U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #104, 97-07-11
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1126
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, July 11, 1997
Briefer: Nicholas Burns
ANNOUNCEMENTS / STATEMENTS
1 Welcome to Visitors
CAMBODIA
1 Read-out on Acting Secretary Pickering Mtg. w/Prince
Ranariddh
4 --UNSC Draft Statement
7 --Drug Trafficking from Cambodia
7 --Hun Sen's Relationship w/Khmer Rouge
5-6 Secretary Albright's Decision not to go to Phnom Penh
2-3,5-6 ASEAN FM Diplomatic Initiative
3,7 FBI Investigation into Grenade Attack of March 30
7-8 Vietnam Involvement
8 Political Assassinations/Recriminations
9 Departure of American Citizens
9 IMF/World Bank Loans/Multilateral/Bilateral Aid
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
9-13 SFOR Capture of War Criminals
10-11 Detention/Release of Drljaca Relatives
9-11 Russia's Participation in SFOR & IFOR
CUBA
13 Report of Cuban Build-up of Shore Defenses
14-15 Proposed Flotilla of American Citizens
15 Migration Talks
NORTH KOREA
15 World Food Program Appeal
15-16 U.S. Alliance Commitments to South Korea/Japan
UNITED KINGDOM (NORTHERN IRELAND)
16 Marches thru Catholic Areas Cancelled
TURKEY/GREECE
16-17 Reports of Violation of Air Space over Aegean by Turkish
F-16 Fighters
17-18 Resolution of Imia/Kardak Dispute
JAPAN
18 Performance of Mr. Irabu of the New York Yankees
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #104
FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1997 1:38 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. BURNS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the State
Department briefing. I want to welcome two of our summer interns, Michelle
van Leewen is an intern in the East Asia and Pacific Bureau. Michelle,
welcome -- from the University of Washington Law School. That's Washington
in Washington State, right? Terrific. You can brief on Pacific Salmon today,
then. Michael Tremonte is here. Michael is an intern in the Office
of Legal Advisor. He is from New York City and attends New York University
Law School. Did they inform you about that you have to renounce the Yankees
before you come into the briefing room? Did they let you know that? Have
you done that publicly yet?
(Laughter.)
MR. BURNS: Would you like to stand up and renounce the New York
Yankees?
(Laughter.)
MR. BURNS: George, isn't that the rule that you and I decided upon?
GEORGE: Absolutely.
MR. BURNS: It's the rule.
GEORGE: It's the rule.
MR. BURNS: Yeah. We hate the Yankees here. Okay. He just renounced the
Yankees. Excellent, Michael. Okay. We're making converts as we go
along.
Okay. I wanted to brief you on the meeting that Acting Secretary of State
Tom Pickering just concluded with Prince Ranariddh. Acting Secretary
Pickering met today with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the First Prime Minister
of Cambodia. Mr. Pickering expressed profound concern at the violence in
Cambodia, the loss of life caused by the conflict between the security
forces loyal to the two prime ministers. We urge Cambodia's leaders to
resolve their political differences peacefully and to abide by the
principles of the Paris Peace Accords.
Acting Secretary Pickering emphasized that the apparently deliberate and
planned use of force to overturn the results of the 1993 United Nations-
sponsored elections in Cambodia was unacceptable to the United States. The
principles of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords should be upheld. Certainly, the
ability of the political party of Prince Ranariddh to play a role in
Cambodia should be sustained and should reflect the fact that that
political party of Prince Ranariddh won the most votes during the 1993
elections.
All of Cambodia's political parties, including that of Prince Ranariddh,
must be allowed to operate in an atmosphere free of intimidation. In this
respect, Ambassador Pickering, of course, reaffirmed the wish of the United
States that elections be held in Cambodia in 1998, as the two prime
ministers had agreed just a couple of weeks ago. He also went on to say
that the United States is a strong supporter of democracy in Cambodia. We
are opposed to having senior Khmer Rouge leaders play any kind of
role in Cambodian politics. We firmly believe that Khmer Rouge leaders
suspected of having committed crimes against humanity should be brought to
justice.
He went on to say that the United States welcomes the initiative of ASEAN
to delay membership for Cambodia in that association until the Paris Peace
Accords and the 1993 election results are observed. We applaud the decision
of ASEAN, he told Prince Ranariddh, to send a delegation to Beijing to
consult with His Majesty, King Sihanouk.
It was, I thought, a very good exchange of views between the two. I know
that Prince Ranariddh is giving his own press conference. I will just give
you a couple of highlights from what he told Ambassador Pickering. First,
on the subject of the Khmer Rouge, he actually raised that issue -- Prince
Ranariddh raised it -- before Acting Secretary Pickering had a chance to do
so. Prince Ranariddh said, I have nothing to do with the Khmer Rouge
and I will not bring them into positions of power. Needless to say,
this was a welcome commitment.
QUESTION: Was that a quote?
MR. BURNS: This was a direct quote. Needless to say, that was a welcome
commitment by Prince Ranariddh because we firmly oppose any participation
by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodian politics.
He also said something that Ambassador Pickering very much agreed with.
That is that the 1991 accords were an international agreement, in which
many countries, including the United States, had a great role to play.
