U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #87 (96-06-03)

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U.S. State Department Directory

U.S. Department of State

96/06/03 Daily Press Briefing

Office of the Spokesman

DEPARTMENT--ANNOUNCEMENTS
Welcome to Dutch Information Ministers ...................... 1
Articles on State Dept. Budget & State/USIA Agreement ....... 1-2
Secretary Christopher's Travel: Mtgs. in Geneva, Berlin ..... 2,14-15

BAHRAIN
Report of Failed Coup Attempt ............................... 3

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Secretary Christopher's Comments re:
  IFOR--Role in Freedom of Movement ......................... 3-4
Removal/Apprehension of Karadic/Mladic ...................... 4-6
Elections--Conditions/OSCE Certification .................... 6-8

COLOMBIA
Samper Case: Reports of Consideration of U.S. Sanctions ..... 8-10
Reports of Revocation of Visas for Colombian Officials ...... 9-10

CUBA
Helms Burton: Letters to Companies .......................... 10

KOREA
Food Situation/Aid/Congressman Richardson's Trip............. 10-11

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Israeli Troops in Hebron/Reported Incident .................. 11
Prime Minister-elect Netanyahu Speech ....................... 11-12
Assad-Mubarak Meeting/Comments .............................. 12

TURKEY
Local Elections ............................................. 13
Extension of Operation Provide Comfort ...................... 13

BURMA
Possible Special U.S. Envoy ................................. 13

BURUNDI
Assistant Secretary Moose's Trip to Region .................. 13

IRAQ
U.S. Trade Issue ............................................ 14

First, to welcome a group of Dutch Information Ministers from a variety of ministries -- I think on both sides of the room -- who are in the United States to study the relationship between government and the press. Welcome to the briefing. Good to have you here.

Second, to draw your attention to an article -- actually, two articles that appeared in the press over the weekend and today. I guess today's paper featured both of these subjects. These are articles about our budget, the State Department budget, which is woefully lacking in general terms, and spoke -- one article -- about the closures that have had to take place of Foreign Service posts. In recent years we've had to close 35 Foreign Service posts, and counterbalancing that, we've only opened about l9 in some new areas -- and talked about the downsizing that's had to happen in personnel at the State Department and overseas, and how this has affected our ability to perform our function; particularly, in areas such as in advising U.S. businesses and commercial interests of possible opportunities -- which has resulted in less economic reporting, unfortunately.

A second article, on a kind of a happier note, detailed an agreement that we've reached with USIA to help solve one of their problems, and in turn save everybody some money. This was an agreement that involved the consideration of up to 40 USIA junior officers for appointment in the State Department's Foreign Service. To be eligible, the USIA untenured junior officers had to meet all of our eligibility regulations, including medical and security requirements. But boiling this issue down, what we ended up with was we saved some people their jobs and we were able, at the State Department, to take on board some people already trained who had language skills and some of whom were already in place overseas. So that was a good agreement. It made good management sense in the spirit of the current downsizing initiative.

Finally, just to catch you up on the Secretary's activities, while all of us were enjoying a very nice weekend here in Washington, some of the best weather we've ever had, the Secretary -- and this should make you feel very guilty -- was off working hard. He left Saturday morning.

He flew first to Geneva, where he held meetings on the Bosnia situation. He had very productive meetings in Geneva with a number of persons involved in our efforts to bring peace to Bosnia. He met with the three Balkan Presidents -- Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic. He met with General Joulwan of NATO, Admiral Smith who commands IFOR, and representatives of the Contact Group countries. Their main accomplishment was an agreement by the three Presidents which recommits them to the Dayton timetable for holding elections by mid-September; and we can talk more about that if you wish.

Then today and tomorrow he is in Berlin -- the new, undivided Berlin, I should point out -- for a meeting with the North Atlantic Council and a meeting with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. He also had separate meetings today with his Spanish, Italian, and German counterparts, in addition to those meetings of the entire North Atlantic Alliance at l6. He held a press conference; he met with Central European ministers -- his now traditional meeting with those ministers whenever he is in a NATO setting -- and this is all part of the process of continuing NATO's revitalization and reform, and its adaptation of post-Cold War realities. Of course, that was begun in January of l994.

This meeting, to distinguish it from what's going to happen at the end of the year, was not principally about expanding the NATO Alliance. It was much more about inward-looking NATO issues: how to revamp and reform and update the Alliance in structure and missions.

