U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #154, 97-10-27
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1031
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, October 27, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1-2 State/Transportation Joint Statement on Japanese Port
Practices
TRADE
2 International Financial Crisis
RUSSIA
2-7 Transfer of US High Performance Computer Technology/
Investigation Proceeding into Acquisition of Technology
/Possible Violation of US Law by US Companies by Sale of
Technology/Russian Cooperation in Investigation
COLOMBIA
7-8 Presidential Candidate Horacio Serpa/Allegation of Ties to
Drug Traffickers
12,17 Use of US Equipment and Helicopters Against Drug Traffickers
CUBA
8 Counselor McLarty Comments re: Differences between US and
European Policy
CHINA
8-9 Expectations of Upcoming US-China Summit
9 US Effort to Deter Nuclear Cooperation with Iran
9-10 Change in Chinese Non-Proliferation Practices
11 Possible Meeting of Secretary Albright and Qian Qichen
During Summit
14-15,16-17 Expectation of Protests during Jiang Visit
SURINAME
11 Report of Coup Attempt
PEACE PROCESS
11-13 Determination of Substance and Timing of Three-Way Mtg.
(Secretary Albright, Foreign Minster Levy, Abu Mazen)
13-14 Update on Sheinbein Case
NORTH KOREA
14 Four-Party Talks/Report of Working Level Preparatory Mtg.
14 Arrival of Food Assessment Team.
IRAQ
15-16 Reaction to UNSC Resolution/Need to Cooperate with UNSCOM
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #154
MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1997 2:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing room. Let
me begin by announcing that we are pleased that the Federal Maritime
Commission has approved a settlement with Japanese carriers. This
settlement is consistent with the goals the Administration and US carriers
have been seeking. We look forward to final signature of the agreement
shortly, and full implementation.
The agreement will promote competition, lower costs and increase efficiency
in Japan's ports - the costliest in the world for loading and unloading
ships. This will benefit American carriers and consumers, as well as
Japanese carriers and consumers.
For the first time, US carriers will be able to obtain licenses to run
their own terminal operation in Japan, and will be able to carry out
operational changes.
With that, I go to your questions.
QUESTION: What about the fine issue? Do you have any answer as to how
that was resolved?
MR. RUBIN: There was an agreement on how to handle the fine question. We
understand that the Japanese carriers have made a payment that satisfies
the Federal Maritime Commission.
QUESTION: How much was it?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to describe the amount involved. This is
a matter between the carriers and the Federal Maritime Commission. It is
possible that at the end of day, the Federal Maritime Commission may decide
for the time being that it is in the public interest to hold details of
this settlement confidential.
QUESTION: Does the agreement go into effect immediately?
MR. RUBIN: I think it does have to be ratified at higher levels. So there
is an additional time frame to get it finally ratified. But we are pleased
to announce this agreement. There will be a fuller statement posted very
shortly.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you know ratified by whom?
MR. RUBIN: We'll have to get back to you on that.
QUESTION: Well, then, without getting into the figures, does the payment
include the total amount of fines levied?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: That would be getting into the figures.
QUESTION: No, because it keeps changing.
MR. RUBIN: I mean, I can run through with you when the fines began. I
have extensive information for you about the amounts that were previously
deemed to be paid. But that won't answer the question of what the amount is
that has been decided that the carriers will pay. That is something between
the carriers and the Federal Maritime Commission.
But I would be happy to spend a few minutes running through with you which
days the fines were imposed and what date that it was frozen and then
unfrozen. You can then do the math and you will discover what, prior to
this negotiation, were the amounts deemed to be paid. But since the
negotiation, I believe the number is different. But it's a number that
needs to be discussed by the Federal Maritime Commission.
QUESTION: Something else? Same general topic.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Does the State Department have anything to say that might calm
what a lot of people are referring to as a world financial crisis?
MR. RUBIN: I'm only going to quote Sandy Berger quoting Secretary Rubin
quoting Alan Greenspan, and that is I have no comment on the market.
QUESTION: Rubin also said he didn't know what was going on, particularly.
MR. RUBIN: Again, as a spokesman for the State Department, I think it
would be a mistake for me, without a lot of discussion and preparation, to
make any comment whatsoever on the financial markets.
QUESTION: Do you have any light on a report that IBM secretly provided a
Russian nuclear facility with advanced computers?
MR. RUBIN: I can say the following. The United States is undertaking an
investigation of the transfer of computer technology to Russia. Under US
policy, computers that operate from 2000 to 7000 millions of theoretical
operations per second - that is called MTOPS -- require an individually
validated license for export to military and nuclear end users in
Russia.
