U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #134, 97-09-15
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
751
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, September 15, 1997
Briefer: James B. Foley
ARMS CONTROL
1-6 US Proposals at Oslo Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines
BOSNIA
6 Assessment of the Elections Process
6,7 Percentage/Participation in Elections
7-9 The Election Certification Process and Installation of
Officials
SYRIA
9 Reported Deployment of Scud Missiles 70 Kilometers from
Turkish City
NORTH KOREA
10 Status of Talks in New York Tomorrow
MEXICO
10-11 Status of Governor Weld's Nomination for US Ambassador to
Mexico
VATICAN
11 Status of Ambassador Flynn
GREECE/TURKEY
12 Prospects for Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers with
Secretary Albright in New York
CUBA
12-13 Reports Cuban Government to Seek Death Penalty Against
Arrested American Citizen
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #134
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1997 1:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: I'm going to be known as the late Jim Foley if I don't get
this under control. But to continue the food metaphor we were working on
Friday, hopefully I'll be able to deliver up some tastier morsels, having
been in the kitchen a little bit longer than planned.
I don't think I have an announcement, so I'm ready for your questions.
George.
QUESTION: Has there been a policy change concerning land mines?
MR. FOLEY: There's been a negotiating change. Our goals in Oslo remain
the same. We are seeking to achieve a key presidential objective which
deals with the humanitarian problem of land mines by seeking a global ban
as soon as possible, while at the same time safeguarding our national
security interests and those of our friends and allies.
But the press reports I think you're alluding to are basically correct. We
have come forward with a compromise proposal which is being discussed now
among a number of delegations in Oslo. The United States decided that we
could drop our proposed exception for Korea and we would resolve our
security concerns in Korea and elsewhere through a time-bound deferral
period long enough to meet our needs -- nine years, that is. We further
agreed that this deferral period would run from the time of signature
and not from entry into force, as we had originally envisaged.
However, we are also seeking two modest but absolutely critical modifications
in the current draft text of the treaty. First, we are calling for a
revision in the current article on treaty withdrawal. We would need to
include a clause that would allow countries to withdraw from the treaty if
they or their allies are victims of aggression. I would note that the
current treaty text does not allow signers to withdraw during a conflict,
while other arms control treaties, such as the chemical weapons treaty,
do not restrict the right to withdraw.
Secondly, we would need to revise the current draft text definition of anti-
handling devices to avoid banning US anti-tank munitions. In other words,
we would seek a modification in the definition of anti-personnel land mines
to make clear that certain US anti-tank mine systems are not covered by the
treaty. This revision would enable the United States to retain its
principal anti-tank mines, just as other states would be able to retain
theirs; even though, in many cases, their mines with anti-handling devices
pose a greater humanitarian risk than US anti-tank mines with self-
destructing protective sub-munitions.
Now, the United States has shown, I think, a remarkable deal of flexibility
in arriving at this proposal; first, in deciding to join the Oslo process,
and then now coming forward with these significant compromise proposals.
The United States is committed to eliminating anti-personnel land mines.
Our compromise proposal is consistent with our commitment to negotiate a
comprehensive agreement, as I said, that achieves our humanitarian goals
while protecting our national security interests. If other conference
participants accept this proposal, it will result in a treaty that will be
far more effective in addressing the global land mine crisis than a treaty
that does not include US participation.
QUESTION: Jim?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, Judd.
QUESTION: What changed? What made the US change its position?
MR. FOLEY: We are committed, as I said, to achieving results, achieving
success. This is a foreign policy priority of the President, of Secretary
Albright, of the Administration. Yet we have had, as you know, some very
serious and legitimate national security concerns that we've wanted to see
addressed.
We believe that this compromise proposal will enable us both to protect
those national security interests - in other words, we're not in any way
considering anything that will undermine our national security interests,
including on the Korean Peninsula, as has been described from this podium
many times -- but at the same time, move us towards success, towards the
goal that we share with our partners in Oslo, which is a true global
ban.
We think that we can achieve both objectives by making these proposals.
Therefore, we are counting on our friends and allies in Oslo to meet us
half-way, as we've now moved half-way.
QUESTION: This is not the Diana factor?
MR. FOLEY: The factor is the goal of achieving success - a success that
meets our humanitarian and national security objectives.
It's no secret that the negotiations have been tough sledding so far, since
the negotiators have been in Oslo. We, as I said, believe in the aims of
the proposed treaty. We're trying, a very serious good faith effort, as I
said, to meet our partners there half-way. We're hoping that they're going
to travel the same distance, and that we'll be able to sign this treaty.
