Cyprus PIO: Turkish Cypriot Press and Other Media, 98-04-07

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From: The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office Server at <http://www.pio.gov.cy/>

TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA

No. 61/98 -- 7.4.98

[A] NEWS ITEMS

[01] Karadayi: Meeting with Tsoganis `extremely beneficial'.

[02] Holbrooke: US will not recognize "TRNC".

[B] COMMENTS AND EDITORIAL

[03] Birand commentary on consequences of Cyprus problem.

[04] Birand sees control of Mediterranean behind Cyprus strife.

[05] Birand: Pseudostate is a "wreck" - one third of its population are from Turkey.

[A] NEWS ITEMS

[01] Karadayi: Meeting with Tsoganis `extremely beneficial'

General Karadayi said that the request for the meeting had been mutual. The meeting lasted for about an hour. In a statement to reporters after the meeting, General Karadayi said:

"We exchanged views on Turkish-Greek joint military issues. It was an extremely beneficial meeting. We, at least, have the chance to put the issues on the table and we reached the following decision. We expressed our wish to make use of such opportunities, to get together to discuss the issues, and to direct them in the right path. Our having met is, in itself, a very positive situation. Therefore I am extremely happy about the meeting and the talks held today. I thank him."

In reply to a question, Gen. Karadayi said that they discussed military issues and that they did not refer to the political ones.

[02] Holbrooke: US will not recognize "TRNC"

Holbrooke held a news conference at the buffer zone in Nicosia following his contacts on the island last Saturday. In his news conference, Holbrooke stated that the United States will not be able to recognize the "TRNC". He further noted that he and Denktash understood one another very well, stressing that his talks with Denktash were of vital importance.

Holbrooke also expressed the view that the United States is against the division of the island, adding that the efforts of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan constitute support for everyone.

Holbrooke further noted that he did not bring any peace plan to the talks, adding that the next round of the talks will be held in the beginning of May. He stated that Thomas Miller will be meeting with both leaders until the beginning of May. In other words, Miller is expected to prepare the ground for Holbrooke's contacts.

[B] COMMENTS AND EDITORIAL

[03] Birand commentary on consequences of Cyprus problem

This game was played until the past few years. We played this game together. The Greek Cypriots said they granted the Turkish community special rights on the basis of the 1959-1960 London-Zurich agreements, whereas their real purpose was to dissolve the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot side said that it launched its 1974 Operation to `bring back the constitutional order' as a first stage, whereas the main aim was to safeguard a secure region for the Turkish Cypriot community.

These reciprocal lies further increased during the past few years. In the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem, each side said it wanted a `federation'. For the Greek Cypriot side, federation meant replacing the Turkish Cypriot community under Greek Cypriot control. For the Turkish Cypriot side, federation meant the formation of its own state.

These games are over now. The `TRNC' is openly saying that it wants to be a `separate state'. The Greek Cypriot administration in turn, indicates that it has chosen the road to unilateral full EU membership.

So, what will happen if there is a parting of ways?

The Greek Cypriots will unilaterally become EU members, and the TRNC will continue to exist on its own. And, if the latter accelerates its integration with Turkey, what will each side gain or lose?

Turkish Cypriot Front's Balance Sheet (subhead)

1. It will be more difficult for Turkey to join the EU. In the same way that Greece and the Greek Cypriots will use their vetoes, even though in the distant future, to prevent the Turkish Cypriots who hold half of the island from becoming EU members, the EU will obstruct the course of the TRNC and Turkey if they do not accept the solutions it proposes.

2. The Cyprus problem will again become the topic of discussion at international forums, and the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and the US Congress will continuously adopt decisions condemning Turkey.

3. After a while, Athens and Nicosia will convince the EU to urge the UN to declare Turkey an occupying country. If they find the means they will try to obtain the decision for issuing UNSC sanctions.

4. It will be more difficult for the TRNC to gain international recognition, and the possibility of it standing on its own feet will be eliminated.

Greek Cypriot Front's Balance Sheet (subhead)

1. The Greek Cypriots have completely lost the other half of the island, and Cyprus will be divided in a way never to be united again. They will be obliged to share responsibilities.

