U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #140, 97-09-30
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
944
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, September 30, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1 Rundown of Agreement in New York (Interim Committee Talks,
Meeting on Four Agenda Items) / US Position
2-3 Definition of "Time Out" / Environment for Talks / Final
Status Talks
3 Schedule for Oslo Process (Redeployment, Security, Upcoming
Agenda Items)
3-4 Tactics re PM Netanyahu's Recent Statements / Palestinian
Authority Actions on Security / Israeli & Tax Receipts
4 Syrian Track
EGYPT / LIBYA
5 Kidnapping and Death of AmCit in Libya / Secretary's
Discussions with Egyptian FM
ISRAEL
5-6 Return to US of Murder Suspect / State Dept & Embassy
Involvement
AZERBAIJAN / ARMENIA
6-7 US Position on Legislation to Lift Blockade / Caspian Oil
Possibilities
IRAN / FRANCE
7-12 Total Company Contract on Oil/US Support of
Legislation/October Mtgs with EU and Canada to Increase
Pressure/Reasoning Behind Companies Pursuit of
Contract/Impact of Sanctions Against Companies/Eizenstat
Trip to Paris/Possible Waiver of Sanctions/Violations of
ILSA/Developing Guidelines on Critical Issues
CUBA
11 Helms-Burton & Extraterritoriality Issue
14-16 Cuban Nationals Hijack Boat / Interviewed at Guantanamo /
Returning to Cuba / Earlier Plane Hijackers Tried in US /
Earlier Boat Hijackers Tried in Cuba
SUDAN
12-14 US Goals / Restaffing US Embassy / Premature Announcement
Last Week
GREECE
14 Supplying the PKK
GREECE / TURKEY
14 Statement in New York
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #140
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 11:53 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings, Washington members of the State Department press
corps. Some of you we saw in New York. Some we didn't. Some may want to
come back with us this afternoon. Some may not. Anyway, I have no
statements. I will turn over the floor to George.
QUESTION: Have you seen Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement this morning
concerning settlement construction activity and that he intends to continue
it to accommodate normal population growth despite the --
MR. RUBIN: I am aware of the government of Israel's position. Let me try
to go through in some detail what we did yesterday and how his statement
affects that. What we did yesterday was get an agreement to begin, for the
first time since March, negotiations in the interim committees. Those will
begin on October 6th. Both sides have pledged to work quickly in good faith
to conclude those negotiations and implement their results as soon as
possible with the objective of achieving - and this is important - a
mutually agreed target date. These meetings will take place in the
region. When we have more details, we'll give those to you.
Then, a week later, here in the United States, Ambassador Ross will meet
with the two parties to begin discussions on the four items that were
agreed to. Essentially those four points in the statement Secretary
Albright read are the agenda items for those discussions. They will include
discussions of security cooperation. They will include discussions of
further redeployments of Israeli forces, and they will include, for the
first time, in this kind of formalized way, the definition and content of a
time-out regarding unilateral steps.
The final item, again, is acceleration of permanent status negotiations.
The parties have now agreed for the first time to discuss the content and
timing of a time-out in the context of overall discussions on the issues I
have just mentioned. As far as our position is concerned, we believe that
in order to create a more positive environment, conducive to final status
negotiations, which will be extremely difficult and would be difficult in
the best of circumstances, that both sides should refrain from unilateral
acts the other side considers provocative.
So what this means is, that as the parties begin the process of re-engaging
in the peace process, coming back from the abyss, we think that now the
parties are doing that re-engagement, that they are beginning to re-engage,
it is all the more important to refrain from unilateral actions that are
seen by the other side as provocative. Now that they have agreed to discuss
the content of the time-out that would take place, we think it's important
to refrain from unilateral acts.
For those of you who were in New York yesterday, there was a lot of to-ing
and fro-ing on what exactly is this time-out, so let me jump ahead to that
question which would naturally come next. We do not think it is wise for us
to discuss publicly exactly what such a time-out would entail. We are now
going to engage in a negotiation beginning very soon, in about two weeks,
on exactly what that time-out would entail.
