U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #172, 97-12-02

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From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Briefer: James P. Rubin

CHINA/TAIWAN
1		U.S. Position on Taiwan Independence
RUSSIA
1,2		Reported Yeltsin Proposal to Reduce Nuclear Arsenal
1-2		Ratification of START II Treaty
8-9		Status of Detained American Richard Bliss
LIBYA
2-3		Possible Military Use of Pipeline Project in Libya
IRAQ
3-4		Update on Situation/Access for UNSCOM Inspectors
4-5		Oil-For-Food Program
11		Status of Kurdish Cease-Fire in Northern Iraq
DEPARTMENT
5,12-13		Meeting at Department with Louis Farrakhan's
		  Representatives
TURKEY
5-6		Secretary Albright's Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister
		  Cem
NATO
6		Greece and Turkey Agreement re Airspace in the Aegean
BOSNIA
6-7		Ambassador Gelbard's Travel
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
7-8		Permanent Status Negotiation Issues
JAPAN
9		Secretary Albright's Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister
MISCELLANEOUS
10		London Historical Conference on Nazi Gold/Under Secretary
		  Eizenstat Leading
		U.S. Delegation
10-11		UN Conference on Climate Change/U.S. Position
SOUTH KOREA
11,13		Financial Situation/IMF Discussions/International
		  Obligations
CAMBODIA
11-12		Assistant Secretary Shattuck's Visit to Hong Kong, Thailand
		  and Cambodia

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #172

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1997, 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I have no statements, so I'm here to take your questions; and we're a little earlier today than yesterday.

QUESTION: Some of the familiar stuff again. China - China acting, threatening or warning it would use force if Taiwan separated. You know about the separationist gains. I wonder if force would be justified, in the US view, if Taiwan should feel it ought to be an independent state.

MR. RUBIN: Well, our view is long-standing and has not changed; and that is that we do not support Taiwan independence. We do not support one Taiwan, one China. What we do support is the resolution of this issue peacefully.

QUESTION: But on the force issue, though, if you don't support independence and Taiwan decides, despite your view, that it's a grown-up place and it wants to be an independent nation, does that justify - would that justify Beijing trying to do something to prevent it?

MR. RUBIN: What we do support, Barry, is the resolution of this issue peacefully. Therefore, we don't support the use of force.

QUESTION: Russia - have you seen - it just hit the wires, so maybe you don't have a reaction. Yeltsin is offering to further reduce the Russian nuclear arsenal by one-third?

MR. RUBIN: Obviously, we haven't had a chance to study this proposal. Any reductions by the Russians in their nuclear forces would not be something we'd be against. But what we think the central item on our agenda in arms control with Russia is at this moment is the ratification of the START II treaty. That is the central item of business in the arms control area.

We made a lot of progress recently in New York - for those of you who were at the General Assembly. We moved on the ABM issue; we moved on several aspects of the START process. What we now need to see happen is the Duma in Russia make the decision that's in Russia's interest and our interest and the world's interest, and go forward and ratify this agreement; after which, we have indicated, we are prepared to explore further reductions.

But for now, the first item of business in the area of bilateral arms control would obviously be ratification of START II. But again, it's not our practice to oppose reductions in nuclear forces by other countries. But again, we haven't seen the details; so it would be very hard to make any specific judgments about its significance until one had seen it.

QUESTION: But doesn't the treaty carry certain advantages in the sense of monitoring? Wouldn't you rather reductions be carried out in a formal, legalistic way?

MR. RUBIN: Absolutely. As I indicated, our arms control position is to move towards ratification of START II and to move towards a discussion of further reductions in a controlled regime with inspection, with verification and with the confidence that that entails.

QUESTION: Have you begun to doubt - because every time - I don't know how many times you've heard the promise, and it's been relayed to us, that the Russian leadership, just over the - just down the block, would be Duma ratification. Are you losing - is the US losing confidence in the Duma's willingness to ratify the treaty?

MR. RUBIN: I think if you looked back several months ago, you would have seen several issues before the Duma that we were concerned about, including the Chemical Weapons Convention; and similar concerns were expressed by outside parties - that they're never going to ratify that. They did move forward and they ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russians have made clear to us this is a very high priority. So we expect the Russian Government, President Yeltsin, to follow through on this treaty by getting it ratified.

QUESTION: Did you have any advance notice of President Yeltsin's proposal? And do you think he made it with the full knowledge of his military chiefs?

