U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #158, 97-11-03
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
941
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, November 3, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
IRAQ
1-9 US Policy on UNSCOM Inspections Blocked by Iraq/UN
Diplomatic Delegation/Number of American Inspectors/UN
Security Council Unity Against Iraq's Actions/Next Steps/
Applicability of UN Resolutions
5 Amb. Butler's Remarks on UNSCOM Finding Nerve Gas
8 Possible Iraqi Troop Movements
15-16 Status of Kurdish Fighting in Northern Iraq/Turkey's
Involvement
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
9-13 Secretary Albright's and Amb. Ross' Participation in Peace
Talks/Agenda/Absence of Committee Chairmen in Palestinian
Delegation
12-13 Update on Doha Summit
PAKISTAN
13 Secretary Albright's Trip to the Region in light of a
Possible Military Takeover
GREECE/TURKEY
13-14 Meeting of Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers at the
Balkan Summit on Crete/Military Exercises
CHINA
14-15 Pres. Jiang's Reference to Mistakes Made During Tiananmen
Square in his Speech at Harvard/Post-Summit Assessment of
US-China Relations
NATO
15 Expected Release Date of NATO Expansion Cost Study
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #158
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1997 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Good afternoon. Welcome to the State Department briefing
room. It is a few minutes late. Please forgive me.
I have no statements; I am here to take your questions.
George?
QUESTION: Saddam Hussein apparently has accepted a three-member team,
proposed by Kofi Annan. Do you consider this to be a helpful sign?
MR. RUBIN: We hope that Saddam Hussein gets the message that he cannot
negotiate; this is not the bazaar. He has to accept the responsibility of
complying with UN Security Council resolutions.
We're hopeful that he will allow the UN to do its work, allow the
inspectors to do their job, and allow this situation to be eased.
QUESTION: Is there anything to negotiate? Anything to talk about? I
mean, as far as the Clinton Administration is concerned, what message would
you like these people to carry to Baghdad?
MR. RUBIN: I think their message will be quite clear.
Iraq knows what the UN Security Council is requiring it to do.
It has to comply with all its obligations. This is not a negotiation.
UNSCOM's work - the UN Special Commission's work is not a subject of
negotiation. If the Commission can't do its work, the Commission can't
certify Iraq has destroyed its weapons of mass destruction.
The Council can't even consider the question of moving to the next phase,
in terms of sanctions relief.
So Iraq has to comply with all of the relevant Security Council resolutions.
From time to time, they try to negotiate the work of the Special Commission,
and time and time again, the Special Commission makes clear that its work
is not a subject of negotiation.
QUESTION: The French apparently have said that if there's any further
action to be taken against Iraq that this would have to be decided by the
UN Security Council in a separate action, a separate vote. Does the United
States believe that the Security Council has all of the authority it needs
now to take whatever action - including all the options that you have said
are open to consideration, including military action? Do you feel
that you have all the authority you need now to do whatever you need
to keep them in line?
MR. RUBIN: Let's step back, first of all, and make clear that the
Secretary General of the UN said that this delegation is being sent to
Baghdad to obtain firm implementation of UN Security Council resolutions.
The team has asked to meet with Saddam Hussein.
UNSCOM Chairman Butler has said the delegation is not going to Baghdad to
negotiate over how Iraq should cooperate with UNSCOM.
It is going there to reinforce with the Iraqi Government the need to
cooperate fully.
It is our view that the Security Council should be prepared to take firm
action to bring about Iraqi compliance in the event that they don't change
their mind in the next day or so. So it is not prudent at this point to
examine all the different options we have ahead of us, all the different
authorities we have ahead of us. Our view is that Saddam Hussein should
change his mind, and allow the UN to do its job. Having received these
representatives of the Secretary General, Hussein should make clear to them
that he's prepared to let the UN do it's job.
