U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #143, 97-10-03
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
985
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, October 3, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS/DEPARTMENT
1 Secretary To Travel to Latin America with the President
Week of Oct. 12
1 Apology from Government of Nigeria for Incident at Farewell
for Amb. Carrington
PERSIAN GULF
1 Increased US Military Maneuvers in Persian Gulf
BOSNIA
2-4 Delivery of T-55 Tanks to Croatia /Details of "Train and
Equip" Program for Federation Forces/ Report of Import of
Secret Arms for Bosnian Muslims /Report of Arming of
Bosnian Serbs
4 Efforts to Expand Programming of Seized Stations/SFOR
Control of Access to Stations/Future Approach to US
Producers re: Programming
5-6 Amb. Gelbard Mtg. With Pres. Tudjman/Discussion of Issue of
Indicted War Criminals
PEACE PROCESS
6-7 Secretary's Comments on Settlement Activity
8 Amb. Ross Travel to Region
8 Talks to Begin in Washington DC October 13
CUBA
8 Trial of Walter Van der Veer/Consular Support to Mr. Van
der Veer/Postponement of Trial
9-10 Oct. 15 Target Date for Agreement on Principles for
Investment Protection under Title III
COLOMBIA
10-11 Gen. McCaffrey Mtg. With Pres. Samper in Upcoming Trip/
Discussion of Extradition Bill
ARMS CONTROL
11-12 Dept. of Defense Laser Test/Not a Treaty Violation/Impact
on Passage of START II by Russia
RUSSIA
12-13 Control and Security of Nuclear Weapons
GREECE
13-14 A/S Grossman Travel to Greece
DRoCONGO
14-15 Possible Dispatch of Special Envoy to Discuss Investigation
of War Crimes
CYPRUS
15-16 Nomination of Thomas Miller as Special Coordinator for
Cyprus
16 Amb Holbrooke Mtg with Taver Etkin
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #143
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1997 12:50, P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. We're sorry for the delay. This is what happens
when you try to re-merge a press office from New York and a press office
from Washington. I have one announcement -- it will come as a major shock
but it's true. Secretary Albright will be accompanying the President on his
trip to Latin America next week. The White House will be giving you details
about that trip, but I just wanted to let you know she will be going.
So she'll have a whole week in Washington.
Secondly, on September 24th and again on October 1st, we condemned the
disruption by Nigerian security personnel of a farewell reception for
Ambassador Walter Carrington hosted by Nigerian pro-democracy and human
rights groups. We noted we had convoked the Nigerian Charge d'Affaires to
inform him that the disruption was unacceptable. We had also asked the
Nigerian government at senior levels to provide an official explanation and
to hold accountable those responsible for the incident.
On October 3rd, today, the Nigerian Ambassador formally conveyed to the
Department of State his government's apology for what he characterized as a
"most unfortunate incident." The Ambassador underscored that the Nigerian
Government has the utmost respect for Ambassador Carrington and that it has
no intention of slighting or otherwise threatening Ambassador Carrington
or the U.S. Embassy in Lagos.
We understand the Nigerian Government will provide us with a written
explanation of this incident within several days. We welcome this apology
and its acknowledgment of the obligation to allow Ambassador Carrington and
the US Embassy to conduct diplomatic business in a safe and secure
environment. We look forward to receiving the written explanation and
continue to expect that those officials responsible for the incident will
be held accountable.
George?
QUESTION: There were reports of beefed up U.S. military deployments in
the Persian Gulf. Have you heard anything about that?
MR. RUBIN: : The Pentagon will be talking about the issue of the carrier
and the reasons for its change in status, and so I really can't comment on
military movements.
QUESTION: Can you comment on the New York Times story today on Bosnian
Serb arms build-up and arms build-up generally in the region -- reports of
an Egyptian ship that has tanks on it that is being held in Ploce, and also
a disturbing report that a Russian general has provided Bosnian Serbs with
secret NATO satellite documents.
MR. RUBIN: The United States does not believe that the Sarajevo
government is engaged in a covert rearming effort outside of the U.S.-led
international train and equip program. The government in Sarajevo has given
the United States several assurances many times that it will continue to
implement the Dayton Agreement through peaceful means and has no plans to
resume fighting unilaterally in Bosnia..
