laundering Sting Operation Casablanca
SYRIA
11 FM Sharaa in Washington Tomorrow / Mtg with Secretary /
Issues for Discussions
LEBANON
11-12 Upcoming Elections
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
12-13 Update on Talks / Readout of PM Netanyahu-Secy Gen Annan
Mtg
CHINA
13-15 Launches of US Satellites / Safeguards System / House Vote
on US Transfers of High Technology / Waiver of Loral Deal
with Campaign Donation
TERRORISM
15 Al Khobar Bombing Investigation Continues
15 Argentina Reduces Iranian Staff at Buenos Aires Emb / US
Cooperation in Bombing Investigation
15 Hezbollah Base in City on Argentine-Paraguayan Border
TURKEY
15-16 Secretary's Mtg with FM Cem in London
PAKISTAN
16 Update on Contacts re Nuclear Test / Delegation Visit to US
/ Discussions With Chinese
INDIA
16 Test of New Rocket
IRAQ
17 Oil-for-Food Update / Allegations of Violations of MOU
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #63
THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings, welcome to the State Department briefing. As you
know, Secretary Albright will be signing the Multilateral Dolphin
Protection Agreement shortly. We'll have a statement on that
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I thought it was moved.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Well then, Secretary Albright just signed the Multilateral -
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: -- Dolphin Protection Agreement and we'll have a statement on
that available after the briefing for the agreement she just signed.
We will also have a statement on Sierra Leone and let me just say with
regard to the increased hostilities in Abkhazia, Georgia, the United States
deplores in the strongest possible terms the increased hostilities between
the Abkhaz and Georgian partisans that occurred May 20 in the lower Gali
region of Abkhazia, Georgia. Both Georgians and Abkhaz were killed and
wounded during the fighting, and the United States has repeatedly expressed
its concern about the deteriorating security situation there.
This, unfortunately, underlines the importance of an active role for the
CIS peace-keeping force and the need to get the UN monitoring mission there
re-involved in the area. The United States stresses the need for the
Security Council to act quickly in providing the security protection that
the UN needs to fulfill its mandate and we call on all parties to abstain
from violence and work with the peace keepers there.
With regard to other subjects, I await your questions.
QUESTION: Before we take a short detour to Indonesia, let me ask you,
please, about the Balkans - about Yugoslavia, about Milosevic appointing a
new federal authority, and the Ambassador Miles gave a note to the
reformist president of Montenegro. Do you approve of what Milosevic has
done and, if you can't get into the note itself, can you tell us what US
messages to this president who was being extolled here just a few weeks ago
is the sign of democracy taking hold?
MR. RUBIN: We remain deeply concerned by the recent dismissal of FRY
Prime Minister Kontic. Such actions are of dubious legality and are clearly
political steps intended to influence the May 31 parliamentary elections in
Montenegro. Such blatant political maneuvering by the political leadership
in Belgrade, by Mr. Milosevic, to maintain power diminishes public
confidence in democratic processes and institutions, and threatens
instability not only in Montenegro, but also in the rest of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
The move also appears to contradict an agreement reached in January between
Montenegrin President Djukanovic and Bulatovic, which ended violence in
Montenegro. We have made it clear to Belgrade that its handling of
Montenegro will effect its relations with the international community. We
are watching developments there very carefully. OSCE observers will monitor
election conditions in voting on May 31. Regardless of the political
maneuvering at the federal level, the elections must be free, fair and in
keeping with democratic standards, and the results must be strictly
respected by all.
In short, we believe that Mr. Djukanovic has shown some remarkable
flexibility and understanding for his people there. We continue to support
the efforts that he's made, and we regard this blatant political maneuvering
as only undermining international confidence in President Milosevic's
leadership.
QUESTION: So your position is clear. Can you tell us something about the
Belgrade response?
MR. RUBIN: I couldn't get into any discussion of any diplomatic
exchange.
QUESTION: Were you happy with the response?
MR. RUBIN: We're certainly not happy with what's going on there.
QUESTION: Can we do Indonesia?
MR. RUBIN: Sure.
QUESTION: You've had 14 hours to digest this - there does not seem to be
a rush toward reform. Any observations?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We do welcome President Soeharto's decision, which
provides an opportunity to begin a process leading to a real democratic
transition, an opportunity for the Indonesian people to come together and
build a stable democracy for the future. We urge Indonesia's leaders to
move forward promptly with a peaceful process that enjoys broad public
support.