QUESTION: But this issue has received a lot of publicity since the death
of Princess Diana. That has had no impact on - there hasn't been pressure
on the US to change its position?
MR. FOLEY: I don't think that our commitment to achieving a global ban
was any less prior to the passing of Princess Diana than it is today.
The Oslo conference negotiations began before her death. We made a major
policy decision to attend the Oslo talks. We've been involved in negotiations,
and they reached an impasse. I don't think that you will find anything in
our compromise proposal now which in any way deviates from our commitment
to protecting our national security interests.
I think we've come up with a formula that meets those interests, and that
can help us get to the global ban. I think that speaks for itself.
Carol.
QUESTION: You talk about coming half-way, though, and the way it looks to
me is that the United States gets everything it wants out of here. I mean,
you get more time so that you can continue to deploy new weapons. You get a
withdrawal clause that allows you to pull out if things don't go your way.
I don't see where the United States gives up anything here.
MR. FOLEY: As you know, our concern has focused, essentially, on the
Korean Peninsula. We are hopeful, indeed, that in this nine-year period
there will be developments on the political front, on the peace front; but
also in terms of further technological developments in the military field
that would also enable us to meet the terms of the treaty within nine
years.
As you know, the President has made a commitment and our armed forces are
actively seeking to investigate alternatives to anti-personnel land mines.
We believe nine years may be enough for those efforts to come to fruition.
We also can be hopeful, I think, that over time and within this period, we
will achieve our objectives of a peaceful settlement on the Korean
Peninsula. But if at the end of that period the situation has not changed
in Korea, or technological developments have not occurred in this respect,
then if absolutely necessary, we would withdraw from the treaty under those
circumstances.
QUESTION: My understanding is - this is not case-specific to you - that
any country could opt for this longer phase-in period. That's correct?
MR. FOLEY: I believe so.
QUESTION: What other countries do you think might take advantage of
that?
MR. FOLEY: I couldn't say at this point. This was an offer that we tabled
over the weekend in Oslo. We're nearing the endgame. It's very difficult to
predict, as we're in the last days of the negotiations, where they are
going to go. We've made a serious offer, and we're hoping that it will be
possible to produce this treaty in the next few days. But I can't really
get into the nitty-gritty with you right now because I believe tomorrow is
the last sort of official working day in Oslo, so it's a moving target risk,
even as we speak.
QUESTION: What happens if every country decides to take on this nine-year
phase-in period as the United States does? I mean, doesn't that significantly
weaken anything you put your signature to, if all these countries say, okay,
we'll wait a decade?
MR. FOLEY: Remember, the United States is not, of course, a contributor
to the problem here. We have national security considerations that are
uppermost in our minds, but as has been stated by Mr. Rubin and others, we
are not the producers. We are not deploying the land mines that are really
of such critical and humanitarian [concern].
But if everyone signs on the dotted line and agrees to the elimination of
these systems within nine years, I think that is a significant humanitarian
achievement. Nine years is nine years, but an agreement is an agreement. I
think it would be a signal accomplishment if this treaty is signed and
brought into force.
QUESTION: But every country could do exactly what the United States is
doing, which is to say - you say you're not deploying, but other countries
do deploy. They could deploy for the next nine years, and then at the end
of the nine years they could say, well, you know, we have a problem with X
or Y. And then they could withdraw from the treaty, and it could end up
being just a paper - you know, a piece of worthless paper.
MR. FOLEY: Well, you're getting into speculation over what may or may not
happen nine years from now and over the course of the next nine years.
Remember, we have a major concern about nations that are not present in
Oslo, some of the most important producers of anti-personnel land mines. We
hope, by virtue of the United States' participation, that we will bring
them into this process. But I think if you look around the table in Oslo, I
think it would be difficult to question the bona fides, the goodwill of
those nations present to actually move towards a global ban.
We, I believe, have the same commitment on the United States side. We have
some specific national security interests that we hope will be taken care
of, addressed, during this nine-year period.
Yes.
QUESTION: How do you arrive at the figure of nine years? What's magic
about that?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I haven't personally spoken to our negotiators. This was
something that was worked out within the government over the last few days.
But it's probably a technical question that I'm not really in a position to
answer.
QUESTION: As far as the United States is concerned, is that figure - nine
years - negotiable?
MR. FOLEY: I wouldn't want to speculate. As I said, they're over there
negotiating right now.
I think the best answer, though, in an overall sense to your question is
that really, we're not considering other compromises or other fall-back
positions. This really is our final position.
QUESTION: I just want to be clear on one thing. This nine-year deferral
is global. It doesn't refer only to the Korean Peninsula.