Frankly, it would be stupid in the extreme for the Bosnian government to
slay the goose that's laying the golden egg. We are providing the Bosnian
government substantial amounts of equipment. We've been assisting the
Federation in training and equipping its military forces for 14 months.
Twelve other countries are involved in this program. I can give you some
details. The United States is providing approximately $100 million of draw-
down military equipment authorized by the Congress, including 45 M-60 tanks,
80 M-113 armored personnel carriers, small arms, communications equipment,
computer equipment for training. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have
donated equipment as well, including Howitzers, field guns, anti-aircraft
guns, tanks, reconnaissance vehicles.
In other words, we and several friendly countries are working together to
arm the combined Bosnian-Croat army for a very good reason; and that reason
points to what has been misunderstood in this debate for some time, which
is that the United States does not intend to stay in Bosnia forever. The
best way to insure that we can leave knowing there is a balance of power
between the parties and that one side will not be overwhelmed by the other,
is to engage in a train and equip program.
Now, obviously, there are some people who don't like this program, who
think that it's not wise to arm the Bosnians, and that's not news. For
those of you who have covered the war in Bosnia for years, you know that
there were often differences on this subject. Some people may have an
interest in exaggerating the possible rearming of the Bosnian government
and suggesting that something is going on covertly as a way of hyping this
issue when, frankly, the arming of Bosnia is quite overt and there is no
secret about it. I laid out some of the details.
As far as the ship is concerned, the United States can confirm that a
particular vessel that was referred to has ten T-55 tanks and spare parts
on board to be delivered under the train and equip program. NATO was
informed about the delivery long before its arrival in Croatian waters.
However, because of some procedural problems, the United States asked both
NATO and Croatia to delay approval for the ship to unload until these
problems could be resolved. We expect these issues to be resolved shortly
and the ship will be allowed to enter port and unload the tanks.
So it sounds like a mountain is being made out a molehill here when what
we're doing is very overtly, and for very good reason, arming the Bosnian
government so that they are in a position to defend themselves and
establish a balance of power. Furthermore, we are confident that given
SFOR's and NATO's coverage of the area, we would be in a position to detect
and seize any significant illicit arms shipments. SFOR patrols the roads,
controls the airspace, makes frequent inspections of weapons storage areas
in the Federation, and SFOR would be in a position to determine if illegal
weapons are being imported into Bosnia. We are not aware of any SFOR
report that this is the case and have no confirmed evidence that secret
arms shipments are going to the Bosnian Muslims. So that's a long
answer.
The short answer is that apparently, some officials that don't agree with
the wisdom of arming the Bosnians are making more out of this than it is.
We are quite open and up-front about the need to arm the Bosnian army. We
own the real estate in the area so we have every reason to believe we would
know if there were secret shipments, and we have no evidence of secret
shipments.
QUESTION: Okay, two things.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: The Iranians were in Bosnia before we were able to pressure
them at the end of the war, pressure Sarajevo at the end of the war, to get
them out. So it's not inconceivable that that connection is still being
made by people within the Bosnian government who want that connection to be
maintained, who don't necessarily don't want a strong US and NATO
involvement in that area. So that, at least, is a possibility and you
haven't addressed the issue of the rearming of the Bosnian Serbs and the
Russian handing over NATO --
MR. RUBIN: Rearming of the Bosnian Serbs? I don't understand. The
question would be?
QUESTION: Part of this report was dedicated to the fact that the Serbs
were rearming themselves within the last couple of weeks, that they were
getting arms from somewhere and arming above the levels one would assume
that were allowed under the Dayton Accords.
MR. RUBIN: I thought that the point was that they were deteriorating and
the situation is now one where the rearmed Bosnian Muslim-Croat army could
overwhelm the Bosnian Serbs. As far as that is concerned, the Bosnian Serb
army retains many of the advantages it held during the war despite recent
press reports that it may be weakening. They include numerical advantages
in heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. They
also have a significant strategic advantage through their continued
close military relationship with the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
We believe that those advantages still must be offset in order to put the
Bosnian Muslim-Croat army in a position to have a balance of power when our
troops leave.
So as far as the question of intelligence data, this is an issue that
should be addressed to NATO and they may have further information. I don't
have any information as to what photos were or weren't shared with the
Bosnian Serbs. But there is often a certain exaggeration of the significance
of that information. The Bosnian Serbs have visited Federation military
storage depots and have been invited to observe training activities. They
have been briefed in detail numerous times both in Pale and in Belgrade by
Ambassador James Pardew, who directs the train and equip program. They have
opportunities to observe equipment and training in the Federation;
therefore, they probably would learn a lot more about the Bosnian army
from those briefings by Ambassador Pardew than any intelligence information
might or might not teach them.