The United States stands ready to support Indonesia as it engages in
democratic reform. We were gratified by President Habibie's public
acknowledgment today of the urgent need for reform and his commitment to
carry out comprehensive political and economic reforms, as demanded by the
people of Indonesia. The indications are that the President will announce
his new Cabinet tomorrow. We look forward to seeing the composition of this
Cabinet as a key measure of the direction they're going. We hope the
Cabinet will include a strong economic team as a signal of the government's
intention to undertake needed economic reforms.
We note the defense minister has publicly stated the military support for
President Habibie. As we have repeatedly stressed throughout this crisis
both publicly and privately, we urge the Indonesian military and all other
parties to exercise the utmost restraint as Indonesia moves through this
transition period - a situation which remains volatile.
QUESTION: What can you say about IMF financial flows to Indonesia?
MR. RUBIN: Our objectives in Indonesia have been to promote financial
stability and economic growth, political reform and human rights. We want
to support the people of Indonesia to achieve these objectives.
With respect to the International Monetary Fund and other international
financial institutions, we will make a judgment about what seems most
likely to advance these objectives. We look forward to progress toward the
political and economic conditions that will permit an effective program of
support for Indonesia's economic recovery.
QUESTION: So you're unwilling to say how quickly the next tranche of
money might flow.
MR. RUBIN: Well, as a matter of simple practicality, you know that the
June 4 meeting had to be postponed because people left. There's a need to
re-assess the economic indicators in light of changes there. As far as what
our policy will be, as we consult with international financial institutions
on how we can best support Indonesia, our policy is the one I just stated.
We look forward to the government quickly creating conditions that will
support Indonesia's economic recovery.
That's why we hope that he will choose a Cabinet that includes a strong
economic team. The situation remains one where we need to have a government
to work with to make judgments about how to have progress toward the
political and economic conditions that would permit an effective program.
QUESTION: Are you satisfied with Habibie filling Soeharto's complete term,
or do you think there should be quick elections, early elections?
MR. RUBIN: What we believe is that this is a decision for the Indonesian
people. We want an Indonesian solution to what is obviously an Indonesian
political crisis. We do not have an American plan; we don't have an
American program for this. The timing and processes for a democratic
transition is a matter for the Indonesian people to decide.
What we are urging - and this is the key point - is that as this transition
unfolds, that the reform process is guided by three principles: first,
inclusiveness; second, dialogue with all elements of Indonesian society;
and third, democratic principles. We want this process to proceed as
quickly as possible. If elections are to be held, we obviously want them to
be free, fair and credible.
QUESTION: Jamie, could you say what - under their constitution, he does
not have to serve out the rest of the term. There is -- a constitutional
assembly, I believe, can be called and his term could be shortened. Do you
have any information on that?
MR. RUBIN: We are certainly familiar with the Indonesian constitution,
and we can give you some paperwork to describe what we know about it. What
we think is important here is that a serious reform include dialogue with
the people of all elements of Indonesian society so that they can come
together and join behind a political leadership that can bring the country
out of the political and economic chaos that has marked recent weeks and
months.
QUESTION: Were you surprised - was the US Government surprised by the
swiftness of the resignation?
MR. RUBIN: We had heard lots of conflicting accounts of what was likely
to take place. I'm not in the position to know what every analyst thought
and how every analyst expected this to unfold.
But let me say this - the Indonesian drama is going to unfold with many
acts; we've seen one act. We saw a situation where clearly we're better off
today than we were yesterday; the Indonesian people are better off today
than they were yesterday. But the success of this transition and determining
what the other acts in this play will look like will be determined by the
extent to which the reform process involves participation of representatives
from across the Indonesian political spectrum, and for that we will have to
wait and see.
QUESTION: Do you think that Secretary Albright's remarks yesterday may
have accelerated President Soeharto's resignation in any way?
MR. RUBIN: We have not been in contact with President Soeharto directly.
Ambassador Roy has been in contact with Indonesian Government officials and
other prominent Indonesians over the last two days. We were not directly in
contact with President Soeharto, nor did we request in any private channel
that he resign. We have not yet had an opportunity to be in touch with
President Habibie since the events of the last two days. But Ambassador Roy
has been in contact with senior officials, including the defense minister,
the armed forces chief and other senior military leaders, among other
things to continue to urge maximum restraint in dealing with peaceful
demonstrations.
Therefore, it's hard to get in the minds of the Indonesian leader -
President Soeharto - and answer the question that you asked. But the bottom
line is that President Soeharto's resignation was a response to the
Indonesian people's clearly expressed desire for change. The process and
timing of this democratic transition that is unfolding is a matter for the
Indonesian people to decide.
