U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/09/19 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

From: Dimitrios Hristu <hristu@corbett.harvard.edu>

U.S. State Department Directory

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/09/19 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Holbrooke/Tudjman/Izetbegovic Mtg. in Zagreb ............14-15

--Bosnian-Croatian Offensive; Banja Luka ................14-20,

Ambassador Holbrooke/Milosevic Mtg. in Belgrade .........14

Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons from Sarajevo ...............16,18,

UN Secretary General's Comments re: UN in Bosnia ........22-23

U.S. Contributions to Possible Peacekeeping Force .......23-24

Ambassador Holbrooke's Return to U.S. ...................26

[...]

[...]

Q According to reports, the Croatians appear to have ended their military offensive. The Bosnian Government forces appear not to have and appear to have no intention of doing so. Is that the reading that Holbrooke got?

MR. BURNS: Ambassador Holbrooke is now in Belgrade. He's in the middle of a meeting with President Milosevic. I was able to talk not to him but to other participants in the meeting this morning in Zagreb -- a meeting that included President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic.

Let me just give you what I have on that. The aim of this particular meeting was to talk about the Federation; the attempt by both Bosnia and Croatia to strengthen the Federation. They both agreed. In fact, I believe they've issued now a joint statement that they would like, in many ways, to strengthen their current Federation which is good news.

The United States has been a leading supporter of that Federation.

There was a general discussion of the military situation in Bosnia. I understand that Ambassador Holbrooke, in his bilateral contacts with them before the meeting -- and, of course, the American side also in the larger trilateral meeting -- raised the issue of the offensive and urged once again that the Croatian and Bosnian Governments be restrained in their military operations.

I understand that the Croatian and Bosnian Presidents indicated that they will be restrained and that they will not now move on the city of Banja Luka.

If, in fact, this is the result of their military operations, that they in fact do cease in place where they are, they do not proceed onto Banja Luka, this will be welcome news. Because the United States has believed for a number of days during the current offensive that there is not a military solution that either the Bosnian or Croatian Governments can seek from their current operations; that they have got to seek a final resolution of this problem at the peace table.

After Dick Holbrooke's departure from Zagreb for Belgrade, the meeting with President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic continued with our Ambassador, John Menzies, who is our Ambassador in Sarajevo, and Ambassador Peter Galbraith, who is our Ambassador in Zagreb. They continue the discussion of Federation matters.

Q Did the two Presidents indicate that they would also not move on other Serb-held territory, or did they just limit their declaration to Banja Luka?

MR. BURNS: What we have seen over the last couple of hours -- and this is consistent with what our people heard in the meeting this morning -- is that there appears to be now, although the United Nations has not verified this, a general inclination to slow down or perhaps even stop all together the military offensive. That has not been verified by the relevant U.N. authorities on the ground.

If this is the case -- and that is the sense of the situation that was received by our people in the meeting this morning -- then that would be very welcome news. Because we believe that while certainly much has been gained by the two governments from a military point of view -- they've gained territory; they've perhaps have strengthened their hand for the negotiations that are going to come -- we don't believe that the continuation of this offensive -- and we've not believed this for many days -- is a positive factor or can be a positive factor in the overall situation in the Balkans.

There is a lot to worry about. Certainly, the Bosnian Serbs are not a defeated military force. They retain a very significant capability to strike back. As a number of us said yesterday, the position of the Government in Belgrade -- the Serbian Government -- has to be figured into this calculation, into this equation.

The Balkan wars have been characterized by situations in which sometimes one side is up and the other side is down and vice versa. We've seen a significant role reversal over the last month. Who is to say that the roles won't be reversed a month from now?

The United States, Germany, France, Britain, Russia -- in the Contact Group -- are offering an alternative, and that's the peace table. Dick Holbrooke flew to Belgrade to emphasize that point, emphasize our very great concern that all military operations be suspended; that the heavy weapons be completely and verifiably withdrawn by tomorrow evening -- mid-night tomorrow -- in Sarajevo so that the way forward can be found towards the peace conference.

Steve.

