U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (June 12, 1995)

From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (June 12, 1995)

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Bosnian Conflict/Fighting ................................14,17-19

--Upcoming U.S. Discussions with French President Chirac,

  UN Negotiator Carl Bildt, Bosnian PM Silajdzic .........14-17

--Discussions/Remarks on Strengthening of UNPROFOR, Negoti-

  ated Settlement, Rapid Reaction Force ..................15,23

--Contact Group, Map and Plan ............................17,21-23

--Report of Chirac/Milosevic Discussion re: UN Hostages ..17-18

--Report of Possible Strikes Against Missile Sites .......17-18

--Sanctions Enforcement ..................................19

--Ambassador Frasure/Milosevic Discussions ...............19,21-22

--Report of Payment for Bosnian-Serb Army Salaries .......19

--Report of Integrated Air Defense System ................19-21

--Call for London Conference .............................22-23

[...]

[...]

Q (Inaudible) the Serb resupply of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia?

MR. BURNS: Roy, that gives me an opportunity, perhaps, to say a few words about Bosnia, as a starter. I've been trying to do that for 20 minutes. (Laughter)

This is going to be a very important week in the development of the situation in Bosnia, and in the development of the West's policy towards the Bosnian conflict.

I would just note three meetings that will be particularly interesting and important for the United States. French President Jacques Chirac will be a guest of President Clinton here in Washington on Wednesday. Secretary Christopher will be involved in the meetings with President Chirac.

Former Swedish Prime Minister and now U.N. negotiator, Carl Bildt, a man who we highly respect, will also be in Washington and will meet with the Secretary on Wednesday; and the Bosnian Prime Minister, Mr. Silajdic, will be back in Washington -- this time to meet Secretary Christopher here in the Department on Wednesday morning.

Secretary Christopher missed, of course, the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister last week because of the Secretary's travel in the Middle East.

We intend to use these meetings to carry out comprehensive discussions with each of these three gentlemen about the situation in Bosnia, about the proper role of UNPROFOR as this situation in Bosnia develops. We'll be particularly interested, of course, in President Chirac's attitudes, his views, his plans for France as the leading troop contributor in UNPROFOR and also particularly interested in the views of former Prime Minister Carl Bildt, who, as you know, is already on the job. He's had a meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev. He's had a series of meetings with U.N. officials, and we want to carry out some comprehensive discussions for them.

What the United States would like to see is the creation of an environment for making sure that UNPROFOR can stay in Bosnia and, as we noted at the Contact Group meetings in Noordwijk, that UNPROFOR can be strengthened.

We are seeking a negotiated settlement to this conflict. That remains the core of U.S. policy and of Contact Group policy. We would like to prevent what would be so dangerous this summer, and that would be the widening of the war in Bosnia. We are also seeking United Nations support for the French, British and Dutch initiative of a quick or rapid reaction force.

I understand from just a recent phone call this morning that UNPROFOR's role and mission and the role and mission of the quick or rapid reaction force are being discussed and debated in the U.S. Security Council this morning and this afternoon; and, as I last checked just before I came out here, Ambassador Albright was engaged in a U.N. Security Council meeting on this issue.

We certainly would like to clarify some of the remarks that we saw reported in a couple of our major papers over the weekend, attributed to U.N. officials, about UNPROFOR's mission. We are uncertain about what these remarks mean, and we're seeking clarification of these remarks.

Let me just say a final word. I've already mentioned former Prime Minister Bildt. He is a well known public figure to us here in the United States. He was a very strong partner of the United States when he was the Swedish Prime Minister. He was particularly helpful to the United States in our joint effort with Sweden and with Germany to convince the Russian Government to withdraw its military forces from the Baltic states -- the Baltic governments -- last July and August.

We intend to give former Prime Minister Bildt our full support. He will be involved and fully involved and aware of the deliberations of the Contact Group. I think it's fair to say that he will be the focal point of the diplomacy, both this week and in the weeks to come.

Q Let me follow that. Does he replace the Contact Group, because that's what Mr. Major said would be very agreeable to him.

MR. BURNS: We certainly want to talk to Mr. Bildt about how he envisages his own role. I don't think it's as neat as that, Roy. The Contact Group is going to stay in existence. It's been a very important creation, an institution, informal institution, for the major Western nations, including Russia, since the Sarajevo market bombing in February '94.