In 1996, US companies sought Department of Commerce licenses to export US
high-performance computers to Chelyabinsk and Arzamas Weapons Labs in
Russia. The application stated that the computers were for use in
groundwater modeling and simulations. We did not approve these requests
because of the risk of diversion to nuclear weapons programs at these
facilities, and because Minister Mikhailov, the relevant minister in Russia,
stated that the purpose of the computers included work on the safety and
reliability of Russian nuclear weapons. Assisting Russia to maintain the
reliability of its nuclear weapons is contrary to US policy.
This is a matter that is the subject of an ongoing investigation by the
Department of Commerce and the US Customs Service. These investigations are
under the direction of the US Attorney's Office. We cannot comment on the
specific investigation. We did, however, once it became clear that the
Russians had certain computers -- that is, on January 13, 1997, when the
Russians announced that it had acquired the two high performance computers
for these two facilities -- we immediately commenced an investigation and
sought Russian assistance in the investigation. We also sought return
of the computers or some other mutually acceptable solution.
Over the next several months, the United States continued to press this
issue at the highest levels with the Russians. We noted that Russian
refusal to cooperate in finding a mutually acceptable solution would
jeopardize joint US-Russian cooperation and would result in tightening of
US export controls vis-a-vis Russia.
In late September, Russian officials informally broached the idea of having
the computers transferred to other Russian facilities with US monitoring.
We view this idea with interest and hope the Russian Government makes a
formal proposal that we can evaluate, including details on what the
alternative facilities might be and how the end use would be different.
That is the status of the two computers you asked about.
QUESTION: Is it a creative suggestion or is it within the known
boundaries, do you happen to know if American sales - in other words, if
there is a monitoring provision, does that connect under the rules?
MR. RUBIN: All of these, in a sense, are cases of first impression in
this policy because this is the first time, I think, as you may have noted
in some of the reporting on this, that experts from Russia and the United
States have found themselves in a situation where they are engaged in this
kind of cooperation. The point is that we have a lot of export controls
that are designed to make sure that when a sensitive product is sold that
its end-use is non-military.
If the facility and the end-use is determined to be acceptable, then we
would view this proposal with interest and would get back to the Russians
with the formal discussion and probably get into the details of this.
But let me emphasize, we view this as a very serious matter. Nonproliferation
is one of the highest priorities, if not the highest priority, for the
Secretary and the President. We want to be sure that our export control
systems are kept as clear and workable as possible. We have made clear to
the Russians throughout the CTB negotiations that high-performance
computers are simply not something they're going to be able to obtain for
the purpose of checking the reliability of their nuclear weapons. If they
want to spend their efforts on that deterrent, it shouldn't be assisted by
these kind of computers.
QUESTION: Is the investigation focusing on end-use? What I'm trying to
ask you is whether the scale, the type of computer is an established fact.
You're not investigating what kind of computer it is, are you?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I am wary, whenever we start the question with an
investigation...
QUESTION: I know.
MR. RUBIN: And I'm inclined to refer you to the Justice Department. As I
indicated in my lengthy remarks, it's Customs and Commerce, overseen by a
US attorney - a Justice Department official.
Let me try to answer the question I think you were getting at. There is no
question that the Russians have computers, and we believe they are
computers that they specifically requested a license for that we turned
down. We believe they are at locations precisely where we didn't want them
to be. That is why we consider this a very serious matter. That is why we
have raised it at the highest levels with the Russian Government. That's
why we're going to continue to work to come up with an acceptable
solution.
QUESTION: One last - can I get one, very quick last question?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Relevant only this week, maybe. Is this the type of computer
that if the Chinese produced the properly phrased pledge of nonproliferation,
they would be eligible to receive from eager American manufacturers? IBM's
not the only eager American manufacturer.
MR. RUBIN: At the risk of incorrectly stating the elaborate export
control system, what I believe we are hoping to be able to achieve with
China - if we receive the necessary assurances - is an agreement that will
permit China to develop nuclear energy with American know-how and American
companies involved.
We will only pursue that agreement if the President believes the highest
possible standards of nonproliferation have been met. This is an agreement
about changed Chinese proliferation practices, not about US commercial
diplomacy. If we believe that we have achieved the necessary assurances
that China will not be assisting non-nuclear weapon states from becoming
nuclear weapon states, the President would be in a position to make that
determination.