QUESTION: But you've had a chance to assess the fact that this has
happened in the aftermath of her remarks, and she had very specific things
to say to address to the Indonesian crisis.
MR. RUBIN: Right, I don't think it's useful for me to express our opinion
without knowing what the calculations were that went into his decision. And
as I indicated, what we do believe is that it was a response to the
Indonesian people's demand for change.
QUESTION: Can I try you, please, just for a second, on the two days of
not being in touch with him? Okay? I mean, you said in recent days the US
has not talked to him directly; you've talked to military folks, or the
Ambassador has. Is that unusual, considering the crisis in Indonesia - that
you would - pick your word - that you would steer clear or you would not
engage? Obviously, you know what we're all driving at. How much contact -
or were you freezing him - were you giving him a message that he's
finished?
MR. RUBIN: We were not freezing him out by not talking to him.
QUESTION: No, no, I'm not saying you were wrong to; I'm just asking.
MR. RUBIN: That's not my impression. My impression is that when a
leadership goes through that kind of crisis, that they're dealing primarily
with factors that do not relate to the views of the United States. They
relate to the process of the stepping down and the transition. I think,
through a variety of messages that they received from us over recent weeks
and months, they understood the basic outlines of what we thought was best
and what we were prepared to do to help.
Certainly, I would have expected that the kind of contact that Ambassador
Roy had with senior economic affairs officials, the environment minister
and other prominent Indonesians, as well as these contacts with the defense
ministers were raised with the President in some form or another. All I can
say to you is that Ambassador Roy is the judge of how to best communicate
American views during a crisis like this. Based on his judgment of
the situation on the ground, what I'm telling you is that there was
no direct contact in these recent few days. And it wasn't a signal -- a
code for some other message than the message that we delivered; and,
frankly, I'd assume you'd expect this - the same message we were delivering
publicly, we were delivering privately, essentially.
QUESTION: Well, the message you were delivering publicly was given to at
least two interpretations. One was that her words yesterday meant it would
be a good idea if he just stepped aside. Another impression was that you
were emphasizing the need for a transition to democracy, and not necessarily
ruling out he looking after or officiating over that transition. Even
though we're going back in time, it's only 24 hours --
MR. RUBIN: Rare that you all would want to go back to yesterday's events,
but let me say this --
QUESTION: Couldn't there have been a transition with him still in
power?
MR. RUBIN: That is what we call, in this business, a wildly hypothetical
scenario, since we're sitting here today and he's gone. It just doesn't
seem of any value to speculate about what might have happened if my aunt
had whiskers. If she did, she would be my uncle.
So what I can tell you is that Secretary Albright's remarks were designed
to make clear to the world - including the Indonesian people - that we
believed that President Soeharto had an opportunity for an act of
statesmanship, as she said, and that the basic point was to get on with the
democratic transition. That has happened, and we, as you know, welcomed
that. With regard to parsing any further her words, I'm not sure there's
any value in that.
QUESTION: I will let it go, but you know there will be post-mortems.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: And you know 34 years, this authoritarian figure has enjoyed
polite respect from a number of Administrations and, in fact, from this
Administration until not too recently. So I'm trying to get an impression -
here's your opportunity to say we tried to push him off the ledge. If you
think it's wildly hypo - it's only 12 hours since he said good-bye. If you
want to touch it, fine; if you don't, that's all right.
MR. RUBIN: What I'm saying is I think the words are pretty clear for
those of you who have followed events like this in the past, and the
importance of a public statement by a Secretary of State at such a time.
What I've said to you is, to the best of my knowledge, the Secretary's
intent was to tell the world that we think it's time to get on with the
democratic transition. That has happened, and we have welcomed that.
QUESTION: Exactly on that point, democratic transition has always been -
in the words of this Administration - elections, free and fair and credible
elections. You used a phrase before, "if elections are to be held" --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm sure there will be elections at some point. The
question, obviously, is when. What I'm signaling to you as best I can is
that we don't want to prescribe the timing and the details of how the
Indonesians will resolve what we still believe to be an ongoing process of
a democratic transition. Except to say that we believe it must include all
elements of Indonesian society.
I'm sure there will be elections, so I can certainly rephrase the phrase
and say when there are elections - I'm sure there will be elections in
Indonesia - and we believe they should be free and fair and credible. But
we are not going to get into a situation where we are at this moment
telling the Indonesia leadership or the people what the timing and precise
nature of any potential elections should be; other than to say that we want
the process to be as inclusive and based on dialogue and as democratic
as possible.
