U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #53, 98-04-30

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From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Thursday, April 30, 1998

Briefer: James B. Foley

ANNOUNCEMENT
1		--Background Briefing on Release of Department's Patterns
		  of Global Terrorism
SERBIA
1,2-3		Assessment of the Contact Group Meeting in Rome
1,4-5		--Freeze on Funds Held Abroad by the FRY and Serbian
		  Governments
1,4		--Further Actions by May 9 Should Belgrade Remain in
		  Non-Compliance
1		--Condemnation of Violence in Kosovo
1		--International Involvement To Facilitate Talks
1-2		--Stabilization Package/OSCE Missions/Confidence Building
		  Measures
2-3		Russian President Yeltsin's Comments re: Kosovo and
		  Pressure on Serbia
3		Serbian Reaction to Contact Group Meeting
5-6		Economic Effect on FRY/Impact on Montenegro
6		Security and Stability of Surrounding States in Region
8		Evans and Novak Column re: Options
RUSSIA
6		Prime Minister Kiriyenko Appointment of Economic Team
INDONESIA
6		Reports of Widespread Demonstrations
CHINA
7		Reported US-Provided Space Cooperation Agreement
CAMBODIA
7		UN Consideration of Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge
7		--China's Position on Establishment of Tribunal
7-8		--Venue for Tribunal
CUBA
8		Reported USIS-Cuban Institute of Film Presentation
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
8		Update on Process/Meetings in London
SUDAN
8		US Humanitarian Assistance

DPB #53

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 1998, 1:10 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements to make except

to remind you that we are going to have a background briefing this afternoon on the Patterns of Global Terrorism Report at 3:00 p.m. It will begin, certainly, after the President's press conference has completed, but tentatively scheduled for 3:00 p.m.

QUESTION: Do you have an assessment of the Contact Group meeting?

MR. FOLEY: Yes. The Contact Group meeting yesterday in Rome had a full day of discussions that went into the evening. We are satisfied with the results of that meeting; the Contact Group agreed to an immediate freeze on the funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian Governments and the contact group also agreed to take further actions by May 9th if Belgrade remains in non-compliance on the critical dialogue between the FRY and the Kosovar Albanians. I can go through some of the main points, if you wish, that the Contact Group agreed.

First, all members of the Contact Group are firmly opposed to the independence for Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable status quo. Second, the Contact Group condemned the increase in violence in recent days in Kosovo, in particular the excessive use of force by the FRY army. The Contact Group noted that the crucial requirements of the London and Bonn Contact Group meetings had not been met and, as I said, it therefore instituted a freeze on FRY and Serbian Government assets abroad.

I think, very importantly, the Contact Group agreed that appropriate international involvement was essential to establish confidence between the parties and to facilitate talks. The Contact Group recommended and urged Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanian leadership to adopt a framework for dialogue based on a number of principles that are necessary to make dialogue succeed; rejection of violence for achieving political goals; no preconditions and mutual respect. They also put forward a stabilization package that must include, as a minimum, first cessation of repression by the authorities in Belgrade, also a strong condemnation of terrorism by the Kosovo Albanian leadership; second, reopening of the OSCE missions in the FRY, including in Kosovo; and finally, concrete inter-communal confidence building measures, including implementation of the education agreement according to the agreed time table. The Contact Group reiterated that it attaches the highest priority to the immediate launching of the Gonzalez mission.

Finally, I'm sure you're aware, that the Contact Group noted that if the leadership in Belgrade agrees to the framework for dialogue; if Belgrade agrees, and indeed implements, the stabilization measures that I mentioned; if the Gonzalez mission is launched; and if substantive talks begin, that the Contact Group will promote "a clear and achievable path towards Belgrade's full integration into the international community, including participation in the OSCE."

So, as I said, we believe it was a constructive meeting and that the Contact Group was able to make concrete decisions that place the focus now principally on President Milosevic in Belgrade. He now has a clear pathway in two directions; one is to continue the repression, to refuse unconditional dialogue and to see the Serb economy, which is already in horrendous shape, get significantly worse and the international isolation of his country deepened, which obviously is a prospect which we hope he does not embrace because it certainly is against the interests of his people. But the Contact Group at the same time opened another perspective, which is one of eventual reintegration of Serbia and the FRY into the international community within the context of a dialogue, an unconditional dialogue, with Kosovar Albanians that will allow not only for the realization of the legitimate political aspirations of the Kosovar Albanians within the FRY but also, we would argue, would be of significant interest to Milosevic personally and to the people of the FRY, including the Serb people of the FRY, insofar as the stabilization of that situation can arrest the downward spiral and allow the Serbian people the prospect finally, almost ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to begin to enjoy the fruits of the democratic changes that have been sweeping Europe to the exclusion of parts of the former Yugoslavia over the last decade.

