TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND PRACTICE AS EVIDENCED BY
THE RECENT TURKISH CLAIMS TO THE IMIA ROCKS
From: The Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gr>
Introduction -
The Crisis -
The Legal Status of Imia -
The Reaction of the European Parliament -
The International Court of Justice -
Turkey's Legal Assertions -
Political Aspects of the Dispute
International treaties and agreements dating back to 1923 establish
unequivocally that the Imia rocky islets constitute an integral part of
Greek sovereign territory.
The fact that the tension caused by the recent Turkish claims to the
Imia rocks did not erupt into immediate conflict does not in the least
mean that the danger has receded. On the contrary, Turkey, through
its former Prime Ministers explicit threat to use military force against
Greece, continues to press claims that are unfounded both in
international law and in the established practice of civilized relations
among nations.
This recent crisis was particularly serious because Turkey's principal
argument establishing her claim to these islets is that the International
Treaties that set down the territorial status of the southeastern Aegean
are not necessarily binding on Turkey. By questioning the sovereignty of
the Imia rocks Turkey thus seeks to overthrow the territorial status of the
entire region.
At the same time, Turkey has consistently refused to support her sudden
assertions through peaceful and legal avenues, by bringing them to
the International Court of Justice, as both Greece, a number of
European Union countries, and the United States have repeatedly
suggested.
As will be seen in greater detail in the following paragraphs, the Imia
rocks have been under Greek sovereignty since the signing of the Paris
Peace Treaty with Italy in 1947. For half a century Turkey did not raise
any questions concerning the status of the islets and rocks.
Unfortunately, the reason she does so now falls within the well-
documented pattern of illegal Turkish intentions and actions over the
past twenty years.
More specifically, in 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied Cyprus in
defiance of international law and in the face of the indignation of the
international community, as expressed in numerous resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.
At the same time, she turned her sites to the rest of the Aegean, by
setting up the so-called Army of the Aegean, a patently offensive
military force equipped with the largest fleet of landing craft in the
Mediterranean. Turkey also raised claims against Greek sovereign rights
concerning the continental shelf, control of the air-space of the area,
as well as Greece's right, as established in international law, to extend
her territorial waters to up to 12 n.m.
In June of last year, the Turkish Parliament passed an unprecedented
resolution authorizing the Turkish government to use all means,
including military ones, should Greece exercise her legitimate rights
concerning the extension of her territorial waters.
Turkey also challenges Greece's national air-space, backing up her
claims by frequent and at times massive violations of the air-space by
her military aircraft.
Unfortunately, the threat of the use of military force seems to be an
integral part of Turkish foreign policy. Just as in the case of the territorial
waters, during the Imia incident Turkey brandished the threat of war in
order to impose her objectives, declaring that any attempt to question
self-proclaimed "Turkish sovereignty" would constitute a causus belli.
These actions, encouraged -- at least initially -- by the lack of any firm
reaction on the part of the international community, have now been
proven to be part of Turkey's design to question Greece's
internationally established rights in the Aegean, and to usurp
sovereignty of at least half of the Aegean, by officially rejecting the
established legal status quo.
If Turkey's attempts to question the binding force of international
agreements were valid, then the majority of the treaties regulating
international frontiers after the First and Second World Wars would
collapse.
On the 25th of December 1995, the Turkish Cargo boat "Figen Akat" ran
aground on one of the Imia rocks, situated 2,5 miles from the Greek
island of Kalolimnos. Although the accident occurred in Greek
territorial waters, the captain of the "Figen Akat" refused assistance
from the competent Greek authorities, claiming that he was within
Turkish territorial waters. Despite assurances to the contrary, the
captain sought assistance from the Turkish authorities
Finally, in agreement with the Turkish company that owned the ship,
the "Figen Akat" was set free with the aid of a Greek tug boat, owned
by the company Matsas Star, and towed to the Turkish port of Gulluk.
On the 29th of December, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
addressed a Verbal Note to the Embassy of Greece in Ankara,
asserting for the first time that Imia constitutes a part of Turkish territory,
as it was registered in the land registry of the Turkish province of Mugla.
It should be noted that this was the first time that Turkey openly laid
claims over actual Greek territory.
In response to Turkey's claims, on the 10th of January 1996, the Greek
Embassy addressed a Verbal Note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In that Note the Turkish claim to the islets was rejected. The Note
underlined the fact that Turkey had reaffirmed Imia as belonging to
Italy by virtue of a bilateral agreement signed between the two
countries in 1932, and that the islets were subsequently ceded to
Greece with the rest of the Dodecanese island chain by the Paris
Peace Treaty of 1947.
