U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (June 15, 1995)

From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (June 15, 1995)

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Report of Bosnian Gov't. Military Build-up ...............19

Involvement of Former President Jimmy Carter .............20-21

Secretary Christopher Mtgs. w/EU Negotiator Bildt ........21-24

U.S. Position on Conflict:

--Strengthening of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, Rapid Reaction Force,

  Political Efforts, Contact Group Map and Plan ..........21-25

Security Council Resolution on Rapid Reaction Force ......25

Reports of Serbian Assistance to Bosnian-Serb Military ...26

--Reports of Other Sanctions Violations: Cyprus, Russia ..26-27

[...]

Q Yes, thank you, Nick. It's been reported that Mr. -- well, we know Mr. Silajdzic took off in a hurry yesterday. I believe there's a nationwide alert in Bosnia, in the Muslim portion -- in the government portion of Bosnia. Mr. Sacirbey, I believe in Geneva, their Foreign Minister, said that the 50,000 -- that was what was reported a little while ago on the radio, a U.N. count of 50,000 -- Bosnian troops northwest of Sarajevo were there for offensive purposes to come against the Serbs. Mr. Silajdzic yesterday said that they were there for defensive purposes. What can you tell us about the up-to-date situation regarding the massing of troops and the intentions as far as we know?

MR. BURNS: We've certainly seen the reports, and we've been informed by members of the Bosnian Government that certainly there's a great deal of frustration on the part of the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian people with the current situation in Sarajevo and throughout Bosnia.

We've seen press reports about the supposed massing of troops north and northwest of Sarajevo. We know that this morning Bosnian Government forces shelled a Serb-held region approximately 12 miles north of Sarajevo; but U.N. observers, according to the reports that I have, are not characterizing this as the beginning of a major offensive or counter-offensive.

All I can tell you is that we are monitoring the situation closely. As late as the time when I came out here, we were not aware that any offensive was underway.

Q I have another question somewhat related. Ex-President Jimmy Carter yesterday said that he was interested, monitoring, up-to-date on the situation in Bosnia; would go, if invited by the Contact Group. What would the Department's reaction be to his becoming involved directly on the ground?

MR. BURNS: We have been in touch for a long time, many, many months, with former President Jimmy Carter about the situation in Bosnia. We keep him regularly apprised of our own thoughts and plans and our own analysis of the situation there. We certainly welcome that part of his testimony yesterday which emphasized the importance of a negotiated settlement as the basis of a resolution for the terrible conflict in Bosnia.

We do not agree with the suggestion that we should be prepared for unconditional talks with the Bosnian Serbs. As you know, it's long been the position of the Contact Group, including the United States, that the beginning of peace talks should be based upon the Contact Group map and plan. The refusal of the Pale Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs, to accept that map and plan as the beginning of talks, of course, has led to our policy of trying to isolate the Pale Serbs until they can decide that they're going to take this step.

As to any plans that former President Carter has, I would simply have to refer you to him. It's really his judgment to make as to whether or not he will become more actively involved in the negotiations there.

Q (Inaudible)

MR. BURNS: Still on Bosnia?

Q Yes. Just for the record, the State Department is against any such Bosnian military operations, right, with the aim of breaking through the siege of Sarajevo?

MR. BURNS: We had a very long discussion of this yesterday. I'd refer you to that discussion. I would be quite willing to say again, briefly, in answer to your question that we do not have a neutral, antiseptic view of the conflict in Bosnia.

We greatly support the Bosnian Government's attempts to achieve justice. We think that can best be achieved through negotiations. We have great sympathy for the plight of the Bosnian people, especially those people who are living in the enclaves in Sarajevo and other enclaves who are being deprived of the necessities of life and who have to live under bombardment.

It has been our feeling that there is not a military solution available to the Bosnian Government at the current time, and that we would strongly urge them to give negotiations a chance, to work with us as we try to convince both Belgrade and the Pale Serbs that negotiations ought to be the focus of the situation in Bosnia.

Secretary of State Christopher met last night with Carl Bildt, who is the new EU negotiator for the Bosnian conflict. They had an excellent discussion, a long discussion, about Mr. Bildt's plans to try to re-energize discussions. You've seen some comments from him this morning. The situation is very grim, and I think he has a quite realistic view of the situation.

We have resolved to work very closely with Mr. Bildt, both the United States Government and the Contact Group. We hope and expect that he will take part in meetings of the Contact Group at the political director level and at all levels, and we wish him well and will give him all of our support.

We think, as we go through the current week and look ahead to next week and the week after that, the appointment of Mr. Bildt, the fact that he will be making new efforts to try to achieve a political settlement, the effort by the French, U.K. and Dutch Governments to form a rapid reaction force -- all of these things we hope might coalesce into a situation where we can achieve our central objectives. Let me just repeat those for you.

