U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/06/23 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

From: Thanos Tsekouras <thanost@MIT.EDU>

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

War in Bosnia

--Rapid Reaction Force: Funding; Mandate; Letter from

   Mr. Akashi to Mr. Karadzic; Amb. Albright's Statement .9-14

--Allegation/Statement re: UN/French/Serb Negotiations ...11-12

--Read-out of Russian Ambassador Churkin's Talks .........24-25

[...]

TURKEY

PKK Terrorism ............................................20-21

Gov't. Recommendation for Extension of Mandate for

  Operation Provide Comfort ..............................21

SYRIA

Report of Syria-Greek Agreement re: Use of Syrian Bases ..21

[...]

[...]

Q Can you say anything additional today about the ground rules governing the Rapid Reaction Force and the possibility of a U.S. contribution to financing that force?

MR. BURNS: I don't have anything new to offer today on that subject, George. We went into that exhaustively yesterday. We are continuing to examine -- on the issue of funding -- with the United States Congress, how the United States might contribute the Rapid Reaction Force.

We support the Force. We want to be able to help bring it into being very quickly. Yesterday, I discussed one possible option that we are pursuing. That is, the creation of a voluntary fund that would be comprised of financial contributions and military equipment that we have offered to the major troop-contributing countries.

We do not yet have cost figures for what the expenses will be to field a Rapid Reaction Force for the next six months, which is the way the costs are being assessed. As soon as we're able to get a detailed cost figure, then we'll be able to assess what the proper contribution from the United States will be.

On the mandate of the Force, we talked about this yesterday. I think you might have noted some comments made by Ambassador Madeleine Albright last evening about the letter that was sent by Mr. Akashi to the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale.

We would be most concerned if the letter were taken to mean that the Rapid Reaction Force is more of the same for the United Nations in Bosnia. As you know, our view is that the United Nations should remain, but it is at this point a flawed operation and it needs to be strengthened.

Our understanding is that the Rapid Reaction Force is intended to help UNPROFOR defend itself and to do its job better, which means making UNPROFOR able to respond expeditiously and forcibly to those who threaten it and its mission. We want UNPROFOR to be stronger and more effective.

So, in this sense, Ambassador Albright felt the proper course was to convey this notion to the U.N. Secretary General, which she has done, and also to make these concerns public.

Q Nick, do you have a copy of the Akashi letter?

MR. BURNS: We do have a copy of the Akashi letter. We did not have a copy until late yesterday afternoon. We had been seeking a copy of the letter. We were able to get it from the United Nations in New York late yesterday afternoon. We were able to examine it. And it was on that basis that Ambassador Albright and the Department decided to make some public comments late last evening about our view of that particular letter.

Q Can you make it public?

MR. BURNS: That's not really for us to say. This is a letter of the United Nations from a U.N. official. It's not our letter. It's a letter that was given to us on an informational basis, so I'd really direct that question to the United Nations.

Q Could you at least say what section of it concerned you the most?

MR. BURNS: I'll be glad just to go through, in a little bit more detail, our views on this particular letter. I think you know that Mr. Akashi, the Secretary General's Special Representative, wrote to the Pale Serb leader, Mr. Karadzic, about the mission of the Rapid Reaction Force that was authorized last week by the U.N. Security Council.

The letter seeks to assure Mr. Karadzic that the Rapid Reaction Force will not change UNPROFOR's essential peacekeeping mission. We would be concerned if the letter were taken to mean,.as I said previously, that this would essentially mean more of the same for the U.N. operations in Bosnia.

Our understanding is that this force is intended to strengthen UNPROFOR which was not the sense that we got from reading this letter.

We have been consulting very closely with the major troop- contributing states -- the British, the French, and the Dutch. Ambassador Albright has had a series of meetings this week. Secretary Christopher has been involved in discussions as have other senior officials of the State Department.

As Ambassador Albright indicated in her statement, the method, the timing, and the substance of this letter are highly inappropriate. The Council's advice should have been sought before this letter was sent. Those views have been expressed directly to the Secretary General as well as to other members of the Security Council.

Q Some media reports believe this letter was part of a larger campaign by the French -- a secret campaign to win the release of the U.N. hostages. Have you discussed the reports of the so-called secret negotiations between the French and the U.N. and Serbs? Are you concerned about it? Is it true? Is it real, etc.?

MR. BURNS: We have been assured by the French Government that no such negotiations took place and no deal was made.