Turkey then addressed a second Verbal Note to Greece on the 29th of
January 1996, wherein the initial claim was repeated and extended
with the request for negotiations concerning the status of all the
islands, islets and rocks whose status, according to Turkey, is not well
determined.
In response Greece addressed a Verbal Note to Turkey on February 16,
1996. In that Note Greece presented international legal documents
and other facts establishing unequivocally the territorial status of all
islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean. Greece emphasized that no
country, including Turkey, had ever challenged that status in the past.
The Note concluded that, as is only natural, Greece would not
negotiate with Turkey matters pertaining to its territorial sovereignty as
established by international law and treaties.
The tension over Imia began to escalate on the 27th of January, when
Turkish journalists from the newspaper Hurriyet took down the Greek
flag from the larger of the two Imia islets and raised the Turkish one. On
the 28th of January a Greek navy detachment replaced the Greek
flag.
Initially, there were no naval units in the area except one Greek unit
and a Turkish torpedo boat. On January 30, however, Turkey sent
several ships to the area, prompting Greece to send an equal number.
A Turkish frigate violated Greek territorial waters targetting a Greek
gunboat that was patrolling the area. A Turkish helicopter taking off
from one of the Turkish frigates flew over the Imia rocks. At the same
time, Turkish warplanes repeatedly violated Greek airspace.
The tension reached its peak in the early morning hours of January 31,
when the Turkish army landed some men on the smaller of the Imia
rocks. An American mediation effort had already been initiated by
means of repeated telephone contacts between President Clinton
and Prime Minister Simitis, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and
Under Secretary Hobrooke with Foreign Minister Pangalos, and the
Ministers of Defence Arsenis and Perry.
After a special session of the Government's National Security Council in
the early hours of January 31, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign
Affairs announced that an understanding had been reached by
means of American mediation. Both sides would withdraw their forces
from the area of Imia and the situation would return to its previous
condition (the "status quo ante").
The Imia islets lie at a distance of 1.9 nautical miles from the Greek
island of Kalolimnos, 5.3 n.m. from the Greek island of Kalymnos, 3.65
n.m. from the Turkish coast and 2.3 n.m. from the Turkish island of Cavus
(formerly Kato). Like the rest of the Dodecanese island chain, they
were ceded to Italy by virtue of article 15 of the Lausanne Peace
Treaty of 1923.
At least three international agreements establish unambiguously
Greeces ownership of Imia.
The first is the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, which limits Turkish
sovereignty -- with the exception of Imbros, Tenedos and the Rabbit
islands -- explicitly only over islands lying within a three-mile limit off the
Turkish coast (Article 12). As noted above, however, Imia are 3.65 n.m.
off the Turkish coast. Under Article 16 of the same Peace Treaty, Turkey
"renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the
territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty
and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is
recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands
being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned."
The second is the January 4, 1932 Agreement between Italy and
Turkey and its supplementary agreement of December 28, 1932. More
specifically, the January 4 Agreement set down with precision the
maritime frontier between the island of Castellorizo and the Turkish
coast. The day this Agreement was signed, the two parties exchanged
official letters by which they mutually asserted that there was no
difference between them as to their respective territorial sovereignty,
and called for a joint Italo-Turkish technical committee to be set up for
the purpose of precisely delimiting the rest of the maritime boundary
between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast.
In accordance with this Agreement, the representatives of Italy and
Turkey signed in Ankara, on December 28, 1932, a supplementary
agreement by which the rest of the maritime frontier between the
Dodecanese and the Turkish coast was precisely delimited. The
agreement fixes 37 pairs of reference points between which the
maritime boundary dividing Turkish and Italian territory (which, at the
time, included the Aegean Dodecanese islands) was drawn.
Point 30 of this agreement states that the maritime frontier north of
Kalymnos will pass at a median distance between the Imia rocks (on
the Italian side) and Kato island (on the Turkish side). Thus, Italian
sovereignty over Imia is confirmed by the explicit reference made to
them in the text itself.
The third international agreement was the Paris Treaty of 1947, signed
between Italy and the Allied Powers after the conclusion of World War
II. In that treaty Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands and all adjecent
islets to Greece. As is well known, under international law, the
successor state automatically assumes all the rights and obligations
that have been established by international treaty between the initial
possessor state and every third party (in this case, between Italy and
Turkey).
The European Parliament, on February 15, 1996, adopted a resolution
titled "On the Provocative Actions and Contestation of Sovereign
Rights by Turkey Against a Member State of the Union," by an
overwhelming 342 to 21 majority. In that resolution the Parliament
found that "the islet of Imia belongs to the Dodecanese group of
islands" pursuant to the 1923, 1932 and 1947 treaties. The Parliament
also condemned "the dangerous violation by Turkey of sovereign rights
of Greece," and called on Turkey to comply "with international treaties"
and to abstain from non-peaceful actions or threats of such actions.