Q The forces on the offensive had known all along that the peace table was a possibility and that the United States and others were cautioning them to slow down or stop their offensive.

Can you explain what might have motivated them to potentially agree to slow down or stop their offensive so soon after the Holbrooke visit there? In other words, what did he tell them that was new? Because they knew the other stuff beforehand that you've cited.

MR. BURNS: They certainly have heard the public calls by the United States, by other European countries, including Germany, that this offensive be ceased. They heard it directly from Ambassador Holbrooke this morning.

It's hard to know, Steve, since the two governments have not spoken to this why they may have made this decision. Again, we have public reports that military operations are slowing down. We now have a very direct indication from this meeting that they intend not to continue their military operations towards Banja Luka.

It may be, Steve, that they've just seen the way the situation has developed. There are, we believe, well over 100,000 refugees in Central Bosnia -- people who have lost their homes as a result of the action over the last several days. The parties have to focus on the imperative of peace talks and on the centrality of the peace process after four years of war. That's where we've placed our emphasis.

Carol.

Q I just want to make sure I understand. Holbrooke was told specifically by the Bosnians and the Croatians that they would not go forward with any offensive on Banja Luka and that they would not pursue an offensive elsewhere -- yes, no?

MR. BURNS: Let me separate it into two parts because I want to be as accurate as I can be, obviously. I did not have a chance to talk to Dick Holbrooke. I talked to one of our Ambassadors who was in the meeting. Dick is not available. He's with Milosevic.

Specifically on the question of Banja Luka, Dick and the two Ambassadors were led to believe, in fairly clear terms, that the Croatians and Bosnians were not inclined to continue the offensive operations up to an attack on Banja Luka, which is good news for us.

We have also seen many reports from diverse sources this morning that, in fact, the military offensive that spread so rapidly through Central Bosnia over the last couple of days, appears to be growing to a halt. We hope that's the case. Because the situation, we think, should now be stabilized from a military point of view and we think the parties should focus on negotiations.

Q But they did not tell Holbrooke and company specifically that apart from Banja Luka they were going to halt their offensive in other parts of Central Bosnia?

MR. BURNS: I don't believe they had a categorical statement from either government that would be the case. You can't discount that as a possibility. But, right, it was not a categorical statement.

Q Why didn't the Americans come back and say, well, you say this about Banja Luka, what about the rest of it?

MR. BURNS: I'm sure we did. I'm sure we represented a very strong view. We're dealing with two separate governments here who are conducting military operations. We don't have complete control over -- we don't have any control over -- those operations.

Q They didn't come back and say, "No, we're not giving you a commitment not to go forward in other areas besides Banja Luka?"

MR. BURNS: I don't believe that such a commitment was made; no.

Q So what you see is, you see a slowing down -- some evidence of a slowing-down, but you don't have a commitment?

MR. BURNS: I think what we need to do now is hope that military operations will be suspended based on the talks we've had this morning and what we've seen on the ground. The people who can best verify that will be the U.N. personnel who are stationed throughout Bosnia. It's really to them to verify that, in fact, this is the case. That is one of the challenges for the next 24 hours -- to continue to use United States and Western influence to convince these parties to stop fighting.

The other imperative is to work through the U.N. and NATO to see a complete and verifiable withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone. So they're twin imperatives for us now over the next 24 hours. It's a critical period.

It's a period during which the prospects for peace may dim or they may brighten. We hope very much they'll brighten. Because after all of the work of the last couple of weeks by the United States, after all the work that Dick Holbrooke has been engaged in, for the parties now to take steps that would block peace or be negative factors in the road to peace would be highly irresponsible. It's time for all parties, led by the Bosnian Serbs, but certainly including Bosnia and Croatia, to understand that there are consequences from these actions.

Q Just to clarify before a filing break. You're using terms like "we're led to believe," "indicated." Can you say that the Bosnian and Croatian Presidents committed to Dick Holbrooke that they would stop their offensive?

MR. BURNS: I'm trying to be as accurate and as direct and as honest with you as I can.