QUESTION: Well, there have been times in the past when the United States
has, in fact, been much more demonstrative about telling countries where to
go and when to have their elections. Cambodia was a good example. I just
wonder if that example and maybe some others might be making you sort of
think a little differently about being aggressive about pushing --
MR. RUBIN: I know you've heard this before, but I hope you really
internalize it at some point. There is no one solution to every country's
problems. There isn't a book that we take out here at the State Department
and we check box one, box two, box three, box four and then we just
implement it. If that were the case, you wouldn't need any policy-makers to
make any judgments to apply their understanding.
I was trying to get away from the cookie-cutter. I've got a book here,
right, a stamp book. But the point is, there isn't any one solution to
every problem in the world. One of the reasons why we have experts in each
of the countries is so they can apply and exercise their judgment as to
what they think would be best for a given situation.
What I am trying to say is what we think is best in this situation is to
let the Indonesians come up with an Indonesian solution to this political
transition.
QUESTION: Some people in the opposition yesterday and today were saying
that the problem is not Soeharto alone, it's the whole regime; and they
don't accept President Habibie as president. Do you believe that Soeharto
personally was the problem, and not the regime? And do you think this is a
recipe for more violence? Is there a concern that --
MR. RUBIN: We are always concerned about the possibility of violence. I
think we've made quite clear that we do not believe that this drama has
fully unfolded yet. We are urging maximum restraint on the part of the
military; and we're urging, in the political process, that to the maximum
extent possible there is dialogue with all elements of society, that the
transition is as inclusive as possible. But we are not going to make
judgments at this point, at this delicate juncture in this democratic
transition as to what precise remedy would best serve the interests of
the Indonesian people.
QUESTION: Jamie, just to go back to the Secretary's comments yesterday.
She talked about preserving President Soeharto's legacy. Different people
have different ideas of what his legacy is. What was she talking about?
MR. RUBIN: Right, well, I think that everyone agrees that Indonesia is a
more coherent, more effective player on the international stage than it was
before he took over. Regardless of whether you're a human rights supporter
or whether you're a businessman or whether you're a strategic analyst, in
all of those cases you would recognize that Indonesia is now one of the
largest countries in the world, is playing a much bigger role in the world.
Therefore, in a purely patriotic sense, Indonesians can take pride from the
increasing standing of their country in the world from the time he
started until the time he left.
Does that mean we are endorsing every one of Soeharto's practices? Of
course not; and our human rights reports make clear those that we do not
support. Nothing the Secretary said was designed to endorse every action
that President Soeharto took in his long period of time.
On the other hand, for those who understand a little bit about what it
takes for the kind of transition that is unfolding to occur, they
understand that appealing to a leader's historical role is often the way to
allow us to move on with a democratic transition; and certainly, Secretary
Albright was doing that.
QUESTION: Jamie, a lot of prominent Indonesians are now saying that the
future of the Habibie Government depends heavily on what the West decides
to do. You talked about and Indonesian solution for an Indonesian problem;
they question whether there is an Indonesian solution without the help of
the West. What is the United States prepared to do to help the Habibie
Government, if anything; and under what conditions?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think I answered the question of what, with respect to
economic reform and economic assistance, the conditions under which we're
prepared to assist the government in Indonesia. So I needn't repeat that
answer. I would if it would help you, but it would be the same answer
because it's the same policy.
With respect to your broadest question, I'm sure there are those who
believe that the United States is always in a position to dictate and
determine the outcome in every country in the world. We do not believe
that. We believe that it is extremely important for us to be selective in
how we conduct our foreign policy. In this case what we are saying is that
we want to watch closely what's going on, we want to see what emerges there,
and we have set up some principles that will guide us in talking about
this and guide us in our policy-making. Those principles, again, are
inclusiveness, dialogue and restraint by the military. That is what we are
looking for; and with respect to a specific program for political reform,
we are not going to recommend an American democratic transition plan.
QUESTION: Let me see if I'm understanding it correctly. Is what you're
saying that, in terms of concrete decisions, such as how the US will vote
on loans to Indonesia, the US has not seen enough yet, is waiting to see
whether or not there is more political reform before you are willing to
vote for any more loans for Indonesia?
MR. RUBIN: We will make a judgment about what is most likely to advance
our objectives when the time comes to make that judgment. What our
objectives are are both financial stability, economic growth, political
reform and human rights. We look forward to progress towards the political
and economic conditions that will permit an effective program of support
for Indonesia's economic recovery.