We have a sense that both parties know what the unilateral acts are that
make the environment difficult and make it hard to envisage a successful
negotiation. What exactly that time-out is also depends, to some extent, on
what the environment is, and in an environment in which the situation has
deteriorated to the point it had prior to yesterday, a very small action by
one party could yield a great reaction by the other. In an environment in
which things are going well and negotiations are proceeding and in which
there is progress at the table, specific actions may not yield the same
kind of reaction.
So the time-out is a flexible tool. The Secretary gave a list in the region
of things that are perceived as provocative by the Palestinians that the
Israelis might engage in, and that is a guideline for the kind of actions
that we think the Israelis ought to refrain from. Now, we haven't achieved
agreement with the Israelis on this. We have stated what we think is
helpful and what we think is not helpful, and we will continue to do that.
But in terms of specifying what the content of the time-out is, we would
prefer to wait at least until the parties have had a chance to talk
about it a little bit more.
Steve.
QUESTION: Cutting away all the verbiage though, didn't Madeline Albright
say in
Jerusalem --
MR. RUBIN: Verbiage?
QUESTION: -- a couple of weeks ago... made a call, a specific call, for
the Israelis to take a time-out on settlement activities? It wasn't just
unilateral acts, but she specifically mentioned settlement activity.
MR. RUBIN: Right. As I said, that was on the list, and Secretary Albright
believes that the environment for talking about talks and then the
environment for the talks would be greatly improved if neither party
conducted unilateral acts of the kind that you mentioned. That is our
general view, but if we are going to get to this actual negotiation where
we will be going through the most excruciating issues, the final status
issues that you know, then it will be all the more important for us not to
have business as usual in the area of unilateral actions.
So there is a general desire to improve the environment and, frankly, the
fact that the Israeli government, Prime Minister Netanyahu, agreed with us
to work in the Ras al-Amoud case to try to prevent any change in the status
quo, to try to agree that the character of the neighborhood would not be
changed, is an example of the kind of action that you would want to see
taken to prevent the environment from collapsing and that would be
necessary for peace talks.
Tom.
QUESTION: The Secretary reaffirmed while she was in the region US support
for the Oslo process and the interim steps on the road to the final stage.
Do you have any understanding or commitment from the Israelis on the
scheduled redeployment, the next redeployment?
MR. RUBIN: That is one of the topics that will be discussed. I think
there are letters, the letter that Secretary Christopher wrote. There is a
note for the record regarding a schedule that says, as I understand this --
and I think this is public information so if I get it a little wrong,
please forgive me -- that they are all supposed to be completed by the
middle of next year - the first, second, and third redeployments. So that
is the schedule, but the first further redeployment did not take place this
March, as you know. It is an Israeli responsibility, and they did
not take that further redeployment. As you also know, the Palestinians
regarded it as woefully inadequate. So there is a schedule that hasn't been
met, but that schedule is also linked to full-scale cooperation by the
Palestinians in the area of security.
What we have tried to do in this four-part agenda is put everything
necessary into that agenda that would make it possible for the peace
process to be genuinely reactivated, as opposed to just the interim
committees, a political negotiation in which all the concerns - security,
the time-out, further redeployment, and this accelerated permanent status -
could be negotiated, discussed and hopefully agreed on a schedule to do
so.
QUESTION: Jamie, in the Administration --
MR. RUBIN: Nice hair cut, Sid.
QUESTION: Thank you. You could use one yourself. The Administration's
view --
MR. RUBIN: No, I was saying, nice haircut.
QUESTION: In the Administration view, can the final-status talks go on
without this time-out?
MR. RUBIN: It is the Administration's view that the final-status talks
will have a real, real hard time succeeding in the absence of a time-out.
We are very clear in our minds that, in the absence of a time-out, the
prospect for success in the final-status negotiations would be greatly
reduced. Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, what is your analysis of the statements that Prime
Minister Netanyahu has been making in the case that...the Secretary asked a
couple weeks ago in the region, said something the other day in New York in
reaction to a statement, and yet he continues to make statements? I'm not
asking you to speak for him; I'm asking what your analysis is of what he is
saying. Is it a negotiating tactic? Is it that there is a fundamental
disagreement? What?