In that event, none of the hypothetical questions that you raise -- namely
what if we wanted to do something, and what if other countries didn't agree
with every single aspect of it -- wouldn't come up. But, if they are not
able to get Saddam Hussein to change his mind, our view is that the
Security Council should be prepared to take firm action to bring about
Iraqi compliance.
QUESTION: But that's the bottom line. You do think that some kind of
Security Council action will be required?
MR. RUBIN: Well, no, that's not what I said. What I said was, our view
is that if Iraq doesn't change its mind as a result of this mission, and
doesn't get the message that this mission is going to bring, that the
Security Council should be prepared to take firm action. Whether or not
there are other options, other authorities, and other legalities is two or
three steps down the road. I hope you will forgive me if we can just
keep it at two steps down the road.
QUESTION: Jamie, can I ask you two questions? One is, do you have a firm
count on how many Americans are still there as part of this team? And
secondly, just to press you a half step farther, do you believe that there
is existing authority under current Security Council rules that you can
take military action -- the United States can take military action under
that authority without a new vote of the Security Council?
MR. RUBIN: On your first question, the information I have is that as of
today, November 3, there are seven Americans in Baghdad assigned to the UN
Special Commission.
As far as your second question is concerned, the technical answer to your
question is yes--but that's not the point. The point is that if Saddam
Hussein doesn't get the message, the policy of the United States is to see
that the Security Council takes firm action to get Saddam Hussein to
reverse his position.
QUESTION: So you're saying that the Clinton Administration feels it has
all the authority it needs under existing resolutions to carry out military
action, should it come to that? It won't require another vote; won't
require anything--?
MR. RUBIN: I have not mentioned the words "military action;" you all
keep mentioning the words "military action." What I have said is that -
and I will be prepared to repeat what Secretary Cohen and Secretary
Albright and spokesmen at the White House have said--we're not ruling out
any options.
QUESTION: No, but just on the key point of whether you have actually -
are able to keep all the options in under existing UN authority, that's the
question; not what you're going to do, but whether you have the authority
to do everything you might like to do.
MR. RUBIN: As a technical matter - you know, lawyers write books about
what is and isn't permitted by Security Council resolutions.
Different countries occasionally have different views about it.
What I'm saying to you is, as a technical legal matter, I don't think
there's any question in our minds that we have all the authority we
need.
The policy of the United States to emphasize right now is that we want
Saddam Hussein to get the message, to change his mind, to get on with the
show of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. If that doesn't
happen, we want for the Security Council to take firm action to convince
him to do so.
Steve?
QUESTION: Would it be incorrect or correct to say that the United States
views this UN mission going to Baghdad now as a - since there's nothing to
negotiate, by definition - little more than a chance for Saddam to save
some face before he backs down?
MR. RUBIN: Well, part of the answer to your question is, if I answered
your question it couldn't be true. So let me answer it this way - whatever
it takes for Iraq, for Saddam Hussein to get the message, we believe would
be helpful. If discussing this matter with a group of prominent envoys,
sent on behalf of the Secretary General will help Saddam Hussein to get it,
that's fine with us. Whatever it takes, so long as this is not the
opening of the bazaar, but this is merely the reinforcement of the
message that the Security Council has already said. That's fine with
us.
QUESTION: Jamie, I'm just trying to get some clarification on how many
Americans were part of the three-member team that was turned away earlier
this morning, or late last night - I forget which.
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that there were two Americans on a plane
that were trying to fly in, that were part of UNSCOM, and one that was part
of the IAEA. They were not permitted to leave the plane, so they did not
go in.
There are other Americans who were prohibited--the inspection was
prohibited because Americans were part of it. As opposed to coming into
Baghdad, how many Americans were part of that effort, I'd have to get you
that for the record.
QUESTION: If you could.
MR. RUBIN: I would be happy to.