The third question I forgot.
QUESTION: I think you covered them all.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: Is the United States now satisfied that you managed to contain
the level of the hostile broadcasts coming out of Pale through the recent
action or are there still plans to use aerial radio jamming equipment that
I think is there at the moment?
MR. RUBIN: Well, right now we are working on programming to cover the gap
that exists now between the time available and the restructuring of the
broadcast management of all three parties that we're trying to create. SFOR
continues to be stationed at the transmitters and controls access to them.
Banja Luka television is on the air. The programming reaches about 75
percent of the Republika Srpska, and we are working with the international
community looking into ways to extend further the reach of the signal.
So we believe that we have this issue in hand to the extent that the
ability to transmit this propaganda that we had a problem with has been
stopped. Now what we're trying to do is make sure the result of all this is
some open, free programming that gives everyone a fair access in the lead-
up to the assembly elections and makes sure that the people of Bosnia and
the Serb part of Bosnia do not continue to receive a skewed version of
events and racist and hostile propaganda.
So we're working the problem. We still control the transmitters and there
have been a lot of meetings here in the Department and elsewhere to try to
set up assistance to the international community in its effort to control
the programming there so that this pattern of propaganda ends.
QUESTION: In the briefing yesterday we were told that some of the United
States broadcasters were being approached for programming that could - are
they going to get a chance to see the Simpsons?
MR. RUBIN: I've come back here twice this week -- Is it this week? -- and
both times I've had to say the same thing - "I think that statement was a
little premature." -- so maybe I should have stayed in New York. We hope to
be in contact with U.S. producers at the beginning of next week regarding
that.
Yes?
QUESTION: Ambassador Gelbard met this morning with President Tudjman. Can
you say whether or not they were able to reach an agreement on the, I
believe, seven indicted war criminals that Croatia -
MR. RUBIN: I spoke to Ambassador Gelbard a couple of hours ago. He said
he had a very long and productive meeting with President Tudjman. They
discussed the Dayton Accords. They discussed the situation in Eastern
Slavonia. He regarded it as a very positive meeting. There was substantial
agreement on steps that need to be taken to live up to the Erdut Agreement
in Eastern Slavonia. Currently the forces here would end in the middle of
January. There has been lagging implementation, and he felt as a result
of his meetings that President Tudjman was going to do and had done some
things he needed to do.
They also talked about steps that need to be taken in Bosnia. He was
pleased at the recent steps President Tudjman had taken in the area of
municipal elections. They worked on some Federation issues, some unification
issues. Ambassador Gelbard and President Tudjman did discuss the issue of
indicted war criminals. We, as you know, have been making very clear that
it's time for indicted war criminals to voluntarily turns themselves in.
President Tudjman assured him that he understood what we wanted and that he
was going to work very hard to achieve the results that we wanted.
We hope to have some results from that effort very soon.
QUESTION: Yesterday there was a statement put out that seemed to indicate
that the United States supported, if certain indicted war criminals were
brought to the Tribunal, that they would have a sort of a speedy process
whereby they would go through the trial. And I understood that this is one
of the concerns that the Croatian government had. Do you know if that is
what was discussed at all and whether there has been a commitment made that
if these individuals are turned over there would be a speedy process?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I understand with the statement - I haven't read it
as carefully as I should have -- but the point of it was that if you turn
yourself in, within three to five months you should get your trial. We
thought that was very important as an inducement to people to turn
themselves in. They're better off turning themselves in than not turning
themselves in.
I am sure that an aspect of their discussion on this issue was the US
determination to work with the Tribunal, as we have been a leading force in
the Tribunal from the beginning, to try to encourage that people will turn
themselves into the Tribunal by knowing that there will be serious
commitments by the Tribunal and the important countries in the world to try
to get speedy trials. We want speedy trials but, obviously, there are
certain logistical problems. We have been a strong supporter of the
Tribunal and we do want people there to get trials quickly. There are
limits, but we do support this three-to-five month statement that
the Tribunal had us put out yesterday, or we put out on their behalf,
and that's something that I'm sure came up.