MR. FOLEY: That's right.
QUESTION: It's not just the Korean Peninsula?
MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry?
QUESTION: It doesn't apply only to the Korean Peninsula. It's to all -
the application of the treaty is --
MR. FOLEY: My understanding is yes.
QUESTION: Okay, and Jim, I just want to ask, apparently there were
discussions with the allies over the weekend. Can you tell us about
that?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have any information about the private negotiations
that are going on.
Bill.
QUESTION: Yes, is there more on the treaty?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: In response to Carol, you said that if there's not significant -
Carol's question - there's not significant progress towards peace in the
Korean Peninsula, the US can use the escape clause to get out of the
treaty. But earlier you said the escape clause was intended for victims of
aggression. I'm a little confused as to how it works.
I mean, if the status quo prevailed in Korea, the US would consider pulling
out of the treaty?
MR. FOLEY: Again, I will state carefully what I said, but I won't expand
upon it. Our decision to make this proposal is made with the full knowledge
that if absolutely necessary, we would withdraw from the treaty after nine
years if we failed to find alternatives to anti-personnel land mines for
use in Korea or elsewhere.
Yes, Bill.
QUESTION: On Bosnia. Of course, I'd be very interested to hear the State
Department's take on the elections this weekend.
MR. FOLEY: Sure.
QUESTION: But specifically, I have an article by Mr. Smucker in The
Washington Times that says Jacques Klein and Robert Frowick both have
stated that the US should foresee, or they foresee, an indefinite Bosnia
stay and that William Cohen is coming around to this point of view, or at
least he's being brought on board about going beyond June of next
year.
Can you respond specifically to that report?
MR. FOLEY: Well, on your second point, I would of course refer you to the
Pentagon spokesman. But the foreign policy and national security team
headed by the President, including Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright,
are in firm agreement on our mission in Bosnia. There's nothing new to
report on that.
We've said all along that the SFOR mission will end in June of '98. We have
a lot of work to do between now and then. I'm going to get to that in a
second, when I answer your first question.
We see that our efforts to accelerate implementation in a more robust and
concerted way
-- across the board applying carrots and sticks, incentives and sanctions --
is starting to pay off. We are achieving progress. The going is going to
get tougher in some respects. But we see a lot of evidence that the trends
in favor of Dayton implementation are on the rise. That's what we're going
to concentrate on between now and next Summer.
In terms of my reaction, or the State Department's reaction to the
elections that took place over the weekend, although there were some
problems in specific localities that had to be sorted out, the overall
conduct of the elections exceeded the expectations of the international
community. This was an important step toward consolidation of democracy and
a benchmark on the road to Dayton implementation.
Voter turnout, which OSCE estimates at about 70 percent, was very high, and
violent acts were isolated and minimal. We are pleased that so many
Bosnians chose to participate peacefully in the democratic process. We
salute, especially, the superb professional work of the OSCE, the election
monitors, of SFOR, and of the Office of the High Representative in these
really very successful elections which took place over the weekend.
QUESTION: Jim, are you saying, in reply to my second point, your first
response, that Frowick and Klein's point of view does not reflect the
administration's point of view about withdrawal next June? Is that
correct?
MR. FOLEY: Indeed, they are not members of the administration.
Carol.
QUESTION: I was wondering if you had any sort of idea what percentage of
the Bosnian Serb community turned out?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that at my fingertips; maybe we could get it. It
was significant. I believe it was in the ballpark of the overall figures.
MR. MCCLENNY: A little higher.
MR. FOLEY: Thank you.
QUESTION: So that 70 percent is across the board, not just skewed to the -
-
MR. FOLEY: Yes, that's right.
QUESTION: Jim?
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: On another subject --
MR. FOLEY: Are we still on Bosnia? I've got a lot of guidance.
(Laughter)
QUESTION: One more.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: It's an easy one, about OSCE.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: According to The Washington Post, they say that after the
Croats and Serbs threatened they were going to boycott that OSCE in return,
they - both sides squeezed concessions from the OSCE, they got something in
return. Do you have any information about the fact that The Washington Post
said the Croats got the victory in Mostar because they played with that - I
don't know - with district regulations?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we believe -
QUESTION: But basically, Frowick said that we have to deal with Milosevic
and Tudjman. And he, in my understanding, admitted that he made a deal with
them.