2. Following this development, most probably the tension and instability on the island will further increase. As a result, the the Greek Cypriots will face a major bottleneck from the perspective of investments and tourism, and it will be difficult for them to obtain the foreign investment and to achieve the tourism boom they expect.

3. Whether they like it or not, the Greek Cypriots will be more in need of Greece and will be forced to increase their relations with Athens. Contrary to what they expect, they will be more dependent than independent.

4. Greece, in turn, will not find the easing of tension it expects in the Aegean, and it will not be able to see its relations with Turkey back on track. Tension in the region will exacerbate.

Result: A Brand New Game (Subhead)

In my opinion, the Greek Cypriots will suffer more as a result of their unilateral EU membership and as a result of not trying to find a political solution. From now on the rules of the game will change. A brand new game will start. We too are going to face difficulties, but not as much as the Greek Cypriots because there is a completely different bargain behind all this struggle.

Cyprus is still a giant aircraft carrier, just like it was from 1950 to 1980. Whichever side maintains authority on this aircraft carrier will take this strategic point in the Mediterranean under its control."

[04] Birand sees control of Mediterranean behind Cyprus strife

Why?

Do not believe the Turks when they vow to `sacrifice their lives to protect the Turkish compatriots' or the Greeks when they say 'we can risk war for the sake of Hellenism.' You can hear such emotional approach only from the man in the street. He frankly feels that way.

The states, on the other hand, look at Cyprus differently.

Long-term interests, not human beings, concern them. If Turkey is today insisting on a `two-separate-states' formula there must be some calculation behind it.

If Greece refuses to accept the TRNC reality and tries to bring the Turks of the island under Greek Cypriot control, it must have a completely different calculation in mind.

Different Picture in 2000 (subhead)

We will be beholding a totally different picture in the year 2000. Turkey's strategic position will undergo a radical change. Its Mediterranean coasts will become centers for oil coming from Central Asian republics. Billions of dollars worth of oil will be shipped from there to the West and Cyprus is so positioned as to keep a control over this vital passage.

Similarly, very soon the Manavgat River flowing into the Mediterranean will turn into one of Turkey's most important water reservoirs for all the Middle Eastern countries. Cyprus is again right on that route.

The Middle East will become the most unstable place on earth in the years 2000. Those countries establishing control over the Mediterranean will secure for themselves a more advantageous position.

Out of Question to Withdraw from Cyprus (subhead)

I can add many more to the above reasons to show why Turkey cannot withdraw from Cyprus and how strategically important it is for Turkey to ensure the survival of a Turkish state there.

In organizing the coup in 1974 and in intending to declare enosis (union with Greece) in 1974, the Greek junta too had moved with the same considerations. For Athens too, the control of Cyprus was tantamount to controlling the regional sea routes and Anatolia's Mediterranean coast, which is regarded as Turkey's soft underbelly. The Greeks failed in their attempt.

Rather, they presented Turkey with an opportunity on a golden platter. They played even that game rather stupidly. They could not, or did not want, to see the signals coming out of Ankara for so many years. That was how Turkey stepped into Cyprus. Those same Greeks are now saying: `What you did was unacceptable. Go back. Let us restore the old order'. They have no inclination at all to pay for their mistakes and divide up the island as a minimal price for their actions. Rather, what they are saying is this: `Since I will not be able to return to the pre-1974 era and recover all my losses, I do not have to help Turkey to feel at ease on the island'.

EU on Greek side (subhead)

In the meantime, using Greece and Cyprus, or through them, the EU is trying to establish itself in the most strategic region of the Mediterranean. In their turn, Greece and Cyprus see a benefit in getting the backing of the EU. The formation of a front against Turkey gives them a sense of security. That is why they dare to purchase the S-300s and engage in a rapid arms buildup. All these are signs of preparation for something...

The Turkish strategists are now asking the following question: If the TRNC joins the EU, or enters a loose federation under the Greek Cypriot umbrella, which side will end up having the upper hand?

Not the Turkish side, certainly.

But there is another side to the coin. If Turkey does not want to betray the TRNC or its own interests, there are things that it should do and things that it should not".

[05] Birand: Pseudostate is a "wreck" - one third of its population are from Turkey

It is also justified to underscore the importance of Cyprus in controlling oil and water routes in the Mediterranean and to formulate policies to that end.