In other words, we're going to be watching; we're going to be judging;
we're going to be assessing how things unfold. Right now there isn't even a
Cabinet. And so prior to the naming of a Cabinet, and we've signaled what
we want to see from that Cabinet, it's hard to make an advance judgment
about what the right decision will be on any particular assistance
program.
QUESTION: Can I just ask you whether you agree or disagree with the
assertion that many prominent Indonesians are making - that there isn't
just an Indonesian solution; that Indonesia's problems, since they are
economic as well as political, simply won't be solved without US and other
help?
MR. RUBIN: We do agree that the IMF and the international community can
play a role and we want to support the people of Indonesia in their
efforts. I am not suggesting there is no role for the United States or the
West or the IMF or any other large institution. What I am suggesting is
that now is not the time for us to prescribe an American political reform
program; now is the time for us to urge that certain principles guide the
parties as they do so - namely the principles of inclusiveness and
dialogue in their economic reform. When the time comes for us to make
a judgment as to how to assist that government, we will do so based
on objective factors, as we always have.
QUESTION: Jamie, on your three principles, I can't help but notice that
they've evolved in the last ten minutes. The first time you came out, it
was inclusiveness, dialogue and democratic principles. The second time the
third one comes out restraint by the military; and the third time, economic
reform. There seems to be --
MR. RUBIN: I guess you've been listening very carefully, Jim. Let me
answer the question as follows. With respect to a particular reform process,
a transition process, there are three principles: inclusiveness, dialogue
and democracy. Okay. There are also principles that apply in this situation,
like maximum restraint by the military. But thanks for pointing that
out.
QUESTION: Jamie, -- (inaudible) - all the travel warnings and evacuation
plans still stay in effect, or is it safe now for --
MR. RUBIN: The situation is generally calm. We have no reports of
violence against Americans. But for the moment, we do not plan to change
our present posture, which urges Americans not to go there, and involves
the departure of non-essential personnel.
QUESTION: Jamie, Colombia has decided to disband it's 20th military
brigade. I'm wondering what the US official position is on that; and
whether the US Government has any evidence that that brigade was linked to
human rights violations; and whether you're concerned now that if these
people go elsewhere, they may be harder to track down.
MR. RUBIN: We commend the Colombian Government's initiative to restructure
and improve it's military both in terms of human rights and in overall
capabilities. We note that the decision to disband the 20th intelligence
brigade was taken in the context of an overall review of Colombian military
structure. We understand this review process is ongoing.
We have noted our human rights concerns with the 20th brigade in our annual
human rights report, and repeat our call on the Colombian Government to
investigate all reported abuses and prosecute those responsible to the
fullest extent of Colombian law.
At the same time, we note that Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries -
the instigator of Colombia's civil conflict - are responsible for the vast
majority of reported human rights abuses.
QUESTION: With respect to the revocation of visas of military officers -
US visas --
MR. RUBIN: We have some old guidance on that that I can provide to you
after the briefing.
QUESTION: This is in reference to an article this morning in The
Washington Post, where former Ambassador Aronson implies or suggests that
the FARC and ELM have sent letters in the last couple of weeks to the US
Government, and they are in a position to negotiate or support a negotiation
for peace in Colombia. Is that something that you can give us some
information about?
MR. RUBIN: Over the past year, we had several feelers, through third
parties, from people purporting to represent the guerrillas. We have used
these third party contacts to consistently convey our demand that we have
satisfactory resolution of the kidnap cases of US citizens held by those
guerrillas.
The US strongly condemns the guerrillas continued practice of kidnapping
innocent civilians and demanding ransom. There are currently five American
citizens held by Colombian guerrillas - four by the FARC, including the
three missionaries missing since 1993. Through the third party intermediaries,
the guerrillas have made assertions that they are not involved in drug
trafficking, or that they are prepared to disengage from trafficking. We
have not seen any evidence of this to date. However, this is an issue
for the guerrillas to discuss with the Colombian Government.
The United States stands ready to do whatever it can to encourage and
support peace talks. However, peace is ultimately a matter for Colombians
to negotiate. We urge the guerrillas to engage with the Colombian
Government in a meaningful peace process. This will be a primary objective
of the new Colombian Government, which will take office in August.
QUESTION: Follow up on that - the US Government will do whatever it takes
- will that involve military?
MR. RUBIN: No, it would not. What we're talking about is trying to
facilitate a peace process. I fail to see how one could even imagine I was
talking about the military.
