U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #113 (96-07-12)
U.S. Department of State
96/07/12 Daily Press Briefing
Office of the Spokesman
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
I N D E X
Friday, July 12, 1996
Special Briefer: Leon Fuerth
Special Briefer: Strobe Talbott
Briefer: Glyn Davies
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls...................... 12
Florida Flotilla Planned for July 13 for Waters off Cuba...... 13
RUSSIA
Natl Security Adviser to the Vice President Leon Fuerth &
DepSec of State Strobe Talbott on VP's Upcoming Trip to
Moscow on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) Beginning
July 14:
--US Cabinet Level & GOR Ministerial Participants............. 1-3
--Agenda/US Binational Commissions............................ 2,5,8
-Heavy Focus on Economic Reform/GOR Request for Increase
in Foreign & US Investment.................................. 2,10
--Structure, Committees, & Programs of GCC.................... 3-5
Continuing Dialogue on Off-Line Discussions/Relationship w/IMF/
Resources/Pipeline Systems/Caspian Sea/"Win-Win" Approaches
to Region/Intl Trade/Counterterrorism/Arms Control.......... 5,7-11
--Army Activities in Chechnya................................. 7
Senior US Official's Dialogue w/Pres Yeltsin.................. 12
DepSec Talbott on Russian Relations:
--Crime & Corruption Real Threat to Reform.................... 6
--Cease-Fire Broken Down/Heavy Force Used Against Villages.... 7-8
CUBA
Defector Jose Fernandez Pupo in Guantanamo.................... 13
Helms-Burton Law:
--Pres Clinton's Decision on Suspension of Title III
Expected Next Week.......................................... 13-14
COLOMBIA
GOC Announcement on Pres Samper's Plan to Attend Upcoming
UNGA Mtg in Sept/US Decision on Visa Revocation............. 14-15
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Pres Milosevic's Role in Dayton Accords/War Crimes Tribunal's
Decision in Determining Future of Milosevic................. 15-17
TURKEY, GREECE, & CYPRUS
Alleged Turkish PM Erbakan's Proposal re Provide Comfort...... 18
USUN Amb Albright's Upcoming Visit to the Region/
Issues to be Discussed...................................... 18
NORTHERN IRELAND
Extradition of Irish Nationalist Jimmy Smyth.................. 19
SAUDIA ARABIA
US Level of Satisfaction with Bombing Investigation........... 19
IRAQ
Alleged Report of Coup Attempt Against Saddam Hussein......... 19-20
ARMS CONTROL
Egyptian Amb's Alleged Stmt on Missile Deal Between North Korea
and Egypt/Upcoming Binational Commission Between US/Egypt... 20-21
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #113
FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1996, 1:09 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. DAVIES: Welcome to the State Department briefing.
We are going to start off today with something a little bit
special. We have joining us here in the briefing room two
officials, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and the
National Security Advisor to the Vice President,
Mr. Leon Fuerth.
They will, for the next half hour or so, talk a bit
about the Vice President's upcoming trip to Moscow to
participate in the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic
and Technological Cooperation. This is known by its
shorthand term, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. This will
be the seventh session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission,
and a very important session, coming as it does in the wake
of the Russian elections.
So, please confine your questions to topics that are
raised in the presentations that you will hear. Let me turn
the microphone over, first, to the Deputy Secretary of
State, Strobe Talbott.
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Thanks, Glyn, and good
afternoon to all of you.
As Glyn said, this is the seventh meeting of the
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, but it does come at a
particularly significant moment, because it is the first
high-level interaction that our Administration, our
Government, will have with the Yeltsin Government, now that
it has been reelected.
The Cabinet level participation includes on our side
Secretary Perry, Secretary Kantor, Secretary O'Leary,
Secretary Shalala, as well as a number of other quite senior
officials of the government. It dramatizes, I think, the
serious and broad nature of our engagement with the Russian
Government through the GCC.
As all of you know, the U.S. has a very broad agenda
with the Russian Federation. That includes, of course,
security and arms control issues, as well as issues of
regional cooperation.
Those, too, will find their way into the discussions
that will take place starting this weekend in Moscow, not
least because Secretary of Defense Perry will be there. And
I am sure that subjects such as START II, CTBT, Partnership
for Peace, the cooperation between Russia and the United
States, Russia and NATO in Bosnia: all of that will figure
in Secretary Perry's discussions with his Russian
interlocutors.
At the same time, though, there is, I think very
appropriately, a very heavy economic focus to the GCC in
general, and there will be that focus during this meeting.
President Yeltsin has made clear, including in a public
speech that he made day before yesterday, that he intends to
capitalize on the election results and the mandate that he
feels he has in order to intensify economic reform.