We believe that UNPROFOR must stay in Bosnia. It has a role, a mission that is fundamental to the security of the people there. We believe that it should be strengthened, and that gets to our very clear, unequivocal support for the idea of a quick or rapid reaction force. We believe that that force can help make UNPROFOR more tenable and we hope more credible, and it can help UNPROFOR continue to stay as a presence in Bosnia. We believe that we need to contain the conflict in order to save lives.

Q Nick, does the deployment of the rapid reaction force at this point depend on the consent of the U.S. Congress?

MR. BURNS: Let me just talk about substance and procedure. In terms of the substance of the idea -- the idea that was discussed in great detail between President Chirac and President Clinton and Secretary Christopher yesterday -- we support the rapid reaction force. We support the French-U.K.-Dutch idea for all the reasons that I've just stated.

On the issue of the procedure of funding, which is a very important procedure -- I don't mean to belittle it by using that word, but it is a procedural question at this point -- senior officials of the Department are on the Hill right now consulting with senior members of the Congress about this issue. Since those negotiations are underway as we are meeting here, I don't think I want to get into the details of it. It's certainly a question that's got to be worked out with the Congress.

Q Nick, to follow that up, do American officials feel as though the understanding at the outset of the quick reaction force -- when it was announced -- on how it would be financed has been changed, and that whereas the United States would always supply support, equipment and personnel in the beginning, now we're being asked to pony up 30 percent of the overall cost?

MR. BURNS: As you know, in Noordwijk -- at the five-and-a-half hour Contact Group meeting in Noordwijk, I think, looking back on it, there may have been some misunderstanding of this particular question. But I think as a result of our recent discussions this week with all the governments involved, and particularly the French Government since President Chirac was here, I think we now have a clear understanding that it's their intention at least to go in a certain direction, and that is a U.N.-assessed direction.

This is a complicated question. It does involve the need for the Administration to consult with the Congress, and that's what we're doing this afternoon.

Charlie.

Q Can you explain a little more fully what Mr. Bildt brings to the table that isn't already there? I mean, why do we need another special negotiator to try and solve this problem?

MR. BURNS: He's not just another special negotiator. We have not added by one. He replaces Lord Owen, who was the European Union's negotiator.

Mr. Bildt is a very distinguished individual. We worked with him very closely last summer when Sweden and the United States, Germany and some other nations combined forces to convince the Russian Government to withdraw its troops from the Baltic countries. He's a very distinguished, capable person. He's very intelligent and very determined, and we certainly got a sense of that from the conversations the Secretary had with him last week. So I think his personal qualities that he brings to bear are quite impressive.

Secondly, the three European Union members of the Contact Group have decided -- two troop contributors have decided that UNPROFOR has got to remain in Bosnia and that it's got to be reinforced by a rapid reaction force.

That is all occurring now, and Mr. Bildt's appointment occurs simultaneously. What we're hoping for is that both a resuscitated and reinforced UNPROFOR might now continue in parallel with a reinvigorated political effort, led by Mr. Bildt, to see if we can make some breakthroughs on the political side. He has taken a great interest in Bob Frasure's discussions with Mr. Milosevic on the question of Serbia's possible recognition of Bosnia.

He also will be, of course, primarily responsible for the continued offer of the Contact Group map and plan as the basis for negotiations. He is off to a very good start. He has had good consultations with the Russian Government; very fine, excellent consultations yesterday with Secretary Christopher; and I believe today he's in New York for meetings with Ambassador Stoltenberg and I think tomorrow meetings with the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali. So he's doing the right things.

Obviously, his appointment takes place at a time of great difficulty and of real grimness, I think, in the situation in Bosnia -- in the status of the UNPROFOR forces themselves and the fact that hostages have been taken; the fact that the fighting has increased and the people who are affected, the civilians, find themselves in a much more dangerous environment.

What we're hoping is that the continuation of UNPROFOR and Mr. Bildt's appointment will both move us to higher ground and move us to a point where we can begin to make progress. I don't think anybody in this government, in our government, wants to predict success. We know that the situation has deteriorated quite badly over the last couple of weeks, and we know that there has now to be a concerted political effort to make progress. There's no guarantee for success, but it is certainly worth the effort, and we think he's a good person to make that effort, and he has our full support.

Q Nick, the way you describe it, it seems that whereas Lord Owen worked in partnership with Stoltenberg, Bildt will be almost a new member of the Contact Group and in fact will have a leading role within the Contact Group. Is that right?

MR. BURNS: I think from the conversation last night he certainly intends to work closely with Ambassador Stoltenberg. Secondly, the United States believes quite strongly that there has got to be very tight coordination, close coordination, between Mr. Bildt's efforts and those of the Contact Group. They are not synonymous efforts. Mr. Bildt is a representative of the European Union.