QUESTION: It has been suggested by some that one of the ways you could do
this is through the United Nations, through some process similar to what
was done in El Salvador. Are there any concrete plans -- even if they're on
a shelf or in a drawer somewhere - regarding Colombia and a peace process
there, and what the US role would be in that kind of plan?
MR. RUBIN: We plan for a lot, but we don't always think it's helpful to
talk about it publicly.
QUESTION: Can we stay on the same continent?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Let's stay on the continent.
QUESTION: Okay. The Mexican congress has just condemned in very strong
terms the Operation Casablanca. They say it is on information of the United
States Government and national security of Mexico. I was just wondering if
you have any comment on that? And also, the say this could effect the
bilateral relations of the United States and Mexico.
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen the report or the specific statements, so I
can't react to it.
QUESTION: On the reported visit of Sharaa, the Syrian Foreign Minister,
is this going to take place tomorrow? And is this just a drop-by or is the
United States, perhaps, looking to try to revive the negotiations with the
Syrians now?
MR. RUBIN: Foreign Minister Sharaa is passing through the US while
returning to Syria from travel elsewhere. It provides us an opportunity --
and the meeting is tomorrow, is my understanding - on Friday - that is
tomorrow. Foreign Minister Sharaa will be meeting with the Secretary and
several other US officials. It provides us another opportunity to discuss a
range of bilateral and peace process issues, including, obviously, our
desire to find a way to put the Israeli-Syrian peace track back on
track.
We intend to talk about the peace process issues, including the need for a
comprehensive peace in the region, and our policy, we would expect, would
come up with respect to Lebanon. Our policy with regard to Resolution 425
is clear: we voted for it; we support its implementation; and we believe we
should make progress wherever we can in the peace process, bearing in mind,
of course, our support for the territorial unity and sovereignty of Lebanon
and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
QUESTION: Jamie, on that topic, do you expect the subject to bear
influence over the elections in Lebanon to come up? And also, their support
for international terrorism?
MR. RUBIN: I would expect that the full range of bilateral issues will
come up; it usually does. With respect to Lebanon's first municipal
elections in 35 years, we welcome these elections. The United States and
Lebanon share democratic traditions, and we have long urged the Lebanese to
uphold democracy and support their own constitutional processes.
We anticipate that these elections will be free and fair, and we urge the
participation of all Lebanese in these elections. It's an opportunity for
all Lebanese to make their voices heard in this first opportunity for two
generations of Lebanese to determine their local leadership.
QUESTION: Do you have any observations on the House inquiry into high-
tech sales to China?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, let's stay on the Middle East and then we'll --
QUESTION: Can you bring us up to date on the Israeli-Palestinian track,
what the Secretary has been doing?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, the telephone is working, and telephone contacts
continue. I don't have any specific contacts to report to you; other than
to say that we continue to see whether we can find a way to bridge the
remaining gaps. The gaps still exist. We are not in a position to report a
breakthrough. If we are unable to close the gaps and get agreement to the
American ideas soon, we will have to make that clear, explain the reasons
for it; and that day is not far off.
But as far as the details of those discussions, we do not think it would be
wise to get into any of the details publicly.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: No, the phones work on all floors of the State Department.
QUESTION: Jamie, there were a couple of reports out of Israel today that
said that day is about a week off. Can you address that?
MR. RUBIN: I find it not very constructive to get into a response every
time the Israeli media ejaculates some new alleged fact. I'm just not going
to do it.
QUESTION: The Israeli - (inaudible) - the include American officials
saying that --
MR. RUBIN: Then answer to the question is the same as the last answer.
QUESTION: They believe that Mr. Netanyahu is going to be more forthcoming
on 425 on South Lebanon than on the Palestinian track.
MR. RUBIN: Right, again, we're working on all fronts. The question was
about the Palestinian-Israeli track; we continue to work on that. With
respect to 425, would you like me to repeat what I said before -- so what's
the question?
QUESTION: The question is, he met with Mr. Annan last week, and I'm sure
you've been briefed by the United Nations.
MR. RUBIN: Right, and if there's a briefing about - if you want me to
comment on a meeting between two other leaders - okay.
QUESTION: My question is, according to - based on this report that you
got, do you think that Netanyahu is serious now and this is a serious
proposal on the table?
MR. RUBIN: We're working on the problem.
QUESTION: Any comment on the House inquiry into high-technology sales to
China?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the first point I'd make on this - and I hope those of
you who are in the communications business, like journalists, understand
what this is all about.
If you look at what happened yesterday when a satellite went down and
people's pagers and communicators were not functioning, people will begin
to understand why we believe that allowing the United States to pursue its
competitive advantage in communications is part of the reason why we think
it's important for the Chinese to launch American satellites.