QUESTION: Jamie, Saddam Hussein has done this time and time again. I'm
just wondering why, in the Administration's view, you should show any
flexibility whatsoever. Why should there be a mission to go there? Why
should there be dialogue? Why are you sort of legitimizing his stand here
with a bunch of diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing?
MR. RUBIN: We do not regard the sending of envoys to repeat the demands
of the UN Security Council as the beginning of a dialogue.
I think I've been very clear here this morning - the bazaar is not open.
Saddam Hussein must comply with UN Security Council resolutions, full stop,
period.
And if receiving envoys of this kind and having it explained to him that
the Council is united - he obviously miscalculated that the Council wasn't
united - will help turn him around, that's fine with us.
QUESTION: Why, if I can ask you, do you think Saddam Hussein is doing
this now? And do you believe this is an effort to split the United States
away from its other allies in the Gulf Coalition and the Security
Council?
MR. RUBIN: Last week this issue came up quite a bit, and I think my
answer at the time was that he, from time to time, miscalculates what the
temperature is in the Security Council and the extent of the support that
all Council members have for the admission of the UN Special Commission.
Clearly he miscalculated on this case. It is obviously true that there
were tactical differences between us and some of our allies about whether a
travel restriction should be placed on Iraqi officials and how soon that
should be placed. That's no secret. But that is not the same as a
difference of view on whether Saddam Hussein should comply with the
requirements of UNSCOM. And as he saw, once he tried to exploit what he
perceived as a division, is that the door slammed in his face and the 15
members of the Council, in a record time, put out a statement demanding
full and immediate compliance with the requirements of the UN. Whatever
perceived wedge he might have thought was there evaporated quite quickly.
QUESTION: If I could just follow up, sorry. There is a - I'm curious if
you agree that there is a wedge developing over what to do if he doesn't
change his mind. I realize you don't want to get into hypotheticals, but
Arab countries this weekend urged no use of force. The French and the
Russians have clearly been reluctant to use force, and have said so, which
makes using it harder, even if you do do it. So I wonder if you regard
that as a wedge.
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, I think we were all quite heartened that the
moment he tried to separate out Americans from the rest of the UN Special
Commission's work, all 15 members of the Security Council rallied very
clearly and very definitively.
If you look at the French-Russian Foreign Ministers' statement from
Saturday, you see very clearly stated that the Iraqis must comply with the
UN, that their views are unacceptable, and that there is no choice.
As far as what countries would want to pursue what next steps, I've seen a
lot of reporting about this, and some of it does not comport with our
private assessments of what might happen if things do not change. I'm not
going to get into a diplomatic discussion of what Secretary Albright
believes to be the different positions of the different countries. I can
say that she has been in touch with many - and we'll try to get you a list
later today - of the relevant officials over the weekend; she's engaged in
a round of calls with some of her colleagues and has done much work
over the weekend. We think the world is united against Saddam Hussein,
and he's making a mistake if he doesn't realize that.
QUESTION: Jamie, there's another - getting back to the question of
Saddam's motive for doing this now. There were some comments I think were
attributed to Butler, a day or two ago, that the Commission was close to
closing in on some new nerve gas with ten times the potency of Sarin. Do
you know anything about that?
MR. RUBIN: I would have to refer you to Ambassador Butler for a specific
of what he was closing in on.
QUESTION: If you are so confident that the world is united in action
against Saddam Hussein, why can't you be more specific, then, about this
term "firm action" that you think the Security Council must be willing to
take?
MR. RUBIN: Because if you go back and look at all the different cases of
the United States and its allies developing policy options and pursuing
those options, there is a time to be specific in public, and there is a
time to be clear in public without being specific. Today is the time to be
clear, "firm action," without being specific.
QUESTION: Jamie, to follow up on something that Sid had said earlier, you
said that the door has slammed in Saddam Hussein's face this time, and it's
clear that the world is united against - following through on its action
against him and containing him.
Does the United States feel that they are confident that should this
become - or rather, after this admonishment, are you confident that you
will be able to contain him and he won't resurrect, and in the future these
admonishments are going to actually do some good?