He has stressed the importance of that economic
challenge directly with President Clinton. When President
Clinton reached President Yeltsin by phone a week ago today
to congratulate him on his victory, President Yeltsin said
that it was extremely important to him and to Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin that there be a substantial increase in foreign
and particularly American investment in Russia.
The President answered that he is committed to help
Russia in this regard if the Russians are able, as we feel
they are able, and are determined to improve the climate for
investment.
In a sense, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and its
agenda, I think, go to the very core of our overall policy
and our overall strategy with regard to Russia. As all of
you know, because we have talked about it many times, our
policy is to support reform in all of its dimensions in the
Russian Federation. But I think it is fair and accurate to
say that the fate of reform in general is going to depend to
a significant extent on the fate of economic reform in
particular.
And just as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has
already been a factor, or I even say a force, for stability
and progress in U.S.-Russian relations, the Commission is
also a factor that is going to continue to be very conducive
to Russian reform, especially in the economic sphere.
And on that note, I would turn the microphone over to
Leon Fuerth.
MR. FUERTH: I thought I would talk a little bit about
how the Commission actually works, what its objectives are,
and then open the floor to as many questions as we will have
time to take.
As Strobe indicated, the Commission brings together
very senior officials on both sides of the government. They
are Cabinet level on our side and Ministerial on the Russian
side.
I am just going to quickly run through the structure of
the Commission so that you have the full scope.
There is a committee for agribusiness, which is headed
by our Secretary of Agriculture; one on business
development, which is headed by the Secretary of Commerce.
There is another on defense conversion, headed by the
Secretary of Defense; another on energy policy, headed by
Secretary O'Leary; environment, headed by Carol Browner;
health, by Secretary Shalala; science and technology, by Dr.
Gibbons, the President's Science Advisor; and space, headed
by Dan Goldin of NASA.
Each of these committees operates not just once every
six months when we meet but continuously through working
groups and contacts in each others' capitals on schedules
that are worked out by the parties directly concerned.
What happens as we get ready for one of these meetings
is that all of the information about what is going on begins
to come together into a tighter, tighter focus. We check to
see what is nearly done that could be accelerated. We try
to figure out whether or not there are accomplishments that
might be pushed forward that might otherwise not be.
Some of the things that have happened to date through
the Commission include a great deal of forward progress on
oil and energy investment in general in Russia. Oil and gas
investment in Russia is potentially one of the largest
economic forces available to power the economic
transformation of that country.
The potential for U.S. investment alone in the energy
sector is upwards of $70 billion, and I think some of my
friends in the Department of Commerce might say that is
conservative.
There is already a substantial amount of American money
invested in the energy sector in Russia, but it is
just the beginning. However, in order for it to succeed, many
complex changes of Russian law and regulation are needed.
It has been the Commission's business to push those forward
in close dialogue with the Russians. And progress has been
made from one session to the next.
We talked a lot to the Russians about opening markets
and about reducing barriers to investment, and we have had a
series of successes with them. It requires that you get
down to the nuts and bolts in order to follow these issues
on a sector-by-sector basis, but the point is that there is
a dialogue. It is technical, it is detailed, and it moves
forward.
We have a program for purchasing blended down highly
enriched uranium that came out of Russian weapons, blended
down to low enriched uranium for consumption in U.S. nuclear
energy reactors. That program is up and working. We have
purchased the equivalent of hundreds of bombs' worth of
uranium in a win-win arrangement that removes the HEU from
existence as the source of weapons of destruction in the
future, and which applies it directly to the generation of
energy for peaceful economic purposes. It really is swords
into plowshares.
We have extensive programs with the Russians designed
to improve the safety of Soviet-era nuclear reactors. And a
great deal of progress has been made along that line.
We have programs with the Russians designed to improve
the security of fissionable materials in storage, and great
progress is being made cooperatively between them and
ourselves in upgrading the security arrangements under which
these materials are moved and stored.
We have made great strides in working towards common
approaches to environmental problems. We have programs with
the Russians that address the question of sustainable
forestry, programs that are aimed at reducing concentrations
of lead in the atmosphere and the surrounding land and
water. Programs that are aimed at helping train a new cadre
of Russian specialists in policy-making on the environment
and in legislation on the environment.
We have been working with them on projects having to do
with safe drilling for oil in the Arctic; on exchanges of
information previously classified as intelligence data on
both sides, now declassified and converted into information
for use by environmental scientists.
We are in the process of creating an international
space station whose fundamental components are Russian and
American, with a contribution of the other partners in the
process. And that operation is proceeding in a very
businesslike way. We will start to see the actual space
station components go up in about a year.
In addition, there have been a series of so-called
off-line discussions between the Prime Minister and the Vice
President, that cover issues that are not pertinent to
economics or too sensitive for discussion in the plenary
meetings. It is not going to be possible for me to provide
much detail about these because by virtue of their
sensitivity, they need to be kept private. But the point
is, such a channel exists. It is used by both sides, and it
has been productive in helping us move past a number of
significant problems.