What I don't have is a memorandum of the conversation from the meeting. I don't have a detailed line-by-line description of the conversation. What I have is a sense of the meeting, a very clear sense of the meeting, from a senior American who was in the room. I have not been able nor has anyone else in this city been able to speak to Dick Holbrooke for a couple of hours.

So I have chosen to give you this because I think it is a very clear indication of what we think happened at this meeting.

We also think this is a critical time for peace. It's a testing period for peace, and the parties -- all of them -- have to stand up and meet that test. Because we haven't had in four years in the Balkans such a good opportunity for peace and all of them must now grasp it.

Q A filing break.

MR. BURNS: Okay. The wires have called for a filing break, so we'll continue the briefing. But just duly note that they're taking a filing break.

Why don't we stay on Bosnia. Then we'll go back to the Iranian plane.

Q Can you confirm that the Croatians have crossed into Bosnian territory and taken towns back from the Serbs in Bosnia?

MR. BURNS: Roy, we have seen those reports that the Croatian Government has crossed the border and is now involved in offensive military operations. The United States does not have people on the ground in these areas. We have a few diplomats -- as you know, a very small mission -- in Sarajevo.

We can not independently confirm these reports. The United Nations is seeking to confirm them.

Q Well, is there any objection if Croatia is sending forces across the international boundary?

MR. BURNS: Certainly, I think, Roy, the United States has spoken loudly, and we have spoken clearly, over the last couple of days -- as have a number of our European allies. We and the Contact Group believe that all parties must cease their military operations, cease the fighting and turn towards peace.

Q This is a (inaudible) of the war, certainly, if Croatia is sending regular forces with their own shoulder patches into Bosnia. I mean you're sort of taking this as just another development among many.

MR. BURNS: Roy, I cannot independently -- the United States Government cannot independently confirm the events to which you refer. Therefore, I don't want to give it an official nature in terms of my response. But I can say directly to you and to everyone else that we think that the worst possible turn of events would be an escalation of the fighting, a broadening of the fighting, just at a time when the stranglehold on Sarajevo may be broken, when humanitarian goods are now flowing into Sarajevo, when we have a chance to deliver the people of Sarajevo from the heavy weapons of the Bosnian Serbs.

The United States will not be a party to an escalation of the fighting. We want to see the parties choose peace and not a continuation of warfare.

Q Isn't this an escalation of the fighting?

MR. BURNS: We have certainly seen an escalation of the fighting. So in response to your question and a number of others, what I am saying on behalf of our Government is that we don't favor an escalation of the fighting, a broadening of the conflict, a further resort to fighting after four years -- which has been fruitless.

Q In addition, a member of President Tudjman's government said the other day that the Croats do not want Serb forces, do not want a Serb territory, on their southern border -- which has great implications, well beyond just the Banja Luka area, really, suggests another collapse of the Republic of (inaudible).

Now, have you commented on that? This is -- I forget that fellow's name -- Mitchelich, or something like that.

MR. BURNS: I don't believe we have commented on it. Our comments are going to be directed towards the negotiations. There was a successful Geneva meeting on September 8, which provided the foundations for future negotiations among the parties, and the United States believes that Bosnia-Herzegovina must survive as an independent nation state.

There will probably be two entities in that. One of them would be a Serb entity.

We are not going to provide a detailed blueprint for the resolution of the many constitutional and political problems that will assuredly surface in those negotiations.

Q Nick, do you have any comment -- Ambassador Holbrooke told President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic that continued military operations would have an impact on NATO airstrikes?

MR. BURNS: I don't know if Ambassador Holbrooke raised the issue in that manner.

The United States has not resorted to threats over the course of the past seven or eight days, as we have seen the Bosnian and Croatian offensive proceed. We are trying to use our political influence with both of these governments to convince them that the time has come to choose peace after so many years of war, but I don't want the impression given that that's all we've done over the last seven or eight days -- that is, talk to the Bosnians and the Croats.

We're talking also to the Serbian Government about the necessity for the Bosnian Serbs now to meet the terms of the agreement that was voluntarily and unilaterally offered last Thursday and Friday and accepted by NATO.