MR. RUBIN: Again, I haven't seen the proposal. I have not heard about this proposal. That doesn't mean someone in our government hadn't heard about it; but I certainly hadn't.

QUESTION: Jamie, on another subject, have you seen the report - there's one in The New York Times today, but it's appeared elsewhere - that this grandiose water project in Libya may not, in fact, be primarily a water project, but could have some military purpose?

MR. RUBIN: We study very carefully what happens in Libya because we consider this regime a dangerous regime. We watch very carefully to ensure that projects like this water project are not covers for military projects.

We are confident that we keep a close eye on developments in Libya. As you know, we don't make it a practice of revealing publicly everything we think we know about a particular military or non-military development around the world. We watch developments in Libya very closely.

With respect to the Tarhuna plant, which was mentioned, as well, publicly, we believe the Libyan Government intended to use the Tarhuna plant as a chemical weapons manufacturing facility. We believe construction of that facility has ceased. Nevertheless, we remain deeply concerned about Libya's chemical weapons program. We believe Libya is actively working to increase its stockpile of chemical weapons, as well as delivery systems capable of reaching around the Middle East. That is the reason why we will continue to work closely with our allies to prevent Libya from acquiring the equipment and technology it seeks to produce weapons of mass destruction.

With regard to our specific assessment of this, I would merely note that some of our colleagues in other parts of the government, the Pentagon, as I understand it, has said that it's an irrigation project; at least that is their view.

QUESTION: Given the size of the conduit, could it be something in addition to water? Could it be used for water on Mondays and Tuesdays, but on the rest of the week, for moving troops?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - we have no illusions about the Libyan regime and the Libyan regime's willingness to mask what it's doing in one area with cover stories. We have never been fooled by that in the past, and we will certainly do what we can to make sure that our efforts are devoted to knowing what goes on in Libya because we consider the regime dangerous.

As far as any specific analysis or assessment of this program, all I can tell you is that we watch it very closely.

QUESTION: Any export violations, for instance, by Caterpillar, as this article points out?

MR. RUBIN: I am not aware of any licenses issued for the export of American heavy equipment to Libya. As far as specific questions about licenses, I would refer you to the Treasury Department.

QUESTION: I actually have seen no Iraq statement today, but that doesn't stop me from asking you, where do you stand? I mean, with all the twists and turns, is he getting closer to compliance or moving away from it?

MR. RUBIN: The Iraq story has been a long and complicated story from the beginning. We are vigilant in our determination to push for full access for the inspectors to do their job. My understanding is that they are on the ground, doing their jobs, and have been since November 21. My understanding is that Ambassador Butler plans to go to Baghdad this weekend to discuss his intentions to move forward in the inspection regime.

I think it's clear to all that the fact that Iraq chose unwisely to expel the inspectors has postponed the day when sanctions could be lifted, because it undermined the ability of the inspectors to establish a baseline of what Iraq had, what it didn't have, and thereby make a determination whether all its weapons had been destroyed.

We will only know whether we're closer to sanctions being lifted if Saddam Hussein changes course and allows the inspectors the full, unconditional and unfettered access to all facilities in Iraq that Ambassador Butler will be seeking.

QUESTION: Is Ambassador Butler going to be formally asking to see the so- called presidential sites?

MR. RUBIN: Well, you'd have to ask him about his particular plans. I can just assure you that we have full confidence that he knows what he needs to do to do the job; that he intends to continue to try to do his job; and if Iraq wants to improve its relationship with the international community and advance the day when sanctions can be lifted, it would behoove the Iraqi Government to change course and allow him to get the unfettered access to those sites that he needs.

QUESTION: Back to Russia for a minute --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, any more on Iraq?

QUESTION: Yes, one more. There was just a bulletin that came over the wire just before - the gist of which was that the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdun said that Iraq would not accept an increase in the oil-for-food plan -- which is currently $2 billion - unless the way the aid is distributed is revamped, unless there's a change in the aid plan. I was wondering what you thought of that, and what you thought of the possibilities of increasing the oil-for-food program.

MR. RUBIN: Before answering the specific, let me again emphasize there is a difference between sanctions relief on the one hand and a humanitarian program to aid the Iraqi people on the other. The sanctions regime has always included humanitarian exception; the oil-for-food program grew out of that. It was something the United States put forward in mid-1995. The Iraqis stonewalled for a year and a half in accepting that program, using excuses like the one that you are now indicating, which is that the distribution plan wasn't acceptable.