I think I should stop here and just welcome your
questions.
Q When is the meeting going to take place (a), and
(b) how unique is this idea of having a Vice President-led
commission? I believe there is one in South Africa, as
well. Are they the only two?
MR. FUERTH: No. The meeting will begin, actually, on
Sunday evening with an informal one-on-one dinner and
discussion between the Vice President and the Prime
Minister. That has become a routine. It will shift into
high gear on Monday, with another one-on-one session. There
will be a meeting between the Vice President, we anticipate,
with President Yeltsin. There will be a press opportunity
that day following the discussion with President Yeltsin. I
thought I would mention that for your notes.
The plenary sessions will begin that afternoon. First
up will be defense conversion, business, energy, and then
there will be another session the following day that will
take care in two bites of all the remaining committees.
There will be a press conference at the end of the overall
session.
There is a U.S. Binational Commission for South Africa,
headed by the Vice President on our side and by Thabo Mbeki
on the South African side. In fact, he is coming to
Washington and we will have a meeting of this commission
this month, I think on the 2lst or 22nd of the month. And
there is another Binational Commission with Egypt, and we
are anticipating a visit by President Mubarak towards the
end of the month. And when President Mubarak and President
Clinton have completed their business together, we are
anticipating a roll-over into a session of the U.S.-Egyptian
Binational Committee. And there are a few
other organizations similar to this in existence involving the
Vice President that are a little less labor-intensive than
these, and not as well-known, but they are there, and they
are useful.
Q I had a question about oil and gas investment,
but perhaps it best be addressed to Strobe because it refers
to something he said yesterday at the Russia-U.S. Business
Council.
Yesterday, specifically on oil and gas investment, or
in general yesterday you were talking about the need for
Russia to deal with lawlessness and corruption. What do you
say to a businessman who says that there is something
inconsistent about such a policy, and then dealing with
Mr. Chernomyrdin who apparently has done very well by himself
in ways which were not available to Western investors? How
do you explain that apparent anomaly?
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: I would respond, without
accepting the premise of the question, Jim. President
Yeltsin has made clear, indeed Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
has made clear, including in recent days, that they
recognize what we see very clearly, and that is that crime
and corruption constitute a real threat to Russian reform,
and therefore to the prospects of the success of the
Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin program.
One issue that comes very sharply into focus when the
Vice President, Leon, and others connected with the
Commission talk to the American business community is that
crime and corruption represents a real obstacle to the kind
of increase in investment that the Russians want to see.
Indeed, there is, if I'm not mistaken, Leon, a new
working group in prospect on the issue of crime and
corruption under the rubric of the Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission.
Q What would you say to the businessman who
questions why the investments, which apparently enrich
Mr. Chernomyrdin, were not available to Westerners --
outsiders?
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Again, the question asserts
a premise that I know I would not accept in a discussion of
the American businessman or, indeed, in our back-and-forth
here.
Q Are there any plans, as policy, to channel U.S.
investments in the oil and energy sector in Russia with a
view to developing the Novosibirsk complex and the pipelines
leading to it as the main outlet to Kazakh and Azeri oil?
MR. FUERTH: There is a dialogue on-going with Russia
about the general development of Russia's resources and
pipeline systems and it's also about the Caspian Sea and its
reserves and questions concerning how to develop the riches
of the area in a way that will work to the benefit of all
the countries concerned, bring in capital, bring on
production, assure environmental safety, which is something
that the Russian Government is concerned about deeply when
it comes to the Caspian, and support of what we would call
win-win approaches to the region.
Q So much of the problem is the Russian army's
activities in Chechnya. Where does this get mentioned? How
strong a position are you going to take?
MR. FUERTH: There is bound to be a discussion of this
while we are there. It's one of the kinds of things that
would take place typically in the off-line discussions,
one-on-one, so that there can be a full exchange of views on
both sides.
Q We know that most of the victims have been
civilians there. Is there any determination of the U.S.
Government whether the Russian Army has committed what are
customarily called violations of the Geneva Conventions in a
major way -- that is to say, war crimes? And will this come
up?
MR. FUERTH: I would defer to Strobe on this.
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Roy, I would say that we are
going to confine ourselves from this podium to what we know.
What we know is disturbing. Indeed, I think you've
heard Nick (Burns) and Glyn (Davies) and others use very
strong language. There is no question that the cease-fire
has broken down. That is extremely regrettable. Because
the cease-fire that was reached during the course of the
spring represented a real hope, not only for what we want to
see, but what I think the Russian people clearly want to
see. That is, the two parties cease trying to resolve this
issue by military means and resolve it by political means.