We believe additional progress has been made in that area. Substantial
progress had been made prior to the visits. The deal is not done yet. And
if the President makes the determination, what that would be focused on -
again, in the hypothetical formulation, or the subjunctive clause - that
would be about nuclear energy, not this kind of computer.
I would refer you to the Commerce Department to get a complete list.
Basically this is the kind of computer that you have to not only specify
what it's for, but that you have a single end user. It's a single item
export control, as opposed to a broad category that you just get permission
to sell. Every time you want to sell one of these, you've got to get a
specific license.
QUESTION: Go back to the Russian computers. What does this say to you,
though, about the credibility of the Russian Government? And why are you
even entertaining the possibility of some kind of a deal with them that
would allow them to keep these computers, when they acquired them under
false pretenses anyway?
MR. RUBIN: This is a matter under investigation, and I'm not going to be
able to comment specifically on the investigation.
We made a decision that the original request ought to be turned down,
precisely because of the risk that the end-use might be nuclear weapons
reliability or design. If, as a result of negotiated arrangements, the end-
use does not contribute to that purpose, that would be a different story.
In other words, a specific request was made to us about these computers
going to specific facilities that we believed, if implemented, would yield
possible inherent knowledge and capability in this nuclear weapons
reliability program; and so we said no.
Clearly, computers arrived in Russia. At what stage they are in, to the
extent their operational or not, I am not in a position to tell you at this
point. But if, after investigating the matter and working with the Russians,
we were to conclude that the computers would not end up posing the risk --
the very risk that caused us to turn the original application down -- then
the policy objective would be met.
QUESTION: But my question still stands; and, that is, if the Russians
acquired these computers and are using them in a way that you didn't want
them to use them from the beginning, why would you give them a second
chance to negotiate a deal that they could then violate?
MR. RUBIN: Again, the premise of your question assumes that they are
already being used for a purpose that we didn't want them to be used for.
All I can tell you is that the transfer of computers and the application of
those computers to a program of nuclear weapons is a many- month-long
process. It is not like you arrive with your high-performance computer in
its box and you open it up and start using it. It takes many, many, many
months for it to be fully integrated into the kind of program that
we would have problems with.
If, prior to that point, we have adequate safeguards in place to assure us
that the computers will not be used for that purpose that we reject, that
would be a horse of a different color and then we might be prepared to
entertain that proposal and to discuss it with the Russians.
I'm not saying we are going to accept the Russian proposal. What I'm saying
is that we found this specific idea interesting and we are prepared to
discuss it with them. But the bottom line is, we view this as a very
serious matter that the Russians obviously obtained these computers and it
is a matter that is so serious that it has been brought up at the highest
levels in our discussions with Russians.
QUESTION: In the story that has triggered all this discussion, there was
a suggestion that there was a deal made, that in exchange for signing on to
the Test Ban Treaty that we left them -- the Russians -- with the
impression that they could go ahead and buy these computers. According to
the article, Mikhailov actually pulled out a letter from Clinton or
something suggesting such.
MR. RUBIN: If you read the next sentence in the article in a publication
whose name I will not mention because I don't mention publications from
this podium, he specifically acknowledges that it is not an explicit
promise to provide this kind of technology. Without getting into that
letter, what I can say to you is that at no time during the negotiations of
the Comprehensive Test Ban or subsequently did we ever make a statement
that could be fairly construed as indicating a US commitment to provide
Russia access to these kinds of computers.
What we did do is make clear to the Russians that we were prepared to
engage in extensive scientific exchange and that we were prepared to have
those exchanges be at the unclassified level. We did not provide any
reasonable basis for them to draw this conclusion. When they first started
to suggest it, we took every reasonable step we could to explain to them
that they were under a fundamental misimpression. By the time this happened,
I think the Russians had no illusions that we thought this was okay.
QUESTION: Jamie, if the computer winds up in permissible use, do you
still have a violation if a sale was made, a transfer was made, behind the
government's back -- a furtive transaction? In other words, in answer to
Carol, do you say the government is willing - horse of a different color -
if it turns out it is not being used in a suspicious way --
MR. RUBIN: I was trying to simplify a very complex issue.
QUESTION: Yes, a horse of a different color is a nice turn of phrase, but
did IBM or whoever the company is, violate American law by engaging in a
deal that didn't have the US' approval, however happy the use of the
computer may be.
MR. RUBIN: Fair enough. The question that I was trying to address,
however effectively, was the Russian side of it. As far as the American
company side of it is concerned, we have policies and laws in effect
precisely to protect against these kinds of efforts. There is an ongoing
investigation. We consider this a very serious matter. It is being pursued
as a criminal matter or it may be a civil - please forgive me if I got that
wrong. It is an investigation
about whether US companies violated American law --
QUESTION: By doing this.