It's proven in many cases to be invaluable. Sometimes it's posed some difficulties, because we haven't always seen eye to eye within the Contact Group, but I think by and large we feel it's an institution that's got to stay in being. It's got to stay active. We would like him to be involved in the deliberations of the Contact Group.

I think it's reasonable to say, given the degree of confidence that governments have of Mr. Bildt, that he will be the focal point of diplomacy, but I don't think he'll be the sole point of diplomacy. The United States, of course, will continue to represent its own interests and carry out its own diplomacy through the Contact Group and sometimes apart from the Contact Group.

So I don't want to make a blanket statement about his role, and I think that we need to have a series of discussions with him. That has to also happen within the context of the U.N. and with other Contact Group members before we're able to say with a precise level of detail what all the arrangements are going to be.

Q Has he given you a preview of what his views are so that you have some sense of them before he arrives?

MR. BURNS: Not to my knowledge. We have received some reports about his meetings with the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kozyrev, and we, of course, have been in contact with him over the last couple of days -- several days, I guess, since he's been appointed.

But Wednesday really represents our first opportunity to have the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and Deputy Assistant Secretary Frasure sit down with him to talk in detail about what his view of the situation is.

Q One of the ideas that's come out of his appointment is to call an all-Bosnia conference and to look at the map once again almost from scratch and start over again. I'm curious whether the Contact Group Map is still the central point of Western diplomacy or whether maybe a conference would replace it?

MR. BURNS: The Contact Group Map and Plan is still the centerpiece of Western diplomacy. It is the offer on the table that we hope the Bosnian Serbs will some day decide should be the basis of negotiations. I'm glad you brought that up, because that in fact is the focal point of our diplomacy.

In seeking a negotiated settlement, we are trying to convince Mr. Milosevic that he should use his influence with the Bosnian Serbs to convince them that it's in their interest to quickly go to the negotiating table. There is a Map and Plan. There is a full set of initiatives that is ready to be discussed. We think it's a fair point at which to start, and that remains the policy of both the United States and the Contact Group, and it has the full support of the United Nations.

Q Nick, if I could follow, there's a wire that reports that President -- or Prime Minister Jacques Chirac spoke to Milosevic today about freeing the remainder of the U.N. hostages, and apparently there was a positive response from Milosevic on that.

I would ask you this: There's also been talk around this town of punitive strikes against surface-to-air missile sites in Bosnian Serbian regions, and how can there be talk of any kind of airstrikes by NATO when there are still U.N. hostages? Point one.

Point two - question two -- is Mr. Haris Silajdzic the other day basically dodged the issue when asked about whether they were expecting a Bosnian Serb offensive or counter-offensive would not respond to that. You raised that a few minutes ago. Can you say if that is still expected, or is this war at a standstill because of the hostage situation?

MR. BURNS: Bill, that's a lot to digest but let me try. I'm unaware of any conversation between President Chirac and Mr. Milosevic this morning.

On the issue of the hostages, our policy remains firm and clear. We believe the hostages should be released immediately. There is no justification for the Bosnian Serbs to hold those people hostage.

Q But any talk of further airstrikes, punitive or otherwise -- is that sitting well?

MR. BURNS: I have nothing to say on that subject today.

Q Okay. And what about the counter-offensive of the Serbs? Is it still -- according to the State Department, is it still possible or in the works?

MR. BURNS: The Bosnian Serbs you're referring to.

Q The Bosnian --

MR. BURNS: There's been a good deal of fighting that has continued over the weekend between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serb forces in and around Sarajevo but also in other parts of Bosnia proper. Near Bihac, for instance, there was a considerable amount of fighting there.

I am not privy to the battle plans of the Bosnian Serbs, so I don't want to get into predicting what they're going to do. We felt as long as three or four months ago that the cease-fire that was in place and the lull in fighting had to be maintained through the spring. It wasn't. We have been very concerned about the renewed outbreak of fighting and the prospect of a larger war -- a war that could spread.

That has been one of our primary interests since the beginning of the Bosnian conflict, to prevent the spread of the Bosnian conflict, and that remains the focal point of the diplomacy, and I think that will be an issue that we discuss on Wednesday with the three visitors whom I mentioned.

Q I take it there's still concern of a larger war within Bosnia that might spread.