Second, Roy, we know that heavy force has been used in
recent days against several villages and that there have
been significant civilian and military casualties.
Obviously, this kind of loss of life is deplorable. We are
going to continue to do what we've been doing for some time
both in public and also through the private channels that
are available to us, which is to urge, in the very strongest
terms, that all the parties return to a cease-fire and to
the search for a political settlement.
Q Had the use of force exceeded that which is
permissible under the so-called "laws of war" to the point
that you could speak of violations of them and war crimes?
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: I think I'll stop with what
I've already said on that subject. Obviously, we are very
disturbed by what is going on. We're disturbed,
particularly, that the two sides in this conflict have
allowed the dynamic to reach the point where the cease-fire
has broken down. We hope that they will see it in their
mutual interest to get back to the bargaining table. But I
don't want to take it beyond that in the way we characterize
the fight.
Q Can I just follow up on that a minute? What do
you think the intention of the Russian Government is? Do
you think that the intention of the cease-fire was just to
get past the election and that, really, they see no
long-lasting peaceful solution with the Chechens and that
eradication or total military victory -- even though you say
that's not possible -- is what their intention is?
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Carol, I understand why
you're asking the question. I hope you understand that in
answering it Leon and I are not going to go beyond
(a) telling you what we know, and we've done that; and
(b) what our policy is.
Q What about the Caspian Sea basin production? Is
this Administration still pursuing a multi-route policy
towards the main export pipeline issue to be decided next
year? And is it on the agenda in Moscow?
MR. FUERTH: I did not hear the second part of your
question.
Q Is it going to be discussed in Moscow, the main
export pipeline issue?
MR. FUERTH: I expect that there will be a discussion
concerning Russia's thoughts about the Caspian as well as
our own views.
As I said, we are looking for win-win strategies. We
tend to believe that multiple pipelines is a way to make
sure that that happens.
Q That win-win strategy mainly includes the United
States and Russia, right?
MR. FUERTH: No. In my opinion, we tend to use a
shorthand in which you say something like "U.S. and
Russia." But when the United States goes into these
discussions on these issues and on international trade
issues in general, the principles that we advocate are the
principles on which general international trade runs. In
other words, what we're looking for would not only be
potentially good for U.S.-Russia binational economic
relations but good for anybody's economic relations with
Russia.
It's up to our businesspeople to be competitive. It's
up to our government to try to work with the Russians to
create an arena in which they can compete with others.
Q And what of the counterterrorism issue --
specifically, that of Iran -- the cooperation that Russia is
giving to Iran in their nuclear programs, and another little
follow-up in a minute?
MR. FUERTH: President Clinton and President Yeltsin
asked the Prime Minister and the Vice President to take on
that issue some time ago. They have. There has been a
continuing dialogue about this question -- again, in the
off-line sessions. That's about all I can really say about
it other than to tell you that it is a useful dialogue and
we think has helped to permit both sides to very clearly
understand the concerns of the other.
Q Yes, Leon, can I follow?
MR. FUERTH: Sure.
Q On the issue of nuclear materials from Russia,
can you comment at all on press reports of Russian nuclear
materials possibly being smuggled into this country and our
government putting radiation detection devices on our
southern borders, would this have to do with detecting
radiational-type threats or other-type threats? Can you
comment?
MR. FUERTH: We and the Russian Government take
seriously the risk of diversion of fissionable material --
ours as well as theirs. We continuously scrub our system to
look for vulnerabilities. In fact, we have, at various
times, discussed with the Russians things that we need to
fix up on our own system. It's a two-way discussion.
With respect to the Russians, nuclear disarmament which
is going on -- the rapid reduction of nuclear weapons, the
physical destruction of the warheads generating a lot of
fissionable material -- we are working hard with them to
make sure that this material is accountable and stored well
and is not vulnerable to theft or terrorist attack. That's
a jointly held objective. Both governments have been
continuously deepening what they do and accelerating it in
that area.
Q About the Caspian Sea? Will the issue of the
division of the Caspian Sea be addressed -- I mean on the
sectoral or the condominium basis?
MR. FUERTH: I should just limit my answer to what I've
said before, which is that there will be a general
discussion of that along with other energy issues.
Q To what extent are you going to get into arms
control and non-proliferation issues? And, specifically,
which ones?
MR. FUERTH: These issues tend to be things that wind
up on the off-line agenda rather than as a systemic part of
the discussion. For example, the Defense Committees are
talking about how Russia is going to go about down-sizing
its defense industry and converting portions of it to the
private sector and what we can do to assist that as well as
other areas of defense-to-defense cooperation that have
turned out to be very fruitful.
What comes our way in the Commission will tend to be
issues that are politically significant to both countries
but that people have not been able to resolve at lower
levels. So they get bounced up.
