U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/08/07 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/08/07 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Croatian Offensive .....................................12-13,15

--Impact on Negotiations ...............................9-10

Mr. Carl Bildt's Work in Region ........................10

U.S. Technical Support to Croatian Gov't. ..............10-11,13-14

President Yeltsin's Proposal for Tudjman/Milosevic

  Talks ................................................11-12

Humanitarian/Refugee Situation .........................12

Possibility of Bosnian-Moslem/Croatian Alliance ........11-13

Report of Karadzic/Mladic Split ........................13

U.S. Condemnation of Mistreatment/Killings of

  UN Peacekeepers ......................................14-15

Possibility of Bosnian-Serb Retaliation ................15

[...]

[...]

Q Yes, sir. Pentagon, White House, State Department officials -- senior officials in all places -- are speaking hopefully of the Croatian victory in Croatia against Serbs as possibly foreshadowing a diplomatic opportunity to settle the war in Bosnia.

Would you mind getting into the rationale of that type of semi- prediction we're getting from Christopher and McCurry, the President, I believe, Pentagon, I believe. What is it? Is it that it would not be as -- they would not press their initiative against Bihac or what?

MR. JOHNSON: I'm not sure I agree with everything you've laid out --

Q Well, maybe --

MR. JOHNSON: -- in your thesis, but I think what we're recognizing is that the change in the situation on the ground holds the possibility of producing the type of new dynamic where negotiations could bear fruit. We've made clear ever since I've been involved in this, and I'm sure in years before, that we believe that the only lasting solution is going to come through a negotiated process.

It's our hope that the changed situation on the ground and the new dynamic it introduces could play a role in making those negotiations more productive.

Q That's really my question. How? Last week Administration officials were sending a message of caution to the Croatians up there, saying that they're anxious -- the U.S. is anxious that this war could spread if they took the offensive.

Now they have taken the offensive, and somehow you folks see a silver lining. So I'm trying to understand not so much the change in tone, but what is it that you think has possibilities for new dynamics - - that the Serbs will get tired, that they will take this defeat to heart and sit down and negotiate? I don't get it.

Q Let me back you up a little bit. Last week we were saying and we did say, up until the moment this offensive started, that we did not think it was a good idea; that we thought that the best solution was at the negotiating table. We had our Ambassador in Zagreb out working very hard -- and I'm sure that you wrote about -- your wire services and on television made a number of reports of that.

But it's also clear that the recalcitrant negotiating partner throughout all of this -- the group that did not accept the Contact Group Map and Plan -- was the Bosnian Serbs. If this situation on the ground induces changes of heart which allow fruitful negotiations to go forward, that is where the hope lies. It's that -- it's a hope; it's not a prediction, and it's based on a new dynamic. It's not a result of this. We didn't favor this outcome on the ground. We didn't favor this offensive on the part of the Croatian Government, but it's a reality that we've had to deal with now, and we're hoping that we can turn it to an advantage at the negotiating table.

Q Can I ask you just -- and I'll drop it -- where Mr. Bildt is now or where does the process stand now, do you know? He was going to Belgrade last we heard, but planning stops in other capitals and checking back with you folks.

MR. JOHNSON: I believe he is continuing his work in the region, and it's not just in the capitals of the Contact Group that he has to do his work. It's also in Belgrade and in Zagreb and in Sarajevo where any plan that he might develop further and finally get adopted is going to have to be acceptable to all the parties concerned.

We continue to work with him and hope that his plan can bear fruit. He's continuing those efforts to try to build an equitable package that can be supported by all the sides in the conflict, but exactly where he is physically located at this moment, I do not know.

Q David, you said the United States Government didn't favor this outcome on the ground. The Bosnian Serbs are saying, however, that there are some Americans in the guise of technical advisers or whatever who in fact did play a role in the military action that took place in the last three or four days.

Were there any official Americans involved on the side of the Croatians?

MR. JOHNSON: There are no official Americans. What one could be referring to there is some technical support being provided to the Croatian Government in helping them establish a military that functions in a civil society; that does things like report to civil authority and is a functioning military that observes the rules of conflict. But we in no way provided any technical or strategic advice or planning that was part of this offensive.

Q David, Yeltsin has said that he is trying to get Tudjman and Milosevic into talks. Are we being kept up to date by the Russians on his efforts?

MR. JOHNSON: We have had conversations with the Russians. We are in the process of learning more about the details of what President Yeltsin proposes to put forward. We hope to learn more of those details before we give you a fuller reaction to how that might play a role in a negotiated solution.

Q Is Mr. Bildt being tied into this particular --

MR. JOHNSON: I am not aware of how he is being tied in. I wouldn't exclude that, but I don't have anything to tie him in specifically for you.

Q When do you expect to have more information on this?

MR. JOHNSON: I wouldn't expect to have more during the balance of the business day. I hope to have some more information tomorrow.

Q David, one of the biggest problems has been the splits in the conflicts between the Bosnians and the Croatians throughout the years, since both were subject to Serb aggression and individually they really couldn't put up any kind of a force, but together they could do something, as was proven in the recent offensive.

The real question is how stable is that unity now? There are a lot of rumors going on, a lot of stories in the European press about a special deal that's been made between Milosevic and Tudjman. Yeltsin invited both Milosevic and Tudjman to Moscow. What is the U.S. impression? Is this thing going to hold, or are there potential splits which can create further conflicts down the road?

MR. JOHNSON: I'm not going to be able to be a crystal ball gazer for you. We worked very hard to try to put the Federation together, and we've worked hard since then in a number of ways to try to keep it intact. I'm not going to speculate about what type of pressures might be on it. We think it's been a successful diplomatic outcome that we are pleased to have played a part in bringing into play, but I'm not in a position to try to tell you what sort of pressures might be on it in the future.