MR. RUBIN: We believe our containment policy is a success, that Saddam
Hussein has been placed in a strategic box. He can't fly his airplanes in
many places. He can't develop weapons of mass destruction. He's had the
longest and most comprehensive embargo in the history of world placed on
his country. And, although there is occasionally leakage, it still is the
most comprehensive embargo in history. He's contained. His options are
limited.
And he's miscalculated that it will serve his cause to stop the UN from
doing its work.
QUESTION: Sorry. If they have, however, developed this VX gas --
MR. RUBIN: Again, I can't comment on that. I specifically referred the
last questioner to Ambassador Butler in New York, and I'd be happy to have -
-
QUESTION: Okay. Fine. But if there are weapons of mass destruction
still there, is it really appropriate simply to threaten a travel
restriction? Is that really an adequate response, from the United States
Government's point of view, or are you looking at something more substantial?
MR. RUBIN: Well, you're going to ask me to try to get into specific
options, and all I can say is, we haven't ruled any option out. As far as
him having weapons of mass destruction, I would emphasize that if you look
very carefully at Ambassador Butler's reports, what you will see is the
extent to which enormous amounts of weapons of mass destruction materiel
have been destroyed.
And, what we're talking about here is trying to make sure that he never
again can produce them. They have been trying to get at the documents;
find the evidentiary trail for all the different pieces and all the
different parts. But, we feel fairly confident that at least in several
key aspects - and I'd urge you to read that report for any specific comment
on it - that this is not a situation where he's on the verge of developing
a weapon like the one that was described.
QUESTION: But isn't it a little concerning, nonetheless, that in these
circumstances, we still don't have a common position shared by all 15
members of the Security Council?
MR. RUBIN: I would reject the premise of your --
QUESTION: Even on a travel restriction?
MR. RUBIN: I reject the premise of your question. We have a common
position of all 15 members of the Security Council. I urge you to poll each
one of them; and they will all say that Iraq's position is unacceptable,
and that it must allow the UN to do its job, that it cannot pick and choose
between inspectors.
That is a united position of all 15 members of the Security Council.
QUESTION: When people brainstorm here - as they must, over all these
several days of impasse - what is the going theory, if there is one, as to
his motives? Is he trying to hide ingredients of chemical and biological
weapons from prying eyes? Or is he hoping to benefit from the allies not
always agreeing, as they didn't the last time the US tried to impose
tougher sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I think the only answer that I'm comfortable giving in
this setting is to suggest that it's possible that he misinterpreted the
differences between us and some of our allies on whether to impose
additional travel restrictions on Iraqi officials as the beginning of some
split in the coalition--which proved to be not true the moment he tried to
exploit it by suggesting that the Americans be treated differently from
others on the inspection teams. All 15 members - the entire world, through
the Security Council - rallied behind us and behind the UN, and made
clear that Saddam Hussein cannot split off the United States from
its allies, and that all of our allies are united against it; so he
fundamentally miscalculated.
QUESTION: Jamie, you say that technically there is all the authority that
is needed for any action that the US might believe was necessary, in the
event that he doesn't back down.
But you also say that you, in the event he doesn't back down, expect the
UN Security Council to take firm action. Is that - can we read from that
that you're confident that France and Russia will vote for the kind of
thing that the US would call firm action?
MR. RUBIN: David, we're at a position now where we have a team going out,
probably later today. Ambassador Butler will be reporting to the Security
Council later today. We probably won't hear back from the team going to
Baghdad for a day or two.
At that point, the Security Council would be in a position to decide what
its next steps are.
What I'm saying to you is that we would envision the Security Council
taking a firm stand against this position, and firm action as the next
step. As far as what that would be, who would support it, and how it would
be negotiated, that is two steps down the road, and we're not prepared to
discuss that at this time.