Therefore, the solution to the Cambodian problem ought to be considered to
be an international solution; or at least a solution - a set of problems -
on which the international community has a legitimate right to comment.
This is in contrast to the press conference held in Phnom Penh yesterday
where Hun Sen said that the problems of Cambodia are an internal matter.
Well, the international community helped to bring peace to Cambodia in
1991; we helped sponsor the elections of 1993; and we have delivered over
$1 billion in assistance to Cambodia since 1993. It is legitimate for the
United States, for ASEAN, for Japan, for Australia and other countries to
have an interest. Prince Ranariddh put for that point of view and
Ambassador Pickering very much agreed with it.
I said a good exchange of views because it was an opportunity for us to
hear at some length about Prince Ranariddh's views. I know he is giving a
press conference, but he did signal - he did tell us - that the suspension
of aid by the United States was a strong and clear signal that he welcomed.
He hoped very much that the Paris Accords could be preserved. He did,
obviously, indicate in a variety of ways that he felt that democracy in
Cambodia was in danger, grave danger.
He said that members of his government -- some of the members of his
military and his government were being held against their will in Cambodia.
Other ministers in his government had taken refuge in Bangkok and Singapore
and the United States and other places. He cited the March 30th grenade
attack -- which, as you know, wounded an American citizen, and thus the FBI
is investigating it -- as very grave concern and as a harbinger, perhaps in
hindsight, of troubles to come.
He urged that the FBI continue it's investigation into that grenade attack,
and Ambassador Pickering said that the United States would continue the FBI
investigation. Again, as I said, his statements on Khmer Rouge were most
welcome. Ambassador Pickering reviewed the major points that I have already
told you about, and he welcomed the statement that was made on the Khmer
Rouge. Ambassador Pickering said that we look forward to being in touch,
but at the present time, we really were putting great stock in the effort
by the ASEAN foreign ministers from the Philippines, Thailand and
Indonesia to have a round of consultations with King Sihanouk, Prince
Ranariddh and Hun Sen, and that we would follow those very closely.
Obviously looking forward to the Secretary's trip to Malaysia at the
end of this month, in just a couple of weeks time, this obviously
will be a source of discussion for the United States with our ASEAN
partners.
QUESTION: The Prime Minister's statement that he has nothing to do with
the Khmer Rouge -- does that square with your understanding of the
situation?
MR. BURNS: I think we have spoken just in the past couple of days about
our concern that there was a flirtation that had developed between Prince
Ranariddh's political party and members of the Khmer Rouge. We obviously
welcome the statements made today because, as I said before, we resolutely
condemn the Khmer Rouge and all it stands for. We think the influence of
the Khmer Rouge has been gradually waning over the past several years. We
would like to see that trend continue. We would not like to see the
Khmer Rouge feel it is emboldened by the present political crisis. I know
that Ambassador Pickering urged Prince Ranariddh to say in public what he
said in private to us about the Khmer Rouge. I expect he will do so at his
press conference.
QUESTION: I want to ask George's question in a different way. Do you
believe him?
MR. BURNS: Well, in diplomacy, it is customary for nations to base their
appreciations of situations on evidence and on deeds rather than just on
words. The words in this case are welcome because we had not heard these
words from him before, at least not in several years, certainly not
recently in the last several months. The words are welcome; but what
matters more than the words are the deeds. We will, of course, be very
sensitive to any attempt by any of the political parties in Cambodia to
resurrect the Khmer Rouge and to bring the Khmer Rouge back into positions
of influence in Phnom Penh or in any place, any city or province in the
country.
QUESTION: I would like to ask sort of a formal question. Do you recognize
the government that exists now in Phnom Penh?
MR. BURNS: We recognize the government that was elected in 1993. There
are two prime ministers of that government. The first prime minister is
Prince Ranariddh. The second prime minister is Mr. Hun Sen. If you want to
ask a legal question, we recognize, as you know - pardon?
QUESTION: Go ahead.
MR. BURNS: We recognize countries and not especially governments. That is
true in many other countries around the world. Afghanistan is an example of
that. So, it is not a question of deciding whether or not we need to make a
decision of sustaining formal diplomatic relations. We have diplomatic
relations with Cambodia and intend to continue them because it is in our
interest to do so.
We still work with and certainly recognize the role that Prince Ranariddh
has been given by the Cambodian people in a democratic election. In fact,
when he walked in, the first thing that Ambassador Pickering said to him
was, welcome, Mr. First Prime Minister; and that was meant quite sincerely.
He is elected by the Cambodian people. We don't take away that designation.
Mr. Hun Sen is trying to take away that designation, but we're not going to
play that game.
QUESTION: Clearly, he can't go back to Cambodia, at least not right now.
And consequently, the practical effect of all this is that Hun Sen is
running the country. Did Ranariddh suggest at all any thought of setting up
a government in exile?
MR. BURNS: He did not mention that. He did mention that he intended to
press his case internationally. He said he would be traveling to Southeast
Asia in a matter of days to consult with governments there. I think he said
he would be attending or at least be present in Kuala Lumpur during the
ASEAN meetings. There was talk about a United Nations Security Council
statement. There is such a statement, I think, that's been drafted in
the United Nations. The United States very much supports that statement.