It should be noted that the Parliament, a few months earlier, had
ratified the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU. It
should further be noted that the Common Position of the Council, set
out at the EU-Turkey Association Council meeting of March 6, 1995,
stated that it was "of paramount importance to encourage good
neighbourly relations between Turkey and its neighbouring Member
States of the EU." The Parliament, in its February 16, 1996 resolution,
emphasized that "these privileged relations between the Union and
Turkey should automatically preclude any military aggression."
The International Court of Justice
After the crisis, the U.S. administration suggested that Turkey's Imia
claims be taken for peaceful resolution to the International Court of
Justice.
Similarly, on February 26, 1996, the Italian Presidency of the European
Union issued the summary of discussions that took place that day
among the EU's fifteen Foreign Ministers on the issue of Imia. In that
announcement the Presidency, among other things, emphasized that
"territorial disputes must be resolved only through recourse to Law, that
is to say, by the International Court of Justice."
Turkey immediately turned down both appeals. In contrast, from the
beginning of the crisis Greece has stated that it would consider such
an adjudication should Turkey, which is the party raising the territorial
claims in the present instance, where to apply to the Court.
It should be noted that, contrary to Greece, Turkey has not yet
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
After the crisis, the U.S. administration suggested that Turkey's Imia
claims be taken for peaceful resolution to the International Court of
Justice.
Similarly, on February 26, 1996, the Italian Presidency of the European
Union issued the summary of discussions that took place that day
among the EU's fifteen Foreign Ministers on the issue of Imia. In that
announcement the Presidency, among other things, emphasized that
"territorial disputes must be resolved only through recourse to Law, that
is to say, by the International Court of Justice."
Turkey immediately turned down both appeals. In contrast, from the
beginning of the crisis Greece has stated that it would consider such
an adjudication should Turkey, which is the party raising the territorial
claims in the present instance, where to apply to the Court.
It should be noted that, contrary to Greece, Turkey has not yet
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
The principal argument on which Turkey bases its claim is the assertion
that the legal procedures of the agreement of December 1932 were
not completed and that it was not registered with the Secretariat of
the League of Nations.
However, the December Agreement was supplementary to that of
January, which set the maritime frontier between Castellorizo and the
Turkish coast and settled an issue concerning the sovereignty of some
islets around Castellorizo, over which there was a difference of opinion
between the two sides. The December agreement did not aim at
settling any territorial difference between the two countries, as was
stated both in the text of the agreement itself and in the letters
exchanged on the 4th of January 1932, between the then Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the then Italian Ambassador in Ankara,
by which the two parties declared that there existed no difference as
to the territorial sovereignty of each side. The December agreement
merely sets with precision the remaining maritime frontier between the
Dodecanese and the Turkish coast. For this reason it did not need
separate registration with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. It is
thus not surprising that the delimitation of the frontier set by this
agreement was never in the past contested by Turkey or Italy, even
after the Dodecanese was ceded to Greece.
Turkey has further asserted that Greece allegedly had doubts, at the
time of the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, concerning the validity of
the 1932 agreements. This Turkish argument is unfounded both in law
and in fact. As noted above, according to international law, the
successor state succeeds to all rights and obligations established by
international treaties between the original possessor state and any
third party. Greece had no doubt as to the validity of the
aforementioned agreements nor had Turkey or Italy, since they both
immediately implemented the provisions of the Agreement and
abided by them thereafter. There is clearly no need for any
confirmation of the validity of any treaty regulating the status of the
ceded territories.
This is further evidenced by other international agreements and maps
of the immediate post World-War period, according to which this
delimitation is officially recognised by Turkey as her frontier line with
Greece. To mention just two, there is the map attached to the 1950
ICAO Regional Agreement adopted by the Council of the
Organization, and also the official Turkish map included in the 1953
edition of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Navigation through
the Straits.
Furthermore, not only Greek and Turkish maps, but also official maps of
other countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and Italy
include the Imia rocks within Greek national territory.
Finally, the fact that both Greece and Turkey considered the
agreements of 1932 as valid, is shown by the fact that Greece was the
country that exercised sovereign rights over the Imia islets all this time
without Turkey ever raising any protest. The Greek Geographic Service
repeatedly visited the Imia islets and used a trigonometric marker on
the larger rock which it had installed for its purposes, Greek fishermen
fished regularly in the waters surrounding these islets, and Greek
shepherds are the owners of the goats that graze on the islets. Finally
enviromental activities both by Greece and the European Union were
carried out on the Imia rocks since 1984.