I would direct you to the French Foreign Ministry Spokesman's comments this morning on this issue. I believe it's out in the wires where he categorically rejects the notion that France engaged in this type of action.

I would also refer you to Mr. Akashi, who has said publicly that is also the case from the U.N. point of view.

Q Your understanding is that the French commander there did not meet privately with his Bosnian Serb counterparts?

MR. BURNS: I think you'll have to direct your questions on this to the French Government. I cannot be responsible for answering questions about who met who when the United States Government was clearly not involved.

There is an authoritative and very clear statement this morning from the French Foreign Ministry on this particular issue.

Q But do you believe it?

MR. BURNS: We certainly have full faith and trust in the word of the French Government.

Q Do you have full faith and trust in the word of Mr. Akashi?

MR. BURNS: Sid, I'm not sure this line of questioning is entirely appropriate. I think we've been on record on this time and again, and I would just refer you to what I said the other day. I would direct that question to Mr. Akashi.

Q Ambassador Albright's statement was a written statement; this was not spoken somewhere; it was a written statement?

MR. BURNS: Ambassador Albright had to travel last evening to Chicago. She worked out a statement with some other officials here in the Department that she wanted to issue because she had the lead, of course, in the discussions in the Security Council on this issue. That was conveyed to some news organizations last evening by the Department.

Q Nick, to follow up somewhat on Sid's most recent question. Is it the view of the U.S. Government that Mr. Akashi is still the man to carry the U.N.'s views -- best carry them -- in Bosnia even if UNPROFOR is strengthened, according to U.S. wishes?

MR. BURNS: We certainly want UNPROFOR to be strengthened. We are working closely with the United Nations to that effect.

I would just note that Mr. Akashi was appointed by the U.N. Secretary General. Therefore, it's really not appropriate for me to comment on that particular appointment. It's really up to the Secretary General to make these decisions as to who will serve him in the field.

Q But it's appropriate for the U.S. to have a view?

MR. BURNS: The U.S. has views on many issues. Sometimes we make our views public and sometimes we keep them private.

Q Nick, should the U.N. -- should Akashi withdraw the letter?

MR. BURNS: Our feeling is that there should have been a discussion in the Security Council among the major contributors to UNPROFOR before this letter was sent. The United States is a major contributor to UNPROFOR. We're the major the financier of UNPROFOR. We are deeply involved in UNPROFOR's operation. We have clear and strong views on the mandate of the Rapid Reaction Force and on UNPROFOR's mandate.

We think this letter, in many ways, is inconsistent with our own understanding of that mandate. It would have been entirely appropriate and reasonable for the Security Council to have had a chance to look at any proposals or any explanations of this Force that were being sent to the Pale Serb leadership. That did not take place, and that is at the root of our displeasure about this particular incident.

Q So what should be done to correct that displeasure?

MR. BURNS: The United States is going to follow up in the Security Council to make our views known, not only to our fellow members of the Security Council but also to the U.N. leadership itself. That process started yesterday when we had an opportunity to examine the letter.

Q Let me try that question a little differently. Should Akashi be reprimanded or removed from his position?

MR. BURNS: I just have no comment on that, Carol. It's not in my domain to make that determination. I don't believe that determination has been made.

Q But certainly you're not giving him a vote of confidence?

MR. BURNS: Carol, Mr. Akashi works for the U.N. Secretary General. It is simply not appropriate for me to comment publicly on his status.

Q Nick, might it not be the case, however, that what Akashi said to Karadzic in his letter more closely mirrors what the British and French are now thinking about the mandate of this Rapid Reaction Force than what the United States would like for it to be?

MR. BURNS: I think there are two questions here, Steve. One is a very important question of process and one is a question of substance.

On the question of process, given the enormous importance of defining the mandate and agreeing on a mandate for the Rapid Reaction Force, it was simply unreasonable and ill-advised for this letter to be sent before there had been a clear discussion in the Security Council on that question. That's a question of process. But it also extends into the substance of the matter.

The United States has a very clear view that the addition of the Rapid Reaction Force to UNPROFOR should be designed to strengthen UNPROFOR, to make it better able to defend itself but also to carry out its missions. That's the clear view of the United States. We have made that view known to our allies.

Q You didn't answer the question. I'm saying, isn't it possible that what he said in his letter more closely mirrors what the participants in the Rapid Reaction Force feel about its mandate now than what the United States would like for it to be?