MR. RUBIN: The Israeli Government has its own views and they can speak
for themselves. From our standpoint, what's important is that our role be
one in which we let the parties know - both parties - when we think
particular actions are unhelpful. We have said that just as recently as
last week. As you know, the Secretary viewed the decision to build houses,
300 houses at Efrat, to be an unhelpful decision. So we have seen - as far
as we know, Prime Minister Netanyahu has told us he is committed to the
peace process. We take him at his word on that. What we can now do is try
to encourage that process by letting him know and letting his government
know when we think adjustments need to be made and things need to be done
differently.
Foreign Minister Levy, like any good negotiator and any good foreign
minister, yesterday said that they understand that a negotiation is not
about getting everything you want, but it's about meeting your basic
principles. We think the best way to meet the basic principles for peace
that Prime Minister Netanyahu has laid out is to come to this discussion on
October the 13th and negotiate seriously on these four points.
Any more on this? Yes, one more.
QUESTION: One more. Among the other things that the Secretary asked the
Israelis to do, did she asked them to turn over the remainder of the
withheld tax receipts?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't think that came up yesterday. That process has
been moving along quite smartly. Both the Israelis and the United States
yesterday made the point that they thought there had been significant steps
taken by the Palestinians in the area of security cooperation. We have seen
arrests of the right people. We have seen them go after institutions, a
dozen or so institutions that constitute part of the infrastructure
of Hamas. They have a plan. They have been working with us on that plan. I
think the feeling is that the security cooperation has improved.
In that context, as you know, the government of Israel has eased the
closure. They have allowed for the transfer or additional elements. We have
said quite clearly for some time that we did not understand the logic of
withholding this money, and that is still our position. But I don't believe
it came up in the meeting yesterday.
New subject. One more. Yes?
QUESTION: On the Syrian track, the Secretary also met yesterday with the
Syrian foreign minister. Did she achieve anything new?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any new progress to report to you on the Syria
track. There obviously was discussion of that in New York yesterday and we
have the same objective, which is to try to find a way to bridge the gap
between the Syrian position on what is necessary or not necessary in this
case to begin negotiations again, and the Israeli position on what is
necessary. There are still significant gaps and I have no progress to
report to you today.
QUESTION: Still on the Secretary's meeting yesterday - and you may have
covered this up there yesterday. If you have, then just forget about it.
The story that Egypt was involved in the kidnapping of an American dual
citizen who was later executed in Libya.
MR. RUBIN: Right. It actually didn't come up, but I think our position on
this is pretty clear. I tried to say what I could earlier in the week,
which is that since the beginning of 1993 when this case first came to our
attention, the United States has pursued this case vigorously. We raised it
with all the relevant authorities at the time.
Since that time, the United States has developed credible information that
Mr. Kikhia was killed earlier this summer. When we developed that
information, we communicated it to his family and we raised it directly
with the Egyptian government in all its aspects. I can't comment on the
specifics of that information because of its nature, but I can say that
Secretary Albright and the Administration are taking this case very
seriously and intend to pursue it with all the relevant authorities until
we get a satisfactory understanding of what might have happened.
QUESTION: And was this part of the discussions with the Egyptians?
MR. RUBIN: I was not in that. I can get you a formal answer. I would be
surprised if it didn't come up, but to what extent it was discussed with
Foreign Minister Moussa, I don't know.
QUESTION: What are your options at this time regarding that case besides -
-
MR. RUBIN: Well, we are not at the option stage. We are at the trying-to-
determine-who-is-responsible and getting-to-the-bottom-of-it stage. After
we are at the conclusion stage of what happened, a determination has been
made finally about what happened, then obviously we have options. But our
bottom line option is that anyone who is working with the Libyan government
or the Libyan government itself needs to be held responsible for murders
and abductions overseas. It's part of a pattern of terrorism that
is unacceptable to the United States.