At the December meeting of NATO, what we'll see are some decisions about NATO expansion, which is going forward as a process.

In any event, that was the update I wanted to give you, and I'm happy to go to your questions.

George.

Q There apparently was a failed coup attempt in Bahrain. The Bahrain authorities are saying the Iranians had a hand in it. Do you have any comment to make?

MR. DAVIES: I don't. I saw the ticker item about that, and that's something we're looking into. But I think that may just have broken in the last couple of hours, if I have it right. That was when I first saw the ticker item.

So absent further information about what may have occurred in Bahrain, I think I'll hold our fire from the podium.

Q Glyn, getting back to what the Secretary was doing yesterday in Geneva, can you clarify his remarks on directing troops to be more proactive in arresting those people that are wanted in The Hague? Have any plans been drawn up for this? What is going to happen now with this change in --

MR. DAVIES: I think, Betsy, what he was pointing to was the fact that, just in general terms, now that NATO has completed its first six-month mission of separating the parties and getting the arms control process underway, that now we have a situation which IFOR -- the NATO Command -- can step out a little more aggressively to work on ensuring freedom of movement, which of course feeds directly into the issue of the elections and whether or not they will be a success; and we certainly expect that they will be a success.

So his comments were simply meant to indicate that after having spoken with General Joulwan and Admiral Smith, it's his understanding that there will be a more aggressive stance taken by NATO forces in ensuring freedom of movement -- which raises a greater possibility that some of these individuals who have been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal may run afoul of NATO and end up being taken into custody, which would be a very positive development.

So I think those were the points he was making.

Q Does this mean that the IFOR troops will become more involved in trying to get, say, Bosnian Muslims to areas where they once lived? The Serbs have been very stringent in not letting many of these people return to their homes. Will they become more proactive there?

MR. DAVIES: A couple of points.

First off, of course, we are in a situation today, close to six months after the Dayton Accord came into being, where in fact many thousands of people do cross back and forth across the boundary line. That doesn't though prevent some of these incidents from occurring, in which for the most part Bosnian Serb villagers or others put up resistance to those visiting from the other side.

I don't think that we're in the situation where the Secretary and the others have necessarily hammered out any kind of specific agenda or agreement about what precisely the NATO forces will be doing in the future. I think what we're talking about is just a general more aggressive stance on the part of IFOR troops as they go about their mission of ensuring freedom of movement in the country, which should make it possible for these elections to be held before September l4 in an open manner.

So that's where we are, and of course General Joulwan and Admiral Smith -- and I think they may have had a few public things to say as well in the last little while -- agree that IFOR will be in a position to do more.

We'll have to see what that means precisely, but this is a gradual process as they consolidate the very successful gains in the first six months and move on to the elections and getting into the civilian side of the Dayton process.

We expect that IFOR will be able to do more, and they've said that they'll be able to do more.

Q There were several reports over the weekend that stated that the U.S. Government is considering different sanctions against Colombia -- trade sanctions and that kind of thing.

MR. DAVIES: How about Bosnia? We'll stick with Bosnia; and then we'll come back to Colombia, sure.

Q This new aggressive, more aggressive stance that you've described -- what are going to be the rules for troops? Given the fact that President Karadzic is protected at any time by 50 to 60 armed men, what are going to be the rules of engagement, so to speak, for troops, should they run into him with his armed entourage? Is the U.S. prepared to entertain U.S. casualties in the process of arresting President Karadzic?

MR. DAVIES: David, I think it would be a huge mistake for me to try to lay out what the terms of engagement are or will be for U.S. troops as they move to do more along the lines of their general mission. That wouldn't serve anybody's interest to sort of put up a placard that lists the five principles of whatever it is. That's point one.

Point two, of course, those decisions will be made by commanders on the ground, on the spot, and I think it's self-evident that those decisions will be very situational. It will simply depend on what kinds of situations IFOR troops find them in if an opportunity presents itself.

So it's very, very difficult to say when or if or how this might occur. Obviously, we hope in the first instance that the signatories to the Dayton Agreement will move to fulfill their obligations and remove Karadzic and Mladic and the others from power. It's really their responsibility to see that this is done.