MR. BURNS: It's our view that we have not reached a conclusion in the Security Council about the mandate of the Rapid Reaction Force. Discussions continue with the Dutch, with the French, and with the British. Frankly, we are not hearing consistent views from all three countries about the specifics of the mandate. There are varying ideas that are being proposed privately as well as publicly.

We need to sort through those ideas and develop a common view of what the mandate is. Since we're in the middle of that process and have not reached the end of it, it therefore made little sense to send a letter from the United Nations to the Serb leadership defining what the mandate is.

[...]

Q In the last 15 days, at least 40 Turkish soldiers were killed by PKK terrorists. Immediately after this, six members of the Greek Parliament visited OPA. And the Turkish Government yesterday protested the thing officially to the Greek Government. What is your position on that?

MR. BURNS: I think you know our position; we've talked about this frequently and that is we support the decision by the Turkish Government to protect its citizens from terrorism, in this case specifically from PKK terrorism. There are problems within Turkey. There are problems in northern Iraq.

And while we're on the subject of northern Iraq, let me just reiterate our very strong support for the "Operation Provide Comfort." We understand that the Turkish Government has recommended to the Turkish Parliament that the mandate of "Provide Comfort II" be extended. We welcome that.

I would note that the Turkish Parliament has not yet voted on the extension, and while we cannot predict the actions of the Turkish Parliament, we nevertheless thank the Turkish Government for its recommendation to the Parliament. We believe it's a case for renewal of "Operation Provide Comfort II" remains overwhelmingly persuasive, and we hope the Turkish Parliament will again vote to extend this mandate.

Q Excuse me. Don't you have any comment on the Greeks' position?

MR. BURNS: On the Greeks' position?

Q Yes. Greece -- PKK.

MR. BURNS: I can't speak for six Greek citizens. I don't want to comment on the actions of six Greek citizens. The Greek Government, of course, is committed as a NATO ally to certain standards of conduct, and I have no reason to question the conduct of the Greek Government.

If it's a question of Greek citizens, then I would need to know more about who these people are, what they said, and what they did, and I don't have that information.

Q Nick, there was a suggestion here yesterday that Syria had agreed to allow the Greek air force to use their bases for something. Have you all -- has the Administration sought any clarification on that?

MR. BURNS: I don't have any information on that today, Sid. No information.

Q Is the Administration trying to seek some sort of clarification about it?

MR. BURNS: I think we agreed that we would look into the matter, yes.

[...]

Q Nick, do you have any readout on Ambassador Churkin --

MR. BURNS: Yes, I have a readout which is not, I think, comprehensive and is not detailed, but I think it might be helpful to you.

As you remember, Ambassador Churkin returned to Moscow the night before last. He met yesterday with the Contact Group Ambassadors, including Ambassador Tom Pickering.

He provided to the Contact Group Ambassadors a thorough readout of this talks in Belgrade and in Pale. It was clear from -- at least it's clear to us from his report that neither Mr. Milosevic nor Mr. Karadzic have altered their position on two of the key negotiating issues that are on the table. Specifically, it appears to us that Mr. Milosevic is still unwilling to accept anything short of a full lift of the sanctions rather than a partial suspension of the sanctions, which of course is the position of the Contact Group and strongly held position of the United States Government.

Secondly, Mr. Karadzic is still unwilling to accept as the basis for negotiations for peace in Bosnia the Contact Group Map and Plan. We are satisfied as a result of the briefing received yesterday that Ambassador Churkin's bilateral contacts were consistent with the Contact Group's efforts over the last couple of months. And certainly consistent with the agreement reached at the Contact Group Ministerial in Noordwijk, at which both Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Secretary Christopher participated.

As you know, membership in the Contact Group -- the Contact Group is an informal organization -- does not preclude bilateral contacts with parties to the conflict. Russia has now just finished a series of bilateral contacts. The United States has exercised this right. Ambassador Frasure did so recently on a number of occasions on behalf of our government.

The Russians described Ambassador Churkin's travels as a fact- finding mission and not as negotiation. Given the fact that we have received this briefing and that we understand what transpired, we're very thankful for it. We think it is one more indication that as we go through the transitional period in Bosnia, we must intensify the diplomatic talks.

There has got to be an effort to work both with Belgrade and Pale on these two negotiations that the Contact Group would like to engage in in an intensified way. But right now, as a result of these briefings, it does not appear that either Belgrade or Pale can contribute to any furthering of those negotiations. That is really a pity, and we hope very much that both will reconsider their decision.

Q Thank you.

MR. BURNS: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:37 p.m.)

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