QUESTION: Different subject, same area. Does this Administration have a
view on the Israelis' failure to return a young man who is accused of
murder in this country?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure the Administration has a view, but the view that I am
permitted to express from this podium is that this case is a legal matter
and needs to be discussed by the Justice Department.
QUESTION: Was this building involved in the negotiations to try to secure
his return?
MR. RUBIN: I would have to check that. I'm sure at some level we were
involved, but even at the most logistical level. But the specific answers
to this subject I have been advised are not to be discussed from here and
to be discussed by the Justice Department.
QUESTION: How about the consular aspects? Any visitations? Anything that
the embassy is doing?
MR. RUBIN: I will try to get you some information on that. I'm sure our
embassy there would be engaged in its proper consular function.
Yes, David?
QUESTION: New subject?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: What is the Administration's position on Section 907, which
prohibits --
MR. RUBIN: Aid to Azerbaijan?
QUESTION: Yeah, and which is coming up in the House-Senate Conference in
the next 48 to 72 hours. Do you want to have it entirely repealed at this
point? Is that your position, or are you going for a compromise and what
kind of compromise?
MR. RUBIN: I remember being there when that awful section was written by
the Senate in the Bush Administration, and we had no idea what we were
doing, obviously, because by doing that, we have tied the hands of the
Administration and its ability to promote peace in the region. My
understanding is that we think this is an unnecessary restriction on our
ability to operate and that we share the goals of the legislation; namely,
that we would like to see the blockades on Armenia lifted, but that this
kind of a flat prohibition that can't be waived even if circumstances
require it or would justify it, is going too far.
As far as what our specific position is on a current piece of legislation,
I will have to get you an answer for the record because I don't know what
iteration the legislation is right now. But generally speaking, we think
that the Administration should have the flexibility to determine whether
assistance to Azerbaijan would promote the national interest of the United
States and not have a flat, unwaivable prohibition, especially in an area
that's becoming increasingly important to all of the world as the
Caspian oil possibilities and gas possibilities are discussed. This
is an understandable provision given the suffering that has occurred
for the Armenians, but it's not a wise tool for foreign policy.
QUESTION: The Armenian-American community feels that the oil companies
have gotten to the Administration on this.
MR. RUBIN: I can assure you as someone who watched that piece of
legislation be drafted and then switched over to the Administration and
knew about our views on it, that prior to the oil companies having any view
on it, the Bush Administration hated it because it limited the flexibility
of the President in this area.
When I first came into the Administration and Secretary Albright went to
that region --we didn't have too many meetings with oil companies -- she
quickly observed that this was a piece of legislation that harmed our
flexibility and harmed our ability to conduct wise policy in the region. If
oil companies agree with us, that's fine, but that's not the reason.
QUESTION: Another subject?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: On Iran.
MR. RUBIN: Which part?
QUESTION: Well, on this particular issue of the oil and gas deals that
have been cropping up.
MR. RUBIN: Correct. I'm trying to get to my book quickly, because it's in
the Europe section.
QUESTION: I see.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: How long do you think it's going to take for the Administration
to come to some sort of conclusion on this particular case, the Total
Gazprom Petronas case?
MR. RUBIN: It's in the Europe section, but I can't find it. As I saw some
official quoted in the newspapers, we're not likely to get immediate faxed
copies of the contracts so it will take some time to study this.
Frankly, I think in understanding this issue and understanding our thinking
about this issue, it's important to bear in mind the reasons why we
supported the legislation in the first place. That is because we share the
view of Congress that we need to get other countries in the world to agree
to ratchet up the pressure on a government that has so blatantly supported
international terrorism, that is determined to develop weapons of mass
destruction, and is such a determined opponent of the peace process. The
objective of the legislation is not to impose sanctions. The objective
of the legislation is get other countries, in Europe in particular,
to work with us on the subject of tightening up the pressure on Iran.