MR. RUBIN: By doing this, period. Absolutely.
QUESTION: Jamie, can you explain why it is a US policy to oppose
verification simulation by computers? I thought it was the US policy that
it was a pretty good idea -- better than the alternative, which is actual
testing.
MR. RUBIN: It is our view -- and you haven't stated the words exactly
right. It is not about verification technology. It is about whether by
using computers that we have the Russians will be in a better position to
insure the capabilities of their nuclear arsenal.
QUESTION: Yes, proofing of -
MR. RUBIN: Reliability testing, or inherently in reliability testing
might be developmental testing for better weapons. We are not going to
assist Russia in maintaining a nuclear deterrent. We are going to try to
provide Russia as much scientific exchange as possible at the unclassified
level to assist them in technical scientific exchange. We are prepared in
many cases to provide significant assistance when it comes to the security
of nuclear weapons or nuclear material. But as far as just making their
nuclear testing, their scientific program better, we don't think that
is a particularly wise use of American technology.
QUESTION: Can you confirm press reports accusing Horacio Serpa, the
candidate from Colombia of links to the narcos?
MR. RUBIN: We are aware that Colombian presidential candidate Horacio
Serpa is under investigation in Colombia for his alleged role in the 1995
campaign finance scandal, in which the drug cartels contributed $6 million
to the campaign of President Samper. We are following this case closely and
we will continue to review the information as it comes in.
QUESTION: Can I follow up on that? Can you say whether the US does and
did have solid information on him as Newsweek reported today?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know what was exactly said in any particular
publication, but what I can tell you is that we are following this case
closely and we will continue to review the information as it comes
in.
QUESTION: If the United States Government had such information, would it
release it publicly?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think it is our practice to release information if it
is based on access that we consider confidential and privileged.
QUESTION: Cuba. Jamie, this morning, Mack McLarty said that the policy of
the United States is not a successful one for Cuba. Can you give us the
details on that?
MR. RUBIN: I understood that there were news accounts of his comments
that concluded that, but knowing Mr. McLarty the way I do, and knowing the
confidence the Secretary has in him and the President has in him, I did
check into it and as I understand it, that is not what he said.
What he said was that we and the Europeans have had different approaches to
Cuba; but Cuba is still totalitarian; Castro is still there. So neither of
our approaches has succeeded in achieving the desired objective, which is
democracy in Cuba.
QUESTION: But he was talking about the US embargo. And he says Castro is
still there.
MR. RUBIN: That's a fact.
QUESTION: So that is a successful one?
MR. RUBIN: We will consider our policy the right one to pursue, as far as
I know, up until the day that democracy returns to Cuba. We believe that
the best way to promote democracy in Cuba is to continue the sanctions we
have in place, to continue our policies; and that around the world, it has
been proven that with patience even the dinosaur communism of Castro can
fall.
QUESTION: Jamie, there seems to be some concern that - or criticism that
the United States is not going to get enough from China on the summit, no
demonstration about human rights in terms of freeing dissidents. Also,
there seems to be the view that the summit won't result in an agreement for
China's ascension into the WTO. How do you respond to such criticisms?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, I would say that our policy towards China
and our desire to have this summit is not predicated on breakthroughs in
the areas that you mentioned. We believe that China is an important country
in the world. It has 1.2 billion people. We need to engage with China. It
doesn't mean we have to agree with or endorse their policies. But we have
mutual interests, and from a national security perspective, the more
success we have in getting China to join the international norms on
nonproliferation, the more success we have in getting China to work with us
on security problems like North Korea's nuclear capabilities or peace on
the Korean Peninsula, the more success we have in getting China to
work with us on matters like Cambodia, on law enforcement, on international
drug trafficking, on terrorism - the better the national security of the
United States is.
That's why we have to maintain a relationship with China. That's what this
summit is about - having across-the-board ties, having discussion so that
we can expand areas of cooperation and minimize areas of difference.
The two specific cases you mentioned - I'm not going to preview what will
or won't happen over the next couple of days. I will say that the test for
this summit is not what happens over the next two days; the test is what
happens in our relationship with China over the coming years. Do we develop
a relationship that will enable us to pursue our interests? And are we
doing it in a way consistent with our values? As Secretary Albright said
over the weekend, we will never have a fully normal relationship with
China so long as its human rights practices don't change. We intend to
continue to raise our concerns about human rights over and over again at
the highest possible levels with China so that some day the kind of
jailings and arrests of dissidents that we so strongly object to stop - or
at least those people are released.