Q I want to ask about Colombia for a minute.

MR. JOHNSON: Let's do Bosnia and then we'll change to other subjects.

Q Can you give us a readout on the humanitarian situation on the ground now with this exodus of new refugees?

MR. JOHNSON: The reports I have on that are based on reports from the U.N. High Commission on Refugees and Mrs. Ogata's people on the ground there. They're anticipating as many as 150,000 ethnic Serbs from Croatia could flee their homes in response to the Croatian military offensive. Most of those are believed to be heading toward the Serb- held towns of Banja Luka and Prijedor in northern Bosnia.

UNHCR estimates that 30,000 Serbs have already arrived in Banja Luka. An additional 60,000 displaced persons from Sector North and 30,000 from Sector South are also expected. UNHCR is concerned that the refugee influx will force the estimated 67,000 non-Serbs living in Banja Luka to evacuate.

For that reason, the U.N. is sending monitors to the area to check on that, as well as issues such as human rights abuses against the Croats and Muslims who might remain in the area.

Both UNHCR and ICRC have stocks of food and emergency supplies in Banja Luka, and in addition to that a 13-truck UNHCR convoy is en route to the area from Belgrade.

There are reports that another 20-30,000 refugees are reported to be waiting to get into Serbia, but we don't have anything to confirm that.

Q Is it the sense of this Department that the offensive is over?

MR. JOHNSON: I don't have anything that says it in quite that way. Most of the territory that was held by the Krajina Serbs has been retaken except for the Sector East. So one could draw that conclusion, but I'm not in a position to do so.

Q David, going back again to your statement that the United States favored neither side, but isn't an alliance between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croatians a logical outcome of the Federation that this United States Government promoted so heavily?

MR. JOHNSON: It could be one of a number of outcomes. I don't profess to predict that future for you.

Q Well, wasn't that one of the purposes of it -- to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs because of the potential threat from an alliance between the Croatians and the Muslims?

MR. JOHNSON: The purpose of it was to enable the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats and the Croatians to cease their hostilities against one another and to work together to try to build a more stable situation.

Q And that happened.

MR. JOHNSON: And it has.

Q Do you have any information on the split between Ratko Mladic and Karadzic, and what that portends?

MR. JOHNSON: I have the same facts that you do, and the fact that there is no love lost between them, it is not sadness, I believe.

Q It's not sadness on your part.

Q David, can I ask -- Jim before you spoke of -- so badly phrased now but just to be succinct about it -- this program to teach democracy to the Croatian military. What program is that part of, and is it being done -- is something comparable being done elsewhere in the Balkans or in Eastern Europe or whatever? How did it just happen? I mean, did it just happen?

MR. JOHNSON: I'll look into any comparables for you. It's a commercial licensed transaction between some consultants here in the United States and the Croatian military.

Q Private consultants, with U.S. approval?

MR. JOHNSON: It's a licensed transaction.

Q Okay. What kind of -- I'm not sure I understand. They're selling democracy?

MR. JOHNSON: Purchase of services --

Q You mean --

MR. JOHNSON: -- in terms of how one organizes a military in a democracy. How one responds to civilian control. How one organizes oneself so that one respects the rights of non-combatants -- those types of issues that we were interested in a military that would be working that area knowing about.

Q And they would teach Croatian soldiers how to treat civilians humanely is the idea?

MR. JOHNSON: That was the goal.

Q Do they have any other talents, teaching them how to treat combatants, perhaps not so humanely? I mean, like point in that direction and maybe you'll hit something? Don't aim at the school, aim at the ammunition depot. Are they part of the Croatian military structure?

MR. JOHNSON: I wouldn't call them part of the Croatian military structure. I'd call them a service that the Croatians have purchased in terms of advice on how to organize their military, and our interest in it was how to organize a military so that it functions in a democratic state.

Q Is there any other company that has a like contract -- licensed contract?

MR. JOHNSON: To?

Q Between Croatia and this country?

MR. JOHNSON: I simply don't know. I couldn't exclude that, but I don't know it to be the case.

Q Could you look in?

MR. JOHNSON: I will do my best.

Q Can you give a preliminary tally or score card how the Croatians have behaved so far as your repeated appeals last week for treating civilians humanely? I know you spoke of the refugee flow and all. What's their performance so far --

MR. JOHNSON: We don't have people on the ground there to assess that, so it's not something I'm in a position to give you. I can tell you we are very disappointed, and we have condemned both publicly ourselves and in concert with others at the U.N. the reported treatment of a number of U.N. peacekeepers who were reportedly used as "human shields." We've also condemned the deaths of I believe four peacekeepers during this action.

We saw no reason for that, and we have asked that the Croatian military investigate those deaths as well as the mistreatment of other U.N. peacekeepers, and we're looking for a public report on that and for prosecution and punishment of any of those who are involved in treating them wrongly.

Q David, two military questions. Back to the point that you had made on Krajina. Have the Croatian Government informed the U.N., NATO or this country, Mr. Galbraith, of any further actions -- military actions or objectives within the Krajina, within their own borders?

MR. JOHNSON: I'm unaware of any knowledge we might have of any further objectives that they are going to pursue.

Q And, secondly, are we aware by the means of intelligence from any source of the Bosnian Serbs or the Krajina Serbs retaliating, countering any actions that have been taken by the Croatians or any other actions they might in Bosnia?

MR. JOHNSON: I don't have anything for you on anything related to that. Are we finished with Bosnia, and would we like to go to Colombia for a while?

(The briefing concluded at l:27 p.m.)

END