What we have been doing in that regard is we have had an intensified
dialogue with the European Union and Canada aimed at seeking greater
convergence in our policies towards Iran. Those experts will meet again on
October the 8th, and a follow-up working group meeting is planned for
October the 28th. In other words, this coming month we're going to be
talking with our allies about ways to ratchet up the pressure. That is a
factor that will go into any decision-making because the law itself
specifies the option of waiving a sanction in the event that the governments
themselves have agreed to tighten the pressure up.
As far as how many days it will take us to determine that it fits the
criteria, I can't answer that question. All I have been told today is that
we are studying it. As soon as I have some time frame for you for a
determination, I will give it to you.
QUESTION: But as you stipulate the legislation's goal, it seems to be a
failure. All you have done so far, it seems, is stoke trans-Atlantic trade
disputes with the allies. How can you point to any success in this?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I remember those very questions were directed at a
previous spokesman on the subject of Helms-Burton. We were in a very
similar situation. We had a situation where other governments believed our
laws were extraterritorial and they were unfair. They disagreed with the
intent of the law and the law itself. But I think everyone can agree that
after the work of Ambassador Eizenstat, European governments and other
governments improved, from our perspective, their willingness to be tough
on Castro when it came to human rights. That was the purpose of Helms-
Burton.
As a result of those improvements and that ratcheting up of the pressure, a
decision was made to continue to suspend the application of parts of Helms-
Burton. So what I am saying to you is, if we had been sitting here the day
after we made the first announcements or first decisions on Helms-Burton --
and European governments were taking their positions, however, with joy or
pleasure or whatever emotion they might have about it -- we explained
what the purpose of the law was, and I think at the end of the day,
when the negotiations were done and the dust settled, the purpose of the
law had been met because the pressure had been ratcheted up against
Cuba.
QUESTION: But there are people who feel you just sort of punted that
issue down the road, and that it remains a festering dispute across the
Atlantic. And there are some who have even said recently, some Europeans
have said that they are not sure that there can be a real resolution. But I
want to ask another sort of related question, and that is, you have known
about this Total deal for some months and yet you weren't able to keep
it from going forward.
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Why were you unable to keep it from going forward and why do
you think that now you will have any more success?
MR. RUBIN: We were unable to prevent the deal from going forward because
the companies themselves - and again companies made this decision, we don't
believe that governments made this decision, we believe companies made this
decision - decided that it was more important to purse oil and gas efforts
in Iran with a government that is a sponsor of international terrorism,
that is an opponent of Middle East peace, that is determined to develop
nuclear weapons, than it was to withhold the pursuit of additional profit.
We have told our companies, by law, that they are not allowed to pursue
profit in Iran. That's because we believe the danger is great. We believe
you can't do business with countries like this by day and expect to be
protected from the terrorists they support at night. That is the position
of the United States and we have put our money where our mouth is when it
comes to our companies.
We wish that other countries would recognize the danger that is posed here
and understand that it's worth taking measures that are extraordinary
because the dangers are extraordinary. Now, obviously, they don't see it
that way and they believe that engagement at some level with the government
of Iran is the best course, and we don't. That is reason we were unable to
convince governments to encourage their companies to not go forward with
this kind of a decision.
But as I said, only time will tell whether this kind of law, as a result of
additional work -- and I'm sure we're going to be working on this very hard
and carefully in the coming days -- will yield greater pressure on the
government of Iran the way the Helms-Burton law yielded greater pressure on
the government of Cuba.
David, yes.
QUESTION: Have you done any analysis yet, since you have known this deal
was coming down the pike possibly, of how much impact sanctions might
potentially have on Total and Gazprom and the other company? From what I've
read, Total has sold off - the day before the deal -- sold off its largest
holding in the United States. Is there really any way the US Government can
have any real impact on that French company?
MR. RUBIN: The sanctions, as I understand them and as they have been
provided to me, are the following six possible sanctions: a ban on EXIMBank,
meaning Export-Import Bank assistance; a ban on export licenses; a ban on
US private sector loans over $10 million per year; a ban on United States
Government procurement; and an import ban; and if the sanctioned person is
a financial institution, a ban on performing certain types of financial
services in the United States. If, indeed, a company has protected
itself by not caring if any of those things happen to it, then the
sanction won't have any effect, by definition.