So much of what the Secretary's been up to has been to encourage the parties to the Dayton Agreement, and he had a very tough meeting with Milosevic along these lines to do what they signed up to do; which is to, if you will, remove these people from positions of authority.

Q Is it safe to assume that patrols -- these more aggressive patrols -- are going to be equipped and prepared to arrest a man that's protected by such a large force?

MR. DAVIES: You're getting to a very technical kind of operational question. I don't know what types of equipment they necessarily will have with them or whether it will be at all different from what they've had in the past; how they will configure themselves -- those are all operational, military questions that you'd have to address to the military.

We're certainly not going to lay out any kind of game plan, so there's no aggressively going after these people in a military sense because of the dangers involved (a), and (b) because of the fact that really it's up to the parties to the Dayton Agreement to make good on their pledges.

Q So that's definitely ruled out -- there will be no posse type of pursuit of these men by IFOR, is that correct?

MR. DAVIES: Bill, I don't think it was ever the intention that NATO forces would saddle up and go after Mladic and Karadzic and try to bring them to heel. That's just not what this is all about. This is all about getting the parties on the ground in Bosnia to live up to their commitments.

Part of the reason that we're laying so much stress right now in the elections process is because we believe that the elections will play a strong role in marginalizing these people, especially Karadzic; that once elections occur, Karadzic will no longer have anything like the mandate that he fancies he has at this stage. So that is a reason for moving forward with elections as quickly as possible.

Q And from the meetings this weekend, the elections are definitely on as far as all parties are concerned, is that --

MR. DAVIES: It will be up to the OSCE to certify that conditions exist for those elections to take place, and they have a couple of weeks to do that. The United States has a position on this -- and that's a position that I think is widely shared -- that it's important to move ahead with elections; that elections are going to solve some problems here. Elections at the end of the day will bring about a degree of change and accelerate the Dayton process.

So it's important from now until elections take place, whenever it's decided they are to take place, that work accelerate to achieve the kind of conditions needed for elections to be held that are free and fair, and that result in a legitimate government.

Q Glyn, as both you and others have characterized Secretary Christopher's meeting with President Milosevic as "difficult" -- didn't this expansion of the IFOR mandate in some respect result from President Milosevic's reluctance to facilitate the departure of Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic?

MR. DAVIES: Yes, there's been a degree of disappointment on the part of the U.S. Government. There's no question about it. I mean, we're now close to six months into this, and we haven't seen happen what we believe should have happened some time ago, which is that Karadzic would be removed from a position of authority, from a position of power.

So what the Secretary did in his meeting with President Slobodan Milosevic was make clear the necessity of removing Karadzic and Mladic from positions of influence, and he also made clear the necessity of bringing them to justice. The parties, for their part, noted their general obligations to cooperate fully with the War Crimes Tribunal and to abide by the prohibition on persons indicted by the Tribunal holding any appointive, elective or other offices.

It was in that context, I think, that the Secretary talked a bit about IFOR greatly increasing its dispersal throughout the countryside and increasing its ability to enforce freedom of movement and opportunities for apprehension of war criminals.

Q You think Karadzic lacks support among his people. On what basis do you say that?

MR. DAVIES: I'm not sure I said that. Did I say that?

Q Well, I think -- I interpreted what you said before to mean that, when you said something about the elections will demonstrate how little support he has, or words to that effect.

MR. DAVIES: Here's what I meant. What I meant was once you have elections in which Karadzic may not participate, you will end up with a government that has, we hope, a high degree of legitimacy. That government will not include Karadzic, which should in turn marginalize him, we hope completely and, if you will, remove him electorally from any claim to power or office. That's I think what I meant.

Q You said that it was really difficult to negotiate with Milosevic. Could you tell us, is there any "if" -- that means is there an "if" you are not going to do that, it is going to be sanctions within 30 days, within six months, within three days?

MR. DAVIES: I don't have any kind of a specific threat to report to you today. Milosevic is under pressure -- we think a great deal of pressure -- because the so-called outer wall of sanctions remains in place. There is also the pressure that comes from his certain knowledge that if at the end of the day he doesn't comply sufficiently with the Dayton accords, other sanctions may be reapplied.

But I don't have any word about his having been given an ultimatum. I don't think we're at that stage yet. We're still at the stage of talking very frankly and increasingly sharply with Milosevic to try to bring about a real change on the ground instead of simply talk of letters having been signed or general promises having been made. That's just not enough.