Ambassador Pickering told Prince Ranariddh that we supported it. That
statement, we hope, will make some of the same points that we have --
making over the last several days about the inadmissibility of the use of
force, the fact that we hope that the peace accords can be preserved.
QUESTION: Are you thinking at all of trying to impose sanctions on -
international sanctions on Cambodia? Ranariddh also said yesterday
something about pushing the UN, the Security Council to declare sort of a
broad-based halt on aid. I mean, obviously you have a temporary suspension.
But would the United States support an effort by the UN Security Council to
impose a blanket aid cut-off on Cambodia or some other kinds of sanctions?
MR. BURNS: First, I am not aware that the United Nations has taken up any
such proposal. Second, the United States has already made its own decision,
which we discussed yesterday. Third, it's very important that we give
diplomacy a chance to try to do something positive here. That is why the
most important thing that the United States believes is happening now - the
most important development - is the initiative by ASEAN one, to deny its
seat in ASEAN, which is very important, and we support that. Two is
to send this high-level and very distinguished delegation to Beijing to
consult with His Majesty King Sihanouk, who time and again, has stood for
national unity in Cambodia over many decades, and who is a figure of great
respect in Cambodia and internationally; and to talk to the two prime
ministers -- Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen - to see if there is any way that
the 1991 accords can be preserved.
Now, based on the press conference yesterday in Phnom Penh by Hun Sen, that
may be a very tough challenge. Hun Sen appears not to be interested in any
kind of reasonable compromise that would respect international law, the
will of the Cambodian people as expressed in the elections, and the will of
the international community in the Paris Peace Accords. But nevertheless,
we think it makes sense to proceed with that initiative. Today's meeting
was part of the effort to have these contacts with the disputants to see if
it's possible to do something positive. Rather than to blindly strike out
with sanctions - international sanctions - at this point, we think that
diplomacy is probably in the short term the way to go.
QUESTION: Well, are sanctions something that you would in reserve for the
future?
MR. BURNS: Well, obviously, there are many options available to countries
around the world and to the United Nations. But I think right now, these
quiet discussions that ASEAN intends to have is the most important thing
that can occur.
QUESTION: Just one more question. Is there any re-thinking here that
Secretary Albright probably should have gone to Cambodia, made it possible
for herself to go to Cambodia on the last trip, thinking that perhaps she
could have been a catalyst to prevent this coup from happening?
MR. BURNS: No, in fact, quite the reverse. I think a lot of us in
discussions this week have, frankly, reconfirmed in our minds that
Secretary Albright made absolutely the right decision. First of all, let's
remember what she was trying to accomplish. She wanted to have a face-to-
face meeting with both prime ministers -- with Ranariddh and Hun Sen. She
was in personal contact with both of them while we were on the trip in San
Francisco and in Vietnam to try to work out a meeting.
Her security advisors told her in no uncertain terms that going into Phnom
Penh to the Council of Ministers Building where the meeting was to have
been held was not a workable proposition given the security situation where
there had been fighting on the streets, where our embassy had taken an RPG
round. So the strong advice - in fact, the unanimous advice of her security
advisors and of her own senior advisors was to try to arrange an airport
meeting. She personally called Hun Sen and Ranariddh and had Ambassador
Ken Quinn go in four or five times in the space of four or five days to
arrange an airport visit.
Now, I think for reasons of protocol, the Cambodian leaders decided that
would not be appropriate. In hindsight, I think the mistake that may have
been made was that the two prime ministers were more concerned about
protocol, or perhaps about other political factors in Cambodia, than the
importance of a face-to-face meeting which could have been held.
Secretary Albright had to do the responsible thing with her staff and with
the 12 journalists in mind. Taking 40 or so people into Phnom Penh against
the wishes of her security advisors would not have been a responsible
decision. She made the responsible decision. This charge -- and I don't say
it is yours, Carol, but the one that you mention and other reporters have
raised it -- would make sense only if the United States by not going into
Phnom Penh then had no diplomatic contact with the Cambodian Government and,
thus, had no ability to influence the views of the Cambodian Government.
But that is false. Secretary Albright had personal phone conversations
where they talked not only about the visit but about our belief that there
could be no resort to violence and that the two prime ministers had to
cooperate together.
There were four or five diplomatic demarches by Ambassador Ken Quinn during
this period which essentially carried the same message. There were repeated
public statements by the United States about our position. So there was no
confusion about the political message of the United States. Therefore, the
logic of this question, I think, is not there; it's not apparent. I think
she feels good about the decision and we all do, too. I suppose the 12
journalists who are with her feel the same way. But I don't want to
speak for you. Laura?
QUESTION: Nick, given this diplomatic initiative by the ASEAN foreign
ministers that you support, what does this effort envision? That the two co-
prime ministers sit down at a negotiating table? I mean what do you hope
the end result of this diplomatic effort might be?
MR. BURNS: Well, it makes sense to embark on an initiative to try to
preserve the Paris Peace Accords and the results of the elections. That is
what ASEAN intends to do -- to bring to bear influence by the international
community, particularly by Southeast Asian states, on those two questions.
We believe that should be supported.
QUESTION: Can you envision at this moment a future role in the Cambodian
Government for Hun Sen given his --
MR. BURNS: For Hun Sen?