We are obviously aware of the company involved. We were aware of the
possibility of this contract. We took steps in our discussions with the
French government, both in Paris and at the Secretary's level, to try to
explain our reasoning and make the points that we thought might be most
useful in trying to convince them to avoid this kind of festering dispute,
which certainly will fester as this continues.
But it's not a new dispute. We have had a dispute with the government of
France and other European governments about how to approach Iran for some
time, and I suspect it's not going to go away any time soon. But I hope
that when people write about that dispute they bear in mind that we have a
general agreement and a deep agreement with the government of France and
other governments about the need to prevent weapons and weaponry and
weapons of mass destruction from going to Iran. They have a different
view over whether the money is fungible and whether to deny Iran the
possibility of developing its oil and gas sector will impact on the issues
we agree on, but that is a tactical difference. I will try to get you an
answer of what we know about Total's interest in business in the United
States but, if you say they have gotten out, I believe you.
QUESTION: These few days of meetings - you talked about October 8th and
the 28th. Will one of those meetings be Mr. Eizenstat going to Paris for
talks or going to Europe for talks?
MR. RUBIN: No, this is an expert level dialogue that has been ongoing,
and what it is designed to do is to develop goals that we both have for
improved behavior on the part of the Iranian government and, in theory,
actions we would take if that improved behavior didn't occur. So it is
designed to marry, to the extent possible, our views and their views on how
to promote improvements.
Now, whether Mr. Eizenstat, UnderSecretary Stu Eizenstat, takes on this
task -- and I suspect he will; I spoke to him this morning -- I think he is
going to have a tough job ahead of him. Whether it involves travel of the
kind you mentioned I don't think has been decided, but he will be one of
the point men in the Administration on this subject.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) going to be taking part in this as well?
MR. RUBIN: I hadn't heard that. I mean, he obviously has a piece of the
puzzle because he is working on the specific question of missile technology
to Iran. But that's not really the issue at stake here other than, I
suspect, trying to make aware the government's concern of the ways in which
Iran is going about pursuing this effort.
QUESTION: Just finally one more. I just want to be sure I understand what
you're saying. As far as what France or the Europeans might be willing to
do, what you are saying is that if you are satisfied with a set of new
conditions or steps or whatever, then you may reconsider or you will
consider favorably the possibility of waiving the sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: You can draw that conclusion. I can tell you what the law
says. The law says if the Secretary determines that sanctionable activity
has occurred, she has three options under the act: immediately impose two
or more of the sanctions; waive the imposition of sanctions if the
Secretary determines and reports to Congress that it is important to the
national interest to do so.
One second. I don't know where that piece of information is. But, again,
I'm trying to deal with a situation where we don't have a decision yet,
where we don't have a decision yet; we don't have a decision that the
contract itself yields a trigger that would yield those three things. But I
certainly think that just as the purpose of the Helms-Burton law was to get
governments to work with us to put pressure on Fidel Castro, the purpose of
this law is to get other governments to work with us to put pressure
on Iran, and any action in that regard would have an effect on our
national interests and how we might interpret the law.
QUESTION: Mr. Rubin?
QUESTION: On the same issue --
MR. RUBIN: Same issue?
QUESTION: Yes, please.
MR. RUBIN: Sure.
QUESTION: When you say you don't have a decision yet, are you saying that
you don't have a decision whether this Total deal is violating ILSA?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Okay. So there is no certainty even on that yet?
MR. RUBIN: We're studying the contracts to the extent we can get
information about them, and when we have information about whether they
would yield a possible sanction, we'll give that to you.
QUESTION: Jamie, could you deal with the confusion over the staffing of
the US embassy in Sudan, please?
QUESTION: Could I just raise one point? You talk about Helms-Burton as if
the time of contention is past. Sir Leon Brittain was in town last week and
he said, if you'll excuse the expression, the "time-out" in applying the
sanctions on Helms-Burton expires on October 15th and there is no agreement
yet with the United States on the extraterritorial issue. And at that
point last week, he said the European Union would go ahead and bring
the case to the World Trade Organization.