QUESTION: Isn't there a threshold step that might be less likely to have
any division--the threshold before military action of declaring a cease-
fire is irrevocably suspended by Saddam Hussein actions?
MR. RUBIN: There are many different options that exist in cases like
this - sanctions, declarations of materiel breach--they've occurred before.
I mean, just to give you some historical background, so all of you might be
able to put this in context, on several occasions - perhaps as many of half
a dozen occasions - Saddam Hussein has refused to allow the UN Special
Commission to do its work. And on roughly half a dozen occasions, the
United Nations Security Council has declared him in materiel breach. At
that point, he, in most of those cases, agreed to allow the UN Special
Commission to do its work. So there are many different paths.
Again, our objective here is to get the UN to do its work and to get Saddam
Hussein to reverse his unacceptable stand that he can pick and choose who
the inspectors are in these inspection teams.
QUESTION: Without prejudging whether there's a gap in the Security
Council on the question of what is firm action, does the US retain the
option unilaterally to act if it doesn't consider Security Council actions
sufficiently firm?
MR. RUBIN: I think I've done my best to answer that within the confines
of the current situation three or four times now.
As a technical legal matter, I believe the answer is yes. But that is not
what our next step is about. Our next step is about the Security Council
taking a firm stand. So, what is a technical legal matter is not what the
policy goal is right now that I am specifying for you.
QUESTION: Do you expect any sort of action today from the Security
Council, or will they wait for the --
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that Ambassador Butler will report - and
it's possible Secretary General Kofi Annan will describe the purpose of his
sending these envoys - towards the end of the day today. I would expect
the whole process of those people getting to Baghdad and back to take more
than a day or so. That would be, presumably, the next time the Security
Council would act, other than to make clear what the mandate of those
envoys are.
QUESTION: Jamie, I'm sure you would have brought this up were it the case,
but just to ask the question - has the United States noticed through any
means any odd or unusual movements of troops in Iraq since this all began?
Anything that would indicate that something is afoot aside from just the
diplomatic stand-off as it exists now?
MR. RUBIN: Again, that's a tricky territory to begin to wander into but
I can say that right now, we believe we are engaged in a discussion about
how to get Iraq to comply with the UN Special Commission.
New subject?
QUESTION: Jamie, you mentioned that you have the legal authorization for
military action --
MR. RUBIN: That's not what I said.
QUESTION: Oh, all right, could you clarify that?
MR. RUBIN: I've answered this question five times, and I don't see the
value of repeating it. What I said is, in response to specific questions,
we have technically, as a legal matter, the authority to do what we think
we need to do.
I'm not going to spell out what the 17 different options are.
I'm not suggesting exactly the way you formulated the question.
That is, however, not the next step that we are pursuing. We are pursuing
making clear that these are the United States' inspectors that have been
denied access and as a result, the United Nations has been flouted. Saddam
Hussein is now in contravention of the entire United Nations system, and
not the United States.
You can keep asking me about what the US technical legal authorities are,
and I will keep telling you that what this is about is not the US technical
legal authorities, but about Saddam Hussein's Iraq confronting the entire
UN system.
QUESTION: Let me rephrase the question. Will Resolution 678 be
applicable here?
MR. RUBIN: I believe that's the pre-war sanctions - you're talking about
687?
QUESTION: No, 678 was the use of all necessary means, which was the
authorization for the beginning of a conflict.
MR. RUBIN: Right, but there's a subsequent resolution, 687.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: So what's your question?
QUESTION: Which of the two resolutions would be applicable here?
MR. RUBIN: We can get you a technical, legal answer; 687 imposed the
cease fire, which is what's currently applicable.
QUESTION: And, if in fact any firm action is taken, would that be taken
under Resolution 678?
MR. RUBIN: You keep trying to get me to talk about the use of military
force, and I have specifically not done so. So you can keep trying, and
I'm not going to do so.