What is actually happening is that the Vice President
and the Prime Minister have to form an assessment of how
forward each side is prepared to go just a hair beyond where
the negotiators may go in order to reach an acceptable
closure on an issue.
So, for example, we have dealt very successfully with
technical problems involving honest differences of
interpretation of verification language in START I. It's
painstaking. It has people sitting down for months at a
time in Geneva. It has proposals coming forward and then,
finally, it has closure. It's that kind of thing.
Q President Yeltsin has again recommitted himself
to the program of economic reform but he also, earlier
before the election, made a commitment to a social program
in paying back wages and the like. There are many economic
problems facing him where the Central Bank Chief yesterday,
I believe, said that they might have to renegotiate the IMF
loan in order to pay off some of the campaign debt, or the
debt accumulated during the campaign. Will this be a
subject of discussion at the Commission meetings, or are you
leaving that up to the Russian Government to work out -- the
trade-off?
MR. FUERTH: One of the things that the Commission,
including the off-line process can allow, is a candid talk
about where the Russian Government visualizes its next
steps, both near and in the longer term -- in terms of the
general economy as well as management of their revenue
system and handling their relationship with the IMF.
They have been very successful. It's a key point in
doing this. Based on their track record, I think they will
continue to be successful.
I remember that at their first encounter the Prime
Minister told the Vice President that so long as President
Yeltsin and he were in office, they would not go back on the
process of economic reform and modernization. They have, of
course, had to tack from time to time because they've been
dealing with very difficult problems.
But when you look at the general figures for the
Russian economy, they're quite startling. Larry Summers was
at a briefing for the Vice President the other day. He went
down a list that said the inflation rate is two percent a
month. Still a monthly total but it's two percent. It's
low considering where they have been. It got there as the
result of discipline and a macro-economic policy that works.
There are now more people working in the private sector
in Russia, on a percentage basis, than in a number of West
European countries. About two-thirds of their economy is
now generated in the private sector.
A foundation has been laid already for what we hope
will be the next phase of expansion and consolidation of
their reform and conversion into a market economy. People
do not normally notice what is going on.
But I want to stress that one of the themes of this
visit on the Russian side is that they're open for business;
and on the American side, is that we think American business
should get in there while the opportunities are at their
best.
Q Do you feel that these trolly-bus bombs that have
been going off in the past couple of days might be meant as
a signal to you folks among others?
MR. FUERTH: I'll restrain myself on that and let
Strobe's comments stand, and I'd appreciate maybe one more
question, if there is something, on the Committee.
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: I won't even come to the
podium. We have absolutely nothing on the joint
responsibility for this bombing.
Q Who was the last American official who has seen
President Yeltsin?
MR. FUERTH: How many points do we get for the answer
to that one?
Q (Multiple comments)
Q Well, it's been quite awhile, right? So you
haven't had a firsthand assessment of how President Yeltsin
is for quite a while, is that right?
MR. FUERTH: The Presidents have been in touch by
telephone, and the dialogue has been as lively as at any
other time. But if what you're asking, is the Vice
President going to be the first senior American official to
be in the same room with President Yeltsin in a while, I
think the answer to that is yes. But the answer is, fine.
What they will be talking about is business.
MR. DAVIES: Thank you very much.
(Mr. Leon Fuerth concluded his briefing at 1:30 p.m.,
at which time Mr. Davies immediately began his briefing of
the press.)
MR. DAVIES: We'll check into that and get you a
definitive answer. We think the answer is April, the
President, at the anti -- or at that nuclear summit in
Moscow. But we'll check into that to make sure.
I've just got two quick announcements, and then I'll go
to your questions. The first, just handed to me before I
came out, is an announcement that we'll be putting out on
the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. A
meeting has just ended in Vienna, Austria, which brought
together representatives of 33 countries to establish what
is known as the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls.
The purpose of the Wassenaar Arrangement is to
contribute to regional and international security by
promoting transparency with regard to transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use items. Meetings and
exchanges of information will begin under this framework in
September, and the participating states have agreed to a
1 November 1996 date as a target date for implementation of
the control lists of goods and technologies.
What's significant here is that for the first time we
will have a global mechanism for controlling transfers of
conventional armaments and a venue in which governments can
consider effectively the implications of those transfers.
I'd also like to draw your attention to a statement
that was issued this morning by the White House. We will
amplify it with our own statement. These are statements
regarding the flotilla that's planned to waters off Cuba for
July 13. So, very shortly, the United States notes that the
organizers of this flotilla of privately-owned vessels from
Florida, accompanied by aircraft, have planned to conduct a
protest in international waters close to Cuban territorial
seas and airspace. They'll do that on July 13.