MR. RUBIN: Right. I didn't say the dispute had gone away. I think I was
very clear on that. I said that the problem that was being presented to me
in the question was a similar problem that was being presented during the
time when we were discussing Helms-Burton, and we believe we achieved
American objectives through the process of negotiating with our European
allies and we would hope to achieve the same for this law.
QUESTION: The point is that the extraterritorial issue lies in --
MR. RUBIN: You are stating a fact and I agree with that fact. The
extraterritoriality issue remains a matter of disagreement between
countries in the world. Yes.
QUESTION: One last question. What can France, Russia and Malaysia do to
address your concerns about Tehran in terms of terrorism in the Middle East
peace process?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have been discussing in detail some of those issues.
As you know, some of those governments view an engagement policy with Iran
as the best way to promote improvement. Since they all agree with us on the
problem of terrorism, the problem of weapons of mass destruction and the
problem of opposition to the Middle East process, they have been saying
engagement is the best way to promote progress. We've been saying, well,
that hasn't worked. Then they've been saying that our policy hasn't
worked.
So what we are trying to do is see whether we can agree on some guidelines
that would help answer the question of which of the policies might work
best; and that, in our view, would yield greater concerted action, which is
the key to success.
QUESTION: Sudan.
MR. RUBIN: Sudan. The question here was on Sudan. I was hoping to escape
that question, but I guess not. We in the Government all have the same
objective, and that is to increase the pressure on the Sudanese Government
to comply with international demands on human rights and terrorism and
ending the civil war. But there are considerations on how to use our
personnel and resources most effectively, including questions of timing and
any re-staffing.
Any final decision on this subject needs to be taken in the context of the
ongoing Congressional action on Sudan. There is some sanctions legislation
that is now before the Congress so there is still no decision to re-staff
our embassy in Khartoum. Any decision will take into account the factors
that I just mentioned, namely whether to ratchet up the sanctions and the
fact that Congress is now considering the matter.
QUESTION: You know what the next question is. How did it happen last week
that there was an announcement to the effect that the embassy would be re-
staffed?
MR. RUBIN: So one question wasn't enough?
QUESTION: No.
QUESTION: It rarely is.
MR. RUBIN: Well, it happened that there was an announcement that was
premature. We are still working this problem and no final decision has been
made. Yes.
QUESTION: In the British Daily Observer a long interview was published by
a PKK terrorist who took asylum in Britain....
QUESTION: You know, this building is not a building that sort of makes
decisions and puts things on paper willy nilly; in fact, there is usually a
hundred people who approve any one paragraph. So how did this --
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry. We're still on the other subject.
QUESTION: I'm asking a question.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, but it's the same subject.
QUESTION: The Sudan.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, they are still on the Sudan. I was trying to move off,
but it didn't work.
QUESTION: Oh, all right.
QUESTION: So how does it happen that a change of position like this is
made public, as you say, prematurely?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't think it will serve anybody's purpose to wash
all the dirty laundry on this subject in public. Clearly, a decision to
prematurely discuss this in public was a mistake. In the future we will try
to not make such mistakes, to discuss such subjects prematurely with the
Congress and the media.
Yes.
QUESTION: So, basically, Congress pulled you back on this?
MR. RUBIN: That's not correct.
QUESTION: Can you say why? I mean, that's exactly what the scenario you
have described looks like. You had a desk officer on the Sudan desk call up
The Washington Post and announce it. I hate to air your dirty laundry in
public --
MR. RUBIN: No, you don't.
QUESTION: That's what happens when you're on the 10th floor.
MR. RUBIN: You like it a lot.
QUESTION: And then apparently Congress said, wait a second, we have got
some legislation that might affect this. Explain how that is not the
case.
MR. RUBIN: All I can tell you is that there are still considerations that
are being taken into account before a decision is made to increase the
staffing. When this process is over, you may find that it's not all that
different than it started. But the process has to include taking into
account the views of the Congress, taking into account the need we have to
ratchet up the pressure so that Sudan gets the message that when it comes
to terrorism, when it comes to human rights, and when it comes to the
peace process, that we are not satisfied with their policies.