But what we'd like to see is Mr. Bildt participate in Contact Group meetings. That was not always the case with Lord Owen. We'd like to see very close diplomatic coordination, even on a daily basis, both with our experts here -- with Dick Holbrooke and Bob Frasure here -- with our Ambassadors overseas, wherever Mr. Bildt is traveling. He wants that as well, and he and Secretary Christopher agreed that they would be tightly in contact and tightly in focus.

He does not, however, have a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the United States, and you wouldn't expect that. The United States can alone represent its own interests. But as a member of the Contact Group, we look forward to close coordination with him.

Q Nick, back up to the Netherlands, the Contact Group, the misunderstanding. Was it the U.S. impression at The Hague that the French and British were going to pay for the rapid reaction force themselves?

MR. BURNS: Well, those were early days. (Laughter) The concept - --

Q (Inaudible) (Laughter)

MR. BURNS: It was the early -- that's right -- the early hours of one morning, as I remember it quite clearly. I think the concept was just getting to us at that point, just being described to us orally. We hadn't seen anything on paper to that point. There were a series of meetings involving Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili.

Clearly, I think, we didn't have the type of understanding then that we have now. We know what they are proposing to us now. That question, of course, is one that the Administration has a responsibility to consult on with Congress, and that's what we're doing today.

Q But the issue of going to the Security Council for resolution did not arise then, is that what you're saying?

MR. BURNS: No, Judd, I thought you were referring to the issue of funding, and that's what I was speaking to.

Q But the issue now is that it's requiring -- it's under the auspices of the Security Council, isn't that correct, and requires a 30 percent U.S. contribution?

MR. BURNS: There is a resolution that is being debated and discussed in New York at the Security Council. That's right. And that resolution has not yet been voted upon. We have asked for an opportunity both to review the situation in the U.S. Government -- which we've essentially done over the last 24 hours -- and also an opportunity to consult with Congress before we are going to be in a position to vote at the United Nations.

So it's really not possible for me to predict when that vote will occur. We've certainly got to have the discussions this afternoon. I don't know whether or not it will require additional discussions beyond that with the Congress.

Carol.

Q Can I make sure that I understand your position? The United States does not believe that direct talks with the Pale Serbs should be resumed until they accept the map.

MR. BURNS: Right, Carol. We have said for a long time now that there is an offer on the table from the Contact Group, not just the United States; it's the Contact Group map and plan. It should be the basis for the resumption of talks.

We would not be in favor of just beginning anew, in general, discussions without direction with the Bosnian Serbs.

Q The Secretary told this to Bildt yesterday, right?

MR. BURNS: I don't remember that as being a specific part of the conversation. I think it's just clearly understood. All the members of the Contact Group agree to this. We reaffirmed at Noordwijk the Contact Group map and plan as the basis for talks. As I try to remember the conversation, I don't believe that there's any need to really refer to it. I'm sure there's no misunderstanding with Mr. Bildt on that.

Q You've been asked in the last few days several times about assistance from Serbia, the Government of Serbia to the Bosnian Serb army. Are you satisfied that there are no weapons, arms, military assistance of any kind reaching the Bosnian Serbs from countries other than Serbia? From Russia, for example?

MR. BURNS: There are a couple of questions here, and let me just try to parse them a little bit. On the issue of whether Serbia proper is assisting the Bosnian Serbs militarily, I think we've been quite clear and careful in saying that we believe there have been leakages in the sanctions regime, which is certainly not perfect.

We believe the sanctions regime should be tightened and reinforced, and that's why we have asked for an increased number of monitors on the Bosnian-Serb border.

I cannot confirm the reports that Serbia has sent a significant amount of military equipment and is giving a significant level of military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs, but that's really all I can say on that.

On the issue of what other countries are doing, we certainly try to track that fairly closely because of the importance that we attach to the sanctions regime. We are looking into a great number of reports of sanctions violations. We're quite interested in this issue. We certainly do not approve and did not encourage any third country to violate U.N. resolutions.

Q May I follow up?

MR. BURNS: Certainly.

Q In today's New York Times, they reported about Cyprus -- they are involved with some power company and money laundering from the Russian side. Do you have any comment on it?

MR. BURNS: I may have a comment on it, if I can find the right reference. If I can't find the right reference, I won't; but I do. Here it is. Yes. We saw the same article you did and read it.

We're very concerned by allegations of sanctions violations on the part of some individuals in Cyprus. We have repeatedly made these concerns known at high levels to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Government of Cyprus has assured us that it will take the necessary actions to comply with all U.N. resolutions. That's my reaction.

Q How about the Russian side -- money laundering subject?

MR. BURNS: As I said before, there have been a number of reports, not just recently but throughout the history of the sanctions regime, of violations of the regime; and when we think that the reports are credible, we look into them from wherever they occur.

[...]

(The briefing concluded at 2:50 p.m.)

END