QUESTION: Yes, given his activities.
MR. BURNS: Well, he does have a role, unfortunately. He's taken that role
up by arms. He has given that role to himself against the will of the
people and he is playing the role, so that is reality. We have to live with
that, but we certainly can bring some pressure on him as we are doing with
our own diplomacy this week and in associating ourselves with ASEAN to make
it clear to him that it won't be business as usual with him, that he
will not have a decent relationship with many countries around the
world, if he is not interested in political compromise.
QUESTION: On the subject of the FBI investigation, did Hun Sen ask you to
continue pursuing it because he felt - excuse me -- Prince Ranariddh ask
you to continue pursuing it because he felt Hun Sen was behind it?
MR. BURNS: He did not explain the rationale behind his request. But it is
obvious that we would want to have the FBI investigate because an American
citizen was injured in the attack.
QUESTION: Do you think Hun Sen is involved in drug trafficking?
MR. BURNS: Prince Ranariddh alleges that there is substantial drug
trafficking occurring, especially in marijuana, from Cambodia. That is what
he told Ambassador Pickering. He did not make the charge that Hun Sen was
personally behind it. I would have to take the question and seek advice
from our experts about whether or not we think Hun Sen has been involved in
narcotics trafficking.
QUESTION: The 1970s - the 1997 Narcotics Report talks very vaguely and
ambiguously about concerns about corruption and drug trafficking in
Cambodia. So if you could answer it more explicitly?
MR. BURNS: Be glad to take that question, Carol.
QUESTION: Did he offer any evidence to the relationship between the Hun
Sen and the Khmer Rouge?
MR. BURNS: He did not, no. I think you have seen public statements by
Prince Ranariddh just in the last two days about this. But, no, he did not
go into that. I don't believe. I just have to look at my notes. I don't
think so.
QUESTION: Could you just double-check that, please?
MR. BURNS: I'm pretty sure he didn't, Sid.
QUESTION: Did the question of Hun Sen's relationship with Vietnam come
up?
MR. BURNS: No, that did not come up. I think there was a slight reference
to Vietnam in the conversation, but it was not a big part of the conversation.
QUESTION: A follow up?
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: At the exit of the building, Prince Ranariddh was asked about
foreign interference in Cambodia, specifically Vietnam. I believe his reply
was he hoped not, that this was not going on. My question to you, Nick, is,
does this government have any further knowledge at this hour of Vietnam or
any other foreign involvement?
MR. BURNS: Well, if you are talking about nefarious, negative foreign
involvement, I have nothing much to say on the issue of Vietnam. We have
made our concerns known to the Vietnamese about what is going on inside
Cambodia. We expect that the Vietnamese will do what they can to try to
play a positive, rather than negative role.
But again, there ought to be international concern and involvement on the
issue of Cambodia in general because it was the international accords that
laid the basis for the relatively short period of stability that Cambodia
enjoyed for four years.
QUESTION: Nick, just one more thing on Cambodia. We seem to be covering
this to death. You said that Hun Sen appears to be obdurate in his position
for compromise with the Prince. Is the United States worried at all that by
having Prince Norodom sort of parade himself to many senior officials in
the United States that Hun Sen will be enticed toward more hostility to
Cambodians?
MR. BURNS: Well, Hun Sen needs to recognize that we recognize the duly
elected government of Cambodia and that he is not the only person in that
government. Prince Ranariddh, in fact, is the first prime minister and Hun
Sen is the second prime minister. So he surely ought to understand that the
United States wants to uphold a legally established constitutional order in
Cambodia. If he objects to that, then I think he is showing his true
colors.
QUESTION: But he seems to be very frenzied in his temper at the moment. I
mean, he is giving press conferences saying that the Prince can come back
and stand trial in Cambodia. Isn't the United States worried at all that he
might be enticed toward more assassinations of innocent people and
opposition leaders?
MR. BURNS: We have warned Hun Sen and his ambassador here in Washington
that any attempt to engage in political assassinations or political
recriminations - and there is a lot of that going on right now -- is going
to be condemned by the United States and many other countries around the
world. It is against the Cambodian constitution and it is against the rule
of law that had been established there. So, we very much reject it.
QUESTION: Did Ambassador Quinn ever get in to see Hun Sen?
MR. BURNS: Not yet, no. He has not been granted an audience with Mr. Hun
Sen. We hope that will be the case because Ambassador Quinn has many issues
to discuss with him. We think it would be in Hun Sen's interest to have a
direct conversation with the United States.
QUESTION: What are the Cambodians telling you about why he is not being
allowed to see him?
MR. BURNS: I don't know, but I saw that Hun Sen had time to visit Angkor
Wat for a tourism picture today, so we would hope that he would have time
for serious business with the United States, with the delegation of ASEAN
foreign ministers who do wish to visit him in Phnom Penh.
QUESTION: Is he sending you a signal?
MR. BURNS: Oh, I don't know if he is sending us signals. I don't know
what - he is a very confusing guy. I don't know what signals are being sent,
but we do mean to talk to him. Sooner or later, it will be in his self-
interest to talk to us. Yes, sir?
QUESTION: How's the evacuation going? Are the Americans getting
out?