But let's bear in mind why the distribution plan is so important. Iraq has used its people as pawns in not using its money to provide aid to their people; using its scarce resources to build palaces for the Iraqi leadership. So it's been very important to the United States and all the members of the Security Council that when this oil-for-food program was instituted, that the UN was in charge of making sure that the food relief actually went to the people who needed it, and did not go to other purposes.

So a distribution program was established to ensure that throughout Iraq, including in the north and in the south and throughout the country, that the food went to the people that needed it. So Iraq has often tried to use food as a weapon and a card in its attempt to confuse the facts - namely that they are the ones who are refusing to spend their money on food and medicine for their people. They have plenty of money for military projects. They have money for palaces. You'd think they would care enough to spend some of that money on their people.

That is the reason why we have held to such a firm line on the distribution program for this oil-for-food. As far as whether we would be prepared to see that expanded, what I can say is that we will be supportive of continuing the program, looking to the Secretary General to make recommendations as to whether additional revenues would be needed in order to help those who are most critically in need in Iraq. We would be prepared to give any such recommendations urgent consideration.

My understanding is that what we would be looking at here would be a report from the Secretary General some number of months from the extension of the program about whether additional revenues would be necessary; again, for the sole and specific purpose of alleviating humanitarian suffering - in distinction from any easing of sanctions.

QUESTION: On the general subject of Iraq, do you have any updates on Rev. Farrakhan's aids or associates and any meetings here; and where his proposed trip to Iraq stands?

MR. RUBIN: A group, representing Minister Farrakhan, from the Nation of Islam, met with representatives at the State Department yesterday. The State Department officials included representatives from the Near East Affairs Bureau, the Consular Affairs Bureau, Legal Affairs and the Counter- terrorism Office.

We made the following points. Visits by US citizens to states like Libya or Iraq are not helpful. Those are states under international sanctions, which have violated international norms of behavior. These states know what they have to do to get out from under these sanctions. In the case of Libya, they have to turn over for trial those accused of these crimes. In the case of Iraq, that is complying with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

We believe that the visit of US citizens to these countries will therefore result in their being used for propaganda purposes. We are prepared to review, with Mr. Farrakhan's associates, restrictions on passport uses; but we made clear that a visit by Minister Farrakhan to Libya and Iraq would not be helpful, and we are therefore opposed to him going.

QUESTION: And did they say anything?

MR. RUBIN: They did not indicate what their intentions were. They did not seek validation for Mr. Farrakhan's passport.

QUESTION: But is it illegal?

QUESTION: No, it's not illegal.

MR. RUBIN: Well, I can go through the legalities on this, but I think most of the people in this room have heard that ad nauseum.

QUESTION: Secretary Albright will meet with Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, on Thursday. Could you please tell us what will be on Madame Secretary's agenda?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The Turkish Foreign Minister will meet with Secretary Albright on Thursday. They will be laying the groundwork for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington later this month. Their discussion will cover the full range of our bilateral relationship, including our strategic partnership, cooperation on East-West energy routes; opportunities for US investment; and regional developments.

That is, broadly speaking, what they will talk about. I think we would have to wait for them to have a meeting for me to be more specific.

QUESTION: Turkey's application to European Union?

MR. RUBIN: Generally when the Secretary has met with representatives from Turkey, the subject of the European Union has come up. But it's not in the pre-planned agenda listing that I was given; but I wouldn't be surprised if it came up.

QUESTION: By the way, will she participate in the Netanyahu visit? I don't know if everything is on, as it was, given her schedule?

MR. RUBIN: Which visit?

QUESTION: Well, I think - I don't know, I haven't checked today, but I thought he was due here the 8th.

MR. RUBIN: I don't know of any planned meeting like that.

QUESTION: On the next visit? You don't. Okay. Can I try one more?

MR. RUBIN: I think we're on the same general area, then we'll go back to the other general area.

QUESTION: Yesterday there was a breakthrough agreement in NATO between Greece and Turkey, regarding the new structure of NATO. Do you have a reaction on that?

MR. RUBIN: We understand that the two governments, Greece and Turkey, have agreed in principle to a plan to revamp the NATO command structure in the Aegean in the context of an overall realignment of NATO command structure.

We see this agreement as a noteworthy step forward in the effort to improve cooperation in the Aegean, and we congratulate both the Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey, and Secretary General Solana for their work in achieving this agreement. Obviously, the operational implementation of any such proposal involves details that we don't normally get into, and I would just prefer not to go into those details.