QUESTION: Speaking of human rights, has the Secretary decided on a
coordinator for Tibetan affairs?
MR. RUBIN: I have no announcement for you on that.
QUESTION: You said that there's no deal yet on the nuclear side. But how
is this deal going to come together? Is it going to take - will it not come
together until - well, ultimately it won't come together until Jiang and
the President meet. But I mean, is the Secretary going to meet with Qian
Qichen when he gets to town? Is there any plan for that kind of preparatory
--
MR. RUBIN: There are officials that are in regular contact, and have been
for some number of days now, at the medium levels, who are reporting in a
variety of developments to their superiors, including Secretary Albright
and through Mr. Berger to the President. That process continues.
As I said, we have made significant additional progress in recent weeks in
these discussions to achieve our objective, which is to make sure that
China's nuclear cooperation with Iran stops. But whether the type of
commitments we've received meet the threshold of clear and unequivocal
assurances that the law specifies, and that the President would, and the
Secretary would want to ensure before recommending such an agreement is
something I'm not in a position to report to you.
But I would urge those of you who are in a position to comment on this
subject one way or another, to take into account the fact that over the
last five years, there has been a sea change in Chinese policies and
practices on nonproliferation. Whether it's in chemical weapons - joining
the Chemical Weapons Treaty; whether it's joining the Nonproliferation
Treaty; whether it's signing the Comprehensive Test Ban; whether it's
making direct commitments to the United States on missile technology;
whether it's promising not to assist unsafeguarded reactors - these are
things that your colleagues in this briefing room thought would never
happen five years ago with the Chinese Government.
They have happened. There have been major changes. Practices have changed;
policies have changed. If indeed these assurances are deemed sufficient, it
will be taking place in a context in which the United States has succeeded
in bringing the Chinese Government into the international rules of the game
when it comes to this all-important issue.
QUESTION: I just want to get the --
QUESTION: -- five years.
MR. RUBIN: I use that - you could go back before that.
QUESTION: Well, you could say four years and ten months, to be more
specific to the Clinton Administration.
MR. RUBIN: No, I believe that the --
QUESTION: You're taking credit - the Clinton Administration is taking
credit for sea changes in Chinese behavior --
MR. RUBIN: Barry, I specifically used five years, and I specifically
meant the Bush Administration. I am suggesting that in the area of
nonproliferation, if you go back and look at the '89, '90, '91, '92 period
and you see what the kind of problems were that were raised out there, and
you fast forward to 1997, you've gotten enormous progress. There's been a
sea change that is the result of a committed United States policy of both
the final years of President Bush and President Clinton and the --
QUESTION: So the process began in the Bush Administration, and the
current President of the United States ran against Bush's China policy -
accused him of coddling the Chinese. But in reflection, it turns out the
sea change began under George Bush.
MR. RUBIN: No, Barry, you're being engaged in debate mode.
QUESTION: No - you said five years. That's not an accidental number.
MR. RUBIN: Barry, what I was talking about was nonproliferation.
QUESTION: I know.
MR. RUBIN: Not human rights - where there was a difference of view during
the campaign, which you are referring to. So let's please be clear on what
the issue is. The issue is nonproliferation. I don't believe there were
dramatic statements by any of the candidates for whatever office in that
period of time. I'm talking about nonproliferation; and in that area, there
has been major change, and that's what I'm pointing to.
QUESTION: Can I just get a clarification? But there are no plans for the
Secretary and Qian to have an llth-hour meeting before the signing --
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't rule it out. I will not rule out any meetings like
that to deal with a whole number of issues. There are mid-level officials
meeting. Often in this process, the mid-levels officials think that they
can get some progress if it's kicked up the chain, and they might. I
wouldn't rule out that they would ask the Foreign Ministers to engage.
QUESTION: Is there any change on expectations on human rights? Last week,
despite an appeal - and there's been more than one appeal, of course, the
Administration, State Department said that there was no - they knew of no
imminent release of high-profile, political, pro-democracy movement
prisoners.
MR. RUBIN: We have long said that there should not be detention and
arrest of political dissidents. We don't believe they should be in jail; we
believe they should be released. That has been a policy that we have had
for some time.
Secretary Albright has raised this issue repeatedly with her counterpart.
It's something the Chinese know we feel very strongly about. If there are
to be any changes in that, I'm not aware of it. That doesn't mean that it
can't happen. We are always going to be hopeful that the Chinese will do
the right thing when it comes to political dissidents. But as of now, I
don't expect any imminent release in the next day.