QUESTION: Just to be specific about the seven Bosnian Croats, the Vitez
group that might turn up in The Hague, what is holding up their transfer?
Apparently, there are discussions going on. Can you tell us that?
MR. RUBIN: I just said that Ambassador Gelbard did discuss this with
President Tudjman. As you know, it's been a matter of discussion for some
weeks now between the United States and the Croatian government. As I said,
we hope there will be some results on this soon and it's not limited, you
know, to a particular group. There are a number of Bosnian Croat indictees
who we would like to see brought to justice, and to the extent that the
government in Croatia has leverage and influence and can provide an
inducement to those indictees to go to The Hague, that is something we
are pushing very hard for them to do.
Ambassador Gelbard said he had a good meeting and that we hope to have some
results soon. But as far as the specific details of what is holding it up,
obviously, it's not easy to get people to turn themselves in for trial, and
it's not clear the extent to which the Croatian government is doing
everything it can. We are working with them on the subject and we'll know
they are doing everything they can when the people show up in The
Hague.
QUESTION: Did Tudjman tell Gelbard, though, that the statement addressed
the concerns which the suspects had?
MR. RUBIN: I think that the Croatian government regarded the statement as
helpful, yes.
Any more on Bosnia? Let' s go to the Middle East.
QUESTION: I was wondering if you can tell us your policy on settlements,
if you can clarify more what the Secretary said.
MR. RUBIN: I know there was some confusion on this, so let me try to
explain it. For those of you who have ever been interviewed on a morning
show, it is an interactive process. Heads are nodded and words are stated
as a way of engaging in conversation. After the show, I spoke to Secretary
Albright and she told me that I could tell you that there was no intent on
her part to adjust the longstanding American policy not to make a grand
legal judgment about settlements. We have made a lot of judgments
about the wisdom of settlements, some from this podium and some from
many other fora, but this was specifically not intended to make a legal
judgment about settlements. It was part of a narrow technical answer to
what is permitted and prohibited by the Oslo Accords.
She was trying to make the point, which obviously wasn't fully successful,
that the issue is not legality; the issue is wisdom. She was saying that
she thought it is not wise, and it is unhelpful in many cases, for
activities to be conducted that purport to prejudge final status issues.
And so it is our position that settlement activity is unhelpful in many of
the cases that have come up recently. We are not intending to make a legal
judgment about this and she was not intending to do so in the grandest
sense.
QUESTION: Can I follow up? Two days ago -- the day the statement was made
-- in your answer, you said that Oslo does not prohibit settlement
activities. If Oslo does not mention an issue, does that make it legal?
MR. RUBIN: Well, this is the kind of issue that lawyers love to go round
and round on, and I, for very good reason, never went to law school and so
I'm not going to round and round on it with you. She was not intending to
make a legal judgment about settlements. She was trying to answer a narrow
technical question in the context of an interactive interview where you try
to make things simple for the American public because it's being read
in the morning, being watched in the morning, and there is a tendency to
try to simplify issues in the morning.
It was obviously misunderstood and so I'm here to tell you that we have, I
believe, stated before that Oslo didn't prohibit - and that's a very
careful formulation - did not prohibit. If you say it's not mentioned, then
it clearly did not prohibit if it's not mentioned.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) to the final status, which means nobody should
change anything on the ground before the final status arrive.
MR. RUBIN: Right. So it' s a technical point and it's an irrelevant point
to the point that the Secretary of State was trying to make, which is that
when it came to several settlements that she was asked about in New York,
including a question you may have asked about the houses in Efrat, she said
that this was unhelpful. Our view, our judgments, are going to be made on
what we think can contribute or take away from the peace process in
the Middle East, not grand legal judgments about specific actions. We have
resisted, and will continue to resist, making determinations about what
Oslo does and doesn't say.
QUESTION: So there has not been any change in US policy towards
settlements since the '70s, since the Carter days?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't want to get caught on that. I mean, all I can
say is the Secretary of State in that interview was not intending to make
any new statements about the grand legal judgment of the settlements in the
Middle East. I think we have exhausted that completely.
QUESTION: Cuba?
MR. RUBIN: Cuba, yes.
QUESTION: What can you tell us about --
QUESTION: Middle East.
MR. RUBIN: Middle East. Sorry. Yes, a couple more.
QUESTION: Earlier today it came out that the Pentagon is sending the USS
Nimitz to --
MR. RUBIN: I've answered this question. It's for the Pentagon. It was the
first question I got at the briefing.