QUESTION: Jamie, on a different issue, Mr. Gelbard met with some Kosovo people yesterday. Is that part of his Bosnia duties? And is he planning to do anything more for Kosovo?

MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright and the Department take very seriously the issue of Kosovo, and recognize its importance to long-term stability in the Balkans. Ambassador Gelbard did not go to Kosovo on this trip, but he does take the Kosovo situation very seriously, and intends to reschedule his visit.

He is here today, and will be in Madrid on Friday to meet with UN Special Representative Gonzalez and representatives of the Spanish Government. He will be in Bosnia over the weekend - I don't have a set schedule, but will probably be in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and is contemplating going to Belgrade, ending at the peace implementation committee meeting in Bonn on December 9 and 10; but not Kosovo.

QUESTION: I don't know who made the unilateral step first, but Israel and the Palestinians are both declaring themselves. Israel's talking - and maybe you touched on this yesterday - but Israel's declaring it might have to annex part of the West Bank; and the Palestinians are speaking about they might have to declare independence. And do you have a view on it - either of those?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The short answer is that none of this rhetoric is very helpful to the peace process. We believe that issues reserved for permanent status, such as the question of sovereignty and borders, need to be addressed in the permanent status negotiations, which we are trying very hard to reach. No one should be pre-empting any of those issues. Those are issues that should be discussed at the negotiating table, and not through the media.

The process envisages them being decided - that is, the Oslo process and the declaration of principles - in a final status negotiation, which we are working hard to achieve. So we don't find it constructive at all to have this kind of a public discussion. It makes it harder, frankly, for the United States to do its work in advancing the peace process.

QUESTION: So I suppose it would be futile to ask if the US has a position on annexation and/or statehood. I think you probably have one on statehood, but you're a little shy about it.

MR. RUBIN: I think your assumption was correct.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: I mean, Taiwan - you have a position on Taiwan statehood, and I suspect you have one on Palestinian statehood. It may be different from Taiwan statehood.

MR. RUBIN: That's an interesting analogy.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: No, no, but wait a minute, let's take it one at a time. Would there be any occasion when you would see Israel being justified, for security reasons, or maybe at the behest of Jordan, for annexing part of the West Bank?

MR. RUBIN: I think you know very well our position on this question. Our position is clear and consistent; that is, that this is an issue to be resolved in the permanent status negotiations that Secretary Albright is working very hard to try to generate. We do not believe it is useful to publicly pronounce oneself on issues like this that would purport to pre- empt any of the discussions that might occur in that hoped-for negotiation.

So our goal here is to try to advance the peace process. And it is our view that advancing the peace process means not discussing publicly issues that were reserved for the permanent status.

QUESTION: When the Rabin-Peres- (inaudible) people were at the brink of - maybe they actually crossed the line and withdrew their objections to a Palestinian state, there wasn't a great chorus of no, no, here at the State Department. If the Palestinians -- out of frustration or out of national whatever, ambitions - were to declare a state, what would the US say -- you should wait to negotiate, or would the US say, hey, what you do is your business?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I will now retreat to the last refuge of a spokesman, which is that's a hypothetical question.

QUESTION: Hypothetical, very good, all right.

QUESTION: Richard Bliss, the American who was picked up yesterday, I believe - anything new from our embassy there, in terms of contact with him?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, Richard Bliss remains in detention in Rostov, Russia. But we understand that no formal charges have been filed at this time. We've seen some reports to the contrary, alleging that he is being investigated and possibly charged for espionage.

As you know, we don't comment on intelligence matters. Mr. Bliss has received a consular officer from our embassy in Moscow yesterday. We found him in good health and good spirits. However, the visit took place on the sixth day after Mr. Bliss' arrest, and the 1964 US-USSR Consular Convention, which remains in effect, requires consular visits within four days.

Our Consul General in Moscow has protested this lack of timely access to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no response yet to our protest. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bliss is under detention, which can supposedly last ten days or until Friday. This does not necessarily mean Mr. Bliss will be held for ten days, but that is the maximum the Russian federal security service can detain him without formally arresting him.

The Russian MFA informed our Consul General of these facts. We understand that Mr. Bliss' employer, Qualcomm, has arranged for a Russian attorney to represent him.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - his detention is - I mean, do you know where he's being kept?

MR. RUBIN: In Rostov, which is a city in Russia. I'll try to get you some coordinates after the briefing.

QUESTION: You just said, at the beginning, that you don't discuss intelligence matters. Why would you have to mention that, when discussing Mr. Bliss' case?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think, as you know, there are public - this is a briefing room, and here we discuss what's discussed in public. Certainly news reports about this issue have suggested that fact.