MR. BURNS: Yes. Just to be absolutely clear, I wouldn't really term it an
evacuation in this sense. We are not physically evacuating people by U.S.
military means. The airport is open. Commercial flights are now resumed.
Charter flights have been ongoing. We think between 450 to 500 American
citizens have left over the last several days. There is now ample
opportunity for Americans to get out without cause for panic. We still
encourage all Americans -- strongly encourage and advise all Americans
to leave Cambodia. There is no telling what might happen in the coming
weeks. The embassy in Phnom Penh is still available to counsel Americans,
to assist them in any way. Our embassy in Bangkok has been busy receiving
American citizens and helping them with their onward travel from Bangkok.
In fact, our embassies in Bangkok and in Phnom Penh and Hanoi and our
Consulate General in Hong Kong have all taken in American citizens and have
done an admirable job over the last several days. Yes?
QUESTION: The United States Government has any views of IMF loan to
Cambodia? Do you have any opinions?
MR. BURNS: Well, I'd have to check to see if any IMF loan decisions or
World Bank loan decisions were imminent pertaining to Cambodia. Obviously,
we will look very closely at that question of multilateral aid, as well as
the question of bilateral aid, which is now being reviewed for the next 30
days.
QUESTION: Another subject?
MR. BURNS: On Cambodia? We're done with Cambodia. Carol? Yes.
QUESTION: The Russians don't seem to be very happy with the snatch of the
war criminal yesterday. They're accusing the U.S. of cowboy tactics.
There's some vague reference to possibly withdrawing their troops from the
Bosnia effort. What do you think of it?
MR. BURNS: Well, SFOR, I guess, might liken its mission to a mission of
being a sheriff in Bosnia. I don't know anyone, I don't know any other
country that's seriously argued against this. I think maybe the Serbs don't
like it very much. I know the Pale Serbs don't like it. If the Russians
wish to associate themselves with the Serbs in Pale, I guess that's their
decision.
But it seems to us that here you have the Dayton Accords. The Serbs and
Bosnian Serbs signed on the dotted line to turn these indicted war
criminals over. They didn't do it for a year and a half. Therefore, it's
incumbent upon the international community to do that, given the opportunity.
The British had the opportunity; they took it; they performed magnificently.
I think all over America, people are applauding what the British have done.
Just talking to reporters and talking to average people in my neighborhood,
people are applauding what the British have done. People see it's the right
thing to do.
You have these notorious people who are responsible for the worst human
rights abuses in Europe since the Second World War, since Adolf Hitler, and
the British go out and do something positive. We congratulate them, and we
would hope the Russians would want to associate themselves with that kind
of right thinking.
QUESTION: Go ahead.
QUESTION: But Plavsic didn't like it either - the person you're trying to
bolster here.
MR. BURNS: Well, Mrs. Plavsic - Secretary Albright phoned Mrs. Plavsic
yesterday morning to explain the operation, to explain what was behind the
operation. I know that Mrs. Plavsic was concerned that in the operation, a
couple of individuals, including the son of the man who was slain, were
taken into custody. Those individuals have now been released. We know that
was a particular concern of Mrs. Plavsic. So working with the British and
others, we, I think, were able to make sure that two relatives of Mr.
Drljaca - including his 17-year-old son - were released. That release
was expedited.
We have respect for Mrs. Plavsic. She's under a lot of pressure now. She
faces a lot of political pressure from some of the intransigent dinosaurs
in Pale - some of the criminal associates of Mr. Karazdic. I think
everybody supports Mrs. Plavsic in her role to maintain the constitutional
order in the Republika Srpska.
Now, she has dissolved the parliament; and therefore, the United States no
longer recognizes the parliament and will not recognize any act of the
parliament. So I just want to be clear about the phone conversation, about
some of the nature of her concerns. I think at least some of the concerns
have been met.
QUESTION: The Russians are also complaining about not being informed in
advance. Were they informed in advance? And also, was Madame Plavsic
informed in advance?
MR. BURNS: I don't think anybody on the ground in terms of - I don't
think any of the Serbs were informed in advance. You wouldn't expect that
they would have been informed in advance. As for the Russians, I'll have to
refer you to SFOR and to the British; I just don't know the answer to that
question.
QUESTION: -- idea of a release, are you - is what you're saying that
Plavsic achieved an expedited release of these two individuals, based on
her intervention with Albright?
MR. BURNS: Well, not just with the - yes, I think she mentioned that to
Secretary Albright, but not just with Secretary Albright. She made this
view public. These two individuals were not indicted war criminals. They
simply happened - one of them was a son of Mr. Drljaca - so therefore they
were detained; probably with a very good cause because they were in the
vicinity. I think when it was determined that they were not indicted war
criminals -- there was no reason to arrest them - their release was
expedited.
So Mrs. Plavsic is in a very difficult position for a lot of reasons. She's
under attack by the hard-liners. We hope that her efforts to sustain
constitutional norms and constitutional rule will be successful.
QUESTION: But doesn't this - on the negative side, however, doesn't this
attempt - the attempted arrest and death of one of these people, doesn't it
prove that this can happen and that Karazdic or Mladic could also be killed
in the process of capture and become martyrs? Couldn't this be destabilizing?