QUESTION: Can we try and change --
MR. RUBIN: Change the subject, yes.
QUESTION: Is there an early line on the Middle East? Specifically, we
know the Secretary's agenda; did she go over it again? How long is she the
US mediator? When does Dennis kick in, et cetera? Are you still saying a
few days? When do you shift to Virginia? Do we get free buses there? You
know, whatever. We'll take almost anything at this stage.
(Laughter)
QUESTION: Because we know there has to be peace in the Middle East.
MR. RUBIN: Okay. We've now added - any more before I try to respond?
QUESTION: Yes. I mean, I'm sure Barry knows it, but could you describe
the Secretary's agenda for these talks, what the United States hopes to get
out of them? I mean, are we still in the interim -- the airport and the
seaport? Or are we more ambitious?
MR. RUBIN: The situation is as follows. Secretary Albright has met
separately and together with Foreign Minister Levy and Abu Mazen. They met
a couple of times in different ways this morning. Ambassador Ross is now
discussing with the delegations the important issue of how to get down to
work on the various subjects. We are --
QUESTION: Here?
MR. RUBIN: Here. They are still in the building, or they were when I
came down here. I can't confirm that they didn't leave in the last 35
minutes, while we were talking about Iraq.
The Secretary is concerned, however, that the Palestinian delegation was
not in a position to discuss some of the interim issues related to the
airport, the seaport, the industrial park, and other matters.
They are working on, right now, trying to obtain additional negotiators
from the Palestinian Authority in order to be able to do that.
That's been what's focused Ambassador Ross in the recent hour or
so.
But once we get that procedural hurdle resolved, the subject matter is to
try to combine progress on the interim issues--namely, opening the airport,
getting the seaport, getting the industrial park, safe passage between Gaza
and the West Bank. These are concrete steps that can show the people of the
Palestinian Authority that the peace process brings benefits to them-thus,
combine that work with the current question of how to get from here to an
accelerated permanent status negotiation and in between, the two extremely
difficult issues: the question of an additional deployment, further
redeployment of Israeli forces from the West Bank, and the question of what
the Secretary has called the "time-out."
That is, how to make sure that unilateral actions don't occur during the
course of getting to accelerated discussions on these permanent status
issues. Then during the discussions, if we get to them that these
unilateral moves don't undermine any chance of solving what will be the
most complex issues in the history of the Middle East peace process.
QUESTION: To pick up on the first point, there's at least two possible
explanations. One is that Palestinian officials -- maybe Arafat himself, I
can't recall -- have dismissed seaport/airport/industrial park as sort of
peripheral issues, not to the heart of what they hope to accomplish.
Another possibility for inaction right away is that they were supposed to
be sending only three negotiators instead of a full team.
So did they only have - do they have only Erakat, Abbas, and Scha'ath here?
Or do they have the back-up that could deal with that?
MR. RUBIN: Just the three, and that's what I said.
QUESTION: Is that the problem?
MR. RUBIN: The problem is that they've been discussing this morning how
to get the additional committee chairmen, or committee heads -- the ones
who know the details about the airport, seaport, and industrial park - to
come to the United States and make these --
QUESTION: And that could take at least a day or two?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, confirming for you that they are not here --
QUESTION: Right.
MR. RUBIN: -- and that a significant part of the morning was discussed
about our concern that, without them, we won't be able to make any
progress. And that is what they are working on now, and trying to get them
here.
QUESTION: Are they not here because Arafat and his people consider those
minor issues? Or are they not here for other reasons?
MR. RUBIN: Barry, I'm not going to start the process of divining the
intentions of both parties in the Middle East peace process every time they
make a procedural decision.
What I can say is that we're concerned they're not here, and we're trying
to get them here.
QUESTION: Okay, let me try one quick one - a hair-split, maybe. Did A or
B occur? A, the US tried to begin with these issues and couldn't because
of the absence of experts. Or B, simply you noticed this wasn't necessarily
the first item on the agenda, but you wanted to deal with it right away as
best you could.