MR. FOLEY: Let me answer your question. We believe the OSCE did an
excellent job in the preparation and running of the elections, as I've
said. I think there were two issues of focus late last week, in advance of
the elections. One was the reinstatement of the two Bosnian Serb candidates
in Prijedor and Bosanski Brod. The provisional elections commission, the
PEC, has the authority to review and approve recommendations for sanctions
against parties responsible for election abuses. Now, their decision to
first strike the Prijedor and Bosanski Brod candidates and then reinstate
them was taken by the PEC in accordance with its usual rules and procedures.
I would note that there were only reinstatements of two from the group of
52 candidates struck from the ballots for electoral abuses. Thirty of these
candidates struck were from the Bosnian Serb side, twenty from the Croatian
HDZ, and two from the Muslim SDA.
As for Mostar, which is a critical issue, I agree. Originally, Mostar was
to have 12 representatives for the eastern and 12 for the western portion
of the city, plus a central district of three representatives. The OSCE
agreed to abolish the central district. Voters who would have voted there
had to vote in either the east or the west portion of the city.
Now, in exchange for this, the HDZ made several extremely important
concessions, which significantly advanced the peace process and implementation
of Dayton. First, obviously, they agreed to drop their threat of a boycott;
and we think that was important.
Secondly, the Herzegovina-Neretva Cantonal Assembly passed the long-awaited
and long-delayed constitutional amendment which consolidates the multi-
ethnic structure of the city, adopting operating procedures to allow the
city finally to begin to function as a multi-ethnic entity.
Lastly, the HDZ also committed itself to allowing refugee return to Mostar,
under UNHCR guidelines.
So we are satisfied that the OSCE acted with intelligence and discretion
and that the results achieved fully merited their efforts in allowing the
elections to go forward.
Now, the big question, I think, on most observers' minds has to do with
implementation of results. I'm surprised not to get that question. This is
no doubt going to be a critical test of all of the people of Bosnia and of
the international institutions involved and of the international community.
This will not be an easy process. It's going to be very difficult. It is
also critical. We are not without tools at our disposal, and we are not
lacking in ideas and certainly in fortitude to see this through, because
the elections were critical to the implementation of the spirit, as well as
the letter of Dayton -- which calls for a single Bosnian state.
We have seen, for example, in the area of refugee return, some movement
over the last month - some surprising movement. As we move to the next
phase - which is the implementation of the results of the election - the
Office of the High Representative and the OSCE and other members of the
international community have a solid plan to accomplish this implementation.
It was approved in Sintra at the ministerial meeting of the Peace
Implementation Council steering board.
I can describe a little bit to you what that entails. The first step will
be to complete the election certification process. That's really a two-part
procedure. I believe Ambassador Frowick will deliver some kind of a
technical assessment of the elections. Then there is a body called the
National Elections Results Implementation Committee that was set up by the
OSCE and the OHR and the international community. There will be subsidiary
committees at each of the five OSCE regional centers.
Within about a month from now, some of those tough decisions are going to
be made, as this committee begins to assess, first, the results -- we're
going to have to see, over the next few days who won elections and where,
and that's not clear yet, so some of this is hypothetical. Then they are
going to be examining, on a case-by-case basis, the performance of
municipalities around Bosnia, in terms of reflecting the legitimate results
of the elections.
Tough sanctions are being considered and will, indeed, be implemented in
the event of noncompliance. They will include denial of any economic
reconstruction assistance to noncompliant municipalities; denial of travel
privileges for officials deemed to be responsible for thwarting the results
of the elections; and also such officials who may have been elected in
these recent elections will be taken off the elected list, in the event of
failure to comply with the results and an effort to thwart those results.
In summary, I would say, again, that we are at a critical point in our
stepped-up efforts to achieve Dayton implementation. We are fully
determined to make full use of the tools available to the international
community to see that the aims of Dayton are brought to fruition in the
months to come.
Yes.
QUESTION: Turkish press reported that Syrians have deployed 36 Scud C
missiles only 70 kilometers from a major Turkish city in the region,
Antakya. Do you have any information about this deployment?
MR. FOLEY: I do not. I'd be happy to look into it for you.
QUESTION: I have another Korea question.
MR. FOLEY: Korea?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: There are talks tomorrow in New York.
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: Are you able to be somewhat more forthcoming about those talks
than you were late last week?
MR. FOLEY: George, no verbatim transcript of the meeting in advance of
the meeting.
(Laughter)
QUESTION: You're not going to touch that land mine, huh?
(Laughter)
MR. FOLEY: It's getting out of hand.
QUESTION: Jim.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, Jim.
QUESTION: In the matter of Ambassador Weld, did the State Department have
any recommendations for him, one way or another, whether he should withdraw
his name?