QUESTION: Has the State Department heard of the coup attempt in Suriname?
And do you have a comment on it?
MR. RUBIN: The government of Suriname announced on October 26 that on the
night of October 25 national security forces arrested a group allegedly
planning an attempted coup, and took 11 suspects into custody. We
understand that two more suspects have since been detained. No more details
are available at this time. We are closely watching events as they
unfold.
Our own position of supporting a democratically elected government is, of
course, clear. No Americans are reported to be involved, and there has been
no violence or danger to the public.
QUESTION: Which government are you dealing with?
MR. RUBIN: I'll get back to you on the details.
QUESTION: Can I ask a question about the Middle East? About ten days ago,
you suggested that the Foreign Minister of Israel and his Palestinian
counterpart will be coming here at the end of the month. Over the weekend,
David Levy has been saying that he has no plans to come because he has no
firm instructions. Do you know if he is still planning to come? Is that
meeting still on?
MR. RUBIN: The next step in the Middle East peace process is for the
Secretary to host a three-way meeting with Foreign Minister Levy and Abu
Mazen. We believe that that meeting should take place as soon as possible.
Internal deliberations are now taking place in Israel on the substance and
timing of this three-way meeting.
We hope these deliberations will conclude, leading to a meeting soon. We
want this process to progress. Time should not be lost. So we would like to
see these internal Israeli deliberations finished, and a meeting be held as
soon as possible.
QUESTION: Does your expectation that it would take place by the end of
the month still hold?
MR. RUBIN: We would certainly hope so.
QUESTION: Jamie, you have some further interest in Colombia. I'd like to
start by asking, is Colombia in deep trouble, as testified by Director
Freeh -echoing the Russian Ambassador to Colombia's view about arms flow
from Russia into Colombia? And I would ask specifically, does the United
States have an interest in providing the helicopters that will help the
government against the FARC, who have sophisticated weaponry? Are we going
to provide them helicopters and weapons to counter the guerrillas?
MR. RUBIN: Well, nothing has changed as far as our view of the overall
problem with the Colombian Government in the area of certification and
drugs.
As far as the helicopters are concerned, we have long said that if this
kind of assistance is necessary to fight drug traffickers, that we are
prepared to provide it. We have an end-use system in place to make sure
that any equipment like this is used in a way that doesn't violate the
human rights of the Colombian people.
We also recognize that, increasingly, in several cases there is a definite
and growing link between guerrillas and narcotics traffickers in Colombia.
Although not all guerrilla fronts are involved in the drug trade, nor are
the guerrillas involved in all aspects of the drug trade, we have seen
increasing evidence that they provide security for fields and labs,
collecting money from the narcotics traffickers for these services, and
that at times they transport illegal narcotics. By law, US assistance may
be used to confront anyone who is directly involved in narcotics trafficking.
So the bottom line is, we are prepared to see our equipment used, provided
its purpose is the fighting of drugs. To the extent that there are direct
links between guerrillas who are assisting drug traffickers, yes, it would
be involved in that effort. Any suggestion that we are providing helicopters
to the Colombian Government in its broad-based civil conflict with
guerrillas is in correct.
QUESTION: You sounded a bit piqued at the Israeli Government. Do you
really feel that they are dragging their feet on this issue?
MR. RUBIN: I thought I was still piqued at Barry.
QUESTION: Well, make it clear for me.
MR. RUBIN: The Middle East peace process goes through its ups and downs.
The Secretary believes that, as a result of momentum that she helped create
and the President helped create on her trip and in subsequent meetings in
New York, that time is not a good that should be wasted, and that internal
deliberations are fine and good and they need to occur. Every democracy
and government has important issues that need to be raised internally
before one can engage in a negotiation. But time is being lost.
So we would like these internal deliberations to conclude. We would like
these meetings to take place as soon as possible. Yes, it is frustrating
that an internal deliberation is holding up the Middle East peace process,
and time is not to be wasted here.
QUESTION: It seems sort of like an internal matter -- an internal
governmental matter in Israel and, yet, you seem to be advising them on a
different matter.
MR. RUBIN: I am not crossing that important line between an internal
matter where you take a position on the side of one or the other, which is
what we do not like to do here from the State Department podium. I am
merely saying that we would like to not see time be wasted in the Middle
East process process because time is important, and it's being lost. We
would like the internal deliberations to conclude. We would like to work
with Foreign Minister Levy in negotiating on the subjects that you are
familiar with, the four-part agenda that the Secretary would be in a
position to take up as soon as this meeting can be scheduled.