QUESTION: So you won't comment at all on increased tensions?
MR. RUBIN: It's a Pentagon question on the deployment of ships.
Yes?
QUESTION: Is the US more concerned about the apparent continued Iranian
violations of the no-fly zone?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any new Iranian violation of the no-fly zone.
I can tell you that the United States intends to enforce the no-fly zone
with respect to Iraq, and that Iraq has been made well aware of our
determination to enforce that no-fly zone and we will do so. But as far as
ship movements, that's a Pentagon subject.
QUESTION: I just want to know if Monday's talks about talks, whether
you've got any details --if you could tell us when Ambassador Ross is going
to be going?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, he will be going to the Middle East and
will be discussing - now, that's not the talks about talks. That's the next
week. That's the talks about the committees. Next Monday the committees,
the liaison committee, will meet with Foreign Minister Levy and Abu Masen.
Dennis Ross will be part of that to try to work primarily on the issue
of the seaport and the airport and safe passage between the various
territories.
A week later in Washington there will be talks about talks with the four-
point agenda that you are all fully familiar with so I will not repeat.
Cuba.
QUESTION: What can you tell us about the trial of Walter VanDerVeer which
appears to have been postponed?
MR. RUBIN: The trial had been scheduled for today. It has been postponed
to allow Mr. VanDerVeer's legal representatives to arrive in Havana. We had
requested the Cuban government to facilitate the travel arrangements,
including expeditious visa issuance of Mr. VanDerVeer's legal representatives
to attend the trial. This morning, the Cuban government informed us that
they would accommodate our request. No new date has yet been set for
the trial.
As you know, according to the government, Mr. VanDerVeer is accused of
"armed action against Cuba." We have serious concerns about legal
proceedings in trials in Cuba and whether those proceedings meet international
standards to to give people fair trials, so we are making clear that as
part of our consular service we will be watching this closely. Our consular
officers have visited him regularly. We have sought to assist him with his
dietary needs, to insure that he has access to a lawyer, to the prison
doctor, and that messages are passed between him and his wife. We
have a full disclosure Privacy Act waiver from Mr. VanDerVeer.
Just to repeat, when this first happened we emphasized our concerns about
their legal system. On August the 28th, our officer in the US Interests
Section did so, and we have long-standing concerns about getting a fair
trial in Cuba.
QUESTION: Are we still on Latin America?
QUESTION: Are we still on Cuba?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: His lawyer in Miami was saying still yesterday that he's not
allowed to go to Cuba, by the Cuban government, not by the American
government.
MR. RUBIN: Right. Hopefully, that's changed. I think what I just said -
and I'll repeat it for you - the trial that had been scheduled for today
has been postponed to allow Mr. VanDerVeer's legal representatives to
arrive in Havana.
QUESTION: Another thing on Cuba that has nothing to do with this?
MR. RUBIN: Still on this case?
QUESTION: Yes.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: Is the postponement of the trial at all linked to the warning
that you put out for Americans to be careful who may be in Havana because
of the recent bombings.
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard that that's the reason for a delay. I think
the delay, we hope, is so that he can get legal representation.
QUESTION: The Cubans have been requesting that we, that this government,
issue a warning about the bombings and to show concern over them, and this
seems to have been done --
MR. RUBIN: I can certainly say we are always concerned about bombings,
wherever they are.
QUESTION: Has there been any sharing of information about the bombings?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any. Yes?
QUESTION: This 12 days to go for this time - for the WTO that the
Europeans have said, I heard that in these last days there were again some
more conversations. Can you tell us what the situation is?
MR. RUBIN: What I can say about that is that we have been working closely
with our European allies to try to work through this problem. We are making
progress on a number of fronts. There are a lot of difficult issues
remaining. October 15 remains our target date to reach a set of principles
and disciplines for the strengthening of investment protection so that the
people whose properties were expropriated have better protection. It's
too early to tell whether we will achieve that.
As you know, we said that we will continue to consult with the Congress. We
will continue to work with our allies and we will continue to try to
ratchet up the pressure when it comes to human rights and democracy on the
Cuban government. And to the extent that process is proceeding, we told the
Congress we would be proceeding with a view to waiving again the application
of Title III lawsuits. So that is our policy. We have some time left to try
to get agreement on those disciplines with regard to investment and to work
through the problems of greater support for our policy of putting
pressure on the government of Cuba to improve its policies.