QUESTION: Qualcomm and Bliss and the State Department, quoting them, have denied any hint that he was involved in any sort of intelligence.

MR. RUBIN: Right, correct. Well, that was what the Embassy in Moscow did. We, as a matter of policy, don't comment on intelligence matters. So I have not - yesterday --

QUESTION: Did the embassy speak --

MR. RUBIN: Well, as far as procedurally, I think the answer to that question is yes, but it has no bearing on what we think about this gentleman's behavior. We haven't changed our view between yesterday and today as to what he was doing. But it is normally not the practice of embassies or the State Department to comment on intelligence matters. So procedurally, I think the answer to that question is yes.

QUESTION: But you would still say that he was not involved in any sort of spying activities?

MR. RUBIN: No, what I would say is, we don't comment on intelligence matters.

QUESTION: So you know yesterday you --

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say yesterday that anything other than we don't comment on intelligence matters.

QUESTION: Well, I don't understand. There seems to be universal feeling here that, based on facts, that he was not involved in any sort of spying activities.

MR. RUBIN: Right, but as a matter of practice, if one starts down the road to declaring oneself on each and every case one's asked about this, eventually you might reach something where it becomes complicated. So as a matter of practice, we don't do that from this podium in an on-the-record forum.

QUESTION: The Japanese Foreign Minister will be traveling to Washington and be here on Thursday and Friday. Will the Secretary be meeting with him?

MR. RUBIN: I believe that is currently scheduled. I'll have to get you more details on that.

QUESTION: Under Secretary Eizenstat has said that the US is going to pay $4 million to Holocaust victims, and then follow with, hopefully, up to $25 million.

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: What is the reason for this, when the United States was not directly involved with the looting of the Holocaust gold?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, I will get you a copy of his statement, which gives a full justification of this. I think the point here is that all - if you've read the very extensive reports that have come out, examining the historical facts in this area, you have seen the fact that I think all governments wish they would have done things differently during that period. A lot of attention is focused on other governments, but I think the historical documents and records show that all governments feel that way, and we want to do what we can to promote and prompt support for Holocaust survivors. So we think this is an appropriate contribution.

But as far as the specific rationale, I'll be happy to get you that for the record.

QUESTION: Have they decided where this money is going to come from?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think we will be in a position to contribute, as a down payment, $4 million, on what we hope will become - with the help of Congress - a fund of up to $25 million over three years. So, yes, we'll be working with Congress to try to develop additional monies.

QUESTION: Jamie, what is the policy that the United States Government takes to Kyoto, being the world's scientific leader, with regard to global climate change? Is it closer to the IPCC - that's the International Panel of Climate Change - that says it's definitely a greenhouse problem? Or is it closer to the NAS, which says, well, wait and see; it might be a global - - natural global change, or can you say?

MR. RUBIN: I would rather not get into a position of characterizing us as agreeing or not agreeing with any one particular group. Clearly, the President, the Vice President, the Secretary think that this is a problem that, if not addressed, will haunt us in future generations.

Exactly the extent to which this problem will haunt us in future generations is something that experts will continue to disagree on; and one can expect that. But it is our view that we need to work with other countries to reduce the potential climate change from greenhouse gases, and that is why Vice President Gore is going. We are working very hard to try to do that, because we think this is a very important issue for future generations.

QUESTION: Greenhouse gases are a problem or a threat to the climate of the planet, according to these groups.

MR. RUBIN: Again, I think I can say with some confidence that this government believes there is a problem in climate change that we are trying to address. But as far as how extensive the problem is scientifically, I think it would be a mistake for me to try to side with one particular body of evidence or another, other than to say that we believe it is a problem - and a serious problem at that.

QUESTION: About Northern Iraq, did the US give any assurance about Northern Iraq cease-fire line? According to several press reports, David Welch, from the State Department, he talked last Friday with Mr. Talibani and Barzani, and he gave some kind of assurance which stopped the third party interference in the area. If so, my question is, do you see Turkey and the Turkish forces as a third party?

MR. RUBIN: Let me do this - David Welch, our Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near East Affairs, is a man of action on this subject. He's been in regular contact with the parties over many, many months, if not years. I would like to get him to describe specifically what it is that he said or didn't say before I answer your question.

QUESTION: What is your understanding of the status of the negotiations between South Korea and the IMF on their bail-out package?