MR. BURNS: Well, I think most of us feel that it's a very good thing that
all these indicted war criminals strewn across the territory of the
Republika Srpska, of Serbia, of Croatia - maybe they're going to lose a lot
of sleep over the next couple of weeks. Maybe that's a very good thing.
Let's keep them guessing.
QUESTION: Nick, Russia's also saying that it's going to have to
reconsider - or suggesting it might reconsider its force - its troop
involvement in the NATO mission in Bosnia. What does this - is the United
States concerned about that? What kind of message would this send to the
United States? What comment do you have on that?
MR. BURNS: Well, the participation by Russia in the SFOR operation, and
IFOR before, has been very positive. The Russians have acquitted themselves
responsibly and well. They have been a very good partner of the United
States in SFOR and IFOR. So we very much hope the Russians will stay within
SFOR; they're playing an important role.
QUESTION: But they seem to be suggesting they're not happy with the way
these criminals were attacked, is what they're calling it. And they're
suggesting that they could reduce their involvement and maybe even pull out
of the NATO force.
MR. BURNS: It has always been part of the rules of engagement for SFOR
and IFOR forces to detain indicted war criminals, should the conditions be
favorable to do that. The British took advantage of that yesterday, and we
congratulate the British for that action.
QUESTION: I'm a little curious about why you're giving such sympathetic -
(inaudible) -- to Mrs. Plavsic. Wasn't she - if I'm not mistaken, she
helped plant a lot of ethnic hatred against the Bosnian Muslims during the
war, did she not?
MR. BURNS: We have never said that we agree on everything with Mrs.
Plavsic. We've had, in fact, quite serious disagreements with her on many
issues. When Secretary Albright met her in Banja Luka on June 1, they
didn't agree on a lot of issues. But we know one thing - she has pledged to
uphold the Dayton Accords and she's pledged to uphold constitutional rule
in the Republika Srpska. That's a lot more than Karazdic and even Mr.
Krajisnik and a couple of others.
So you have to judge the differences among leaders and that doesn't mean
that they're always on your dance card. But it does mean at least you think
you can work with them. We can work with her despite the many disagreements
we have with her. Yes.
QUESTION: Nick, by putting - you talked about a bunch of people losing
sleep. By putting --
MR. BURNS: We're not losing sleep.
QUESTION: Well --
MR. BURNS: It's the indicted war criminals who ought to be losing
sleep.
QUESTION: Indicted war criminals. By putting people like Karazdic and
Mladic on notice that something like this could happen, why are you not
making it more difficult for SFOR people or other forces to pick them up or
arrest them? Why is this now a much more complicated problem?
MR. BURNS: Well, I think that Secretary Albright has said a couple of
times, just in the last week, that sooner or later these guys are going to
get their just desserts. Their just desserts will be a trial in The Hague
on the charge of war crimes. That's as much as I'm going to say on this.
They're going to have to calculate how difficult that's - they're going to
have to worry about the intentions of all of us in the international
community. Sooner or later, they're going to be tried for their crimes.
QUESTION: Does any of this raise a greater possibility that people who
would have to make the arrests are more likely to be hurt?
MR. BURNS: Well, obviously, there is risk and danger in any kind of
military operation such as the one that the British undertook yesterday.
But our soldiers are professionals, and the SFOR soldiers are among the
best in the world, or are the best in the world, many of them. They are
fully capable of defending themselves and carrying out their missions when
they are asked to do so. I think the Bosnian Serbs understand that. They
understand the professionalism of SFOR.
QUESTION: Nick, why do you want to warn them? Why don't you just go and
arrest them? I mean, do you just enjoy torturing them for the time being?
Just go and get the guys.
MR. BURNS: Well, we don't mind the latter. But listen, Talal, we're not
going to forecast anything in advance. Obviously, there is very little that
can be said about that particular issue.
QUESTION: Nick, could you answer a Cuba question?
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: There is a report this morning that Cuba is bolstering its
shore defenses, and they have anti-ship weaponry which, the story says,
could perhaps be targeted at U.S. vessels going in and out of Guantanemo.
MR. BURNS: Well, I can't comment on the report because it is based on a
leak of a highly classified intelligence document, per usual. So I can't
comment on that. But what I can do, George, is just say that the Cubans are
not foolish enough, we think, to fool around with the U.S. Navy or our
military forces on Guantanemo because we are a hell of a lot stronger than
the Cubans. So they won't do that.
Obviously, we have to be concerned about protecting our military forces and
we have done everything necessary to protect our military forces. Now,
there is a related issue here - somewhat related, at least it pertains to
Cuba. I just wanted to draw you attention to the public statement we issued
last evening about the proposed flotilla of American citizens in international
waters this weekend to protest the actions of the Cuban Government.
We issued a public statement last night and I can tell you that both here
in Washington and also in Havana, we have made very clear to the Cubans
that they must exercise discretion and restraint and prudence in reacting
to this flotilla. The flotillas previous to this have all been law-abiding.
They have not transgressed international law, and the Cubans need to
understand this. We expect that the Cubans will act with the utmost
discretion, restraint not to use excessive force should any private vessels
or aircraft enter the Cuban territorial sea or air space. That is very,
very important.