QUESTION: This matter of law with Total and Iran and France and this new
additional problem -- is this not interfering or making it more difficult
to reach an agreement, because I think both laws are negotiated at the same
time, yes?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the people who negotiate these laws tend to be the same
people, but I don't know that they are the same negotiation. It is
certainly true that in any negotiation there is a frustration level that
can be increased if the problems go across the board and all around the
world, and I am sure that the last thing that people working on the Cuba
situation wanted was to have European negotiators who were even more
irritated as a result of the Iran-Libya situation.
But at the end of the day these decisions are made based on policy grounds
and not the irritation level of officials. If we can get agreement on what
needs to be done with regard to investment and on Cuba, we will get an
agreement and it will be based on Cuba. If we can get an agreement on what
we need to do to ratchet up the pressure on Iran, it will be based on views
on what we should do on Iran. So they are not connected other than the
atmospherics and the convenience for all of you to report two fights at
once.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) General McCaffrey's trip to South America?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Is he going to meet with Samper?
MR. RUBIN: General McCaffrey expects to meet with a broad array of
Colombian officials during his trip to Colombia later this month. He will
be discussing our joint effort against drug trafficking in that country. A
meeting with President Samper and the Foreign Minister will be requested.
As far as the question of whether this is normal, given that we revoked his
visa, in general we have communicated with President Samper through formal
diplomatic channels, usually through Ambassador Myles Frechette. Infrequent
meetings of U.S. officials with President Samper have been and continue to
be based on US national security imperatives, in this case, the national
security imperative of the continued heavy flow of cocaine to the United
States and the tools necessary to confront this threat, such as extradition.
If such a meeting takes place, it will represent no change in official US
policy.
Obviously, the topic here is that we have been troubled and dismayed over
the failure of the senate in Colombia to pass a bill to allow extradition
of Colombians for crimes committed before such a bill's passage, and that
would presumably be a very important part of any discussion that he might
have with the President.
QUESTION: How does the State Department feel about the Pentagon's
decision to go ahead with the anti-satellite test?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as you know, Carol, I have some familiarity with this
issue over the years and there is always going to be discussions back and
forth on a subject like this. But having checked with our people, I have no
reason to believe that we here in the Department had any specific problem
with this test.
The reason is that the kind of test that it is doesn't pose any problem
with becoming an anti-ballistic missile system and this experiment does not
violate any arms control agreement. As you know, there is no anti-satellite
treaty, other international law, or US domestic law. It is an experiment.
It is designed to collect data that will help improve computer models used
for planning protection measures for US satellites.
This is not a test of an anti-satellite system. This experiment will not
destroy the satellite, will not result in any orbital debris, and will not
pose any risk to other satellites. Furthermore, this laser, as I said, does
not have an ABM capability. We, therefore, see, no reason why this
experiment should cause any problems with the Russians or any other
country. I can't rule out that officials in the State Department might have
asked some questions, but this is an experiment that we don't believe is
anything but a good use of research and development funds.
QUESTION: Well, as the Secretary has argued in the case of the Middle
East, where there is a climate of distrust or at least there is a problem
or some tension, sometimes even things that seem to be in other situations
maybe benign, in certain environments, they are viewed more as greater
tension-producers. And I just wondered, given the fact that you're having
so much trouble getting the START II treaty through the Russian Duma and
that there are elements in the political ferment of Russia that are
concerned about the ABM treaty and what the United States may be doing
in terms of missile defenses, do you believe this is the right time
for this kind of a test?
MR. RUBIN: Today is, what, Friday? Last Friday the Secretary of State and
the Foreign Minister of Russia signed two arms control agreements - one
very important one on the ABM treaty and how to make sure that anti-
tactical ballistic missile defenses were permitted and strategic defenses
were prohibited. We have been working very, very well with the Russians.
There is no crisis of confidence in the relationship between the U.S. and
Russia. Frankly, Secretary Albright finds her ability to work very
closely with Foreign Minister Primakov one of the true surprises and
something she's very pleased about in her job.
So there isn't the kind of environment in this case that would lead to the
analogy that you were suggesting some might have. So we don't have trouble
with this test. As I said, it's not a test of an anti-satellite system.