So when this all is put together and finally, correctly discussed publicly,
you may find that it's not all that different than - you are always telling
us you want to watch the policy process unfold in public. Maybe you did a
little bit. Yes.
QUESTION: The Observer published a long interview by a PKK terrorist who
took refuge in Britain, and he gave very interesting and long details of
the help the Greek government gave to PKK, including Stinger missiles, I
understand. In last year's report, the State Department's Terrorism Report,
it was admitted that the Greek government "tolerates terrorist groups in
Athens."
On the basis of this interview, has there been a reassessment of the help
the Greek government gives to terrorists?
MR. RUBIN: I will get information. I have no information on that. I
wasn't aware of the interview. When I get some on it, we will give it to
you. Yes.
QUESTION: Question on Cuba. Do you have --
QUESTION: Same subject, sir.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, one more on that. Yes.
QUESTION: The U.S. Government always encouraged Greece and Turkey to calm
down and to ease the tension between the Aegean two sides. Then last week
in New York, the Foreign Minister of Greece used some verbs out of the
rules and regulations, he blamed the Turkish side as the killer, rapist,
and the thief. I wonder if this kind of statement, did you think it was
helpful to ease the tension between the two countries? This kind of
statement?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen the statement. We will take a look at it and
try to get you a comment. Yes.
QUESTION: Could you give me what information on the two Cubans who have
been arrested for hijacking a boat to get into this country?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Six Cubans were picked up on September 25th, were taken
to the Guantanamo Naval Base for further processing. The vessel they were
on, which belongs to the Cuban Border Guard, is in the custody of the U.S.
Coast Guard in Florida. All six Cubans were interviewed by the Department
of Justice investigators regarding the events. Based on statements provided
by all six to the investigators, two of the Cubans, a port security
guard and his brother-in-law, hijacked the Cuban Border Guard vessel,
taking four hostages in the process. The two were armed with AK-47s found
on the vessel and a knife.
The Border Guard machinist forced to operate the vessel was struck several
times in the head with the butt of a knife. The hostage-takers also fired
multiple rounds at a Cuban Border Guard patrol boat that was chasing them.
The Cuban Government has informed us that there was one injury aboard the
patrol boat as a result. The patrol boat rammed the vessel in an effort to
stop the hijackers.
The two, who admitted to the hijacking, were interviewed by INS asylum
officers. They were found not to be entitled to protection and will be
returned to Cuba. The four hostages, including three Cuban Border Guard
personnel and a 15-year-old minor girl who was a friend of one of the
Border Guards, were the four that were taken hostage. They declined to be
interviewed by asylum officers and asked to return to Cuba as soon as
possible. They were returned to Cuba on September the 29th.
We are looking into a request by the Cuban Government for the return of the
Border Guard vessel. We will be repatriating the hijackers.
QUESTION: Jamie, in a previous case where a plane was hijacked to this
country, the man was tried in a court of law. Why would these people not be
tried in a U.S. court and why are they being returned?
MR. RUBIN: The five Cubans who hijacked the tugboat? Is that the case
you're talking about?
QUESTION: No, the airplane hijacking. I think it was two or three years
ago.
MR. RUBIN: I don't know. We'll have to get you a reason. But we are
sending them back.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) the tugboat question, say something about
that.
MR. RUBIN: All right, the five Cubans who hijacked the tugboat and an
accomplice in Cuba were later tried by the Cuban Government and sentenced,
depending on the level of involvement. The sentences were consistent with
the normal length of sentences in Cuban hijacking cases. I'll get you some
specific answers as to why in this case we're sending them back, if you're
saying that in other cases we didn't.
QUESTION: Well, I'm wondering if it's a difference in policy?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think so. I think it just depends on the case. But I
don't think there's any policy ramification. It depends on the case. We
will get you details on how the cases differ. In fact, Lula Rodriguez,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs - our Principal Deputy is Jim
Foley -- is one of the world's greatest experts on this subject. I welcome
you to give her a call.
(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)
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