MR. RUBIN: B.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: C -- so their understanding was they would send a full
delegation to discuss the interim issues, as well?
MR. RUBIN: Their understanding?
QUESTION: The Palestinians.
MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously, if that was their understanding, they would
have brought the full delegation.
QUESTION: So the question is, did they do this intentionally?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I assume that not having plane tickets and not
bringing somebody with you was intentional. Whether it was intentional to
send a signal, as Barry suggested, I urge you to ask the Palestinians their
reasons.
What I can tell you is our view; and our view is that this is a matter of
concern. Were working to fix it.
QUESTION: The Americans are annoyed they're not here.
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. It's a matter of concern, and we're
trying to fix it. If we don't fix it, that might be a different story.
Finished?
QUESTION: Have they agreed to then bring the additional negotiators?
MR. RUBIN: That's what we're working on right now.
QUESTION: So there is some hesitance on their part to bring them over. I
mean, it's a simple question - they're not here, bring them over --
MR. RUBIN: They're not here, and we'd like them to be here, yes.
QUESTION: But there's some resistance on their part to bringing them
here?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there must have been, or they would have been here in
the first place.
QUESTION: Did they offer any explanation as to why?
MR. RUBIN: Again, you'd have to ask them their reasons.
QUESTION: How about the issue of statehood in Jerusalem?
Is that on the agenda at all for this meeting?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first we've got to get the committee chairman for the
airport here; then, we'll worry about those very complex final status
issues.
QUESTION: Just one more, and forgive me if you covered this while I was
away. But are we any closer to the Doha Summit?
MR. RUBIN: Are we what?
QUESTION: Any closer to the Doha?
MR. RUBIN: The date is approaching, yes.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: There is a - (inaudible) - summit in the island of Crete
underway --
MR. RUBIN: Let me just repeat so that people don't get the wrong
impression. Secretary Albright is intending to go to the Doha Economic
Conference. We are hoping that as many countries as possible send their
representatives to this meeting. We don't believe it is a favor to one
side or the other. We would like to see this conference go forward with
the maximum representation from as many countries as possible.
On that point? Yes. Sorry, I'll come right back to you.
QUESTION: On the question of her trip, there's been a development in
Pakistan over the weekend. Some analysts say the military may be preparing
to take over.
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that there's any change in her current plan and
intention to go to that region. The date is still to be worked out.
QUESTION: Even if under the hypothetical, the government - there's a
military take-over?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I can't answer that hypothetical.
QUESTION: Jamie, did you - sorry, this is on the Mid-East still - say how
long you think these talks are going to go on?
MR. RUBIN: They were scheduled and planned for during the course of this
week, roughly.
QUESTION: You still think that these talks will end by the end of the
week?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll see.
QUESTION: I changed my mind.
(Laughter.)
Seriously, there is a Balkan Summit in the island of Crete right now.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: On this side, Turkish and Greek prime ministers will also meet,
I understand. Do you have a reading, expectation for this summit?
MR. RUBIN: We understand that the Greek Prime Minister and the Turkish
Prime Minister will be meeting tonight while they are in Crete for the
November 2-4 Balkan Summit. We are pleased that this meeting is taking
place and hope that it will prove constructive in improving Greco-Turkish
relations.
We also want to commend the Greek Government for taking the initiative to
host the Balkans Summit and hope that it will enhance security and economic
prosperity throughout the region.
QUESTION: Both sides are right now conducting exercises in the region.
Are there any heightened concerns about this recent escalation?
MR. RUBIN: We have urged the governments of Greece and Turkey to ensure
that their military forces conduct national exercises with restraint,
avoiding any behavior which might lead to increased tension between Athens
and Ankara.
We have also noted that recent events involving the Greek and Turkish
militaries point up the urgency of NATO Secretary General Solana's
initiative to develop procedures to improve communication and lessen
tensions between the Greek and Turkish militaries.