Q Is it fair to say that Bosnian Government is under pressure because Mohammed Sacirbey, that Special Envoy for implementation of Dayton Agreement, said that, "We believe that conditions do not exist, and that certification cannot currently take place." Could you comment on that?

MR. DAVIES: It's not up to him to certify. It's up to the OSCE to make that certification, and I'm certain he has an opinion. All players in the Dayton process will have an opportunity to express their opinion. At the end of the day, the OSCE will have to make that decision -- will have to make that call. We think it's certainly very possible that conditions will exist and that the OSCE will be able to certify that elections are something that can take place, and we would like to see those elections take place within the Dayton-mandated time frame that ends in mid-September.

Q I'm sorry, one more. In New York Times Sunday report about internal reports of that organization in Sarajevo, I think that there is some disagreement between public and internal report of Robert Frowick from Sarajevo. Could you comment on that report on Sunday?

MR. DAVIES: I think I'll leave to Mr. Frowick commenting on the OSCE's work. I don't have any particular comment on that. I mean, those, as I read them, were daily reports of activities; and, of course, if you disaggregate anything, you can make a case that perhaps runs counter to the result that ultimately will be achieved.

There are problems here; there's no question about it. This is not an easy thing. A lot of us, I think, were kind of lulled by the very terrific first three/four/five months of the Dayton process when the military end of it was achieved so well, so quickly, with so few problems -- very, very few difficulties to speak of.

But we are now heading into the tough part of the Bosnia project, which is to get it right on the civilian side, create the institutions that are needed, so that that country can stand a strong chance of going forward as a unified state, and this isn't going to be a picnic -- no question about it.

But we are going to press very hard to see that steps are taken so that certainly by the end of the year there will be sufficient progress that Bosnia can stand a chance of surviving into the future.

Any more Bosnia questions?

Q There were reports over the weekend, stating that the United States is considering different sanctions against Colombia in case the Colombian Congress relieves of any fault President Samper. Is there any truth to those reports?

MR. DAVIES: There is no truth to any reports that indicated that we would have something public to announce along those lines, because we don't at this stage. Our views on what's occurring in Colombia are fairly well known. We'd like to see justice done within the framework of the Colombian constitution, and we are very closely watching what is occurring in Colombia.

But I don't today have any announcements about sanctions that are likely to be imposed.

Q Are there any under consideration?

MR. DAVIES: Sanctions under consideration?

Q Yes.

MR. DAVIES: That, I think, falls under the rubric of internal deliberations of the U.S. Government, so I'm going to decline to get into whether we're thinking about sanctions. We're always thinking about various ways to bring pressure to bear where it should be, but I'm not going to tip our hand there.

Q Glyn, let me follow up. Passions in Colombia are running very high because of this whole issue, and many in the country seem to feel that the U.S., especially President Clinton, who ultimately will impose the sanctions, has really no moral right to put any pressure for the President of Colombia to be indicted, because they say he, himself, is being accused of sexual harassment. He is involved in the Whitewater allegations as well. And they feel that it's just not right that he intervenes in the issues of a country like Colombia who is struggling and trying to solve this itself. How do you respond to that?

MR. DAVIES: I can't ratify that that's kind of the prevailing opinion in Colombia. Some may hold that view. Others, I would imagine, probably view the principled stand that the United States Government has taken as a positive and welcome stand.

The United States Government is going to move to protect its interests, and in the case of Colombia we've repeatedly spoken of the necessity that the process play out there in accordance with Colombian law. And we've expressed concerns about some of the recent decisions that have been made down there.

I think it's kind of ridiculous to try to juxtapose the two. We're talking about charges having been made against the President of Colombia; that he has accepted large amounts of money from known narco-traffickers. I just don't think that there's any comparing the situations the way some in Colombia seem to have done so.

Q To follow, The Washington Post said yesterday the State Department is going to cancel another tourist visa for an official from Colombia. Is that true?

MR. DAVIES: Again, no announcements to make today about any revocation of visas or other restrictions or any other economic measures. We simply don't have any announcements for you today. But we will continue to take actions that we believe are in our interests consonant with how we like to see things play out.

Q It is obvious that the U.S. has to protect its interests around the world, but is it too risky that maybe one of its strongest allies in the war on drugs might turn against it, into an enemy, basically because of this whole pressure issue?