We do not have the capability to launch American satellites as cheaply as
China does, and we have a system of safeguards in place that has allowed
three Administrations to conduct this process by which American technology
is protected, but America's satellites are launched into orbit, and
America's competitive advantage - part of the reason that we are a global
superpower is because of our communications advantage over other countries.
And as everyone saw so graphically yesterday, the absence of sufficient
satellite capacity and the absence of back up satellites and the inability
to have enough satellites in space can have a direct and material effect on
not only the lives of Americans, but our competitive advantage in this
area.
With respect to the decisions yesterday to cut off or assert the right to
cut off such cooperation with the Chinese in this area - I'm sorry, I was
sort of off on my satellite in space and had to come back down - (laughter)
-- we were extremely disappointed by this vote in the House of Representatives.
If passed in the Senate, this legislation will threaten American leadership
in the commercial satellite business, and therefore threaten an area
where America has a competitive advantage.
Moreover, it is based on incorrect information. No controlled information
relative to ballistic missiles or warhead delivery technology has been
authorized to be made available to Chinese authorities. The whole
underlying suggestion that somehow we want to transfer technology to the
Chinese as a result of I don't know what, is simply fatuous. And the more
rational analysis, which I hope would come from the kind of people who've
been covering this issue for some time, would certainly help bring to the
American people an understanding that this process does not transfer
technology by design. There was a case and, demonstrating the effectiveness
of our safeguards, there is now an investigation going on. So we are not
willfully transferring technology. On the contrary, we are willfully
improving the lives and competitive advantage of the United States while
protecting our technology that people are concerned about.
QUESTION: But at the same time, you use the satellite system going down
yesterday and many Americans found that to be a graphic example of the need
for these kinds of deals. At the same time, many Americans would find it
very curious that the President waived the Loral deal with China in light
of the fact that its chief executive officer donated a lot of money to the
Democratic Party. Some might find that a little more than a coincidence.
How would you respond to that?
MR. RUBIN: The answer to the question is that we have been pursuing the
same policy under Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton. And if you want to
invent a linkage for which there is no evidence, I can't really answer your
question.
QUESTION: I don't think I'm inventing anything, I'm just giving you the
facts of what is out there.
MR. RUBIN: No, you're inventing a linkage that there is simply no
evidence for.
QUESTION: So you don't think Americans shouldn't find this at all
something to take pause at?
MR. RUBIN: Americans should find things curious, especially when people
are misleading them by amalgamating a whole serious of issues about
campaign finance; about the Commerce-State issue on who controls the
munitions list; on the question of willful desire to transfer technology,
when in fact the same policy occurred under Presidents Reagan, Bush and
Clinton. It's that simple.
QUESTION: Was there a contact between the Secretary and the Turkish
Foreign Minister on Sunday while she was in London?
QUESTION: I have just one more - is there any concern that the safeguards
that you think are in place, especially for dual-use technology that
satellites could be, that they are as foolproof? Because one of the things
that Loral admitted to doing is that it actually sent the report to the
Chinese before it had anyone in the Administration look at it. That was a
mistake that Loral admitted to. So are you as confident that the safeguards
in place for dual-use technology are foolproof?
MR. RUBIN: Let me distinguish - nothing in life is foolproof, okay? So
the suggestion that something in life can be foolproof is an absurdity.
What we do in government is we weigh risks. And there's a risk if we don't
allow satellites that American companies service the American people as
well as provide us a competitive advantage. If they can't get off into
space, we are worse off. There is a risk in not letting them do that. You
nod your head, but that's an incredibly important factor.
Meanwhile, there is another risk - a risk that unauthorized technology
might leak through the safeguards system. What we're trying to communicate
to all of you is that for three Administrations in a row, we have been
weighing the costs and benefits of those risks and pursuing the exact same
policy for three Administrations. There is no new element to this
policy.
What I am suggesting to you is the fact that we are now investigating what
might have happened in one case demonstrates how effective the safeguard
system is; because the moment you think something might have happened, you
have laws that prohibit it and there are investigations. That's what
safeguards are about. Is there a foolproof system to prevent anything from
happening, anything in the world? There is no such thing as foolproof in
the real world - only when people are writing articles and passing
legislation.
QUESTION: Might not be surprised if I bring up the subject of Iran. The
Argentine Government has got the goods on the Iranians in the bombing at
the Jewish center and the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. They say that
the orders were given in Tehran. Have you any take on that, any reaction to
that? How does that reflect on the Israeli-Palestinian matter and the
Khobar Towers bombing? Is there a parallel?