QUESTION: What would be Russian President Yeltsin's comments on Kosovo today?

MR. FOLEY: What did he say? No, I didn't.

QUESTION: Well, it was a call to resist pressure. There's not been international pressure on Serbia over Kosovo, and I was wondering if you had a reading on whether Russia was increasingly at variance with your position over Kosovo.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I think there has been a disagreement over tactics between Russia and other members of the Contact Group, notably the United States over the last month and a half since the crisis broke out. We saw Russia disassociate itself from some of the punitive measures decided, I believe in London on March 9th. So I would argue in the first instance that this is not new and we do have a difference of view. We believe that we went the extra mile in acknowledging that it was important to offer a positive perspective to the leadership in Belgrade; that if they take the steps that are necessary that the Contact Group, including Russia, has called upon Belgrade to take in the way of ending the repression and beginning a real dialogue -- that if they take those steps there is a perspective for improved relations and improved cooperation and integration in the international community.

So we accepted that thesis, but we believe that it is equally important that the leadership in Belgrade must understand that their situation will get worse if they don't take those necessary and important steps called for by the international community. So we have a difference of view there. I wouldn't exaggerate it because the fact of the matter is that the Russian Federation in the Contact Group meeting, Minister Ivanov, played an otherwise constructive role. I believe the atmospherics were good. Ambassador Gelbard felt that it was a good meeting, not only in terms of results but in terms of the spirit of cohesion that prevailed in that meeting. And I think what is most important is the fact that Russia did adhere to the basic prescriptions that the Contact Group endorsed. Russia only disassociated itself from the two punitive measures that were agreed by the other Contract Group members.

But insofar as we're talking about the framework for dialogue, the stabilization package, the call for unconditional dialogue, an end to the repression, the pullback of special police units, disengagement of the Yugoslav army from internal repression, we believe there was a unanimity of views in the Contact Group.

QUESTION: Have you seen the initial reaction from Belgrade?

MR. FOLEY: I have not.

QUESTION: Well, they describe the Contact Group's actions as criminal activity, apparently not auguring very well.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't think we would be surprised by their initial reaction, but Belgrade now has a number of days until May 9th to digest this meeting of the Contact Group. Inasmuch as Belgrade may have hoped that that meeting would have produced a result at the lowest common denominator; would have produced a result that did not entail punitive measures; would have produced a result that might have shown daylight between members of the Contact Group, I can understand that those hopes, not having been fulfilled, that there might be a reaction of disappointment, if not bitterness, that is reflected in the hyperbolic nature of those comments.

But the fact of the matter is because the meeting was successful, the focus is no longer on the Contact Group. The Contact Group has acted and the ball is solely in Mr. Milosevic's court, and we trust that on sober reflection he will consider that he has now two stark choices and it's up to him to choose. One choice leads to the unknown, to an unknown which is replete with negative possibilities for himself and for his people and for the region, and the other one is a very positive perspective. Milosevic has shown himself as someone who has, in the past, been part of the problems in the Balkans and also someone who is able to make himself part of solutions to problems in the Balkans. So we think that, as I said, on sober reflection he will have an opportunity to see that, indeed, there are opportunities for him and his people in following the advice of the international community.

QUESTION: The Contact Group accord that you mentioned, you mentioned four very specific "if's", if this happens. Was there any specific provision if none of these happens? What if Belgrade goes ahead with the current policy?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, indeed. The Contact Group decided - let me find the appropriate quote here. This was minus Russia, of course, but we think it's significant nevertheless, that if Belgrade takes the steps in paragraph six of the Contact Group statement to bring about negotiations, we will immediately reverse the decision on the freezing of assets. "We have also," said the Contact Group, "decided that if dialogue is blocked because of Belgrade's noncompliance, we will by the 9th of May take actions to stop new investment in Serbia." I think that's about as explicit as they could possibly be.

QUESTION: A meeting on May 9th and, if so, at what level?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that there is a Contact Group meeting as such on May 9th. I believe that all the foreign ministers who are members of the Contact Group will be in London for the pre-G8 summit meeting of finance and foreign ministers.

QUESTION: Can you help us to understand to what extent, if any, the freeze on assets is more than a symbolic move? What assets are there that were frozen?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not going to be in a position to give you facts and figures and to flesh out the Contact Group's statement. They have made a decision yesterday and it's now going to be up to capitals to take a look at their inventories of assets and take the measures that are required. So we don't have that information now. I think it is indisputable though that the FRY and Serbian governments do maintain significant accounts abroad. It is difficult to state with precision how much money will be affected by the funds freeze, but we will press for implementation of this measure to be as far-reaching and consequential as possible.