We recognize the right of the participants to engage in
this peaceful protest against the Castro regime, and we have
reminded the Cuban Government of its obligation to exercise
restraint in dealing with this and not to use excessive
force. But we do wish to urge the democracy movement and
all the participants in Saturday's flotilla to observe U.S.
law and refrain from entering Cuban territorial waters
during this event.
Those are the announcements I've got. George.
Q Also on Cuba, the Cubans initially indicated that
either extradition or prosecution by the United States of
the defector would be satisfactory to them, but now the
Cubans are saying or the Cubans are insisting that he be
returned to Cuba. Do you have any comment on that?
MR. DAVIES: I don't have an update to give you on the
hijacker, the defector who's now at Guantanamo base -- our
base in Cuba. The gentleman, Jose Fernandez Pupo, is still
in custody. He's in the brig at Guantanamo. We haven't
made any decisions regarding his status. We're still
reviewing what it was he did. So I think for the time being
it's inappropriate for me to get into that.
We'll make a decision about Mr. Fernandez once the
review has been completed, and then, of course, the other
place you can pose questions on this is at the Justice
Department.
Q Do you have anything on Title III of
Helms-Burton? Any decision imminent?
MR. DAVIES: No. According to the way the law is
structured, the President will decide -- should decide, must
decide by mid-month this month, which puts us to about
Tuesday/Wednesday of next week. I think there may be an
announcement Wednesday of next week out of the White House
of the President's decision. He'll have to make that
decision by Tuesday, by the end of the day on Tuesday. So
in a sense, that's a question that you could address to the
White House.
Q But has the Secretary of State made a
recommendation to the President yet on this issue?
MR. DAVIES: Carol, I think what I'll do is stay out of
the business of trying to track paper, track
recommendations, decisions, as the U.S. Government goes
about its internal deliberations on this matter. The
Secretary will play, obviously, a key role in advising the
President on his decision, but I'm not going to tell you
where that stands. There's been no decision, I can tell you
that.
Q But you're not even willing to say whether or not
the Secretary has made a recommendation?
MR. DAVIES: It's just not something that I think is in
our interests to get into; you know, who's made a
recommendation, and then the follow-up is, "Well, what was
the recommendation." The point is that the government will
make a decision on this. It will be announced mid-week next
week.
Q On Colombia. The Government of Colombia has
announced that President Samper is planning to attend the
U.N. meeting in September with visa or without visa. The
Government of the United States are trying to stop him if he
plans to attend the United Nations meeting? I mean, in
terms of order, chief of state Castro has been attending
those meetings in New York for the United Nations General
Assembly.
MR. DAVIES: Okay, I guess that's a question. We don't
have any visa application from the Colombian Government on
behalf of President Samper. The action that was taken and
announced yesterday, we were very explicit about it. It
deals with his ineligibility under the Immigration and
Nationality Act for a business or tourist visa. It doesn't
go directly to the question of his coming here as a head of
state with a diplomatic class of visa.
We stick by what we said yesterday. He's not welcome
in this country. If the Government of Colombia makes an
application on his behalf for him to come here to the United
Nations General Assembly, we'll look at that.
But what's important to underscore here is that our
action to revoke his visa was directed at an individual,
Ernesto Samper, someone we believe has aided and abetted
drug traffickers. It was not directed against the Colombian
nation as a whole. We don't consider our action in any way
to be an intervention in their internal affairs.
We consider it an action to defend our affairs, to
defend our nation. We're a sovereign nation as well. We
have the right to determine who may or may not enter our
country, and to the degree that a government is permitting
the flow of drugs into our country, it's a violation of our
sovereignty.
He, in his statement, made an important point. He
reiterated his intention to fight against narco-trafficking,
so we hope to continue to work with those individuals and
institutions in the Colombian system that have demonstrated
through their actions rather than their rhetoric their
commitment to fighting the drug scourge.
Q Does the United States believe that Milosevic
should be investigated for war crimes?
MR. DAVIES: We leave to the War Crimes Tribunal in The
Hague those questions. That's why it was set up with the
very great support of the United States in the first place.
It's up to that independent body to make determinations
about who is to be indicted as a war criminal and who is not
to be indicted. So that's a question you would have to put
to them, I think, at this stage.
Q I think it was indicated in issuing the warrants
that it's now time to make the investigation of him a formal
one. Is the U.S. bound to cooperate in this?
MR. DAVIES: What we understand they've done is in this
warrant they have reconfirmed earlier indictments. The
warrant does not by its own terms direct the prosecutor to
issue any new indictments. That's our understanding of it.
We fully support the Tribunal's commitment to bring to
justice those who have committed these atrocities, but the
bottom line is we respect their independent efforts, and
they have yet to issue any further indictments along those
lines.
Q But my question didn't go to whether or not they
should indict him, it went to whether they should
investigate him for war crimes, and you have no opinion
about that?