MR. DAVIES: I don't know that -- we certainly haven't reached a conclusion like that. We think it's important that the influence of the narco-traffickers be reduced to the extent possible, because their activities impact directly on the welfare and security of United States citizens, in the form of flows of drugs into this country, which have effects all are aware of. So we are going to continue to do whatever we can to fight the narco-traffickers and their influence.

Q At this point, do you have confidence that the Colombian Congress will vote, will decide on the Samper case based on the facts, or you are concerned that our political factors will have an influence?

MR. DAVIES: We hope that they make a decision based on the facts -- absolutely. I'm not sufficiently conversant with the Colombian situation or system to be able to tell you whether or not we think that politics will play too great a role. Politics play a role in any system; there's no question about it. But we think this is one that they ought to get right based on the facts.

Q Have any other letters gone out to companies under the Helms-Burton --

MR. DAVIES: No, no. Not to my knowledge. The letters that went out were those that Nick spoke of at the end of last week, and I think you all got the announcement with the generic letter that went out. We chose not to detail the recipients of those letters, and that's the only tranche, or wave if you will, of those letters that's gone out so far.

Q Any decision yet on Korean food aid?

MR. DAVIES: No. No decision on Korean food aid. We are still looking at the degree to which the food situation has worsened in North Korea, and, as you expect, we're also consulting closely with the Governments of Japan and of South Korea about that situation.

There are various appeals being made by international organizations, including the United Nations, and we're looking at the appeals, assessing the situation for ourselves, and talking to our partners about where to go forward from here.

Q Did Richardson shed any light on this on his return?

MR. DAVIES: Richardson's visit was helpful, and he spoke publicly about what it was he discovered. Of course, we've spoken with Congressman Richardson as a result of his trip, and that's feeding into the analysis that's underway in the U.S. Government about what we ought to do bilaterally with North Korea.

Q Did the Congressman make a specific recommendation that the United States provide 100,000 tons of food to North Korea?

MR. DAVIES: I haven't seen that. I have not seen that. I don't know that he made any such specific recommendation. To my knowledge, he outlined what he saw, what he heard. He may well have offered an opinion about where we should go from here, but out of deference to the Congressman, I don't think I'll be replaying the recommendations he gave us in private.

Q Glyn, you've probably gone over this in the last few days, but let me try it. Is the United States confident that the new government of Israel is going to withdraw the number of troops it's required to withdraw from Hebron, as scheduled?

MR. DAVIES: I think the word on Israel today is that it's premature -- and I can repeat that several times -- to really comment substantively on how it is we think events or policies will shape up in Israel, especially vis-a-vis the West Bank.

We took very careful note of what Prime Minister-elect Netanyahu had to say in his victory speech over the weekend. We welcome his support for continuing the peace process and for continuing close relations with the United States. But it's simply premature to go into detail on particular issues until he's had a chance to form his government, until we've had a chance to talk with him, and we hope to be able to do that very soon.

Q Do you have any comment on the tone of the speech, the spirit of reconciliation that he demonstrated in those remarks?

MR. DAVIES: What I've tried to signal is that we view it very positively, and I think there was a reaction out of the White House along those lines over the weekend. We are very pleased that he has laid stress on those two areas: that there's a necessity not to walk back with the peace process, to continue the peace process, and also his statement that he places great value on close relations between Israel and the United States. We will absolutely take him up on it. It's what we would like to see happen as well.

Q Do you have any comments on the Assad-Mubarak meeting, and the comments afterward by Assad, who I guess is in no rush to think about resuming talks with Israel?

MR. DAVIES: I don't in particular except to echo what the Secretary said at the end of last week and what I think others, including King Hussein, have said in the region -- that it's important not to prejudge the situation, but rather to give Prime Minister-elect Netanyahu a little bit of breathing room and time to set himself up in office and time to consult, both internally and externally, with the United States and Israel's other partners in the peace process.

After that, then perhaps we can get back into the process of kind of reacting to specific statements or pronouncements. But we would hope that the Syrians and all others involved would give him a little bit of time -- breathing room.

Q Is the U.S. concerned about the incident in Hebron this morning where Israeli soldiers seemed to take a harder line in patrolling that city and in roughing up some Palestinian policemen and arresting participants? I mean, it seemed rougher than they had previously been handling these situations?