MR. BURNS: Again, I'm not in a position to predict the activities of the Bosnian Serbs or the Bosnian Government -- the military activities. But, yes, in general we're very concerned about the possibility that this war could spread. Absolutely concerned about it.

Q Nick, could we get back to Roy's question about leakage at the border?

MR. BURNS: Yes. Roy, do you want to give me a specific sense of what you'd like to know?

Q Well, there's a report that Milosevic is still sending supplies to the Bosnian Serbs.

MR. BURNS: Let me just say in answer to that, I read that article over the weekend -- the same one you did. Unfortunately for you and probably fortunately for me, that article refers to intelligence sources as the crux of the information, and, of course, I'm not in a position to discuss intelligence sources or intelligence information from this podium. So I can't get into the specific allegations -- some of the specific allegations.

But I can say this: The sanctions that have been in place have not been perfect. Sanctions regimes are rarely perfect. In fact, I don't know one that has ever been perfect, that has completely closed traffic. There have undoubtedly been leakages in the sanctions.

But, having said that, these sanctions have been felt in Pale. They've been felt by the Bosnian Serbs, and they've been painful, and they were intended to be painful because of the transgressions -- the outrageous transgressions of the Bosnian Serbs.

What we are interested in doing is working with Mr. Milosevic to tighten those sanctions so that they continue to be painful. That's what Ambassador Frasure has been discussing with Mr. Milosevic, in part during his recent trips to Belgrade.

I think Betsy was first, and then Mark.

Q What about the aspect of paying for Bosnian Serb salaries -- army salaries?

MR. BURNS: I just have nothing for you on that, Betsy. I can't confirm that. I don't have any information available to me that would confirm that.

Q How about the link of the air defense in Bosnia with the air defense in Krajina and the air defense in Yugoslavia?

MR. BURNS: I simply am not in a position to confirm either way. Obviously, the quality of the relationship and the degree of contact between the Government of Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs is a primary concern for us. That in fact was part of the reasons why we imposed sanctions on Serbia proper in the first place, and it's the heart of the issue about our offer to -- if we can ever consummate this offer -- to offer partial, limited sanctions relief to Serbia in return for recognition of Bosnia.

That's something that we monitor. It's something that we're quite interested in following closely, and I'm unable to confirm either your specific interest or Betsy's on both those counts.

Q Have there been any protests from this government or even some comment to Milosevic that there is an integrated air defense system, because it's known around this government -- (a). And (b) he therefore was in a position to monitor the repositioning of the air defense and the shooting down of that plane, and he probably could have blocked it. I mean, is there any --

MR. BURNS: "He," Milosevic?

Q "He," Milosevic. Is there any discussion with Milosevic about his role in the air defense, because it is still centered in Belgrade, from all the information I have.

MR. BURNS: Again, I want to be clear about this. I cannot confirm the reports over the weekend that there is this degree of integration and of assistance on the part of the Serbian Government with the Bosnian Serbs. I can't confirm that. I don't have any information on that.

But, Roy, obviously this has been one of the primary issues that we have had for the last three years with Mr. Milosevic. What is the degree of his relationship with the Bosnian Serbs and what is the quality and nature of that relationship. And that remains, I can assure you, of primary interest to us, and we will continue to look into it.

Q But, I mean, there are so many political implications of this intelligence information that I wonder whether it couldn't be released from the realm of the super-classified just due to the facts that exist? Because if you're talking to Milosevic on the one hand about lifting sanctions or suspending them, and meanwhile he's supervising an air defense or monitoring an air defense that is shooting down American planes, it would just seem like there's a contradiction there.

MR. BURNS: There's no contradiction from our part. As I said, we have a fundamental interest in ascertaining what the relationship is between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. I'm just not in a position to discuss intelligence information. As well, I don't have information that would allow me to confirm to you this relationship that was described in the newspapers over the weekend, and that's really all I can say about this today.

Q I'm sorry to respond again, but I think that information is available in fact, and it's not just strictly limited to intelligence. I think that it's widely known within this government, and that the political implications are significant, and that it's reasonable to ask that you comment on the political implications rather than just simply labeling it as "intelligence information."

MR. BURNS: I'm actually glad to comment on the political implications. What I cannot comment on is the nature of the relationship, because I don't have sufficient information to do that. So I can't confirm the validity of the press reports.