I think in addition to a focus on central Bosnia, the world needs to turn its attention to Sarajevo over the next 24 hours to ensure a complete withdrawal of the heavy weapons.

Q In that connection, could you go over one more time exactly what is a heavy weapon that has to be removed?

MR. BURNS: Certainly. Under the terms --

Q In the view of the United States?

MR. BURNS: Yes, in the view of the United States -- but I believe in the view of General Janvier, and I also know from Ambassador Holbrooke it's President Milosevic's view -- that any heavy weapon equal to or greater than 82 millimeters must be withdrawn from the Sarajevo exclusion zone by midnight tomorrow night. That is the l44th hour of the agreement that was offered to the West, and to the United Nations and NATO, by the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs.

Q Eighty-two millimeters or larger is mortars and such weapons, is it not? And am I not right that artillery of l00 millimeters or larger is to be removed --

MR. BURNS: Absolutely.

Q -- and that antiaircraft guns are not covered?

MR. BURNS: David, I'm just trying to stick closely here to the written agreement as it was offered and accepted, and it refers to all heavy weapons -- all heavy weapons equal to or greater than 82 millimeters.

Now, I think the distinction that we would like to put on this is that there has to be absolute and complete compliance with this provision.

In addition to that, the Bosnian Serbs have offered to cease offensive military operations in and around Sarajevo. Until this date, until this hour, they have largely complied with that. There have been a few incidents. Needless to say, David, there will be some Bosnian Serb weapons left in the exclusion zone after tomorrow night even with complete compliance and verification.

There is no possibility for the Bosnian Serbs to use those weapons. NATO has made it completely and abundantly clear that we will return to our own use of military power should those remaining weapons be used.

Q I'm sorry. A hundred millimeter artillery, or is it 82- millimeter artillery that have to be removed?

MR. BURNS: It starts at 82. It includes 82 and encompasses all weapons that also exceed 82 millimeters in strength and in size. So that would cover any heavy weapon above that range -- above that mark.

Q I ask because I've seen the written document and that isn't what it says exactly. It says "artillery" -- it says "82-millimeter heavy weapons except for artillery," which can be 100 millimeters or more.

MR. BURNS: I've also seen the agreement. I'll have to go back and check the agreement, but that's my understanding of the agreement.

Q Anti-aircraft guns are covered?

MR. BURNS: That's my impression.

Q Despite reports to the contrary?

MR. BURNS: All heavy weapons, which would, of course, include anti-aircraft which are of great concern not only to the Bosnian Government and the citizens of Sarajevo but to NATO.

Q (Inaudible) up until now?

MR. BURNS: The United Nations is the best source. The French military component of UNPROFOR has played the largest role, I think, in actually verifying on the spot the withdrawal of the heavy weapons. Yesterday was 150. I understand from NATO AFSOUTH today in Naples that there was a report that further withdrawals were made today. They have a ways to go because we think the total number of heavy weapons that would meet the category that we've just been discussing would be far greater than 150.

We know what the weapons are. We think we have a very good idea of where they are, and so we're watching very closely -- NATO and the United Nations are watching.

Q Nick, do you have any comment or reaction to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, that he's calling for the removal of U.S., or rather United Nations forces from Bosnia even if the peace agreement was not completed?

MR. BURNS: The United States fully expects that the United Nations will meet its commitments and its responsibilities and will remain in Bosnia for the foreseeable future -- certainly, during this transitional period as we try to convince the parties to move towards peace. If the parties are able to get to a peace conference, if they're able to work out an agreement at a peace conference, then NATO and others in the international community will have to turn to the question of how you implement such a peace, how you safeguard it, and what kind of international military presence you would need.

If at that point the United Nations chooses to withdraw the UNPROFOR contingents, then, of course, NATO and others in the international community, including Russia, would have to decide together what kind of force will then be produced to replace it. So we fully understand the nature of the Secretary General's comments. We have no argument with them.