QUESTION: And can you say -- to whatever degree you can say, what are
these internal deliberations about?
MR. RUBIN: I am not in a position to speculate. Obviously, there has been
a lot of public discussion of what the reasons are, why the Foreign
Minister is reluctant to come here. I am not going to get in the middle of
that. What I am trying to indicate is that we would like those internal
deliberations to end and the meetings to start.
QUESTION: In connection with the Sheinbein case, there is now another
case in which a person convicted of a crime in Israel is now being deported
to the United States and released on eight years of, I don't know, freedom
I guess, before he can return to Israel. What is happening on the Sheinbein
case? Do you have any reaction to this other case?
MR. RUBIN: I don't see the connection. In the case of the one, we are
talking about a murder that happened in the United States where we believe
that the Israeli Government should have done its best to cooperate in the
extradition of someone back for justice in the United States. The second
case is an incident that occurred inside Israel.
As far as the Sheinbein case is concerned, we are continuing to work with
Israeli officials to provide the best possible evidence and support for
extradition. It is not surprising that it is taking some time to move
forward.
QUESTION: Mark Minton met with Li Gun, the ambassador from North Korea to
the UN. They met at Stanford University, and they talked about the four-way
peace -- preparatory peace talks and that they would perhaps resume in New
York on November 10 to the 13. Can you confirm that? And, also, can you
confirm - it said that they also discussed a formal peace conference for
early December in Geneva.
MR. RUBIN: I have not seen the report you are referring to. We are always
hopeful that the North Koreans will be willing to get back to the
discussions on a serious effort to get to the four-party peace talks. I
suspect this is a subject that is going to have some prominence during the
next couple of days, as one of the other parties, in addition to the United
States, is China. We will be working with the Chinese Government to try to
see what we can both do to promote an early activation of this proposal.
When I have additional information on any working level meetings that could
lead to the specific time frames that you mentioned, I will get back to
you. I don't have any information for you on that.
QUESTION: Jamie, on North Korea, one more, please. Did the food survey
team arrive in North Korea. If they did, which part of the country now they
are allowed to go to for the investigation?
MR. RUBIN: Right. I am under the impression they did arrive, and they
have begun their work. Communications are not terrific, and I've been
advised that it will not be our intention from the team or from here to
provide a daily update of who they met with, who they saw and where they
went. But when they are finished with their work, we will try to develop
the most appropriate opportunity for all of you to ask them questions.
QUESTION: When will they be back in the US?
MR. RUBIN: I think it's a five or six-day trip, but I'll get you that
information.
QUESTION: Jamie, have you had a read-out, anything at all, on how Jiang
Zemin has enjoyed his brief stay so far in the United States? Have you had
any reports on how he's enjoying it, or how you would characterize he's
enjoying it? And secondly, are you concerned about protests and dissidents
greeting him? The Chinese line apparently has been that if the United
States is a good host, it would keep the dissidents down. Large protests
are expected. There's a hearing in the House of Representatives tomorrow,
featuring Harry Wu. Are you concerned, or are you worried about the
Chinese concern that this would undermine the summit?
MR. RUBIN: We will certainly do all we can, as good hosts, to provide a
hospitable environment for another head of state. But we are a democracy;
and in a democracy, people have the right to speak out and explain their
views. One man's First Amendment might be another country's civil
disturbance. We believe that in the United States, expressing one's view is
part and parcel of being an American. We don't intend to encourage
extraordinary efforts to prevent that.
So I wouldn't be surprised if there were expressions of different points of
view during the course of the visit of the Chinese President. That's to be
expected. We certainly warned them of that. As Mr. Berger and others
pointed out, many of these stops were specifically requested by the
Chinese. So we'll see.
As far as how it's going so far, I'd actually prefer to delay comment until
they arrive in Washington.
QUESTION: Jamie, just on the protests - does the Clinton Administration
think they're justified - the protests?
MR. RUBIN: We don't take position on every placard that's written and
every sign that's painted or every disturbance that is made. We certainly
support the right of Americans to make their views known, but we're not
going to get into the habit of giving a scorecard for every protester.
QUESTION: In general, these protests focus on Beijing's human rights
record, which you all are also protesting, but in a different way.