I can certainly agree with you that the allegations have political significance, and that if the allegations were confirmed, they would have enormous political significance. Absolutely. But what I can't confirm is the events themselves and the relationship itself. I'm not in a position to do that.

Q What sort of political significance? Can you specify?

MR. BURNS: Obvious political significance. It's been our position since the beginning of this conflict that the Serbian Government ought to limit and foreclose all of its military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs, as well as economic assistance. That was why the sanctions were imposed on Serbia in the first place. As we discus, as Ambassador Frasure and others have discussed this issue with Mr. Milosevic, this has been at the heart of the matter.

Q Would you break off --

MR. BURNS: That's what the political significance is.

Q Would you break off the Frasure contact? Would you break off efforts to entice Milosevic into an agreement?

MR. BURNS: The agreement that has been outlined by Ambassador Frasure is on the table. Mr. Milosevic has to decide if he wants to take that offer and if he wants to abide by the commitments that he must make in taking that offer. That's a decision for him to make.

Ambassador Frasure has spent a lot of time in Belgrade -- enough time. The offer is clear. There are no plans for Ambassador Frasure to return to Belgrade. It doesn't mean this story is ended. It doesn't mean we've taken the offer off the table. It's sitting on the table. It's there. Mr. Milosevic now has as detailed a view of the offer as Ambassador Frasure. There's no need for Ambassador Frasure to go back at this point, so he's not going to go back at this point.

Q Do you suppose Frasure could be made available to us for a backgrounder?

MR. BURNS: Is that a level of interest? (Laughter)

Q I think it would be very well attended myself.

MR. BURNS: We'll have to see. I don't know. I'll be glad to talk to him about it, but I can't -- I'm hesitant to promise anyone before I've talked with them.

Q Nick, may I ask a question about another region?

Q One more on --

MR. BURNS: Still on Bosnia, Mark, and then we'll go back. Lee, I'm sorry.

Q On the diplomatic front, are you then saying that you reject the idea and the call for a London-type conference -- a new London-type conference among the warring parties to fashion a new agreement, as suggested by Boutros-Ghali and I believe is promoted by Mr. Bildt?

MR. BURNS: Lee, I'm not sure I agree with the premise of the question. I'm certainly not in a position to reject anything of which we have very few details. We're going to use this week to talk further with former Prime Minister Bildt, with Prime Minister Silajdzic and with French President Jacques Chirac -- discuss all of these issues in detail -- and perhaps at the end of the week we will have a better sense of where things are heading. Perhaps we won't. Perhaps we'll need more conversations.

In addition to that, the United Nations continues its discussions about all these issues, but as far as I'm aware, there's no concrete suggestion on the table that we have to accept today or reject today about any kind of alternative approach or a London conference. It simply hasn't come up to the level where it has to come up in this government for us to have anything to say about it in public.

Q You suggested that the current plan is the plan and will remain the plan, which would seem to eliminate the idea of another London conference.

MR. BURNS: No, I suggested that the Contact Group map and plan is the offer on the table for the Bosnian Serbs that the Contact Group has made available, and it is the offer. There's no question about that. There's no reason for me to say anything otherwise.

You've brought up a different scenario, and I'm just saying that we have not been apprised at a senior level in this government about that scenario. I don't even know if we've been apprised at a mid- to junior- level. I just know we've been apprised at a senior level.

Q Nick, can you be a bit more precise about the clarifications you're seeking from the U.N.? Just what in their remarks leaves you so uncertain? I mean, what they say seems to be fairly clear. Do you mean the remarks took you by surprise or --

MR. BURNS: We are unclear about what these remarks mean about UNPROFOR's mission and role, particularly as it relates to the Bosnian Serbs; and, therefore, we are seeking clarification. Ambassador Albright is doing that today in New York, and that will be also part of our discussions with former Prime Minister Bildt on Wednesday. No, we are not clear about the remarks. We are unclear about the remarks.

Q So you're surprised by them, and you don't like them, would you say?

MR. BURNS: Our position has been that UNPROFOR should be strengthened. That was the position that the United States took at the Contact Group. All the members of the Contact Group agreed on that position at Noordwijk, and that remains the policy of the Contact Group and of the United States.

[...]

(The press briefing concluded at 2:34 p.m.)

END