Such procedures might include new understandings on national exercises.
We have encouraged Athens and Ankara to engage now with Secretary General
Solana of NATO to bring this initiative to fruition.
QUESTION: On China, on Friday in his Harvard speech, Jiang made a comment
about short-comings and mistakes, which everyone sort of read to mean that
he's indicating some sort of revisionist thinking about Tiananmen Square.
I wondered how the United States read it, whether you saw any change in the
glacial mindset.
MR. RUBIN: I read the accounts of the speech, and I've subsequently read
several accounts by the Chinese officials, interpreting the accounts of the
speech. From my reading of the Chinese officials' interpreting the
accounts of the speech, I don't see evidence for a major rethinking on this
subject.
QUESTION: As someone who agrees with you on that topic, can I ask you
whether Jiang Zemin's visit -- now that the smiling Chinese President has
departed our shores - has it made it easier, do you think, or harder to go
forward with the Administration's policy of constructive engagement with a
wider base of popular support?
MR. RUBIN: We'll have to see precisely how all the trips around the
region affected Americans' views of the Chinese President.
And only time will tell whether his trip to Capitol Hill changed any minds
or changed any thinking.
We believe that over time, the American people will absorb the agreements
that we reached and understand that we can have a relationship with a
country as important as China. We can reach agreements, and then have
fundamental disagreements on a subject like human rights. I think it was a
rare thing to see, so starkly and so clearly, the differences between two
major powers played out in a press event, as it was last week.
And the more that that sinks in to the American people and to the Congress
that we don't have to put aside our concerns about human rights, we don't
have to lay them aside in order to have a relationship with a country as
important as China is to our national security. Our national security, in
this case, meaning trying to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction
-- no higher priority than that for this Administration; our national
security meaning the importance of preventing war on the Korean peninsula,
a place where there are 37,000 American soldiers, and nothing could be more
important than taking all the diplomatic steps we could to make sure that
war doesn't break out there.
I can go through the list, but to the extent that over time, after the
visit has been absorbed by the public, by the Congress, and by others, that
it is understood that the Clinton Administration can pursue an engagement
policy without endorsing Chinese policies in the area of human rights, and
that that is an appropriate way to conduct the nation's business. We hope
this will be the final message.
QUESTION: Can I ask you one more thing, which is, do you have an estimate
on when the NATO study of the cost of expansion is going to be ready? They,
I gather, are limiting it to only one of the three categories --
MR. RUBIN: Common costs, I believe.
QUESTION: -- of the sort of Pentagon study.
MR. RUBIN: Right. Let me try to get you a proper answer, for the record,
on that.
In the back, please.
QUESTION: Yes. Instead of the US and the Turkish diplomatic efforts
easing the tension in Northern Iraq, the two Kurdish groups are fighting
each other. We heard that. Is the fighting fierce fighting? Is this
true? Do you know? Do you have anything on this?
MR. RUBIN: I have no new information for you. I certainly can reiterate
our view that we would like to see a cease-fire in that area.
QUESTION: Jamie, have you had any opportunity to rethink your opinion of
what the Turks are doing vis-a-vis air strikes and security zones and so
forth?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that there is - I mean, again, on the question
of involvement in Northern Iraq, with respect to their concern about the
PKK and the terrorist threat, we have said that any Turkish involvement
ought to be limited in scope and duration, and should be undertaken with
due regard for human rights. And that view has not changed.
QUESTION: But there is this assertion by one of the Kurdish groups.
MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't seen that position adopted by the Turkish
Government, so it's hard to comment on a proposed --
QUESTION: So your opinion is that the Turkish Government is not bombing
the Kurds?
MR. RUBIN: No, that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about the
security -- establishment of a security zone.
As far as the bombing is concerned, let me get you an answer for the
record on what we know and what we don't know.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)
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