But I don't want to leave you with the impression that our reading of it is that the United Nations will be leaving any time soon. In fact, the United Nations has a major responsibility during this period - - today and tomorrow and for the next couple of weeks and months -- to try to ensure stability as the parties move to a peace conference. Since we don't minimize the difficulty of a peace conference, we think it's going to be a long process to get to a final peace settlement in Bosnia wherein the United Nations will be a very important factor.

Q What motivated Secretary General Boutros Ghali to make this request or suggestion at this juncture?

MR. BURNS: I'd have to refer you to the United Nations for analysis of why the statement was made. We are in close contact with the Secretary General and his advisors. We'll continue to discuss these issues with him.

Steve.

Q On behalf of Barry Schweid who had leave, he's wondering -- if I've got his question correct -- statements from officials, including the Secretary of State, that United States participation in any future peacekeeping mission might be significantly lower than that number of 25,000 that had been mentioned right along. Can you comment on that? Is that a fact or not?

MR. BURNS: The United States has said for a long time -- even in the darkest hours and days of the war when it looked like the situation would never turn toward a peace conference -- that should peace break out, the United States would certainly contribute its military forces to a peace implementation body.

All sorts of figures have been thrown around by people in this government and by people outside the government as to how large a force that would have to be.

There have been various contingency plans drawn up. The most direct thing we can say about that question, Steve, is, you can't answer the question of how many soldiers you'll need to police a peace until you see the dimensions of the peace.

What will be the requirements of a military force to ensure a peace? Where will that force be deployed? Will the force be used to separate armies? Will it be used to patrol cities? Once we have a peace agreement and once the parties and the intermediaries -- the Contact Group -- do an agreement, settle on those questions, then you can design a military force to implement it. So it's certainly not possible to say 25 or 15 or 10.

We would hope, obviously, that we could produce a situation in which the lowest number -- the fewest number of troops were possible, as Secretary Christopher indicated yesterday in his discussion with USA Today. We simply don't know, as the Secretary also said, what that number will be. We can't forecast it right now.

Q To follow up on that. Doesn't the most recent offensive in the northwest of the country make it likely, if that offensive holds on to the ground which it has taken, doesn't that make it likely that the United States and the overall peacekeeping force would not need to be as large as once envisioned?

MR. BURNS: We hope that would be the case, as Secretary Christopher said yesterday. We just don't know for sure what the absolute and ultimate requirements of this will be. It's a question that cannot be answered honestly on September 19.

Q By that logic, in fact, wouldn't it more advantageous to the United States if the Bosnian Government restored authority to its entire territory? Therefore, you wouldn't need peacekeeping forces except on an international frontier?

MR. BURNS: In a perfect world, there wouldn't have been a war, and the country would be intact and no one would have been killed. The fact is that there have been four years of war. For one side now to turn that situation around where they absolutely control every meter of the country I think is an illusion.

The Bosnian Serbs, in our estimation, retain a substantial capacity to fight back. We are not going to be a party to publicly or privately encourage any faction to continue fighting in a situation where we think there is a rough equilibrium among the forces. That's why we are arguing for a peace conference.

Q What, in fact, is the latest division of control as far as you understand it? Is it 50/50 now?

MR. BURNS: It's hard to say. Certainly, if you take a benchmark of 70/30 from, say, the high water mark of the Bosnian Serb military offensive after Srebrenica and Zepa in mid-July, that has certainly been reduced. There are all sorts of wildly varying figures. It looks now to be roughly 50/50 but that is not a scientific estimate. We have not produced one here. That's a guess.

Q On Banja Luka also, Foreign Minister Sacribey said yesterday, I think, that they don't intend to attack Banja Luka but just to surround it and that they would like to have a new government in Banja Luka to deal with. I think they asked the British to assist in trying to find some other negotiating partners.

Have they asked the United States to do the same? Do you or Mr. Holbrooke have a view on whether this is a good way to proceed?

MR. BURNS: I'm not aware that they have asked us specifically to participate in this proposal. I understand that Foreign Minister Sacribey has talked about this publicly.

We are not going to get into the business on a city-by-city or town-by-town basis deciding whether we think one side should keep it and the other side should not. We are going to argue very broadly for a resort here to peace.