MR. FOLEY: Well, as you know, the Secretary has been in the Middle East
for a week now, so I doubt that she's been personally involved in the
matter, given the critical issues she's been dealing with at quite a
distance. So I really couldn't comment on that, but she has been supportive
of the President's nomination of Governor Weld. I understand there may be
an announcement out of the White House, even as we speak, in that
regard.
QUESTION: There's been a report that he has stepped down.
MR. FOLEY: You'd have to check with the White House. I do believe that
something is contemplated today, around this hour.
QUESTION: Does the idea, or did the idea of the post being vacant for
possibly an indefinite period -- was that a consideration in the State
Department's talks with Governor Weld?
MR. FOLEY: I really haven't any information on that sort of discussion
having taken place. Governor Weld has been a vigorous candidate for the
post until quite recently. So I'm not sure that anybody - I wouldn't really
want to credit the thesis that people have been second-guessing this
issue.
Certainly, Mexico is really one of our most critical bilateral relationships
around the world. We need an ambassador - and a very capable one - there.
That has been a consideration, and will be.
Yes, any other questions? Carol.
QUESTION: Speaking of ambassadors, has Ray Flynn resigned?
MR. FOLEY: I have not heard anything of that.
QUESTION: You've not heard anything of that?
MR. FOLEY: No, no.
QUESTION: On the Middle East --
QUESTION: On the subject of Mexico --
QUESTION: Okay, all right.
MR. FOLEY: On the Middle East, you know the party is still more or less
in the region. I think we'll be prepared to resume our usual forthcoming
approach on that subject tomorrow, when they're back.
QUESTION: Not even on the decision that was taken yesterday to approve a
Jewish housing project in --
MR. FOLEY: Let's wait until tomorrow, when we've got our team of experts
and the Secretary of State and the spokesman all back in Washington.
QUESTION: Do you know what time they're expected?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that, but we can look into it. I think they may
be en route.
QUESTION: On the subject of --
MR. FOLEY: Yes. Which, Mexico?
QUESTION: Yeah, Mexico, maybe it's not the appropriate time, but
nonetheless, on that matter I was referring to, a man of the stature of Tom
Pickering, in my statement of Friday. There is a man that the Mexicans well
respect - a man who's impeccable in law enforcement that could fill that
post. His name is Tom Constantine. Do you have any reaction to that?
MR. FOLEY: I thank you for the comment.
Yes.
QUESTION: I have one question concerning Secretary Albright's UN General
Assembly schedule. How does it stand right now? Will she be able to or
interested in having a tripartite meeting with Turkish and Greek foreign
ministers?
MR. FOLEY: Well, that's a good question. As you know, she had a very
productive meeting with her Greek and Turkish counterparts in Madrid. I
can't predict what her schedule is going to be, but I would guess that if
the leaders are willing to recommit to the spirit of Madrid, such a meeting
could be productive.
We're hoping, indeed, to see, as I said, a resumption of the sort of
atmospherics which are indicative of the willingness on both sides to
engage each other as partners looking jointly for solutions to the problems
that divide them.
I wouldn't say anything more at this point, because I'm not familiar with
her schedule. But I think I made myself clear.
QUESTION: But it's fair to say there is a willingness, apparently, on the
US side for such a meeting to take place?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I won't repeat what I said, but I think I was pretty
clear.
QUESTION: Cuba?
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: Do you have any --
MR. FOLEY: I thought I was heading for the exit..
QUESTION: No, no, not so fast.
MR. FOLEY: I hadn't counted on you, Judd. Yes.
QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to reports out of Cuba that the Cuban
Government is going to seek the death penalty against the US citizen who
was arrested in August of 1996? His name is Walter van der Veer. He was
accused of working for "a terrorist organization."
MR. FOLEY: I don't have anything new today. Maybe we'll have something in
the next days, but this is not a new case. As you said, he entered Cuba
apparently in May of 1996, and was arrested in August of 1996.
We've had some consular access to him with our US Interests Section in
Havana. We've visited him regularly and monitored his case. But at the time,
he stated that one of the reasons he entered Cuba was for the purpose of
working with local church groups. I really don't have anything specifically
new for you on the case. I'd be glad to look into it.
QUESTION: Have the Cubans conveyed any evidence concerning the bombings?
MR. FOLEY: Absolutely not, to my knowledge. I checked this morning to see
if there was anything new, because we've been checking every day, since I
knew you'd be asking me the question. Still nothing new - no official
formal conveying of information or request for assistance.
QUESTION: And you have nothing to say about the arrested Salvadoran; is
that right?
MR. FOLEY: No, no. Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:38 P.M.)
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