It's an experiment that will not destroy the satellite, will not result in
any debris, will not pose any risk, and we see no reason why it should be a
problem, especially in an environment where things are moving forward
with the Russians on subjects like the ABM Treaty.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) the Russians?
MR. RUBIN: Yeah, let's stick with Russia. I know where that next one's
going.
QUESTION: Do you? I'll bet you do. An eminent Russian scientist came all
the way from Moscow yesterday to testify to Mr. Weldon's Committee on the
House that, indeed, he knew the scientists that designed and made these
hand carryable munitions, sometimes called suitcase atomic devices, but
they're not that small. He knows they exist. He knows that Lebed made a
very accurate study. He testified to that effect and he believes, as Lebed
does, that some of these weapons are unaccounted for. The Russians are
saying that they never even existed; whereby, our Defense Department
refutes that.
Jamie, is there a problem with these types of weapons that the Russians
will either not account for them or can't?
MR. RUBIN: Our view of allegations that numbers of suitcase-sized
warheads were missing from Russia's inventory have not changed. There is no
evidence other than hearsay to support such claims; therefore, we give such
claims little credibility. Russian officials, including Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin, as well as Defense Ministry Officials, Atomic Energy Ministry
Officials and others have strongly denied these specific allegations and
confirmed that all Russian nuclear warheads are under Russia's control.
This is a subject of the highest possible interest to the Secretary of
State and the President. We have a number of officials in this Department
and many in other departments who work every day on programs to try to
ensure that nuclear weapons don't get out of control. As you know, movies
are made about the people who do work on this subject and there are a lot
of them. We have remained in close and cooperative contact with Russia on
questions involving command and control of their nuclear arsenals. The
government of Russia continues to assure us that it retains adequate
command and control and that appropriate physical security arrangements
exist for these weapons and facilities. We have no reason or evidence to
doubt these assurances.
We believe Russia, like the US and other nuclear powers, produced nuclear
weapons of various sizes from strategic warheads hundreds of kilograms in
weight to smaller atomic demolition munitions. We cannot comment, however,
about the precise specifications or dimensions of any nuclear weapons, but
we have no information or evidence suggesting that nuclear weapons were
ever developed for or put under the control of the KGB, which is part of
the story here.
The U.S. Government is taking considerable steps to assist Russia in
improving the security of its nuclear materials and technology through the
Nunn-Lugar program and other programs. The United States is working
cooperatively with Russia and other governments to further enhance the
physical security of Russian nuclear storage facilities.
I've been following this issue for a long time and there are always
different accounts of what happened in Russia during the Soviet period and
what capabilities there were. There are many different experts who have
many different opinions as to what was or wasn't happening. I can tell you
this, that there's probably no issue where you have the combined resources
of the US Government working as well together and with such determination
as on the issue of security of nuclear weapons. We work on it every day --
hundreds, if not thousands, of people in the government -- and if they
say that we have no information on this and they say that these accounts
are hearsay that's pretty compelling.
QUESTION: Wouldn't it be appropriate to challenge them or to go to say
(inaudible) the KGB head that was in charge at the time?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I welcome, you know, your efforts. I'm just saying that
we worked this problem. We are aware of these allegations. This is not news
to us, these kinds of stories. That's my point. So we do what we can here
in the government to try to get to the bottom of stories, to try to work
with the Russians. From the top all the way down to the lowest levels,
there are always going to be stories that you can't ever get to the
bottom of, but for now that's our position.
QUESTION: So, no challenge or accounting should be asked for of the
Russians of these types of weapons?
MR. RUBIN: We have worked with the Russians on this subject and I am sure
that in the course of that work the issue of atomic demolition munitions,
which are the ones that might be small, have been discussed.
Yes, in the back?
QUESTION: Yes. A different subject. Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman was
- he's in Athens right now.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: My question is, did he advise the Greek government officials to
tone down their statement, their speech, because of the more stable
atmosphere in the area? Also did he ask Athens (inaudible) some confidence-
building measures on the Aegean subject?
MR. RUBIN: I do not have a report on his trip, but I can assure you that
Deputy Spokesman Foley will get a report on that trip and provide as much
information about it to you as he can.
Yes, Steve?
QUESTION: On another subject, can you say whether or not the United
States is planning to send a delegation to the Congo to try to somehow
resolve this impasse with the UN over the investigation of human rights
abuses?