MR. RUBIN: I do not have an update. You would have to address yourself to the IMF and South Korean Government to describe that, other than that the negotiations are ongoing. I do have some information on the question you asked yesterday, if that would be useful for you - on the effect this crisis may have on the very important work of the Korean Energy Development Organization.

South Korean officials have consistently stated that the Republic of Korea will meet its obligations to KEDO, including funding for the light water reactor project. To put this into perspective, let me note that the Republic of Korea has the world's 11th largest economy, whatever its current difficulties, with a yearly government budget of some $40 billion. The cost of the reactor project - about $5 billion - will be spread out over a period of up to ten years. Japan will also fund a significant part of the project's cost.

KEDO already has funding for the first year costs of the light water reactor project, through mid-1998. That is approximately $45 million. Although funding obligations should increase in the second year of work, costs should be manageable for both the Republic of Korea and Japan, which together will fund most of the project's cost.

I will also note that much of the total expenditure will go to the South Korean company, KEPCO, which is the project's prime contractor.

QUESTION: What can you tell us about Assistant Secretary Shattuck's visit to Cambodia?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I can tell you that Assistant Secretary Shattuck is heading to Cambodia. He will first be in Hong Kong and Thailand, during meetings in Bangkok and Phnom Penh - that is Thailand and Cambodia.

The Assistant Secretary will focus on US concerns about the situation in Cambodia. He will be the highest level official US visitor to Cambodia since Special Envoy Steven Solarz traveled there in July. He will discuss ways the US can best work with the UN, ASEAN, and other concerned countries to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict there. He will underline the importance of free and fair elections, and the safe return of all politicians who fled the fighting in July, so that they can participate fully in the electoral contest.

He will also note our opposition to any political role for past or current Khmer Rouge leaders, and our support for the work of local and international human rights organizations, among other issues. His visit underscores the central role of human rights and the promotion of democracy in our bilateral relations to these countries.

QUESTION: It's interesting that the current prime minister of Cambodia is a former Khmer Rouge official - the first deputy prime minister. He was a Khmer Rouge official. Do you oppose his role in government?

MR. RUBIN: As you know, we have supported, during the period of the election, the co-prime ministers and the elections that went with that. As far as the logic of that decision at that time, I would be happy to try to dig up our rationale -- when I'm sure one of your colleagues asked the very same question at the time.

QUESTION: What is the role of ASEAN now? What happened to the approach of letting the ASEAN mediators handle the crisis in Cambodia? How come there appears to be some sort of change now?

MR. RUBIN: I don't see the change. I mean, just because one sends - goes to visit the region, that doesn't mean that we still don't see the ASEAN role as critical in all this. As you can see, there have been returns of some of the officials, so there is some progress. But that wouldn't in any way change our desire to have an assistant secretary for human rights go to Cambodia to demonstrate our concerns in this area.

QUESTION: Just quickly, was I correct in hearing your answer about Louis Farrakhan - that his people did not express anything about his mission to Iraq, what was going to take him there?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know whether they said anything about why or whether - I'm sorry, why; but they did not indicate to us whether, indeed, the mission would go forward. It was more a session in which we provided information as to the reasons why we think it's a bad idea to go; the passport restrictions that we've placed on various countries; and it was a very cordial meeting, and they apparently took notes. As far as what his decision will be, I would refer you to his office for the answer to that question.

QUESTION: Secondly, isn't this progress, that Farrakhan would send his representatives here before he goes out on a trip?

MR. RUBIN: I guess it depends on what happens, yes.

QUESTION: I mean, considering his past performances?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I think it will depend on what happens.

QUESTION: These assurances that the South Koreans - and you said the Japanese, as well?

MR. RUBIN: yes.

QUESTION: Have offered that they'll meet their obligations, is that something recent, or is this sort of a blanket assurance?

MR. RUBIN: It's been blanket. I think the issue has come up, and we've received the kinds of indications that there hasn't been a shift in their position sufficient to change our statement that we believe they will continue to do what they said they were going to do.

QUESTION: As far as using IMF money for this project, that would be something the US would have to block; is that correct? Because the IMF, under the US - the US is bound to block IMF loans for countries on the terrorism list; so wouldn't that rule out using IMF money to --

MR. RUBIN: Again, I would like to refer you to the Treasury Department for exactly what the rules and regulations are here. But again, budgetary support through an IMF program is not the same as providing the budget from which KEDO's funding would presumably come. But rather than enter the arcane world of financial regulations, I would like to refer you to the Treasury Department.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)

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