Q New topic, Nick. Have we exhausted this?

MR. BURNS: I think we have. But I can't ultimately answer that question.

Q May I ask another topic, please?

MR. BURNS: Sure.

Q Nick, one more.

MR. BURNS: One more from Russ.

Q You said in your own words that this is a critical moment. Is Dick Holbrooke coming back to Washington tonight, or has he got another round of talks out there?

MR. BURNS: Ambassador Holbrooke will be returning to the U.S. either very late this evening or early tomorrow morning, our time. He has done an admirable job. He's been on the road pretty much for three- and-a-half weeks. He's witnessed tragedies -- personal tragedies for him and for the rest of us. He's also witnessed some fairly important breakthroughs for peace.

He's coming back for a couple of days. He will be talking with the Secretary and others here. Our Ambassadors in the region -- Ambassador- designate Menzies and Ambassador Galbraith, as well as (Chief of Mission) Rudy Perina in Belgrade -- will remain very active on a daily basis on this.

Q One more question -- if you would pardon the cynicism this question implies, but despite public comments to the contrary, there seems to be a large circumstantial case that one could make that Holbrooke's most recent visit to Zagreb was to tell the Bosnians and the Croatians that "That yellow light, in case you hadn't noticed, just turned red" on this offensive.

MR. BURNS: That question didn't seem out of the ordinary (laughter) for this group, Steve. It seemed a perfectly natural and normal question.

I think that to engage in "red light," "yellow light," "amber light," "green light" is not helpful. It's too broad and too general. I'd rather be a lot more specific, and let me be specific.

The United States does not favor the continuation of any offensive military operations anywhere in Bosnia by any party to the conflict -- Bosnian, Croatian, or Bosnian Serb. We think it is an illusion to believe that the tide of the war can be turned completely in favor of one side or another.

All that will result in the process is that more people will be killed, more people will lose their homes and become refugees, more bloodshed, more suffering. We're not going to be a party to encouraging that.

What we're trying to encourage is peace. That's what the United States has led over the last couple of weeks -- a peace effort -- and we're going to continue it.

Q In your search for that end, Nick, you've addressed the political leverage which the United States used. I don't know if "leverage" was the right term but "influence" maybe. Did Ambassador Holbrooke mention economic leverage at all, in the coming days when you foresee peace, if they did not stop?

MR. BURNS: I don't believe that we have threatened countries with which we have good relations -- Bosnia and Croatia. I don't believe we've threatened them. I know that we've talked to them in a mature way, as you expect friends to talk to each other.

Q New topic?

MR. BURNS: We're still on Bosnia. It wouldn't surprise me if we go another l0 or l5 minutes, but it's okay.

Q It sounds like there's a lot of wringing of hands here. It's sort of like a public wringing of hands, but you're really not doing anything to stop this offensive. That's the way it looks of course.

MR. BURNS: I would just ask in response: "What would you have us do?" Would you have us send in the 82nd Airborne? Would you have us resort to economic sanctions? Would you have us withdraw the diplomatic initiative?

Look, we are in the lead and have intensively pushed a peace process which is succeeding. It's succeeding in at least moving the parties towards peace.

The United States does not have the capability to turn things on and off in the Balkans. If we had that capability, then there wouldn't have been a war four years ago.

We do influence, but we don't have absolute influence; and it's not our responsibility to stop the fighting. That's the responsibility of the parties.

Q But isn't the plan of Geneva, just ten days old now -- really, isn't it overtaken by events and by trends?

MR. BURNS: No. None of the parties have in any way questioned the fact that all of them have signed on to an agreement that there will be certain principles that will be the foundation of the peace process.

Q Have they even signed this, though?

MR. BURNS: Pardon? I said "signed on" to an agreement --

Q Signed on.

MR. BURNS: But these are commitments made by the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of three countries. We take those commitments seriously, and we certainly expect that they will be adhered to and that there will be a continuation of the peace process. That's where we'll put our emphasis here.

Q New topic?

[...]

(The briefing concluded at 2:l0 p.m.)

END