We have likewise counseled the organizers of the flotilla to observe
international law and, of course, to stay out of Cuban territorial seas
because that, of course, would not be the wise thing to do. But I think the
base here is that American citizens have the right in our country to say
what they want, to protest, to have a demonstration like this. We support
it; we assume it's going to be lawful.
QUESTION: This is a re-run of previous statements which have been issued
prior to similar flotillas dating back more than a year?
MR. BURNS: Yes, we took great care with this. We didn't simply pop it out
of the computer. We did take great care with it. We have talked to the
organizers. We have talked to the Cubans. We would hope that the organizers,
especially, as well as the Cubans, would read our statement and take heed
to some of the cautionary statements in it.
QUESTION: What about U.S. assets accompanying the flotilla?
MR. BURNS: I'd have to refer you to the Coast Guard. I am just not aware
of any plans to do so. Yes?
QUESTION: One of the organizers of the flotilla has apparently said he
plans to cross into Cuban waters. Is there any action that this country can
take prior to that to prevent that?
MR. BURNS: That will be a legal question. That would have to be
determined by the Justice Department or the local law enforcement officials
in Miami, where I believe the individual resides. In any case, we very much
support the right of Americans to organize a flotilla of this nature, but
we would counsel Americans against violating international law. When you
enter the territorial seas of another country without the permission of
that country, you are violating international law. Likewise, we do warn the
Cubans to act with restraint. Now, they did not act with restraint
on February 24, 1996. We haven't forgotten that; we will always remember
that. The Cubans must understand that they must act with the utmost
restraint this weekend.
QUESTION: Is there any recommendation to make to the Coast Guard or any
other U.S. authority regarding restraining these individuals?
MR. BURNS: We are working very closely with the Coast Guard and the
Justice Department and local authorities on this whole entire issue. I
cannot tell you whether we have given any advice on the question of what
could possibly be done to prevent a violation of international law. That is
a legal question. I am not a legal official.
QUESTION: In a more general sense, what effect do these activities have
overall on U.S. policy toward Cuba?
MR. BURNS: Well, I don't think that the organization of a flotilla is
contrary to U.S. policy or U.S. wishes. We support the rights of our
citizens to say what they want and to demonstrate against an autocratic
regime that has clearly failed and that ought to be on its way out, on its
last legs, we hope. We have nothing against the fact that people are going
to demonstrate. We just want them to observe our law and international
law.
QUESTION: On the occasions of previous flotillas, you were more
evenhanded in urging restraint by both sides. Now you are being much more
adamant about the need for Cuban restraint as opposed to restraint on the
part of the flotilla folks.
MR. BURNS: If you read our statement, I think you will see that we call
for restraint on both sides. It is very important, given the track record
of the Cuban government, which is pitiful on this issue, that we remind the
Cubans of their international obligations. It is an outlaw regime. They
have broken international law. They did on February 24, 1996. The
International Civil Aviation Organization said so in its report, so I don't
think it is unreasonable for me to remind Mr. Fidel Castro and his criminal
colleagues that they ought to do what's right here and not overreact to
this flotilla.
QUESTION: Have you heard anything on the migration talks next week?
MR. BURNS: The migration talks?
QUESTION: Yeah.
MR. BURNS: I don't have anything in particular; but, George, if you are
interested, we can certainly get you something on that. Yes. Laura, did you
have something?
QUESTION: Any decision on the World Food Program appeal for North
Korea.
MR. BURNS: No decision, yet; but I think we are speeding along in our
analysis of this request. I think we would like to make a decision shortly,
but nothing at this hour.
QUESTION: Today?
MR. BURNS: I don't know if it will be today, but I think it will be
shortly given the urgency of the situation. I will try to see if we can do
this on a normal working day so that all of you will have a fair chance to
report this story.
QUESTION: Another on North Korea?
MR. BURNS: Yes, Bill. Yes, North Korea.
QUESTION: Anybody else? Okay.
MR. BURNS: I'm sure, Mr. Lambros is not interested in North Korea.
QUESTION: Yes, on North Korea, Nick, I'm sorry, I missed your briefing
yesterday where you spoke about Mr. Hwang's news conference on Wednesday
and the release of the 80-page summary of his debriefing by the South
Koreans. And I would ask specifically about Japan. Mr. Hwang continues to
talk about the threat that North Korea poses to Japan, that might blackmail
the United States from taking action in the defense of South Korea. I would
ask specifically, is there anything, any possible attack or strategy
that the North Koreans could use that would succeed in keeping the U.S.
from defending the South?
MR. BURNS: No.
(Laughter.)
We will defend South Korea and Japan, and no one is going to blackmail us.
We are the greatest power in the Pacific. Little North Korea -- North Korea,
a failing communist regime, is not going to blackmail the United States on
the question of our defensive commitments, our alliance commitments to
Japan and South Korea, which have been in place for going on five decades
now.
QUESTION: So North Korean strategies then, as Mr. Hwang detailed them,
would be faulty, fallacious?
MR. BURNS: Exactly, exactly.
QUESTION: And finally, Mr. Hwang has been accepted by the South Koreans.
I think it's pretty clear that they believe him. Do we believe Mr.
Hwang?