MR. RUBIN: You've answered your own question. But as far as us making a
specific pro or con, up or down, thumbs up, thumbs down, give the protester
in the corner a ten or a 9 or a 7 or a 2, we're not going to do that. We do
have concerns about China's human rights. We put out very important
documents - human rights reports - from this podium, and we explain our
concerns. But as far as taking a position on the substantive content of an
American citizen's sign or protest, we don't do that.
QUESTION: On Iraq, what's the United States going to do about Iraq and
its threat to defy or pull out of cooperating with UNSCOM altogether?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we are concerned by statements coming out of Baghdad;
and indeed, those that emanated from Iraqi representatives to the UN, even
prior to the passage of the recent resolution.
The parliamentary statement aside, we have not yet heard from the
government of Iraq what, if anything, it plans to do in reaction to the UN
Security Council resolution. What matters is whether the government of Iraq
is going to cooperate with the UN Special Commission or not. Iraq has the
obligation to cooperate. I would emphasize to you, none of the to-ing and
fro-ing that you saw in the Security Council changes the fact that all the
members of the Security Council believe Iraq has an obligation to
comply with the UN Special Commission. They have all demonstrated --
although they may have tactical views on this question of when to ratchet
up additional sanctions -- that a failure to cooperate would be a very
serious matter and would have serious consequences for Iraq. What those
would be I am not going to speculate; but I can tell you from watching this
episode up close with the Secretary in New York that the Security Council
has time and again showed its willingness to back up the UN Special
Commission when Iraq seeks to shut it down.
QUESTION: But you haven't heard anything from Baghdad so far as to what
it is going to do vis-a-vis the parliamentary --
MR. RUBIN: The last time I checked, Iraq is not a democracy. Decisions
are not made by its parliament. We have not heard anything from the
leadership that is consistent with what may or may not have been said in a
parliament like that.
QUESTION: Can I follow up with respect to what --
MR. RUBIN: The protesters?
QUESTION: No. I just want to backtrack just - I had a little window, but
Carol asked you and switched topics.
MR. RUBIN: Which is?
QUESTION: Just back to something that Sid had said. You said that it is
not your practice to take positions on every placard.
MR. RUBIN: So it was the protesters.
QUESTION: Well, protesters and other things. Freedom of press, I can ask
you, right?
MR. RUBIN: Since this is a democracy, you can ask anything you want. I
also don't have to answer.
QUESTION: That's true, and you are good at - you're diplomatic about
doing that, which is why we come here every day. The Secretary on "Meet the
Press" did say that the Chinese President, Mr. Jiang Zemin - he is not
going to get a fuzzy warm reception, I think were her words to that,
something to that effect.
MR. RUBIN: Pretty close.
QUESTION: I couldn't verbatim it for you. I think she was referring to
human rights and the protests that are expected. So that would lead many to
believe that she, herself, would be endorsing the protest. Is that a fair
assessment -- that she is endorsing the human rights protest?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary certainly added a new word to the art of
diplomacy by describing this as not "fuzzy." I have been struggling to
figure out what to say when asked what that means.
So let me put it this way. Secretary Albright in her own meetings with
Chinese officials has made clear our deep concern about human rights in
China. The Chinese are under no illusions that that is our view and that is
our policy. Nor are they under any illusions that America is a democracy
and that we have made very clear the limits that exist in a democracy in
imposing any sort of curtailment of the freedom of Americans to protest on
dozens of subjects related to China. It is not just about one subject.
Again, I am not going to get in the position of commenting on specific
American citizens' views, other than to agree with the premise of some of
the questions I have received, that to the extent that any commentary from
American citizens reflects the same position of the Secretary and the
President, that we have deep and abiding concerns about Chinese policies in
the human rights area and that we want to see them change. I cannot
comment on any specific protester or any specific placard or any specific
disturbance that may or may not occur.
QUESTION: On Colombia?
MR. RUBIN: Let's see if I have anything additional to add on Colombia.
QUESTION: Thank you. You referred to Horacio Serpa, and I was wondering
how disappointed or how concerned is the US about the fact that one of the
favorite candidates for president next year is being questioned and is
under investigation for possible links to the cartels?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I am not going to get into any specific examination of
those charges. I was very clear on our position on those charges and I can
repeat it for you. We do have a problem with the Colombian Government in
this area. We have said that before. That is why we have not certified
them. That is our view of the current Colombian Government. As far as the
specific candidate you mentioned, I would merely be repeating what I said
earlier.
QUESTION: Today is Helms-Burton, also. Do you have something on
that?
MR. RUBIN: On what?
QUESTION: Helms-Burton.
MR. RUBIN: Nothing new on that.
(The briefing concluded at 3:35 P.M.)
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