MR. DAVIES: It's up to the Tribunal to do that. What
we don't want to get into is advising the Tribunal about,
"Why don't you go look at this person, go look at that
person." President Slobodan Milosevic is an important
individual, obviously, from the standpoint of the Dayton
Accords. There's no question about that. He's a signatory.
He signed the Dayton Accords as a guarantor on behalf of
the Bosnian Serbs.
So he has from our standpoint this role to play. He
should fulfill all of the requirements of the Dayton
Accords; live up to his commitments as he's made them in
Dayton. And as to whether or not the War Crimes Tribunal
wants to look into Milosevic or not -- and there was some
language in their indictment that seemed to indicate that
they would be looking beyond the two individuals who are the
subject of their work in the last week -- that's up to them.
Q What do you think the impact would be on
Milosevic, though, if he were --
MR. DAVIES: That's speculative. I mean, let's wait
and see what the Tribunal does, and we're happy to react to
whatever decisions they take, whatever direction they go in.
Q Would you be able to meet with someone who was
indicted? Anyone who was indicted? We won't be surprised
because he's indicted. Would you meet with any --
MR. DAVIES: I can't imagine that if an individual were
indicted, we would be meeting with that individual. I mean,
I think that's very straightforward.
Q It would put a crimp in getting enforcement of
Dayton.
MR. DAVIES: Again, I mean, you're taking me down this
kind of speculative path about Slobodan Milosevic, and we're
just not there, and I don't know that we will be there.
That's up to the Tribunal to chart -- they've got to chart
their course in their very, very important work, and they
haven't said that they're seeking any further indictments.
Q I'm going a few steps back on that path. If
indeed they are saying it's now time to formally investigate
his possible culpability, is the U.S. bound to assist them
in the investigation? Where do things stand? I mean, I
know behind the scenes they've already been looking into
this.
MR. DAVIES: Again, we have a premise problem, because
they haven't said that. They haven't said that they're
seeking further indictments. They haven't said explicitly
that they're --
Q I'm not talking about indictments; whether it's
time to investigate.
MR. DAVIES: They haven't said explicitly that they're
going to be investigating him. I don't know how many times
we've done this from the podium, but we've many, many times
underscored the degree to which the United States has been a
supporter of the War Crimes Tribunal, both in our
rhetoric but more importantly in terms of the money and the
personnel that we've made available to the Tribunal, and the
information that we've made available to the Tribunal.
We work closely with the Tribunal, as does IFOR, and if
they make a request of us for information, we'll do our
level best to meet that request.
Q On that point, you suggest that the process is
that they request the information on a specific individual,
and then you provide it. But in the past, that's not the
way it's worked. The way it has worked is the United States
has supplied raw data; they have investigated it, and then
decided if they want more information or that this is
sufficient for an indictment.
In other words, in the past you haven't required a
request. You have turned over information, which the United
States believes is germane.
MR. DAVIES: Okay.
Q So why don't you do it in this case?
MR. DAVIES: We do. We do provide all the information
that we think is germane, that we can provide, given the
strictures of the intelligence information that we have that
we collect, and our bottom line on this process is let the
chips fall where they may.
We will give the War Crimes Tribunal everything we can
possibly give them, but it's up to the War Crimes Tribunal,
and it's important to preserve their independence -- to
carry out investigations, to at the end of the day issue
indictments -- if their investigations lead them to that,
and we respect and support their work.
Q But the difference is they used to make it
public. They used to hand out pamphlets filled with
information on crimes committed in Bosnia.
MR. DAVIES: Well, but again --
Q You haven't done that in about three years.
MR. DAVIES: I'll look into the pamphleteering and why
perhaps we haven't -- you know, let's chalk it up to the
budget. We could go that route, that it's our budget that's
preventing us. No, I don't know the answer to that, if in
fact we're not giving out as much information publicly as we
have in the past. Let me look into that.
Yes, did you have a question?
Q I have a question about Turkey, the Prime
Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erbakan. We heard that he sent some
proposal to Washington about suggesting that, if the
"Provide Comfort" command control center moves from Zakho to
inside of the border of Turkey, they will support the
extension of this "Provide Comfort" timetable. Did you
hear, or did you get this kind of proposal?
MR. DAVIES: I haven't heard that proposal, but that
certainly falls squarely within the realm of our privileged
diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Turkey.
Everybody knows our position on "Provide Comfort." We'd
like it to continue.
If such proposal is made, obviously we'll work with the
Government of Turkey, but I don't think we'll be, kind of,
trading positions in public, as we move forward with it.
Q Would you describe this kind of position as
acceptable, or not?
MR. DAVIES: Again, to go back to where I started,
since I'm not familiar with that particular suggestion, I
can't help on that score. But we can check into whether a
proposal like that has been made, and how we might react.