MR. RUBIN: With regard to the Khobar Towers bombing, it's under
investigation and it will continue to be investigated. When we have more to
say about it, we will. With respect to the Argentina situation, we
understand that Argentine Foreign Minister Di Tella announced on Friday
that they would be reducing the Iranian diplomatic representation in Buenos
Aires to the charge only. We also understand that a number of Iranians have
been held for questioning recently in connection with the 1994 bombing.
The FBI has been assisting Argentina in investigating the 1994 bombing and
the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Those investigations
are continuing. FBI Director Freeh was in Buenos Aires last week to discuss
cooperation in fighting narco-trafficking and terrorism. With respect to
any US view of that investigation, I would refer you to the Justice
Department, but indicate that they are likely to also say that it would
be inappropriate to comment on an ongoing criminal investigation.
Having said that, the fact that Iran has played a role in the past in
international terrorism is something that we are well aware of, which is
part of the reason we worked with our European allies on urging greater
cooperation in this area and we will continue to do so.
QUESTION: Also, the report talks about a city on the Paraguayan-Argentine
border - it's called Ciudad del Este -- it has bases for Hezbollah. Do you
have information on that?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I would have to refer you to the FBI.
QUESTION: There was, according to some reports, there --
MR. RUBIN: If it's not the same question, I'll go there after.
QUESTION: Well it's the same - according to some reports, there was a
contact between Secretary Albright and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr.
Cem, in which the Secretary expressed her concern about some claims -
recent claims by Turkey in the Aegean. Can you confirm that contact?
MR. RUBIN: Discussing the content of a specific confidential meeting is
something I can't do. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has stated there was no
such discussion.
QUESTION: So there was no discussion or you cannot confirm --
MR. RUBIN: I'm pointing you to the Turkish Foreign Ministry statement
that there was no such discussion. As far as I'm saying, we can't talk
about what was specifically discussed in such a meeting.
QUESTION: My question is not for the specific agenda of the discussion; I
want to --
MR. RUBIN: The fact that there was a meeting between the Secretary and
Foreign Minister Cem is a fact, yes.
QUESTION: That was on Sunday in London?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: You have to ask me a question.
QUESTION: Is there continuing conversation with the Pakistanis or is it
sort of like they-haven't-tested-any-bombs-today-so-we-are-thankful kind of
a situation?
MR. RUBIN: We're thankful they haven't tested any bombs today; we
continue to work with the Pakistani Government and other governments to try
to discourage them from testing nuclear weapons. The dates of a visit to
Washington by a delegation headed by the chairman of their Foreign
Relations Committee has not been decided. We do understand they will seek
to meet with senior State Department officials, and we look forward to this
further opportunity for consultations with Pakistan about its security
concerns following India's nuclear test.
With regard to Pakistan's discussions with the Chinese, we have no details
on exactly what was discussed there. But I can say that the Secretary, as a
result of her telephone contact with the Chinese Foreign Minister and
letters that have been exchanged, believes that the Chinese share our
concerns about the situation in South Asia and have condemned India's test,
and would like to avoid a spiraling competition in nuclear arms on the
subcontinent.
QUESTION: The Indians did apparently do a test today of a new rocket. Do
you have anything to say about that?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information on that.
QUESTION: Iraq apparently rejected a US proposal for the renewing food-
for-oil diplomatically. Do you have anything on that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Any time Iraq rejects the provision of food and medicine
for its people, I hope that all of you will realize that it's another case
of Iraq using its people as a pawn, not caring a wit about the health and
ability of the people there to eat. The United States and the international
community are trying to provide more food and medicine for the Iraqi people,
and the Iraqi Government is denying their people that capability.
QUESTION: The Iraqis are saying that they rejected it because it violates
the Memorandum of Understanding that --
MR. RUBIN: The Iraqis always come up with an excuse for denying their
people food and medicine so that they can use their people as a pawn in
their attempt to try to get sanctions lifted without meeting the conditions
of the international community.
QUESTION: And do you have anything on a report from Baghdad - also by UN
officials --
MR. RUBIN: You didn't write that down, I noticed. Is that not useful for
you?
QUESTION: I'll get if from Federal News.
MR. RUBIN: Oh, okay.
QUESTION: A UN official is saying that Iraqi children continue to suffer -
-
MR. RUBIN: And the reason they continue to suffer is because Saddam
Hussein has not permitted his government to import the food and medicine
that the international community is trying to provide for the Iraqi
people.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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