Most importantly, the funds freeze restricts the ability of the FRY and Serbian governments to move money freely through international financial markets, restricting Belgrade's access to the global economy and, obviously, the investment ban will be even more significant if, if it comes to that, by May 9th Belgrade has not moved in a positive direction.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up?

MR. FOLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: You couldn't speak to assets in other countries. What about the United States? Does the FRY or the Serb government have assets in US banks?

MR. FOLEY: Well, as I said, I'm not in a position to get into facts and figures today, and I don't know if I will be able to talk about that publicly later in the week. But the decision has just been made and, obviously, our experts are going to be looking at that. I don't have those for you today.

QUESTION: But a yes or no though, on that. Do they have any assets in the United States?

MR. FOLEY: I believe they do.

QUESTION: Jim, weren't they frozen? Didn't the US freeze their assets a while ago?

MR. FOLEY: The US government has already taken action in this regard. I'm not sure if it is as far-reaching and comprehensive and definitive as was decided by us and our partners yesterday but, obviously, we're looking at the widest possible impact and how it will be applied in other countries, and I would say as well in countries beyond the members of the Contact Group. So we will also be seeking to build support for a wider application of this sanction.

QUESTION: Isn't the ban only in Serbia and not against Montenegro?

MR. FOLEY: That's my understanding.

QUESTION: In general, what do you think the economic effect on Yugoslavia will be, because some people say it's not going to be very significant?

MR. FOLEY: May I just go back to Ron's question? I'd like to take that question and get back to you on it because the language of the Contact Group's statement is that the Contact Group had decided to take action and put into effect a freeze on the funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian governments. I need to check that. Certainly, in so far as the prospective investment ban is concerned, the operative word here is Serbia.

QUESTION: If I could just repeat my question. What, in general, do you think the effect will be on the Yugoslav economy, as some people think it won't make an awful lot of difference?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I think, as I indicated, that the prospective investment ban will probably have the most profound effect because we understand, and I can't get into the details - in part because I don't have them with me here at the podium, but nevertheless we understand, though, that there are some significant prospective investments out there that would be affected by this ban if it does come into effect. We think, though, as a general matter, that these measures, both the asset freeze that was decided yesterday and the investment ban that may eventually come into effect in about ten days, have a significant chilling effect on the Serb economy. It is a message to not only international investors and entrepreneurs, but indeed to investors and entrepreneurs inside Serbia, that the prospects for a good return on their money are dimming and almost nil under current circumstances.

And as we have said here on previous occasions, as bad as the Serbian economy is today, it can get a lot worse. In fact I think we've not begun to see the ultimate impact of the decision reached I believe in London in March on the ban on western support for privatization in Serbia, because we've known for a fact that previous privatizations have served, in effect, as kind of a "cash cow" for Milosevic, which has permitted him to pay off some of his debts to the leading pillars of his regime and that is drying up significantly. So, he is going to face, if not by May 9 when we've requested or demanded that decisions be taken, but eventually he's going to reach a crunch point. And having successfully presided over the amputation of the former Yugoslavia, I think on two occasions already if you look back to the start of the Balkan war and to the events in the Krajina; having successfully presided over the demolishing of his economy, he's setting himself up for further successes of this nature unless he reverses course.

But again, the decisions in Rome yesterday are not strictly of a punitive nature. We have gone the extra mile to trace out the perspective of a different future for Mr. Milosevic and for his people if he's willing to do what we believe is in his interest and in his people's interest, which is to settle the problem politically in Kosovo.

QUESTION: Earlier in the week you mentioned reinforcement of elements of cooperation between NATO and Albania. Did the Contact Group come out with something on that and is there a sense of how Russia feels about it?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that the Contact Group specifically addressed the issue of the surrounding countries yesterday in their meeting in Rome. Ambassador Gelbard has not returned and so I don't have a full readout of the meeting, but certainly the security and stability of the surrounding states in the region remains of paramount concern to us and indeed, this is a subject that was addressed in London in the initial meeting of the Contact Group on the Kosovo crisis on March 9 and so it is something that is of concern to us and that we have under review.

QUESTION: Kiriyenko has appointed his economic team, and I was wondering if you had any view on whether it's good news for the reforms?

MR. FOLEY: I think we're going to be reluctant to try to comment on specific individuals in the government except to wish all of them well, insofar as this is a pro-reform team that Prime Minister Kiriyenko has assembled under President Yeltsin's leadership. We wish it well and we hope that it will continue along the path of economic reform and we see no reason to suspect otherwise. So, we wish President Kiriyenko and his new government well and we look forward to close cooperation with that government.