Indeed, it is on the basis of these thoughts that Turkey has begun to pursue a `two separate states (in Cyprus)' policy.

It is not for nothing that it has given up its older pursuit of a `bizonal, bicommunal federation'. It has changed its stance, even though 90 percent of its demands within the framework of that older formula have been satisfied. The reason is that Turkey has reached the conclusion that it cannot ensure its security needs in the Mediterranean in the 2000s with a `TRNC that is a member of the EU as part of a federation'.

But changing policy is not enough.

It is also necessary to fight effectively against problems that will be encountered.

The most important in my opinion, the most crucial problem that awaits Turkey is the question of whether it will be able to live up to the expectations of the Turkish Cypriot community after the latter parts ways with the Greek Cypriots.

With the military intervention in 1974, Turkey established a secure region for the Turkish Cypriot community and embarked on an endeavour to create a `state' out of `nothing'.

The result after 24 years is, sadly, a wreck.

Turkey has carried all the diseases of its bureaucracy to this tiny island and created a dysfunctional and sluggish mechanism.

Cyprus should have become a free trade zone, it should have been turned into a heaven of trade and tourism, and the Turkish Cypriot community should have become rich like the Greek Cypriots.

We know the difficulties.

Embargoes, restrictions, international pressure, massive aid to the Greek Cypriots, and so forth.

Still, Turkey failed to bring prosperity to a community numbering less than 200,000 on a tiny piece of land. It has created a sluggish and, compared to the Greek Cypriots, impoverished structure.

Today, the TRNC is a unproductive country, home to an army of retirees largely dependent on the State and with a steadily growing unemployment that could be eliminated with just a few investments.

Today Cyprus faces a great peril.

The stagnation in the Turkish Cypriot sector even as the Greek Cypriots grow wealthier is slowly driving Turkish Cypriots away from the island. Young people migrate to Turkey or, if they find the opportunity, move to Europe after they graduate from university and never return to their homeland.

In the meantime, growing numbers of Turks from Turkey migrate to the island because they think opportunities there are better than in Turkey.

According to figures provided by TRNC Prime Minister Dervis Eroglu, one- third of the 160,000 people who live in northern Cyprus are from Turkey. This figure includes the 30,000 Turkish workers who settled in Cyprus after they arrived in the aftermath of the military operation as well as individuals who came as tourists and stayed.

This proportion is growing steadily.

Further increases in this migration will be inevitable after a mutually agreed solution becomes impossible and the break with the Greek Cypriots becomes final in the coming years.

There will come a day when native Turkish Cypriots will become a rarity and the island will be filled with Turks from Turkey.

Today, the Greek Cypriot sector is very alluring with a per capita income of $15,000 per year and its glittering lights. Its allure will grow stronger in the 2000s. At some point we will not be able to stop people from crossing over to the Greek Cypriot side `to get rich' no matter what barriers we erect. This is the real danger.

If Turkey does not abandon the outmoded and hardheaded approaches it has implemented in the TRNC so far and fails to adopt a new policy that fits today's conditions, it can neither control the oil and water routes in the Mediterranean nor retain the Turkish Cypriots.

If, in our quest to protect our strategic interests, we create a dilapidated northern Cyprus and a Turkish Cypriot community that seeks salvation from unemployment in the Greek Cypriot sector, we would betray both ourselves and the Turkish Cypriots.

The only way to avoid such a situation is to revitalize the TRNC.

In other words, Turkey is obligated to build a TRNC that rewards those who work and not the retirees, has a complete infrastructure, and removes all trade, financial, and investment barriers between itself and Turkey.

It is essential to replace the system that allows Turkish investors to come to Cyprus with their money and workers and return with their money and workers without allowing the Turkish Cypriots to participate, with one that provides opportunities for Cypriots.

Turkey's stance on Cyprus is correct.

Despite the potential for many ups and downs, I do not see any solution in Cyprus other than the two-state formula.

Most importantly, though Turkey must plan to abandon its old policies and reformulate its approach to the TRNC. If that is not done the 2000s will be a time of agony for us."

From the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office (PIO) Server at http://www.pio.gov.cy/

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