MR. RUBIN: We are actively considering sending an envoy to the region,
primarily to the Congo, to talk to the government about the work of the UN
team. We take this matter very seriously. We have not settled on a person
for that, but we are actively considering sending such an envoy. It would
be designed to underscore the importance we attach to resolving this
deadlock between the UN and the Congo on getting to the bottom of these
reported massacres. It's a very serious subject.
We obviously would discuss and coordinate this mission with the United
Nations because we would want to be able to make sure that whatever
agreements or discussions resulted from that mission that the UN's needs
would be fully taken into account. So we are considering it. I don't have
an announcement of a name and a time for you, but it is under active
consideration.
QUESTION: If I could follow up on that a bit. You've been underscoring
the importance of this, as well as the UN, for several months now. And the
government there keeps delaying, putting up new obstacles, saying they're
going to let people in and then they don't let them in. At what point do
you do more or what can you do to somehow get this going? I mean every day
you wait, the evidence disappears presumably.
MR. RUBIN: There is a limit to one's patience on this kind of subject,
but for now what we are trying to do is get the team in there as quick as
possible so that any possible evidence cannot be tampered with or
destroyed. Other options one might have to pressure the government might
make the sending of such a team less likely rather than more likely, and so
one has to weigh the options of pressuring the government with the goal of
getting the team in.
There have been some conflicting reports of what Mr. Kabila's intentions
are. The objective of such a mission would be to try to talk very straight
with him -- the way Ambassador Richardson did earlier -- about the
consequences of a failure to cooperate with the United Nations on this
subject. I mean, the whole world is watching the government and the Congo.
Are they going to be outside the system of normal government or are they
going to try to get the country reintegrated into the international
system? A failure to even let UN teams investigate is behavior that
only the most recalcitrant regimes usually engage in.
So that would be the discussion that we would want to have with them and,
obviously, we've made clear in the past that our assistance programs are
tied in the sense of -- we could not envisage having a normal relationship
with a government that refused to allow the UN into investigate reported
massacres of significant and substantial and horrifying size.
Yes?
QUESTION: The Department's Special......
MR. RUBIN: Same subject, yes.
QUESTION: Ambassador Simpson, I think, met with Kabila two days ago -
MR. RUBIN: Was it Kabila or the Foreign Minister? I'm not sure. I'll have
to check that for you. If we thought things were going right we wouldn't be
sending the envoy -- if we, indeed, choose to send the envoy, which I am
not announcing. I am merely saying it is under active consideration.
Yes?
QUESTION: This goes back to Turkey.
MR. RUBIN: Well, if we're going to do Turkey let's go over there.
Yes?
QUESTION: May I ask a question now?
MR. RUBIN: Please. Please.
QUESTION: Okay. Department's special Cyprus Coordinator Tom Miller, I
think, was announced yesterday by the White House. He's elevated to the
rank of ambassador?
MR. RUBIN: I think I prematurely announced that one, too, about a month
ago. Remember that?
QUESTION: Yes. Is this specific to his job as a Special Coordinator, his
ambassadorship or is he Ambassador from now on? I didn't understand the
procedure.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not in the Foreign Service. I'm sure this is a
detail that is extremely important to the Foreign Service. But my guess is
that the ambassadorial rank was assigned to him to maximize his chances for
success in pursuing his mission as Special Coordinator for Cyprus.
QUESTION: Once he's not a coordinator, he's not an Ambassador any
more?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know. I mean, does that really matter?
QUESTION: Yeah, it does. For me it matters.
MR. RUBIN: Okay. Then I'll try to get you an answer.
QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.
QUESTION: Speaking of high level talent on Turkey, I understand that
Richard Holbrooke met today with Tavar Etkin who was involved with the
Turkish Cypriot breakaway government. And I wondered if you could talk a
little bit about what those intentions were and whether this man is going
to be in Washington?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Holbrooke usually makes a point of letting me know
what he's up to so that I can report it to you so that it can be covered,
and he didn't call me this morning about that.
QUESTION: Would you just check?
MR. RUBIN: I will check it for you though.
QUESTION: I have a question.
MR. RUBIN: On the thing that I don't know anything about?
QUESTION: Yes, but maybe you can take it at least because this official
in question is going to be in Washington next week and reportedly is going
to have discussions here at the Department. Could you -
MR. RUBIN: Well, as part of the answer to Carol's question, we will
certainly try to get information on that.
QUESTION: Thanks.
(The briefing concluded at 1:40 p.m.)
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