QUESTION: There seem to have been fairly widespread demonstrations today against the Soeharto Government in Indonesia. Do you have any information on that; some of them were met with police?

MR. FOLEY: I've not seen those reports. As you are aware, on previous occasions when this question has arisen in this briefing format, we have indicated a couple of things; first, that we recognize that the security authorities in Indonesia have a responsibility to preserve order But we've also reminded them that they have an equal responsibility to do so within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights and respect for the safety for civilians and respect for the right of peaceable assembly; and we continue the urge to government in that direction.

QUESTION: May I ask a question about China?

MR. FOLEY: Let me just say that I'm unlikely to say very much about countries which the Secretary of State is in the process of visiting.

QUESTION: Would you submit comment on the press report here from the The Washington Post, yesterday, that reported the United States has offered to sign an agreement on space cooperation with China. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. FOLEY: I believe you're referring to another newspaper in this city. The fact is, as you are aware, we don't comment on alleged classified documents that were referenced in the article in question. I can tell you, however, that the US has not provided China with a draft space cooperation agreement, so the article is wrong.

Moreover, the Washington Times, which is the newspaper involved, was informed of this fact the other day. The important point is that, as we made clear back in March when commenting on another story on a similar subject, that there never was and there still is not any US plan or proposal to offer China access to missile technology. Missile non- proliferation is a long standing high priority for this administration's global non-proliferation policy. It is one of the key issues we discuss with China. The US has a strong interest in promoting restraint in missile- related exports in accordance with the MTCR guidelines. So, in this regard, we have been considering ways to encourage China to strengthen its controlled missile-related exports. This includes consideration of scientific space cooperation. But again, no one is proposing any offers of direct or indirect access to missile technology.

QUESTION: Can you confirm a report in the New York Times today that the United States is asking the United Nations to set up a three-man tribunal to try Cambodian Khmer Rouge leaders?

MR. FOLEY: Yes. The crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge were among the most horrifying of this century with up to two million deaths over a four- year period. For this reason, the US Government believes we must do everything possible to bring the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders who exercised the most senior leadership positions during the 1975-79 period to justice. Based on the current military situation in Cambodia with respect to the Khmer Rouge, we have discussed with many governments a variety of options should senior Khmer Rouge leaders become accessible to the international community, and we have concluded that creation of an international criminal tribunal is the most appropriate of those options. We have shared with UN Security Council members in New York a draft resolution to establish a separate tribunal for Cambodia which would try a small number of senior Khmer Rouge leaders for their actions during the 1975-79 period. We certainly hope that the Council will be able to act swiftly on this proposal.

QUESTION: Do you have that China already is saying that it's not in favor of this?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we're in the process of dialogue with China on this issue; I think we remain hopeful about Chinese cooperation.

QUESTION: Where would this tribunal sit?

MR. FOLEY: I believe, and I'd like to get back to you if I'm wrong, that it would be in The Hague.

QUESTION: On Cuba - Last night in Havana the film "Amistad" was shown in a presentation co-sponsored by the US - (inaudible) - and the Cuban Institute of Film. This is a first in many, many years in Cuba. Is this part of a program to do things with the Cuban Government - these kind of promotional films?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of the facts of the case. I'd be happy to look into it for you though.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment about Chairman Arafat's acceptance of the US plan and Prime Minister Netanyahu's apparent resistance to it, public resistance to it?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we've not commented publicly on either party's specific views about our proposals in view of the fact that we're negotiating those proposals privately, and I think you won't be surprised if I'm not willing to do so. I'm certainly not going to be drawn out on this subject in advance of the very important meetings to take place in London on Monday.

QUESTION: Do you have anything in response to the Evans and Novak column today, which was rather unkind to the Secretary?

MR. FOLEY: Yes. It's flat out wrong.

QUESTION: What part of it is wrong?

MR. FOLEY: Well, first of all, it's wrong concerning the policy in question. There has been no change in US policy on the question.

QUESTION: Would that be the Christmas -

MR. FOLEY: I'm not going to address the specifics of the story, but there has been no change in American policy, and that as far as we're concerned, everything remains on the table. We've not ruled any options out, but we don't speak publicly and have not about that issue. But the story is wrong.

QUESTION: I asked you a couple days ago about aid, humanitarian aid to Sudan?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, I think if you give me a couple minutes I can get you something on that. Other questions? Thank you.

(The briefing ended at 1:40 P.M.)

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