MR. DAVIES: Betsy, all I've seen so far are press reports -- in fact, I think just one -- detailing what's alleged to have happened there. So I don't have any particular reaction to it. Israel, of course, has an obligation to protect its citizens and to administer certain of those areas that have not yet been turned over to the Palestinian Authority, and I at this stage don't know enough about what happened to be able to give you any kind of a closer reaction than that.

Q Glyn, yesterday Turkey had local elections and both Central Right Party -- they lost support, and the Religious Party -- they gained a lot. Do you have any comment on such?

MR. DAVIES: I really don't. I don't know that our Embassy has yet come in with a full report, and I haven't had a chance to check with anybody to see how we might react to that development. I'm not sure we would, but I'm happy to look into it and perhaps have something for you tomorrow.

Q To "Provide Comfort" also, because they -- the two delegations -- they are still (inaudible) each other.

MR. DAVIES: I haven't seen any results of that meeting, so I don't know yet whether there's any final word on "Provide Comfort." We'd like very much to see "Provide Comfort" extended. Our position is clear on that. But I haven't seen any final word.

Q Has an envoy been named to Burma?

MR. DAVIES: No, I think we're where we were at the end of last week, which is that in principle we'd like very much to have an envoy go out, but nobody has been named at this stage.

Q What's up on the Burundi situation?

MR. DAVIES: In Burundi?

Q Yes, please.

MR. DAVIES: Assistant Secretary George Moose went out to the region -- in fact, he was out twice in the last couple of weeks to the region -- and paid calls at a number of spots. He came back over the weekend from his second trip to the region.

In his travels in the Great Lakes Region and to the west of the Great Lakes Region -- I think he was in Zaire -- he emphasized the support of the United States for the negotiating efforts of former Tanzanian President Nyerere in pursuing a negotiated national reconciliation in that country -- in Burundi.

He urged all the parties to cease violence in order to create conditions necessary for Nyerere's effort to go forward and succeed, and reiterated the view that from the standpoint of the United States, only those who put aside violence -- abandon it -- will deserve a place at the negotiating table.

Just to give you a quick rundown on what he did, he met on the 29th with Nyerere in Tanzania. Again on the 29th went to Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, and met with the President of Rwanda, President Bizimungu. Then on the 30th -- to Bujumbura, where he met with senior officials. 31st -- he traveled to Kinshasa, Zaire -- the capital -- and met with Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo. On the 1st he was in Kampala, Uganda, to meet with President Museveni, and he returned to Washington on June 2.

He did not, I should note, meet with Zairian President Mobutu, as he had the first time. I think Mobutu was in Europe.

Q Same subject. Since he's been so active out there, perhaps he could brief us.

MR. DAVIES: Perhaps he could. I like that idea. I'll see if he can't do that in some fashion.

Q Iraqi oil is ready to pump out for the export, and I believe the U.S. -- are you decided to buy and sell this --

MR. DAVIES: There's been no decision yet. I asked that question of those at higher pay grades in the White House just a couple of minutes ago and was told to stay tuned, so we're staying tuned. But there hasn't been a final decision. I would expect one will come soon.

Bill.

Q Glyn, on the meetings -- the NATO meetings -- what is the policy of this government regarding the desire of European NATO members to have more -- play a greater role in command and control of NATO? Is this going to be accomplished at this meeting -- some turning over of power to the NATO allies?

MR. DAVIES: I wouldn't describe it as any kind of a turning over of power necessarily. They discussed different structures. For instance, they reached some agreement on the modalities for U.S. cooperation with the Western European Union countries and how the Western European Union or other European-only types of groupings of countries could, with NATO support, deal with security threats that arise in Europe.

So in general it was a meeting that talked about how the Alliance can continue to adapt itself and update itself in the post-Cold War world in terms of its internal structures -- its military structures -- and they talked, obviously, a bit about Bosnia as well -- the success of the mission there.

To some extent, I think Bosnia was being looked at and talked about as a model for some future planning in NATO. But that was the nature of the discussions, talking about NATO's internal operations and how they would move forward in the future now that there is no longer, as the Secretary of State said, a single monolithic enemy, such as the Soviet Union, which NATO confronted for two generations.

Q Thank you.

MR. DAVIES: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 p.m.)

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