MR. BURNS: Mr. Hwang is a free man now, and thank goodness for that. He
is free to say what he wishes. We have debriefed him. We have interviewed
him over the course of several days, and I am not at liberty to tell you
our conclusions from that, except to say that he is free to say what he
wishes. We are free to say what we wish. I can tell you that the United
States will defend South Korea, as well as Japan. We have a couple more
questions here. Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Nick, on a different area?
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: I may have missed it. But have you all given a reaction to the
Northern Irish, Protestant announcements that they will eliminate their
marches this weekend for Orange Day?
MR. BURNS: Yes. We welcome very much the decision by the leaders of the
Orange Order to forego certain controversial marches that have been
scheduled -- parades for this weekend. After the disturbing events of the
past week, we hope this decision will help diffuse tensions in Northern
Ireland and build confidence between the two communities there. I think I
understand that the White House is going to have a statement on this later
today. But we are very pleased by this decision.
Now, I know that Mr. Lambros wants to ask about Turkey. We have to get a
very important U.S.-Japan issue before we close the briefing. Yes, Mr.
Lambros.
QUESTION: Did you check about the violations and infringements of the air
space and FIR around the island of Lemnos in the Aegean yesterday by
Turkish F-16 fighters when Mr. Pangalos was giving a press conference
defending the Madrid agreement on principles between Greece and Turkey?
MR. BURNS: Well, I can tell you, Mr. Lambros, we have asked the Pentagon,
we have asked our embassies in the region, we have looked at reports. The
only place that we found reports of this violation are in the Greek
press.
(Laughter.)
MR. BURNS: But we are open-minded; we are open-minded. So if you have any
information that you wish to give us, Mr. Lambros, you feel free. But
listen --
QUESTION: In other words, did you receive any complaints?
MR. BURNS: As you know, the United States does not constantly monitory
every inch of air space around the world. So we are not the world's
greatest authority sometimes on where airplanes are being flown. The only
place we have seen reports of this air space violation are the Greek press.
We have no independent information to substantiate the reports. Needless to
say, we continue to urge Turkey, as well as Greece, to refrain from actions
which could increase tensions in the Aegean. We have a very well known
record in this. I say this with all seriousness. But we have no information,
Mr. Lambros; therefore, I couldn't possibly comment further.
QUESTION: Did the Greek Government complain or ask you about that?
MR. BURNS: That's just it, Mr. Lambros. We don't have a complaint from
any government in the region.
QUESTION: In the Sintra conference, Mr. Pangalos stated that Greece is
ready to go to the International Court of Justice for the Imia case if -
(inaudible) -- will address the issue. Since that is your policy to express
many, many times by President Clinton and by you from this forum, I am
wondering, Mr. Burns, sending on Imia to the International Court of Justice,
that would be the end of the dispute.
MR. BURNS: Well, we take note of Minister Pangalos' statements and that
has been the position of the United States that one way to resolve the
Imia/Kardak crisis would be for Greece and Turkey to refer it to the
International Court of Justice for a consensual decision. That is simply
one way that we think might be helpful, but it is up to Greece and Turkey
to decide that. We respect their right to decide it.
QUESTION: Then you're saying that would be the end of the dispute?
MR. BURNS: Well, Mr. Lambros, the end of the dispute will come when
Greece and Turkey decide that they can put the dispute aside and when they
know it's been resolved. So, I couldn't possibly give you a better answer
than that.
QUESTION: I am asking you because there are information that you are
starting to establish a precedent on Imia as a contested area in order to
apply the same decision in the list of other Greek islands in the Aegean.
Is correct?
MR. BURNS: No, no. We have not tried to apply this possible option to
resolve the problem to other parts of the Aegean. We are simply talking
about Imia/Kardak. We have not talked about other disputes.
QUESTION: Why, then, so much discussion about the list of the islands?
MR. BURNS: I have never discussed any lists, ever, from this podium.
QUESTION: We created a whole list of --
MR. BURNS: I've never discussed the list.
QUESTION: Actually, Mr. Kornblum is in charge of the list.
MR. BURNS: There is no list here.
QUESTION: No, no, no. I am saying - (inaudible) -- not over there.
MR. BURNS: You can't even see the islands on the map. You see one big
island.
QUESTION: No, no. I am talking about Mr. Kornblum who is in charge of the
list of those islands.
MR. BURNS: I have never heard about a list; I have never seen a list; and
I've never discussed one.
QUESTION: On Cyprus, finally, the UN Secretary General has given to the
Greek and the Turkish Cypriots yesterday the one known paper, Boutros
Boutros Ghali's ideas for the solution to the Cyprus issue. Do you have any
comment?
MR. BURNS: There is a news blackout in place, Mr. Lambros, until Sunday
or Monday. I am going to observe that.
QUESTION: You said you had an important announcement on Japan.
MR. BURNS: I do. I just want to make a magnanimous statement. I have
never said anything good about the New York Yankees and I never will. But I
must say that Mr. Irabu's performance last evening was most impressive and
indicative of the fact that Japan is producing some of the great young ball
players now, and we want more of them to come to the United States -- but
northeast of New York, no longer just New York City. It was a very
impressive performance. I thought I just had to say that. Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:23 P.M.)
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