Most recently, through a written statement in mid-March 1996, Turkey
asserted that, in the case of the Aegean, it abides only by those
international agreements that it itself considers valid, and then only by
those that both it and Greece have signed.
In other words, Turkey indirectly denied the binding power of the
Italian-Turkish agreement of 1932 (which reaffirmed Italy's sovereignty
over Imia, among other islands and islets) and of the Paris Peace Treaty
of 1947 (in which Italy, in turn, ceded the Dodecanese islands and all
adjacent islets to Greece). Thus, for the first time, Turkey questioned
Greek sovereignty not just over Imia, but over all the Dodecanese
islands.
From the outset of the Imia crisis Greece has asked the Turkish
government to affirm officially and unequivocally its adherence to
three fundamental principles that guide relations among all civilized
nations:
- that it respects international law and treaties;
- that it condemns the use of force or the threat of such use in
relations between nations; and
- that the country raising novel territorial claims -- in this case,
Turkey -- must seek their resolution by peaceful means, under
international law, at the International Court of Justice.
Among world nations today, these principles are self-evident. Any
country that finds it difficult to state its unequivocal acceptance of
them is a country that questions the very basis upon which peaceful
relations among nations are built.
Unfortunately, in the past two months Turkey has consistently refused to
make even these minimal and self-evident commitments. Its refusal
persisted in the face of constant efforts by a number of Greece's
European Union partners, as well as the United States, urging Turkey to
do just that. On March 25, 1996, the Turkish government refused to
commit itself to similar principles, which had previously been
incorporated in the draft Common Position of the EU Foreign Ministers.
As a consequence, the Council of Ministers had to postpone for the
near future the scheduled EU-Turkey Association Council.
Recognizing the paucity of its legal arguments, Turkey has recently
claimed that the matter (as well as other legal claims that Turkey
unilaterally raises against Greek sovereignty) should be settled through
negotiations. It goes without saying that all legitimate differences
should be settled through dialogue. Greece has repeatedly invited
Turkey to a sincere dialogue over the strengthening of the economic
and cultural ties between the two countries. It has also invited Turkey to
negotiations over the drafting of a compromis for the submittal of the
two counties' differences over the Aegean continental shelf to the
International Court of Justice.
Turkey has refused both of these proposals. Instead, in the case of Imia,
it wishes to coerse Greece into bilateral negotiations over Greek
sovereign rights, under the spectre of the use of force. No civilized
nation would willingly submit to such a process, let alone to the open
disregard of international law, and neither will Greece. As seen above,
the territorial status of the islets and rocks is absolutely clear, and Turkey
herself -- understandably -- never challenged it in the past.
Unfortunately, Turkeys proposal appears to be nothing more than a
thinly-veiled attempt to legitimize in the eyes of the international
community an otherwise insupportable claim of sovereignty over
territory that belongs to another sovereign nation. Indeed, when one
compares Turkey's proposal for dialogue with the belligerent
declarations made by former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller in the
aftermath of the Imia crisis -- i.e., that 1,000 islands in the Aegean are
Turkish (she later raised that figure to 3,000, which is roughly the total
number of islands in the area) -- Turkeys real intentions become even
more obvious. The former Turkish Prime Minister added that any
attempt on the part of Greece to challenge her assessment would be
a causus belli. This second threat of war comes at the heals of the
Turkish Parliaments aforementioned resolution concerning the
extension of Greece's territorial waters.
By challenging Greece's internationally recognized frontiers, and by
using the threat of force to do so, Turkey violates the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes
and respect for international frontiers, which, as a signatory to the
Charter of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
she has pledged to respect. In so doing, Turkey establishes itself as a
real and imminent threat to the peace and stability of the area and, in
consequence, of Europe. If allowed to continue unchallenged, this will
create an extremely dangerous precedent for all those countries that,
for one reason or another, consider that the present borders of Europe
are unjust.
Greece, perhaps more than any other nation, wishes to have as its
neighbor a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Turkey. The absence of
these factors can divert the imagination of some leaders to dangerous
foreign policy adventures, as the Imia case illustrates. Greece wishes to
develop friendly and peaceful relations with Turkey, and it will keep
striving to achieve them in spite of any problems that may at times
appear to block the way to friendship.
At the same time, neither Greece nor the international community can
afford the distabilization of the Aegean region through the
continuation or the encouragement of Turkeys illegal claims.
Greece, on her part, will continue to defend the principles of
international law, respect for established borders, and the peaceful
coexistence among nations both with respect to Turkey and with
respect to all other countries in the region.
27/3/1996
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