Q How about Ambassador Albright's visit to Greece,
Cyprus, Turkey? Would you characterize this visit within
the framework of the U.N., or is she going in there in her
capacity as a cabinet member?
MR. DAVIES: I'm sure she's going there in both
capacities. She is going there, obviously, to pay calls on
the leadership in that region, to add some impetus to the
process that's been underway some time, to try to find
solutions to the problems in the Aegean and the problems of
Cyprus.
But, whether she formally took off one hat and put on
another, on her way out there, I don't think, is actually
all that germane.
Q Along with Cyprus and the Aegean, is she going to
be discussing oil-for-food, Ankara-Baghdad relations, and
"Provide Comfort"?
MR. DAVIES: She'll be discussing a broad range of
issues. She won't only be wearing her U.N. hat, I think
it's fair to say. She'll also be talking about the range of
issues that concern the United States in that part of the
world.
Yes, Judd.
Q Glyn, there's an Irish nationalist, by the name
of Jimmy Smyth, in San Francisco, who escaped from Maze
Prison in 1983. He was picked up by the FBI in 1992, and
who has fought extradition through the courts -- winning at
a lower-court level -- on the grounds that if he were
returned to Northern Ireland, he would face persecution, and
then, he lost on appeals. He's still fighting it.
Is this a case that has come to the attention of the
Secretary of State, do you know, and is he going to
recommend on it? Is he going to take any action?
MR. DAVIES: I was alerted to this issue and looked
into it a bit.
One of the areas that we stay away from much comment
on, of course, is the question of extraditions. I think,
suffice it to say on that issue, the extradition process
that's underway, obviously, the State Department plays a
role in. We'll be playing that role, but I don't have any
particular comment to make about whether the Secretary is
aware of it or not.
Q On the subject of Saudi Arabia, do you have
anything to say on the investigation -- how it's going? Are
you still satisfied with the level of cooperation you're
getting from the Saudis? Do you know if anyone has been
arrested?
MR. DAVIES: We've been satisfied all along and remain
satisfied with the level of cooperation that we're getting
from Saudi Arabia. They stepped in a very good and strong
way from the get-go on this to helping us out. Obviously,
we have an FBI team out there that's rather strong. Louis
Freeh has been out there, along with two Cabinet members.
What I'm going to steer clear of is getting into where
we are in the investigation; whether it's going well or not,
or what leads there are. You can try across the river, at
the Pentagon, with those questions -- but I doubt, as long
as it's an on-going investigation, we'll have much to say,
publicly.
Judd.
Q Have you heard anything about reports of a recent
coup attempt against Saddam Hussein?
MR. DAVIES: I have not. I have not. We hear those
occasionally, though.
Q What about his execution of several of the
coup-plotters today?
MR. DAVIES: I've just seen those reports, and don't
have anything to add.
Q (Inaudible) on scud missiles. The Egyptian
Ambassador, in Washington yesterday, said -- and I'm quoting
him -- that "Egypt has the right to arm itself and defend
itself, and that North Korean scuds are not the only such
missiles in the region." He was, actually, answering a
question about reported U.S. objections to this North
Korean-Egyptian deal.
What is your reaction to this statement? And, on what
ground, actually, did you base your objection to this
transaction?
MR. DAVIES: Our objection to the missile deal between
North Korea and Egypt?
Q Yes.
MR. DAVIES: I don't have anything to add to what the
Secretary of State said when he was out in the region
recently. He was in Cairo. Many of the journalists in this
room were with him, and I think that question was put to him.
I don't think I'll be adding much beyond saying, of
course, that we take reports of missile proliferation quite
seriously: I'll look into them and follow up.
Q Will this issue be raised when President Mubarak
comes here at the end of the month?
MR. DAVIES: We'll have to wait and see. I don't have
any kind of a listing of the agenda items for that visit.
That visit will touch on a number of issues. I'm sure, at
some level -- though, I don't know with the President
directly -- we will talk about our concerns as regards
missile proliferation.
Q Does this Binational Commission, between Egypt
and the U.S., have any defense, or security, component to it?
MR. DAVIES: I believe it does, but that's something I
can check for you -- to let you know exactly what makes up
the agenda of that Commission.
Q Has Egypt signed up for the MTCR?
MR. DAVIES: I don't know if Egypt is a member of the
MTCR. John, do you know? We'll check.
Q Because the Egyptian Ambassador said yesterday
that the acquisition of missiles is a matter of sovereign
right, as far as Egypt is concerned, and that Egypt is not
the only country, in that area, that has that sort of
missile.
MR. DAVIES: Sure, I'm happy to check into it. As I
rack my brain, I seem to recall that they're not a member,
but I'll look into it.
Thanks.
(Press briefing concluded at 1:59 p.m.)
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